exchange of a city were to attempt to control markets of products as labor unions. attempt to control the marketing of labor, would not a court, if it believed that its attempt had definite effect on the lowering of the sale price of an owner's bale of cotton. as shown by proof, allow him to recover the difference in an action at law? And if so why not allow him an injunction as to cotton he still has to sell?

This case, however, is worse than that? The labor union keeps these plaintiffs, if what they say is true, from marketing their products at all. Is it an answer to say "I find no precedent for such an injunction in behalf of a private suitor?" There is an action at law by a private individual against a private individual, and irreparable injury is threatened. Is it not anomalous to say the horizon of equitable relief is narrower than that of law? The accepted belief is that it follows the law to all limits it may rightfully go.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

REWARDS LIMITATION ON RULE AGAINST PEACE OFFICERS EARNING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION IN PERFORMANCE OF REGULAR DUTIES.-The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Hartley v. Inhabitants of Granville, 102 N. E. 942, says that: "The general rule with reference to peace officers is well settled that a promise or reward for additional compensation to a public officer for services rendered in the performance of his duty cannot be enforced, either as being without consideration or contrary to public policy," yet holds that as "there was evidence in the case at bar that the plaintiff spent substantial time in the performance of purely detective work in the investigation and collection of evidence in consequence of the offer of reward outside the service rendered in serving the warrant and doing in other respects what the law required him to do by virtue of his office as constable. The case on its facts is rather close to the line, but it cannot be said that the finding of fact made by the judge was not warranted."

This is to say that while a peace officer ought to run down an offender in his county, yet this does not include his doing detective

work on a large scale, as this would be at the expense of the performance of his general duties. But, if this were the only reason, it would seem insufficient, because, if he were to accept a reward for doing detective work in the consumption of time, that belongs to the public, in his private interest, the temptation would be to make him shirk the performance of his general duties. Of course we do not mean to say that he might not attend, reasonably at least, to his private affairs. But when his private affairs so closely resemble and become intermingled, so to speak, in his public duties, caution and presumption ought to be against independent or extra compensation therefor. The court suggests that this case was "rather close to the line," but it gives small direction for identifying that line.

ACTION-THIRD PERSONS DAMAGED BY FAILURE OF CARRIER TO FURNISH CAPS. -There was much of novelty in suits by employes of a mining company for cessation of work and consequent loss of wages, because of a railroad's refusal to furnish cars to haul Illinois the output in coal of the company. Cent. R. Co. v. Baker, 159 S. W. 1169, decided by Kentucky Court of Appeals. This case was an injunction to obtain the prosecution of a number of such suits and judgment for defendants was reversed.

The court states the question thus: "Can an employe of a party maintain an action against

a

common carrier to recover damages that will compensate him for the time he has lost from his employment on account of the failure of the common carrier to perform its duty in furnishing cars to the party by whom he is employed? It is obvious that if an employe, under the circumstances stated can maintain an action, so could any person who has suffered injury by failure of the carrier to discharge a duty it owed a party who was unable on account of this failure, to comply with his contract or keep his engagement with the party seeking relief. Thus it will readily appear that if actions like this may be maintained, there is opened up an illimitable field of liti gation." The opinion then goes into possible cases, by way of illustration. The court, recognizing the general rule, that violation of statutory duty may give right of action to one having no contract with the violator, argues that the violation here involved rests upon a contract relation and beyond that there is the principle cause proxima, et non remota, spectatur lex, and this relation is entered by notice to carrier to furnish the cars. Out of such statute raises a contract.

This may be good reasoning, but it seems to us wholly unnecessary. There is a common law duty by a carrier to accept freight offered for transportation, and statute providing for notice for cars is in favor of the carrier rather

in that popular title. In this country under the various statutory and constitutional provisions the Justice of the Peace's Court has lost many of the characteristics which orig

coal miner could offer his coal, tender the freight charges and demand its transportation. By the statute before he can make such demand he must apprise the carrier beforehand of his need of cars. Doing this the shipper places himself in position to assert his common law rights. For disregard of these it would hardly be pretended the carrier would be liable to any other party than a proposed shipper. That a penalty is attached to failure to furnish cars does not derogate from the statutory purpose above indicated. This liability to penalty is but a burden in the benefit arising out of the statute in favor of the carrier.

JUSTICE OF PEACE'S COURT.

Until quite recently in practically all the States of the Union the Justice of the Peace's Court was that which was nearest its people and was often called the People's Court. Recently, there has been established in Kansas a court which seems to be nearer, and the object and purposes seem to be, to settle all trivial matters, the limit in accounts here being $5.00, without the formality of a law suit. In this court there are to be no attorneys, the justice or whatever name the person may be designated, makes a personal examination into the merits of the claim and renders judgment accordingly.

If he is paid a fee or receives a salary it comes from the State and not from the litigants. The object and purpose being that small claims may be settled without danger of being eaten up in courts. The measure is a commendable one and its outcome will be watched with interest by the members of the legal profession as well as those engaged in philanthropy in a general way. If successful it may become the People's Court and supplant the Court of the Justice Peace.

indicate that it is a conservator of the peace-In this respect its power is limited.

The office of Justice of the Peace is said to be one of great antiquity. However, so far as English jurisprudence is concerned it has its origin in a statute of Edward III. Here "for the better keeping and maintainance of the peace" it was ordained "that in every county good men and lawful, which be no maintainers of evil or barretors in the country shall be assigned to keep the peace."

.

One writer says that if we are to judge from the large number of works published concerning the duties, etc., it is more ancient than the Bible.1

While they were not known by the name of Justice of the Peace; yet, at common law there were certain conservators of the peace who were of two sorts. (1) Those who in respect of their offices had power to keep the peace, but were not simply called by the name of conservators of the peace, but by. the name of such offices. (2) Those who were constituted for this purpose only, and were simply called by name of conservators or wardens of the peace.

From Blackstone2 we learn that by reason of the statutes of 34 Ed. III, giving to these conservators of the peace the power of trying felonies, that they acquired the "more honourable appellation of justices."

It may be interesting here to note that in England the justice of the peace never had any civil jurisdiction.3

In this same connection we may call attention to the fact that in the United States their civil jurisdiction exceeds that of a criminal character.

That in criminal matters is it only in misdemeanors that the justice is permitted to

pass upon the criminality of the charge. In all the graver offenses he is merely an examining magistrate as to the probability of the commission of a crime, and if he finds that a crime has probably been committed. to require the person charged to appear in a higher court to answer for the same.

4

"The power. office and duty," says Blackstone, "of a justice of the peace, depend on his commission, and on the several statutes which have created objects of his jurisdiction. His commission first empowers him singly to conserve the peace; and thereby gives him all the power of the ancient conservators of the common law, in suppressing riots and affrays. in taking securities for the peace, and in apprehending and committing felons and other inferior criminals. It also empowers any two or more to hear and determine all felonies

and other offenses: which is the ground of their jurisdiction at sessions. . . . And. as to the powers given to one, two or more justices by statute which from time to time have heaped upon them such a variety of business, that few care to undertake. and

fewer understand the office; they are such and of such great importance to the public that the country is greatly obliged to any magistrate that, without sinister views of his own, will engage in the troublesome service."

The latter part of the above quotation is applicable to many parts of our country at this time. There is no doubt but a good man in the office of Justice of the Peace is a very valuable public servant. If of the right spirit he settles many neighborhood difficulties, and by his good offices prevents

many more.

But it is a matter within common knowledge that each year it seems to grow more difficult to prevail upon persons to hold the position, especially is this true in the country precincts.

There the remuneration is very small, and there seems to be a growing disposition against giving gratuitous public ser

(4) Book 1, p. 354.

vice of any kind. And in the cities generally, the official being remunerated by fees, very often dependent upon a finding for the plaintiff, the tendency of the official is not to settle and prevent litigation, but often encourage it, and the good men are not aspirants for positions where such things have been and may be done.

Where the office was looked on with favor it was only given, not only to men of the best reputation and most worthy in the country, they were to be sufficient knights, esquires and gentlemen of the law, and later none were eligible who were not owners of realty of a clear yearly value of £100 above all incumbrances. It was also provided that no practicing attorney, solicitor or proctor shall be capable of acting as a justice of the peace.

Whatever the office may have been in England it was brought to this country by

the colonists. From the earliest colonial period it has existed in this country. By

the code known as the "Dukes Laws" for the government of the colony of New York, promulgated in 1665, justices of the peace

were commissioned for the towns in the

province with the same power as in England. While the office itself was brought to this country by the colonists and in that way it may be said to, with us, have a common law origin, yet it has been so changed by statutory enactments and constitutional provisions that the position may be classed

as a statutory or a constitutional one as the case may be. However, there may be instances when the nature of the court is to

be considered, that there the decisions of the English courts are to be examined and due weight given them. "Custom and usage and the decisions of the higher courts. have during all that time been giving shape and form to the law on this subject, as on all others, and though originating in the statute, the law is now to be sought not in those statutes alone but in the books of re

ports and works of authority on such subjects."s

As a general rule, the office of Justice of the Peace is provided for by the various constitutions of the several states, but the powers and duties are defined by statute. The following states have constitutional provisions in regard to the office."

In a number of states the Justice of the Peace is to be appointed by the governorDelaware, Minneapolis, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and South Carolina.

The office was a constitutional one in Ohio until the adoption of the amendment proposed by the constitutional convention. in 1912. It now exists in that state by virtue of statutory enactment under a constitutional provision that permits the legislature to create such courts as it may think proper inferior to the Supreme, Circuit and Probate Courts.

In a number of states, by a constitutional provision, their jurisdiction is limited to a specified sum in civil matters.10

(8)

State v. Eastman, 42 N. H. 268.

(9) Ala., Art. 6, Sec. 168; Ark., Art. 7, Sec. 38. Col, Art. 6, Sec. 11, 12; Col., Art. 14, Sec. 11; Conn., Art. 10; Del., Art. 4, Sec. 32; Fla., Art. 5, Sec. 21; Ga., Art. 6, Sec. 6, Par. 1; Ind., Art. 7. Sec. 14; Idaho, Art. 5, Sec. 22; Kan., Art. 3, Sec. 9; Ky., La., Art. 126; Mont. Art. 8, Sec. 20; Mo., Art. 6, Sec. 37; Mich., Art. 7, Sec. 15; Md., Art. 4, Sec. 42; Minn., Art. 6, Sec. 8; Miss., Art. 6; Sec. 171; Me., Art. 6, Sec. 5; Mass., Art. 3, part 2, ch. 3; Nev., Art. 6, Sec. 8; N. J., Art. 6, Sec. 7: N. Y., Art. 6, Sec. 17; N. Dak., Art. 4, Sec. 112; N. H., Art. 74, part 2; O., Art. 4, Sec. 9; Okla., Art. 7, Sec. 18; Pa., Art. 5, Sec. 11; R. I., Art. 10, Sec. 7; S. Car., Art 5, Sec. 20; Tenn., Art. 6, Sec. 15; Tex., Art. 5; Sec. 18; Utah, Art. 8, Sec. 8; Vt., Art. 18, Sec.; Wis., Art. 7, Sec. 15; Wyo., Art. 5, Sec. 22; W. Va., Art. 8, Sec. 27. (10) Ark., Art. 7, Sec. 40; amount does not exceed $100.00. Cannot hold where a lien on land is claimed, or title is involved. Ala., Art.

6, Sec. 168; amount not to exceed $100.00, except in libel, slander, assault and battery and ejectment. Cal., Art. 6, Sec. 11; amount claimed does not exceed $300.00 in action to enforce liens on personal property, etc. Colo., Art. 6, Sec. 25; amount does not exceed $300.00, and where boundaries and title etc., are not called in question. Fla., Art. 5, Sec. 22; amount claimed does not exceed $100.00. Ga., Art. 6, Sec. 7; amount claimed does not exceed $100.00. Idaho, Art. 5, Sec. 22; amount claimed does not exseed $300.00 and neither boundary nor title is called in question. La., Art. 126, amount claimed

In a number of states a limited criminal jurisdiction is provided for in their constitutions. This limitation is based either on the amount of the fine that may be imposed, the length of time of the imprisonment, or the degree of the crime.11

A number of state constitutions merely provide that their powers and duties shall be regulated by law. Thus leaving to the legislature the duty of prescribing the jurisdiction to be exercised.12

does not exceed $100.00. Mich., Art. 7, Sec. 16: amount does not exceed $300.00, exclusive up to $100. Minn., Art. 6, Sec. 8, amount does not exceed $100, nor in any cause involving title to real estate. Miss., Art. 171, amount does not exceed $200. Neb., Art. 6, Sec. 18, amount does not exceed $200, nor where title to land is involved. Neb., Art. 6, Sec. 8, amount does not exceed $300, nor where title to land is involved. N. Car., Art. 4. Sec. 27, in actions founded on contract not to exceed $200 when title to real estate is not in controversy; other civil actions where amount does not exceed $50. N. Dak., Art. 4, Sec. 112, where amount does not exceed $200, and where there is no question involving title or boundaries to real estate. N. H., Art. 76, Par. 2, amount not to exceed $100, right of appeal reserved in all cases. New Mex., Art. 6, Sec. 26. Okla., Art. 7, Sec. 18, not to exceed $200. S. Car., Art. 5, Sec. 21, called magistrates, amount not to exceed $300, and title not involved nor chancery case. S. Dak., Art. 5, Sec. 22, amount not to exceed $100, and neither title nor boundary involved. Tex., Art. 5, Sec. 19, amount not to exceed $200. W. Va., Art. 8, Sec. 28, amount not to exceed $300. Wyo., Art. 5, Sec. 22, amount not to exceed $200.

(11) Fla., Art. 5, Sec. 22, in all criminal cases except felonies, and may issue process for arrest of felonies and misdemeanors. Minn., Art. 6. Sec. 8, where the punishment does not exceed three months and the fine not over $100. Miss., Art. 171, has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court in crimes where the punishment does not extend beyond imprisonment in county jail, and such exclusion as the legislature may confer in petty misdemeanors. Mont., Art. 8, Sec. 21, no jurisdiction in cases of felony, except an examining court. In others as the legislature may provide. N. Car., Art. 4, Sec. 27, all criminal matters arising in the county where a fine of $50. the punishment cannot exceed Okla., Art. 7, Sec. 18, convenient jurisdiction with circuit court in all misdemeanors in which the punishment does not exceed a fine of $200. or imprisonment in county jail not to exceed 30 days, or both. S. Car., Art. 5, Sec. 21, such jurisdiction as the legislature may provide, not to extend to cases where punishment exceeds a fine of $100 or imprisonment for 30 days. Tex., Art. 5, Sec. 19, where the penalty of fine imposed by law may not be more than $200.

(12) Colo., Art. 6, Sec. 25; Conn., Art. 5, Sec. 1; Del., Art. 4, Sec. 30 Kan., Art. 3, Sec. 9; R. I., Art. 10, Sec. 7; Ohio, Art. 4, Sec. 9; S. Dak.,