For the sake of our West Indian colonies, and the interests involved in them, we now pay a considerably higher price for sugar, than we should pay if the trade was open indiscriminately, at a moderate duty, with the whole world. Both the consumer and the revenue are losers by the present scale of duties. The result of this system of self-sacrifice, is (as M. Say has remarked,*) that no countries in Europe buy their sugar at so high a price as those which have sugar colonies! Those countries (as Italy) which have none, obtain their sugar at the lowest cost. Of the forced consumption of articles of inferior quality, the timber of Canada and the wines of the Cape afford instances. We have imported, and still import, large quantities of inferior deal from Canada, simply because Canada is our colony. Permanent national detriment has resulted from this discrimination of duties. The enormous number of buildings and public works which have been constructed in London, and the manufacturing and populous districts of the country, since the peace, have been deteriorated in value by the use of an inferior quality of timber, peculiarly liable to dry-rot. So, in consequence of the lower rate of duty, England annually imports more than 400,000 gallons of the extremely bad wine which is made at the Cape, and which is used chiefly as a menstruum for the wine manufacturer. Little of it appears to be sold avowedly as Cape wine; it is chiefly passed off in an adulterated form, as Spanish or Portuguese.

It may however be said, that although a country would lose by imposing a discrimination on imports from different foreign countries, (for example, England, by admitting the wines of Portugal at a lower duty than those of Spain and France ;)—yet it is the interest of a nation possessing colonies, to give a preference to their imports, not on their account, but in order to secure its own commercial independence. It may be compelled to make war against an independent state, with which it had previously maintained commercial relations; but (unless it should rebel) it can never be at war with its own colony. Such (as we have already seen) was the view with which the discriminating duties on Canada timber were established, (avowedly intended to be only temporary ;) and such, too, was the origin of the privilege given to Cape wine. Probably, too, the proposition of Sir Henry Parnell in 1813, to admit North American corn without duty, had a similar foundation; for the dread of commercial dependence was then at its height. That the theory of commercial independence, which has an attractive and patriotic look, should

* Cours d'Economie Politique, tom. iii. p. 440.

have gained credit during the violent disturbance of commerce produced by the wars of Napoleon-that people should have looked out for some apparently immovable spot in the midst of the earthquake caused by his reckless ambition-was not unnatural; but it was a singular delusion which led our government to suppose that this security was to be found in discriminating duties. If the timber-trade with the Baltic was interrupted by the closing of the Sound, Canada timber would spontaneously, without the aid of duties, be brought into our market. So, if all intercourse with the Continent was to be permanently broken off, (a supposition extravagantly improbable,) a natural demand for the Cape wines would be created in England.

The theory of commercial independence seems to us fitted only for an Utopian state of things; for a golden age of the world, when every country shall, of its own accord, produce all things. So strong are the motives to commercial interchange, and so steady the common interest in its maintenance, that no large nation has, so far as we are aware, been unable, even in time or war, to carry on foreign trade. Athens, indeed, near the time of the Peloponnesian war, was able, out of enmity to the petty neighbouring state of Megara-about as large as an English parish, or a French commune,-to cut off its supplies, and to threaten it with starvation.* But it would be utterly impossible, even for a first-rate naval power, to blockade all the ports of a large nation, and intercept all its land communications. A thousand interests would be at work to defeat the prohibition. The failure of Napoleon's Continental System-which was undermined from within and without, by licenses, by smuggling, by corruption, by connivance, by fraud-is a sufficient proof that the most despotic power, and the most unscrupulous use of it, are not able to close the avenues of foreign commerce. However, even if it were possible for a powerful country, in time of war, to interrupt the foreign trade of its enemy, it does not follow that commercial independence, based on a trade with distant colonies, would be of any value. Let us, for example, suppose the most unfavourable state of things with respect to the foreign trade of England; viz. a war with France and the United States at the same time. If, during these hostilities, England could maintain her maritime ascendency, she could secure the continuance of her foreign trade, either direct or in

* See Aristoph. Acharn., 535. The Megarians complained, in the Congress at Sparta, that they had been excluded, not only from the market of Athens, but also from the harbours in the subject islands and territories. Thucyd, i. 67.

direct. The belligerent states would not be able to interrupt her commercial intercourse with other powers; nor, indeed, either directly or indirectly, with their own subjects. On the other hand, if England could not maintain her maritime preeminence, and keep the seas open to her vessels, she would be unable to carry on her trade with her remote possessions, such as Canada, the West Indies, the Cape, Australia, and Hindostan. A large country, such as France, or an extensive confederacy of contiguous states, as Germany, may, to a certain extent, render itself independent of foreign trade, by the variety of its native products, and the power of preserving its internal communications during war. But what is the worth of that commercial independence which assumes the power of maintaining, in time of war, an unbroken intercourse with the most distant regions of the globe? Of what avail is it, that we are exempt from the bondage of European timber and wine, if we are to fetch the one from Canada, and the other from the Cape? The panacea for the evils of commercial slavery turns out, on examination, to be no remedy at all, but rather an aggravation of the calamity.

But while we are attempting, by a system of discriminating duties, to provide against the interruption of commerce consequent upon war, do we not forget, that by this very system we are sowing the seeds of hostilities, and multiplying the chances of the occurrence of the evil which we seek to counteract? By establishing differential duties in favour of our colonies, we exclude from our ports the produce of foreign countries, or admit it on less favourable terms. Regulations of this sort, tending to the discouragement of the industry and trade of foreign countries, are naturally considered by them as unjust and unfriendly. Such distinctions, therefore, engender feelings towards us of no amicable nature, and must rank among the causes which lead to war. At all events, a system of exclusion and discrimination, directed against foreign countries, cannot fail to prevent the formation of that community of interest and feeling, which naturally springs from unfettered commercial intercourse, conducted upon equal terms.

It will, however, be said, that even if it should be apparent that colonial protection is detrimental to the mother country, yet it ought to be maintained for the sake of the colony. The colony, it will be argued, is an integral part of the empire; it is a possession of the British crown; its inhabitants are our fellowsubjects; and it is our duty, not less than our policy, to show favour to its interests, and to strengthen its allegiance, by according preferences to its trade. The parental relation of the

Is it wise for you to set up (?) this line of distinction be

mother country to the colony, furnishes, according to this view, a ground why the more powerful state should make sacrifices of a commercial nature, for promoting the interests of the dependent community. This reasoning, however, obviously proceeds in a vicious circle, and returns upon itself. It is first proved, that the possession of colonies is advantageous to a country on account of the encouragement and extension which they give to its trade. The expenses of civil government, and of military and naval protection, and the increased chances of war, are admitted to be evils; but it is said that a compensation for them is found in the commercial facilities which the colony affords to the parent state. When, however, it is objected, that the mother country is a loser in regard to its trade, and that it sacrifices its commercial interests to the colony; then it is answered, that in order to preserve the allegiance of a valuable colony, and to cultivate the affections of our colonial subjects, we must submit to disadvantages by which their trade and industry are benefited. This species of logic reminds us of the reasoning which is sometimes used to justify the common practice of throwing good money after bad,' A person is advised to engage in some speculation on the ground that it will yield him a large profit. He makes the attemptinvests his money in buildings and machinery, and, instead of gaining, finds a large deficit. His impulse is to sell all his stock at the best price he can obtain, to escape from the enterprise as speedily as possible, and thus to avoid all additional loss. But his advisers represent to him the value of his fixed capital, and the large sacrifices which he has made in order to engage in the undertaking; and they therefore urge him to raise more money in order to make a further attempt. He builds in order to gain; but when the enterprise has been attended with loss, he proceeds. to spend more money upon an unpromising concern, because he has built expensive works. So we obtain colonies for the sake of their trade; and then make sacrifices in colonial trade in order to retain our colonies.

If the preceding views are correct, it follows that a system of colonial protection, by means of discriminating duties and concealed bounties, is unsound and impolitic; and that the notion of a colonial custom's union is thoroughly impracticable.

Supposing protection to be afforded with respect to an article of colonial produce, not grown in the mother country, (for example, sugar or coffee ;) then, as we have shown, the mother

tween yourselves and your fellow-countrymen in Canada?' Lord Stanley, Speech on Canada Corn-law, 19th May 1843, (69 Hansard, p. 598.)

country is almost necessarily a loser. No real reciprocity exists, even if the system of excluding foreign produce is adopted on both sides; for one market is larger than the other. The advantages which the monopoly of the market of the mother country offers to the colony, are far greater than those which the monopoly of the colonial market offers to the mother country. At present, however, even this semblance of reciprocity does not exist, so far as this country is concerned; for England no longer limits her colonies to her own produce. She has abandoned her restrictions on the colonies, though she upholds the privileges to colonial goods by which she suffers. If there is no reciprocity, neither is there any community of interests. Wherever the article is exclusively of colonial growth, the colony and the mother country have avowedly separate interests. The colony sells and the mother country buys. It is the interest of the mother country to buy in the cheapest market, but she is excluded from the cheapest market by her own discriminating duties, and confined to the produce of her own colony.

If the article is produced both in the mother country and the colony, and protecting duties common to the produce of both countries are imposed, (as in the case of Canada corn,) then the protection rests on a different ground. An attempt is made to bring the producers of both countries within the same circle of protection, and to consider them, for this purpose, as members of one community. It is, to a certain extent, an endeavour to create a colonial Zollverein. If, however, any body will consider the principles of the German Zollverein, and apply them consistently to our Colonial Empire, he will speedily discover the dissimilarity of the cases, and the impossibility of success; he will, we think, soon convince himself that it is necessary to regard the colonies as separate, though not independent communities, for customhouse purposes; and to abandon the idea of bringing them within a system of import duties common to themselves and the mother country. For fiscal purposes, the colonies ought to be as foreign countries, with which a perfectly free trade prevails. Each colony has its own tariff, and raises its own revenue of customs, which it applies to the exigencies of its own service. The mother country can watch over these various tariffs; it can prevent the exclusion of its own commodities by prohibitions and discriminating duties, and can secure an uninterrupted free-trade with its colonies. On the other hand, it ought to permit its colonies to trade freely with all the world, and to open its own ports at fair revenue duties to all colonial products; but without giving them an undue preference, detrimental to its own interests, by discriminating duties.

If the attempt to establish a colonial customs' union were made