mediately with other bar associations in the United States, the action of the Bar Association of the State of New York communicated to them, and that such associations and other organizations, societies and individuals be invited to join in said memorial to the president, in order that action by the government of the United States be secured at as early a date as seems practicable and consonant with such an enterprise and the dignity of the undertaking. "Twelfth. That correspondence be also entered into with like legal bodies in Great Britain, its colonies and other countries believed to be interested in such a movement, having for its purpose the encouragement of every effort among civilized nations to compass peace and strengthen the bonds of brotherly love among nations. "In presenting this plan we have not overlooked the fact that there are many obstacles to be overcome before a tribunal that may be entitled to rank as an international court can become a reality. We are not unconscious of the fact, also, that many good citizens of our country, whose opinions are worthy of most careful consideration, maintain that a court of the character outlined in these recommendations is Utopian and impossible. Here is a broad field for argument, but we have endeavored to keep out of it as far as possible. We do believe some plan, be it the one we now present, one at all similar to it, or one entirely remote from it, is possible, and will eventually be a consummation among the civilized nations of the globe, and that there is nothing more Utopian or impossible in such a dream than has appeared in many other dreams looking to a higher civilization among the children of men." ment." Secretary Olney appropriately terms this "imitation" arbitration. Lord Salisbury further proposes that a court of appeal be constituted, of three judges from the Supreme Court of the United States, and three judges from the same court of Great Britain, to review decisions of the arbitration court to which either contestant protested. This is another of the several loopholes which the great prime minister has carefully preserved for the British lion to jump through when to his advantage. Briefly, the international court of arbitration should be founded in a spirit of fairness, and com| posed of a sufficient number of the powers to prevent the sentiments of the judges from controlling their decisions and to enforce the decrees, which should be final. II. REASONS FOR ITS ADOPTION. Love and justice equally commend the establishment of a court of international arbitration where many of the disputes hereafter arising among the civilized nations of the earth may be settled in peace. There are two sources from which will come opposition: First, a numerous and diverse people will have to be taught and convinced. The incredulous, the pessimistic, the selfish and the indisposed will be encountered strong in numbers. The diverse interests of the several constituent powers will have to be to some extent reconciled and the disadvantages of different languages and dialects overcome by translation and interpretation. Chiefly through the free newspapers must detailed knowledge of the proposed court be disseminated among the civilized countries of the world so that the mass of the people, the laymen, who pay the taxes and bear all the burdens but receive none of the rewards of war, will clamor for its establishment. Generally those in office and the holders of delegated authority who draw rich sustenance Very recently there was made public the late official correspondence between Secretary Olney and Lord Salisbury relative to the establishment of a court of arbitration for the adjustment of differences arising between the United States and Great Britain. Unlike most international business, the official papers were made public while the negotiations are still pending, for the reasons that general ency discussion is invited and that every meritorious suggestion will receive consideration. As predicted by the above-mentioned sub-committee, the establishment of such a court between only two nations, as the United States and Great Britain, would be difficult, and its judgments would be unavoidably influenced by the natural love of native land which the judges would feel. At the very outset Lord Salisbury suggests a provision for the treaty establishing the court which would practically defeat its supposed purpose. Thus, section 5 reads: " Any difference which, in the judgment of either power, materially affects its honor or the integrity of its territory shall not be referred to arbitration under this treaty, except by special agree from the existing régimes will strenuously oppose the reform. With impious persistthey will to cling those precedents which so greatly favor them. This suggests the second source of opposition, which is monarchy. It is well understood that a monarchy usually consists of a supreme ruler at the head of a well-organized system of power distributed among carefully selected loyal despots who, together with their numerous vassals and adherents, hold the working people in a state of practical bondage. Fortunately for the mass of the people and for the prospective establishment of an international court of arbitration the European monarchies have been, within recent generations, slowly becoming more tolerable as the education of the common people and the growth of the spirit of liberty progressed. Now in most of the powers of Europe the people are in effect the rulers, and titles are scarcely more than nominal. It, therefore, seems proper to conclude that while only a generation or so ago the establishment of a court of international arbitration would have been impossible, it is now feasible. The object of this court is to abolish war and the necessity of continuous preparation for war. Consider this benign purpose! The aim of war is destruction, not only of armies and navies, but of commerce, material resources and costly improvements. From time immemorial the brightest minds, the most noble spirits, the veritable plumed knights of the land, have been its victims. Individual sorrow and proverty with enormous public debts are its only real rewards. The late American civil war cost $4,000,000,000, and hung crape on the doors of half a million homes. the accumulation of the munitions of war by each other? When the evils resulting from the unregulated bearing of arms by individuals are compared with those flowing from unrestricted national armsbearing, the wonder is that the latter wrong was not corrected first. Finally, it may be accepted that the decrees of such a court as the one above outlined would be respected and obeyed. In the first place, the foreign policy of nations is generally honorable. However unjust and cruel they may be to helpless provinces and colonies when unrestricted by treaties and untrammeled by duties of reciprocity, when any sort of an obligation rests upon one power to another, it is generally regarded. No country can afford to become an in ternational outcast. its decrees it would be easy for the other eight to compel obedience. The mere ability to enforce the decrees would be enough to insure obedience to them. It is estimated that one-half the amounts of the If, however, some one of the nine powers repredebts of the principal powers of the world is the di-sented in the proposed court should refuse to obey rect result and cost of war. A glance at the figures stating the public debts of several countries is appalling, for example, that of France amounts to more than $116 per capita, that of Great Britain is $88 per capita, and that of Italy, $76 per capita. It is also estimated that the world is insolvent; that it is a mathematical impossibility for it to ever pay its debts. Yet this era of civilization and peace is most extravagant and elaborate in its preparations for war. New arts, additional appropriations, splendid equipments, modern barracks and stronger fortresses are the order of the day. In France, Germany, Russia Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and the United States are now 2,853,000 men, idly standing in arms, or at total annual cost of $790,663,000, or about 40 per cent of the total annual expenditure of those governments. Think of how much bread this would buy for the poor! I predict that such a court would soon attain a pre-eminent position in international affairs and that to it a majority of the nations of the world would resort for justice and an inexpensive and peaceable settlement of their disputes. Having jurisdiction as a matter of law over the differences arising between all the powers having representatives on its bench, its jurisdiction could be made to include all other countries who might come into it by special consent. With the establishment of this court will be accomplished the supreme benefaction to mankind, and finally secured “ peace on earth and good will to all men." Notes of American Decisions. BANKS APPROPRIATION OF DEPOSIT TO PAYMENT OF NOTE.—The duty which a bank holding a note owes to an indorser thereon, to appropriate a deposit in the bank to payment of the note, exists only where the maker of the note, at its maturity, has a deposit sufficient to pay it, and not previously appropriated to any other purpose, and does not apply to a deposit made after the maturity of the note, or to a deposit by a prior indorser, though he be in fact the principal debtor, and the maker be an accommodation maker. (First Nat. Bank of Lock Haven v. Peltz [Penn.], 35 Atl. Rep. 218.) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INSOLVENCY-DISCHARGE. -A creditor of an insolvent debtor, whose claim accrued before the enactment of the insolvency law under which such debtor is seeking discharge from his debts, may prove his claim and receive his divi dends without waiving his right to insist that the discharge feature of such statute is, as to his claim, a law impairing the obligation of his contract in so far it assumes to discharge his claim without full payment. That such feature of an insolvency law is unconstitutional as to creditors whose claims existed at the time the law was enacted, is well settled. (Elton v. O'Connor [N. Dak.], 68 N. W. Rep. 84.) CORPORATION-SERVICES OF PROCESS. -A New York corporation, engaged in the collection and distribution of news, and which has no officers or place of business in Indiana, cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court within the latter State by service of process either upon a person who occasionally forwards news to it, at so much a word, having no other connection with the corporation, or upon the general manager in Indiana of a telegraph company, from which the corporation rents wires for the transmission of news; neither of such persons being a general or special agent of the corporation, within the Indiana statute. (1 Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 318; Rev. St. 1881, § 316; Evansville Courier Co. v. United Press [U. S. C. C. Ind. ], 74 Fed. Rep. 918). DEED-COVENANT-RESTRICTON. Where a tract of land is laid out into lots and blocks by the owner for sale in accordance with a general scheme, by which restrictions as to building are imposed on each purchaser, for the benefit of all the land, such restrictions being embodied in the conveyances, the right of one lot owner to enforce the covenant against another is not a legal, but a purely equitable, one; and, being such, the restriction will only be enforced where it would be equitable in the particular case. (Trout v. Lucas [N. J.], 35 Atl. Rep. 153). ALIMONY DIVORCE LIEN. Equity will protect the lien of a wife, adjudged in divorce proceedings, on land held by the husband under contract of purchase, to secure the payment of alimony for the maintenance of a minor child who was placed in the custody of the wife, as against an assignee of the contract of purchase, taking with knowledge of the wife's claim, and with intent to defraud her. (Glick v. Glick [Mich.], 68 N. W. Rep. 153.) EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT LIEN. An agreement entitling the holder thereof to receive a certain number of bonds of a railway company at a future date, by the terms of which agreement no particular bonds are to be transferred to such holder or placed under his control until said date, and by which the other party to the agreement is permitted to deliver any bonds of the railway company purchased in the market or otherwise, or to discharge all obligations by a payment in cash, does not effect an equitable assignment of the bonds or give an equitable lien thereon to the holder of such agreement. (Badgerow v. Manhattan Trust Co. [U. S. C. C. N. Y.], 74 Fed. Rep. 925.) EVIDENCE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-INTERNAL REVENUE COLLECTOR. An internal revenue collector is not justified in refusing to produce, in obedience to a subpoena duces terum issued by a State court, the application or return made by a person who desires to pay the tax imposed by the statutes of the United States upon persons engaging in the retail liquor business either by the nature of such documents or by alleged instructions from the commissioner of internal revenue not to produce such papers for use in evidence in the State courts. (In re Hirsch [U. S. C. C. Conn.], 74 Fed. Rep. 928.) New Books and New Editions. HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, by William B. Hale, LL.B. This is an abridgement in one volume of the well-known two volume work on Torts by Mr. Jaggard. A number of important changes have been introduced by the author, notably in the discussions of legal rights and wrongs and of damages, which, with the subject of negligence and several kindred subjects, have been rewritten. As this work is one of the Hornbook Series, the leading principles of the law are printed in bold faced type, so that they are called to the attention of the reader more clearly. It is an admirable elementary treaties on Torts. Published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. Price, $3.75 net. AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, Second Digest, by W. S. Church. This is a complete digest of volumes 25 to 48 inclusive, of the American State Reports, covering the volumes published in the last four years. It contains some 1296 pages, and is conveniently arranged for rapid work, being supplied with complete cross references. Published by the Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, Cal. $4.00 net. Price, The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, OCTOBER 10, 1896. Current Topics. THE question has arisen as to whether the fourteenth amendment was ever adopted. Judge Seymour D. Thompson, in a recent address, has exploited the facts which have not been publicly discussed previously to any extent. It seems, though our Federal Constitution provides that any amendment must be adopted by the votes of the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, concurring at the same time, that before a quorum of the requisite number of States has been made the legislature of Ohio withdrew its ratification, that nevertheless Mr. Seward, the secretary of state, issued his proclamation declaring the amendment ratified, and held that the State could not withdraw its formal act of ratification. Hon. Edward I. Renick, of the department of state has sent the following touching on this subject, compiled by Mr. Hamilton from the records on file in the office : do hereby certify that if the resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey ratifying the aforesaid amendment are to be deemed as remaining of full force and effect, notwithstanding the subsequent resolutions of the legislatures of those States which purport to withdraw the consent of said States from such ratification, then the aforesaid amendment has been ratified in the manner hereinbefore mentioned and so has become valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution of the United States." Congress by concurrent resolution decided that the legislatures of the several States named, including Ohio and New VOL. 54 No. 15. Jersey, had ratified the fourteenth amendment, and therefore declared it to be a part of the Constitution, directing the secretary of state to promulgate it as such. This was done July 28, 1868. Some claim that the amendment in question has no better foundation than a proclamation by the secretary of state and a joint resolution by congress, which in effect determined a most important question of law. Again it has been hinted that a legislative act can be performed but once, and that it had in addition gone out of their control. We, however, know that the almost universal practice of our legislative bodies is to recall their measures from the governor, though it has been considered in this State at least to be without authority of law and has been generally regarded as a very questionable practice. The Massachusetts Veteran Preference Act passed by the last legislature has been declared constitutional by the justices of the Supreme Court who acted in compliance with an order adopted by the executive council to report to the governor. The court divides on the question and the majority report is signed by Justices Field, Holmes, Knowlton and Morton, and is: "The principal questions are, whether sections 2, 3 and 6 of chapter 517 of the acts of 1862 are within the constitutional power of the general court. Sections 2 and 3 are substantially re-enactments of pre-existing statutes which were expressly repealed by section 8. See Statutes 1887, chapter 437; Statutes 1889, chapter 473; Statutes 1895, chapter 501. The authority given in the general court by the Constitution to pass statutes on the subject has been often cited, and is found in part 2, chapter 1, article 4 of the Constitution. Section 2 of the Statute of 1896 authorized veterans to apply for the examination under civil service statutes and rules, and provides that, if such veterans pass the examination, they shall be preferred in appointment to all male persons not veterans. The effect of the section is that the veterans must first be found qualified by an examination in accordance with the civil service statutes and rules to perform the duties of the office or the employment which they seek, and, if they are found so qualified, they are to be preferred to appointment to other persons, to it. If the section means that the civil except women. "The general court may have been of the opinion that a person that had served in the army or navy of the United States in the time of the war of the rebellion, and had been honorably discharged therefrom, or who was a citizen of Massachusetts, and had been distinguished by valiant and heroic conduct in the army or navy, and had received a medal of honor from the president of the United States, is a person who has shown such qualities of character that it is for the interest of the commonwealth to appoint him to certain offices or employment in preference to other male persons, if he is found otherwise qualified to perform the duties. The general court may have so thought on the ground either that such a person should be likely to possess courage, constancy, habits of obedience and fidelity, which are valuable qualifications for any public office or employment, or that the recognition of the service of the veterans would encourage that love of country and devotion to the welfare of the State which it concerns the commonweaith to foster. Of the wisdom of such legislation we are not made the judges. The section does not give an absolute preference to veterans without regard to their qualifications, and the constitutionality of similar legislation was not considered in the recent decision of the court of which we are the justices. (See Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14.) "Section 3 of the Statute of 1896 gives a discretion to the appointing power to appoint veterans to serve in the offices and employments without an examination, if in its opinion the needs of the public service require this to done. The effect of this section is to permit veterans to be appointed to office or employment in the old way, if it seems best to the power having the right of appointment. The section does not necessarily exclude the appointment of other persons if the appointing power is of the opinion that the appointment should be made under the civil service statutes and rules. We cannot say that this section is an enactment beyond the power of the general service commissioners shall establish rules to secure the employment of veterans in the labor service of the commonwealth and of the cities and towns in preference to all other persons except women, which rules shall secure the employment of veterans, whether they are or are not qualified, we should have great difficulty in sustaining it as a constituThis section does not relate tional enactment. * * * to public offices, and, without suggesting that any distinction can be made between public offices and public employments in the matter we are considering, the section was passed under the authority given to the general court to make all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws. But if the section means that the civil service commissioners shall establish secure the employment of veterans, * * * in preference to all other persons except women, if the veterans are found competent to perform the labor we think the enactment is within the general power of the general court. The section should be so construed as to be within the constitutional power of the rules to general court if it reasonably can be. Without unequivocal language to that effect we should hesitate to impute to the general court citated to labor the right to be employed and an intention to give to persons entirely incapato be paid in the labor service of the commonwealth as if they performed the labor. Unless then the appointing officers call for the names of veterans for labor service whose qualifications have not been ascertained by the commissioners in any manner, we think that the commissioners may provide by rules for determining the qualifications of the veterans. Construing the sixth section in this way we are of the opinion that it is an enactment within the constitutional power of the general court. Justice Holmes concurs in this construction of the section, but is not prepared to say that it is unconstitutional on a different construction." In the opinion of the dissenting justices, Allen, Lathrop and Barker, there is no difference in the constitutional principles which govern the selection of persons for public office or for public employment, and the reasons given in Brown v. Russell for holding sections "The constitutionality of section 6 de- 2 and 6 unconstitutional as to public offices pends, we think, on the meaning to be given | apply to public employments as well. In both court. |