work. It was held that there was no evi-
dence that the fever was contracted at a
particular time and place, and, therefore,
that it was not shown that the fever was
due to an accident.

The event must be unforeseen by whom
The event to constitute an accident must
be one that is unforeseen by the person in-
jured by its occurrence. The standard tak-
en is not the intelligence or foresight of the
average man. Indeed, it has been declared
that an occurrence is unexpected if it is not
expected by the man who suffers by it,
even though every man of common sense
who knew the circumstances would think it
certain to happen.8

The fact that the result of an extraor-
dinary exertion by a man of impaired
physique would have been expected or con-
templated as a certainty by a physician, if
he had diagnosed the case, is nothing to the
purpose. It was also said in the case last
cited, that a thing or event is unexpected
when a sensible man, knowing the nature
of the work at which he is engaged, would
not expect its occurrence.

However, it has been held in a case aris-
ing under an accident insurance policy, that
a result ordinarily and naturally flowing
from the conduct of a person cannot be
said to be accidental, even where he may
not have foreseen the consequences."

Event may be intentional on the part of
another-An event may constitute an acci-
dent although the person causing it did so
intentionally. There is a double aspect in
such cases. From the view point of the per-
son causing the event, there is no accident;
but from the view point of the person in-
jured the happening may be unexpected and
one which he could not forsee. In other
words, an accident.

Thus, an engineer was injured while
driving the engine of an express train by a

(8) Per Lord Macnaghten in Clover, Etc., Co.
v. Hughes, 102 L. T. Rep. 340, 343, 26 T. L. Rep.
359, 1910 A. C. 242, 3 Butterworth's W. C. Cas.
275.

(9) Dovier v. Fidelity, Etc., Co., 46 Fed. 446,
449, 13 L. R. A. 114.

stone thrown by a boy from a bridge under
which the train was passing at the time.
The stone broke the glass in the engine cab,
a piece of which struck the engineer on the
eye, inflicting injuries which eventually
caused his death. It was held by the Court
of Appeal in England, that the injury was
due to an accident; that the circumstance
of the throwing of the stone being a wilful
act on the part of the boy was immaterial.1o

Likewise, in a case in which it appeared
that a cashier, who was employed by a col-
liery company and whose duties required
him to carry large sums of money, was
murdered and robbed while on his way from
the office of the mine to pay off the em-
ployes, it was contended that the man's
widow was not entitled to compensation
because his death was not due to an acci-
dent; that it was an intentional felonious
act, and that the word "accident" negatives
the idea of intention. The court held that
it made no difference whether the shot that
killed the man was intentional or not, of
whether it was intended for him or for
someone else, that as far as the cashier was
concerned it was an accident."

Cause or result that is unforeseen-With-
in the meaning of the Workmen's Compen-
sation statutes, an injury is caused by acci-
dent when the result produced is unintend
ed and unforeseen.

When a man lifts a heavy weight, he in-
tends to do exactly what he does do; nev-
ertheless if he strains a muscle, or ruptures
a blood vessel, the injury is due to an acci-
dent. A workman, having been informed
that a fellow workman had been overcome
by gas, attempted a rescue, although he
knew of the presence of the gas in danger-
ous quantity. In the attempt both men
were suffocated. It was held that the work-
man's death was due to an accident.12

(10) Challis v. London, Etc., R. Co., 93 L. T.
Rep. 330, 1905 2 K. B. 154, 21 T. L. Rep. 486,
74 L. J. K. B. 569, 53 Wkly. Rep. 613, 7 W. C.
Cas. 23.

(11) Nisbet v. Rayne, 103 L. T. Rep. 178, 26
T. L. Rep. 632. 1910, 2 K. B. 689, 3 Butterworth's
W. C. Cas. 507.

(12) London, etc., Shipping Co. v. Brown, 7

A workman, who severely strained his
back in replacing a derailed coal truck on
the track, was held to have been injured by
accident.13

Physical condition of injured person a
contributing cause-The fact that the phy-
sical condition of the injured person is a
contributing cause of the event, does not
prevent its being an accident.1

14

terms because the injury inflicted by the
accident sets up a condition which medical
men describe as a disease. For instance,
suppose some hard substance-a tack, nail,
or piece of wire-is unintentionally allowed
to penetrate the skin and causes tetanus.
Tetanus is a disease; nevertheless the in-
jury was brought about by accident.

Another anthrax case was that of Higgins
v. Campbell,16 in which the disease was con-
tracted through a pimple on the workman's
neck. In that case it was said by the Mas-
ter of the Rolls (Collins): "If a workman
dies of or is injured by a disease which he
himself has brought with him into his work,

Contraction of disease as an accident-
Whether or not the contraction of a dis-
ease constitutes an accident depends upon
the nature of the disease. It must be one
the contraction of which can be definitely
fixed in point of time as an event. This
would seem not to include idiopathic dis-
eases. On the other hand, a disease con-
tracted as by infection from the lodgment
of bacilli comes well within the definition
of an accident, and it has been so held. A
workman was employed to open and sort
bales of Persian wool. While so engaged
his eye became infected with anthrax, which
necessitated an operation, from which he
died. The disease was caused by a bacillus
alighting on his eye. In this instance it
could be told definitely the day on which
the injury occurred, and with considerable
certainty the manner in which it occurred,
and it was held to be due to an accident.15

In such cases as this we must not allow
curselves to become confused by medical

Sc. Sess. Cas. (5th series) 488, 42 Sc. L. Rep. 357,
12 Sc. L. T. 694, 760.

(13) Stewart V. Wilsons, Etc., Coal Co., 5
Sc. Sess. Cas. (5th series) 120.

(14) Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, 99 L.
T. Rep. 595, 1908 A. C. 437. 24 T. L. Rep. 881,
52 Sol. Jo. 713, 42 Ir. L. T. 213, 1. Butterworth's
W. C. Cas. 232.

(15) Brintons v. Turvey, 92 L. T. Rep. 578,
1905 A. C. 230, 21 T. L. Rep. 444. 74 L. J. K. B.
474, 53 Wkly. Rep. 641, 7 W. C. Cas. 1.

dent?" But that is very different from a
case where a workman accidentally catches
an infection in the course of his employ-
ment. The disease here was caused by the
attack or incursion of some bacillus or germ.
Though the attack was infinitesimal in force
and invisible to the naked eye, yet it was
physically a blow, the incursion of a physi-
cal force, which seems to come well with-
in the words used by Lord Macnaghten in
describing the sense in which he thinks the
word 'accident' is used in this act."

Contraction of a cold or chill—The con-
traction of a cold or chill may amount to an
accident, depending upon the circumstances
of the instant case. While employed in
clearing a millrace, a workman caught a
sudden chill, caused by immersion in the
water. Inflammation of the kidneys super-
vened, and he died several days later. The
evidence showed that the attack could only
have been brought on by exposure to cold

water. It was held that the death was due
to an accident.17

Sunstroke or heatstroke-Sunstroke or
heatstroke may constitute an accident with-
in the meaning of the Workmen's Com-

(16) 89 L. T. Rep. 660, 1904 1 K. B. 328, 20 T.
L. Rep. 129, 73 L. J. K. B. 158, 52 Wkly. Rep. 195,
68 J. P. 193, 6 W. C. Cas. 1.

(17) Sheerin v. Clayton & Co., 1910 Ir. Rep.
105, 44 Ir. L. T. 52, 3 Butterworth's W. C. Cas.
583.

pensation laws. Although it has been held
in suits on accident insurance policies in this
country, and in one such case in England,
that sunstroke is not an accident, the better
opinion is that it is.

A workman of poor physique was em-
ployed in the stoke hold of a vessel. The
conditions there were normal, but, as usual,
the place was very warm. The man suf-
fered a heat stroke which resulted in his
death. It was held that his death was due
to an accident.18

In an earlier English case arising under
an insurance policy, it was held that a sun-
stroke received by the master of a vessel
then sailing in the tropics, to which he did
not knowingly and without adequate motive
expose himself, was not an accident.19

Sunstroke contracted by a supervising ar-
chitect in the course of his ordinary duties
was held, in a case in this country, not to be
an injury by accidental means. It was said
that it was a result flowing ordinarily and
naturally from the conduct of the person,
although he may not have foreseen the con-
sequences, 20

If

This, however, is no argument, because
the same can be said of any accident.
one had a perfect knowledge of all the con-
ditions connected with an event, the event
and its results would appear to him to be
perfectly ordinary and natural.

Shock or fright-The fact of an accident
occurring to a person is usually associated
in mind with some physical injury that can
be seen and appreciated by others. How-
ever, the meaning of the word is not so re-
stricted, but includes an event that does
hurt only to the nervous system.

A railway company maintained a system
of insurance, insuring its employes "against
all accidents, however caused, occurring to

(18) Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, 99
L. T. Rep. 595, 1908 A. C. 437, 24 T. L. Rep. 881,
52 Sol. Jo 713.

(19) Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assur.
Co., 3 E. & E. 478.

(20) Dozier v. Fidelity, Etc., Co., 46 Fed. 446,
13 L. R. A. 114.

the insured in the fair and ordinary dis-
charge of his duty." An employe, a signal-
man, saw a train approaching and noticed
something wrong with one of the coaches.
He became much alarmed, and waived his
flag frantically. The engineer saw the sig-
nal and stopped the train, thereby averting
an imminent disaster. The signalman was
so horrified that the shock to his nerves
incapacitated him for work for several
months. It was held that he had sustained
an accident within the terms of the insur-
ance.21

Frost-bite-It has not been definitely'
decided under any Workmen's Compensa-
tion act whether frost-bite is injury by ac-
cident. In Warner v. Couchman it was
admitted for the sake of argument that it
did amount to an accident in that case, but
Cozens-Hardy, M. R., said that he felt con-
siderable doubt whether there was an ac-
cident.

There seems no room for doubt that
frost-bite can occur under circumstances
amounting to an accident. An unintended
over-exposure of some part of the person
to cold, whereby it becomes frosted or froz-
en, can just as well constitute an accident
as an unintended over-exposure to heat
whereby one receives a heatstroke.

Heart Disease-Death from heart dis-
ease may or may not be from accident. The
question depends for its solution upon the
Death
circumstances of the given case.
brought on by the gradual progress of the
But
disease is not due to an accident.
death or injury from heart disease caused
by a sudden strain may well be considered
as being brought on by accident.

A workman was descending the side of
a ship by means of a rope ladder, when
the ladder twisted suddenly, and, with a cry,
he fell into the water. Three minutes later

(21) Pugh v. London, Etc., R. Co., 74 L. T.
Rep. 724, 1896 3 Q. B. 248, 12 T. L. Rep. 448, 65
L. J. Q. B. 521, 44 Wkly. Rep. 627.

(22) 103 L. T. Rep. 693, 1911, 1 K. B. 351, 27
T. L. Rep. 121, 80 L. J. K. B. 526, 4 Butterworth's
W. C. Cas. 32.

he was picked up dead. The evidence
showed that death was due to heart fail-
ure, and probably occurred before he
reached the water. It was further shown
that his heart was in a bad state; that de-
scending the ladder would cause a strain;
that the sudden twisting in the ladder would
he likely to bring on heart failure, and that
the mere exertion of walking uphill, or
coughing, or sneezing, might have been
fatal to him. The county court judge found
that death was due to an accident, and on
appeal it was held that there was evidence
to support the finding.23

On the other hand, where a man who
had been suffering for several years from
progressive heart disease became faint while
hurrying to a railway station with a parcel
for his employer and died shortly after-
wards, it was held that his death was due to
disease, and that there was no accident.24

Inhalation of Gas-The unintentional in-
halation of gas, by which death or injury is
caused, is an accident.25

A workman went into a driven well to
repair a pump, and died in a few minutes
from a deadly gas which had accumulated
in the dug-out portion of the well. The
dug-out portion was only twelve feet deep
and the accumulation of gas was unexpect-
ed. It was held that the death was caused
by accidental means.26

Lightning-It has been held that death or
injury caused by lightning is accidental.27

Question of accident one of fact and law
-For a time the courts of England seem

(23) Trodden v. McLennard & Sons, 4 Butter-
worth's W. C. Cas. 190.

(24) O'Hara v. Hayes, 44 Ir. L. T. 71, 3 But-
terworth's W. C. Cas. 586.

(25) Harding v. Brynddu Colliery Co., 105
L. T. Rep. 55, 1911 2 K. B. 747, 27 T. L. Rep.
499, 80 L. J. K. B. 1052, 4 Butterworth's W. C.
Cas. 269.
(26)
Pickett v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 144 Pa. St. 79, 22 Atl. 871, 13 L. R. A. 661,
27 Am. St. Rep. 618.

(27) Andrew V. Failsworth Industrial So-
ciety, 90 L. T. Rep. 611, 1904 2 K. B. 32, 20 T. L.
Rep. 429, 73 L. J. K. B. 510, 52 Wkly. Rep. 451,
68 J. P. 409, 6 W. C. Cas. 11.

to have considered the question whether or
not a happening constituted an accident as
purely one of fact. This is evidenced by
the consistency with which the court of
Appeal accepted the finding of the county
court judge in this respect as final; ques-
tions of fact not being reviewable by the
court of Appeal. For instance: A woman
employed as a box maker was put to work
on boxes heavier than those on which she
had previously worked. While so engaged
she suffered a strain from the unusual ex-
ertion. The Court of Appeal held that the
county court judge had properly found that
the injury was not due to an accident.28
Other English cases show the same trend
of opinion.

This question has been definitely settled
by the House of Lords in the case of Fen-
ton v. Thorley.29 In this case the county
court judge found that the facts did not
show an accident. which finding was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeal. When the
case reached the House of Lords it was
unanimously reversed, and it was there.
held that the admitted facts showed that the

injury was caused by an accident.

The question is, of course, one of mixed
fact and law. When the facts are found it
is then a question of law whether or not
they constitute an accident.

This article will shortly be followed by
one on "When An Accident Arises Out of
and In the Course of the Employment." To
entitle an injured workman to recover un-
der most of the Compensation statutes the
accident causing his injury must have arisen
out of and in the course of his employment.
C. P. BERRY.

Sheldon, J. This accident occurred in Vermont, and the rights of the parties are governed by the law of that state.

(1, 2) Under our decisions the illegal conduct of the plaintiff in operating his machine without a license to do so was merely evidence of negligence on his part. But on the whole evidence the jury have found, not only that he was in the exercise of due care, but also that this illegal conduct did not contribute to the injury sued for. Under our common law, therefore, it was not a bar to his recovery. Holland v. Boston, 213 Mass. 560, 100 N. E. 1009; Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; Moran v. Dickinson, 204 Mass. 559, 90 N. E. 1150. There was no evidence as to the law of Vermont upon this question, and its common law is presumed to be the same as ours. Hazen v. Mathews, 184 Mass. 388, 68 N. E. 838; Gordon v. Knott, 199 Mass. 173, 179, 85 N. E. 184, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 762. The plaintiff's recovery cannot be defeated upon this ground.

(3) But it was undisputed that by the statute law of Vermont the owner of an automobile or motor vehicle must annually, by application to the Secretary of State upon a specified blank, cause it to be registered, and that a further statute provided that "no automobile or motor vehicle shall be operated upon a public highway" unless so registered. Did the plaintiff's failure to have his automobile so registered, and the fact that without such registration he was operating it upon a public highway in Vermont, prevent him from maintaining this action?

We held in Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, that under our statutes one

who was operating an automobile upon our public ways without its being registered as required by those statutes was a mere trespasser upon the way, and had no greater rights against persons who were lawfully using the way than that they should not recklessly or wantonly injure him or his property. That | rule has been followed in our later cases. Feeley v. Melrose, 205 Mass. 329, 91 N. E. 306, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1156, 137 Am. St. Rep. 445; Trombley v. Stevens-Duryea Co., 206 Mass. 516, 518, 98 N. E. 764; Chase v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R., 208 Mass. 137, 156 et seq., 94 N. E. 377; Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 172, 95 N. E. 404, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; Love v. Worcester Cons. St. Ry. Co., 213 Mass. 137, 99 N. E. 960; Holland v. Boston, 213 Mass. 560, 562, 100 N. E. 1009. The Dudley Case, ubi supra, turned partly upon the language of some of the provisions of the statute, which, so far as the evidence at the trial showed (and we cannot go beyond that evidence), are not found in the statutes of Vermont. But the decisive feature of our decisions has been that the prohibition of the use of unregistered automobiles upon the pub lic ways was intended, not merely to create a public duty to be enforced in the ordinary administration of the criminal law, but to provide for the protection of travelers upon the highways, to regulate the rights of such travelers among themselves. So it was said in the Dudley Case, 202 Mass. 443, 448, 89 N. E. 25, 28, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561: "It is a reasonable assumption that the Legislature intended to put these forbidden and dangerous machines outside the pale of travelers." So again in Chase v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R., 208 Mass. 137, 158, 94 N. E. 377, 385, the court said: "Under the decisions, the operation of the unregistered automobile is deemed to be unlawful in every feature and aspect of it. Everything in the conduct of the operator that enters into the propulsion of the vehicle is under the ban of the law. In going along the way * * the machine is an outlaw. The operator * * *is guilty of conduct which is permeated in every part by his dis obedience of law, and which directly contributes to the injury.

* He is within the words of the statute." And this language was quoted and the rule reaffirmed in Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 172, 95 N. E. 404, 408, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701.

It is to be regretted that we have not fuller evidence of the law of Vermont upon this question. But applying what we regard as the general rules of the common law, we can only conclude that the Vermont statute, like