Coming Soon: The Lawyer's Own Joke Book, entitled LEGAL LAUGHS A JOKE FOR EVERY JURY By Gus C. Edwards of the Clarkesville Bar Every lawyer, and especially the lawyer practicing in the country counties, knows the value of the apt joke in getting close to the heart of the jury. A well-told story is worth 50% in winning a verdict. Get your order in now for Indexed- Classified A rich fund of catchy stories dealing with every kind of legal procedure, and "the joke in point" is ready for use at a moment's glance. Over 1,000 in number, gathered from everywhere carefully compiled neatly bound - $2.50 CALIFORNIA. Long Beach Thomas A. Sherwood ILLINOIS. Henry C. Fuller Wesley Martin Was he Guilty? J. S. was a clerk who attended his employer on a race track to record in a book his employer's bets on the races. Was he guilty of "occupying a place on the ground for the purpose of recording bets," under a penal statute making that a punishable offense? See "Occupant-Agent or employee," in Words and Phrases, for the answer The courts have defined or construed many thousands of words, legal and nonlegal, but all the subject of some legal contest. These definitions can be applied in your practice Words and Phrases 135,000 definitions. 8 volumes $48.00 delivered West Publishing Company You Need This! Gregory's Common Law Declarations HON. GEORGE C. GREGORY. What pleading gives you the most trouble? Your declaration, of course! How often attorneys have been thrown out of court or limited in their recovery by unfortunite errors in the petition? This book will save you these mistakes! Over 109 complete forms, covering every variety of action and dealing with commencement and parties, statement of cause and prayer for relief. Every form supported by authority! You cannot afford to be without it-it will pay for itself every week many times over. PRICE, $3.00; DELIVERED FREE. Central Law Journal Company ges. Three years' course leading to the degree of .L. B. The degree of Juris Doctor (J. D.) open graduates of approved universities and colRegular session October to June, incluive. Credit towards either degree may be obined through work in the summer session of n weeks. Law library of about 33,000 volumes. fourth year of work leading to the degree of laster of Laws and permitting of specializaons has been organized. For announcements, ddress, DEAN, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Diversity of Michigan, Box X. Ann Arbor, Mich. In Pennsylvania there is a statute making it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property and to that end it makes it unlawful for such a resident to own or be possessed of a shot gun or rifle. On a conviction of an unnaturalized Italian of being so possessed he carried his case by writ of error to the Supreme Court, which held that the statute was neither contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment nor to the rights of plaintiff in error under the treaty between this country and Italy. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, dissent by Chief Justice. Mr. Justice Holmes considers that the more difficult question is the discrimination, but he argues, as we take it, that the state does not desire that its wild birds and animals shall be killed, but it does not generally legislate against it, if as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger (apprehended) is characteristic of the class named. He says: "The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized citizens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent," and: "It is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished." This seems a singular way for getting at a discrimination. There is an evil reprobated as to a few, and left open as to the many, when, if it is an evil at all, it may be as well aimed at every one committing it as at its commission by a few, even though they be those who are "the peculiar source of the evil." Is there anything in our law which makes it proper to say that a public offense may be such when committed by one and not such when committed by another? We agree with the reasoning of the learned justice, that, if the law against this class may be upheld, the part of the statute referring to ownership or possession of a shot gun or a rifle may be made a misdemeanor, for these might be deeméd like tools or implements for gambling and accordingly subject to seizure, only it does seem severe that a rifle or shot gun owned by an alien would be deemed contraband and, when owned by a citizen, lawful property. The learned justice says: "It is to be remembered that the subject of this whole discussion is wild game, which the state may preserve for its own citizens if it pleases." But suppose it does. The state is professing by this statute to make the killing of wild game unlawful, and, though generally unlawful, it visits punishment upon a certain class of offenders of the law. Or perhaps it may be argued that the state impliedly says wild game is subject to slaughter, except that no unnaturalized foreign-born resident may slaughter it, or keep a shot gun or rifle, with which it may be done. Would the statute then be lawful? The court does not argue the matter from this standpoint, but speaks of the law having its possible justification in resident unnaturalized citizens being the peculiar source of the evil it desired to prevent. This form of law would show that the only thing deemed an evil was the killing of wild game by such citizens, but not the killing of wild game in itself. Now, while the state may preserve its game for its own citizens, we do not understand that it may fence it around so as to make all others poachers on its preserves, while the state's citizens are free to go in and slaughter as they see fit. We may conceive, that the state could under the reasoning of the justice, distinguish between its own citizens and others in the obtaining of a license to kill game, but that a general statute may absolutely exempt them and make it a crime for another as to the doing of certain acts we do not conceive. This statute seems intended for some other purpose, having most probably reference to the influx of aliens into the coal regions of Pennsylvania. Its purpose appears not so much in the part which toroids the killing of a wild animal or bird, as in the part which forbids the keeping on hand of arms. The incident of the enactment rather than the enactment itself is what is aimed at. If these arms might be forfeited to the state, the carrying of pistols might be taken care of by other legislation. Without this foreign-born population having any arms of their own, they might be more easily controlled. The act was passed in May, 1909, and we think we remember that not far from that time the state was having considerable difficulty with these miners. This law was most likely an outgrowth of that situation. NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST OF A CORPORATION IN LIFE OF ITS OFFICER.-The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds that a corporation may have such an interest in the life of its officer, that it would be justified in taking out insurance to protect the corporation and its creditors from any loss in the event of his death. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Board Armstrong & Co., 80 S. E. 565. The court remarks that: "Although it is well known that the leading insurance companies of the country solicit and carry the class of insurance here involved, we have been unable to find any decision directly in point. The principles, however, announced by the decisions and stated by the text-writers, we think, clearly show that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the life of B. F. Board, its president and general manager." It quotes from one case where it is stated that the success of a corporation may be so interwoven with the personality of its manager that its stock is taken on that account. Mechanics National Bank v. Conins, 72 N. W. 12, 55 Atl. 191, 101 Am. St. Rep. 650. And from another that where a person is the owner of a large part of the stock of a corporation and by reason of his skill and experience he is largely relied on to make it a success, and where in borrowing money he represents his life is insured for the benefit of the corporation, his relatives are estopped from claiming that policies are not based on an insurable interest. Keckley V. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299, Ann. Cas. 1913, D. 607. Then also are cited the general principle of an insurable interest resting on commercial intercourse, and pecuniary advantage from the continuance of the life of another. It was said there was no suggestion of the policy being a wagering transaction, but purely by way of protection. Against this seems the principle that no man's life is of any value to a corporation as such. It is a soulless entity supposed to contract for services as expert and its officers are bound down to hard and fast lines within the limits of charter authority. The personality of an individual could figure in no way in the granting of charter powers, and the routine of his duties contemplates that he is prepared to step down and out at any moment, and his services easily may be replaced. Indeed, the terms of office with which officers are chosen militates against the idea that any board of directors may tie up discretion of their successors by investing money in any officer's life. A board may make contracts in the future in the line of a corporation's business, but scarcely so on any side line. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-AMENDING PETITION AS TO CAPACITY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF SUES IN STATUTORY ACTION FOR DEATH.-In 75 Cent. L. J. 444, we annotated the case of Bresh v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, (III.) 99 N. E. 349, in which it was held that a mere change of party did not change the cause of action, the amendment going back to the beginning of the suit, though that has been commenced by one improperly named as plaintiff.. Since that decision was rendered the Su preme Court of Pennsylvania appears to have decided the same way, where "the proposed amendment does not change the nature of the cause of action, nor destroy the identity of the original transaction and the damages are to be ascertained by the same standard." Com. v. Baxter, 235 Pa. 188, 84 Atl. 139, 42 L. R. A. (U. S.) 484. Now comes a federal court in Pensylvania and holds that where plaintiff sued for a death, alleging herself the widow of decedent, under a statute authorizing suit, first, by husband or widow, second, by children, and third, by parents, an amendment changing the capacity in which plaintiff sues from widow to mother, made after the statute of limitations would attach, subjected the action to a plea of the statute of limitation. Alemandrolli v. Arbo gast, 209 Fed. 126. The court reasons that suit by the parents is different than where it is by a widow or by her children. "It must be shown that there is an actual family relationship. And before the parents may recover it must be made to appear that the decedent left surviving neither widow nor children. Surely the proposed amendment with necessary modification of the plaintiff's statement would affect the measure and character of proof required to establish the alleged tort and necessarily increase the standard by which the damage is determined." In this case the name of the plaintiff was not changed, but merely the character in which she sued. She appeared originally as being entitled under the act. She still so appears. The change from widow to mother is a change wholly in defendant's favor, placing on plaintiff a different burden of proof and making the damages assessed according to her relations to deceased. This does not seem a different standard of damages. The standard is the statute, and that is the same in both cases. We expressed our dissent from the Illinois ruling on the theory that a person having nothing to do with the suit was keeping it alive, while in this case the proper party instituted it, and simply misdescribed herself. to be, but in fact was not, married to a lady, A., by whom he had six children. The testatrix was friendly to A., and devoted to her children. A. died, and four years later the brother of the testatrix married B., and before his death had two children by her. The testatrix left the residue of her estate in trust for her brother's "children." B.'s two children took it all, and A.'s six obtained nothing. The prevalence of damage cases consequent on motor collisions has given rise to some interesting cases as to the rule of the road. We quote the following excellent summary of these decisions which was recently given by one of our judges, and which may be of use to American practitioners who have had or may have occasion to deal with the question involved, which was as to the respective duties of drivers of vehicles at the intersection of main and cross roads: "The vehicles on each road must approach the crossing with caution and take all reasonable care for the safety of traffic on the other, and I think it would be a dangerous doctrine to lay down that this duty lies in a higher degree on the one vehicle than on the other, but there is a real and a very definite distinction in the matter of right. The vehicle on the main road is in possession, while the vehicle coming on to it from the side road is in the position of one who must wait his opportunity to cut in without displacing those already in possession. Accordingly, if two vehicles approach the crossing together, and one or other must give way to avoid collision, the right to proceed is with the vehicle on the main road. If the driver on the main road has approached the crossing with proper caution, and given reasonable opportunity to any driver on the side road to be aware of his approach, he is then entitled to proceed to take the crossing in the belief that this other driver can and will protect himself from a known danger." We notice the case of In re Worthington, as it deals with a question which has not been the subject of decision for some considerable time, namely the transmissibility of a contract. Worthington entered into a contract with a French Company, by which he undertook to form a company in England, and to procure that the whole of the ordinary shares to be issued should be subscribed for within a definite period, with the exception of 5,000, which were to be allotted to him as fully paid up by way of remuneration. The English company was formed, but before the period elapsed, Worthington died, having obtained subscriptions only to the extent of about a quarter of the shares issued. In the admin |