replaced by the Roman, though their time was up in 1848. that which he exercised in the appointment of the United States judges. He saw that the custom of allowing senators and leading politicians to name those judges, was a prostitution of that sacred function. He had strength of character enough, to trample the custom under foot. Then he proceeded in a careful manner to appoint able men. He appointed over sixty United States Judges. He has in this way done much to prepare the way for a sound interpretation of the reformed jurisprudence, which, will, ere long, be established in the United States and the states of the Un In truth and reason, it would seem as though the reform should begin with the government at Washington, to provide a model system which every state could adopt and thus bring about a uniform system of Jurisprudence throughout the United States. A greater good to the nation can hardly be imagined. We must do away with the ever increasing reports, and find means to simplify the duties of the judges. Bacon has indicated plainly the way to do this. Ought not the advice of the world's greatest philosopher | ion. Then we will no longer be looking who was profoundly educated in the phi-through a glass darkly, for that which losophy of the law, to which he gave the most time, come to us with tremendous force in the face of our needs? Needs which he so plainly saw and told us would come to us. It is not a thing the juridical scholar of to-day would regard as incredible, that our reports could be reduced five-sixths and retain the body of the law, and only be increased as necessity might require in the judgment of the supreme judges who might be instructed to superintend the work after it was once established. It is time someone was making a move to bring about a reform so greatly needed. It is a matter of the gravest consideration to the nation, and a movement on the part of the Federal government cannot begin too soon. Of course a move is being made to reform our procedure, but nothing has been said as to how we shall reconcile our conflicting opinions. These reforms should go hand in hand, it cannot be to strongly emphasized that, a system of jurisprudence cannot be wrought out so well as by considering it as a whole. Mr. Taft had the wisdom to see that due process of law is Government itself and that it necessarily followed, that the greatest function of his presidential office, was was in part will be done away, and the perfect jurisprudence established. Rules and decisions, will, if properly prepared, furnish a flexible system of jurisprudence, which, may be made to mould to the justice of case by the good, wise judge, learned in the rules of construction, far better than under the present system. This cannot be done generally by citing cases apart from rules of construction. The decisions, about thirtyfive or forty volumes or less of the best cases which may be found in the reports of England and America to cover the body of the law, or those which the judges may hereafter select to be made a part of the decision. These may be made to stand for the law as fixed initials. Opinions of the courts then would no longer go to increase the volume of reports which are filling up our law offices and becoming a great menace to the profession. Should our government decide to furnish a model system for the states, it might be well to bring in from the civil law countries, their most distinguished scholars. A system of jurisprudence is as a system of religion, where certain great truths are revered and which are the ground work for the faith which is in the follower. So if we are going to establish the civil law in our country, we could not go amiss, to bring into the council great civil law jurists, whether of France, Germany or England. said: "The Maxims are the condensed good sense of the nations." But, perhaps the most prominent fig ure in jurisprudence in America was John Marshall, who did so much to formulate our jurisprudence under the constitution. It was enough that he was deeply versed in the Maxims. With these and his great natural ability for jurisprudence, he wrought a wonderful work. The Maxims are a conspicuous part of his opinions. He read them into the constitution. As to a code we could scarcely improve on the code Napoleon. It is revered in Louisiana. But there would be plenty of material at hand for the judg ment of a council to choose from, to make up a code, together with rules and decisions, which might have met even the approval of Bacon, as they would have been accepted by Mansfield, Marshall, What we need in our law schools is Story, Kent, Field, and many of our juris- more of the civil law, so that a deeper prudents who have caught a glow of the knowledge of jurisprudence may be ob civil law, in spite of Coke and Black-tained, as the price of admission to the stone. But the light of the civil law fell only on Bacon in all its glory. If we search him out, we will get into the true light of our jurisprudence and be able to "see face to face." This is not the proposal of a great revolution, but just getting back to the real source of our own jurisprudence. The lawyer well versed in Brooms' Maxims is always a good lawyer. Of two lawyers of equal ability, one deeply versed in Broom's Maxims, the other not, invariably the maxim man will be found to be the better. Alexander Hamilton said, "A study of the Maxims is a study of government." No one will deny the statement that due process of law is government itself. Gov ernment may be constructed on the Maxims. They are rules of construction. They should not be misleading when they are properly environed, but are great lights of due process of law. Was it not the light of the Maxims which Hamilton reflected at the Philadelphia convention, which made him so conspicuous a figure there? His own words would seem to so indicate: "A study of the Maxims is a study of government." And Sir James McIntosh bar. It is not to be expected that any human system can be made perfect, but it would seem that the mass of weighty authority stands for the civil law as nearest to perfection. Kent calls attention to the fact that "Lord Bacon, in the aphorisms annexed to his treatise, De Augmentis Scientiarum, speaks of the necessity of a revision and digest of the law, in order to restore it to a sound and profitable state, whenever there has arisen a vast accummulation of volumes throwing the system into confuson and uncertainty. The period anticipated by Lord Bacon seems now to have arrived. The spirit of the present age, and the cause of truth and justice, require more simplicity in the system and the text authorities should be reduced within manageable limits." "The value of the civil law," says Kent, "Is not to be found in questions which relate to the conection between the government and the people, or in provisions for personal security in criminal cases." The influence of the Christian dispensation has modified the criminal law; as it has done much to develop freedom, in a marked degree and within a hundred and fifty years the advance in a humanitarian sense in due process of law, has been more rapid than in all the time of the Christian era before. So that, "in everything which concerns civil law and political liberty" the civil law "cannot be compared with the free spirit of the English and American common law." But, says Kent, (Vol. 1-15 Ed. 5865), "The rights and duties flowing from personal contracts, express and implied, and under the infinite variety of shapes which they assume in the business and commerce of life, are defined and illustrated with a clearness and brevity without example. In all these respects and many others which the limits of this discussion will not permit me to examine, the civil law shows the proofs of the hghest cultivation and refinement; and no one who pursues it can well avoid the conviction, that it has been the fruitful source of those comprehensive views and solid principles which have been applied to elevate and adorn the jurisprudence of modern nations." sary transfer of printed on the back, which has been signed in blank by the owner, is not at common law a negotiable instrument, title to which passes by delivery. If obtained feloniouslly from the true owner, his title ordinaryily is not divested upon sale by the thief to a purchaser for value, without notice of the theft. Scollans v. Rollins, 173 Mass. 275, 278, 53 N. E. 863, 73 Am. St. Rep. 284. The case at bar upon the agreed facts falls within this familiar rule. The original owner of the stock in question, one Schumacher, after signing the certificate in blank, pledged it as security for a loan to a national bank whose cashier subsequently embezzled and appropriated the sertificate to his own use. tl is under his felonious act that the plaintiff derives ite alleged title. But as no title passed, the defendant as the transfer agent of the corporation is not iable either in contract, or tort for its refusal to return the certificate presented for transfer, or to issue therefor a new certificate. Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 491; O'Herron v. Gray, 168 Mass. 573, 47 N .E. 429, 40 L. R. A. 498, 60 Am. St. Rep. 411. (3) The evidence of a local custom that a good title passed b ydelivery under either a sale or a pledge, where the certificate is indorsed in blank, or is transferred by a separate instrument, and power of attorney, if the signature is guaranteed by a stock exchange house and witnessed, because as stated in Baker v. Davie, 211 Mass. 429, 436, 97 N. E. 1094, 1096 (37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 944) "the owner, having given another such indicia of title as clothes him with the appearance of ownership, is precluded from setting up title in himself as against a holder for value and in good If the custom is faith" was rightly excluded. good a question we do not decide-the plendge took place in another jurisdiction where a cus tom of this character is not shown to have prevailed, and under such circumstances as to preclude any inference that Schumacher had any reason to anticipate embezzlement by the cashier or that the certificate through his criminal act might come into the possession of the plaintiff or other foreign purchasers who were ignorant of the true ownership. Barrie v. Quinby, 206 Mass. 259, 264, 265, 92 N. E. 451; Russell v. American Bell Telephone Co., 180 Mass. 467, 62 N. E. 751. (4) We add, as matter of precaution, that St. 1910, c. 171, §§ 1, 5, has no extraterritorial application. The failure of the plaintiffs for these reasons to prove title in themselves justified the presiding judge in refusing the first seven rulings requested, and the remaining seven requests, to meet other grounds of defense, therefore became immaterial. Judgment for the defendant. NOTE-Negotiability of Stock Certificates Indorsed in Blank for Transfer.-The great majority of decision seems to be with the instant case, though there is strong authority the other way. Thus in Austin v. Hayden, 171 Mich. 38, 137 N. W. 317, it is said: "While certificates of stock are not, strictly speaking, commercial or negotiable paper under the law merchant, like promissory notes or bills of exchange, yet the recognized usage of indorsing such certificates in blank and so transferring title to them and what they represent, by delivery, has given them a quasi-negotiable character to such an extent that they are often held, as they pass from hand to hand, free from undisclosed antecedent equities." In Masury v. Arkansas Nat. Bank, 93 Fed. 603, 35 C. C. A. 476, Thayer, C. J., Caldwell and Sanborn, C. J. J., concurring, said: "It is a well known fact that stock certificates frequently circulate in places far remote from the home of the corporation by which they were issued, that in all commercial centers they are commonly transferred from hand to hand like negotiable paper, and that they are hypothecated for temporary loans by a single endorsement and delivery thereof, the latter being perhaps the most common use to which such securitiees are put. In the great majority of cases, when stock is merely pledged for a loan, no record of transfer is made on the books of the corporation, and in the judgment of laymen the making of such a record seems to be a needless formality. The trend of modern decisions has been to encourage the free circulation of stock certificates in the mode last indicated, on the theory that they are a valuable aid to commercial transactions, and that the public interest is best subserved by removing all restrictions against their circulation and by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper." In Talcott v. Standard Oil, 135 N. Y. Supp. 617, 149 App. Div. 694, it was held that though a certificate of stock is not a negotiable instrument, yet an assignment and power of attorney indorsed on the back of such a certificate, in blank, present such indicia of title that an innocent assignee thereunder obtains good title. This case cites Knox v. Eden Musee Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E. 988. 51 Am. St. Rep. 700, 31 L. R. A. 779, which holds that an agent to whom the owner has delivered a certificate of stock duly indorsed for transfer, with a limited power of disposition for a special purpose, may bind the title thereto as against the true owner by transferring it to a bona fide transferee who has no notice of the limitations of the agent's authority, although the transfer was made for an unauthorized purpose and with the intention on the part of the agent to commit a fraud on his principal. In Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 30 Conn. 274, it was said: "The certificate accompanied with the transfer, executed in blank, has a species of negotiability of a peculiar character, but one well recognized in commercial transactions and judicial decisions, and absolutely essential to the usages and necessities of modern commerce, to make such certificate available in commercial transactions. C. The due administration of law loses nothing when it passes through the hands of Mr. Justice Middleton, of the Supreme Court of Ontario. An illustration of this may be seen in the case of Snider v. Snider, 6 O. W. N. 80. The plaintiff's claim was upon some promissory notes, but he followed up the claim with what the learned judge described as "a long and rambling account of the transaction." which apparently was not material to the issue. His further language on the subject may well be marked, learned and inwardly digested by solicitors of the present day: "Although the art of pleading has fallen into disrepute, it seems to me that, quite apart from the rules, reason and logic are not entirely dethroned, and a litigant ought to be compelled to present his case decently clothed in appropriate English. It is said that the due purpose of language is to conceal thought: yet in the preparation of pleadings some evidence of at least rudimentary thought ought to be apparent." The Canada Law Journal, in commenting on this decision, says: "In the old days of accurate pleading, special demurrers, etc., pleading was not only an art, but it taught lawyers to be exact, and to use language which expressed what was meant and appropriate to the occasion, and not redundant or slovenly, or capable of two meanings." The English Judicature Act, which has made pleading so simple that a man of the streets may draw up his own petition has at the same time made it harder for the courts to understand the pleadings thus filed or to define the issues to be tried, thus necessitating the filing of many bills of particulars. CORRESPONDENCE. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, OF ITS OWN MOTION, INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT PARTIES WHO DISOBEY THE INJUNCTION ORDERS OF ITS COURTS. Editor Central Law Journal: I note in the issue of the Central Law Journal of March 27th, the appearance of the greater part of the argument of Mr. A. Leo Weil, of Pittsburgh, on the question whether "the United States Government through its own officers, institute proceedings to punish for contempt parties who disobey the injunction orders of its Courts;" and I note the closing paragraph of the comments added by the editor, to the effect that the Journal would like to hear from attorneys having suggestions to make on this "interesting situation." Without desiring to enter into any argument, pro or con, it would occur to the casual reader, as it seems to me, that the bare statements of the proposition in that part of the title to the article as quoted, would call for an answer in the negative. The writer received some time since Mr. Weil's pamphlet or printed argument on the subject, and sent, as I infer, to the members of the American Bar Association. Mr. Weil has the reputation of being one of the prominent and able lawyers of Pittsburgh, but without any knowledge whatever of the action in which the proceedings for contempt were instituted, except from the statement in Mr. Weil's pamphlet, it would seem that if the Court having jurisdiction of an action is powerless through technical defects or otherwise to enforce its orders against parties for contempt, then there must be some defect in the Court or in the attorneys who represent the parties. It is the business of the attorneys in the case, to see to it that no technicalities intervene to prevent the enforcement of contempt orders. Furthermore, to allow Counsel to go outside of the record and call upon the Federal Government to come into the case and undertake to go after parties who have been in contempt of a Court's order, would open up such a wide door for invoking outside Federal aid, as would know no limit; and would establish a precedent that would have a tendency to disorder all judicial proceedings where the question of contempt was involved. Respectfully yours, Cincinnati, Ohio. AARON A. FERRIS. Court of Illinois, and William Caldwell, Professor of Logic and Moral Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal. Price, $3.50. Boston. The Boston Book Company. 1914. Review will follow. Homicide. A treatise on homicide. By the Editorial Staff of The Michie Company. Under the supervision of Thomas Johnson Michie. In two volumes. Price, $13.00. The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Va. 1914. Review in this issue. The Federal Employers' Liability Act. Being a treatise on the Federal Act of April 22, 1908, and the Amendment of April 5, 1910. By Homer Richey, Associate Editor, "Virginia Law Register." Price, $2.50. The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Va. 1913. Review will follow. Missouri Appellate Practice. Practice in the Supreme Court and the Court of Apeals of Missouri in Appellate Proceedings and Original Writs. Second Edition. By G. A. Finkelnburg and Tyrell Williams of the St. Louis Bar. Price, $4.50. St. Paul, Minn. Keefe-Davidson Company. 1906. Review will follow. BOOK REVIEWS. SINGER'S PATENT AND TRADE MARK LAWS OF THE WORLD. 'Mr. B. Singer, of Chicago, has published a new and comprehensive edition containing the patent and trade-mark laws of the world. This work shows the laws on these subjects of every country of the world, the material therefor being taken from statute books and adopted rules of practice of the various countries, showing how applications may be filed annuities paid and the workings of various statutes. The work is very valuable to practitioners in patent and trade-mark law and the abridgments are not so scant that full information as to how to proceed may not be gathered from the pages of the book. The work is in a single volume bound in law buckram and the countries being in alphabetical order it is readily usable. It is published apparently by the author in 1914. BOOKS RECEIVED Philosophy of Law. Modern Legal Philosophy Series. Vol. XII. By Josef Kohler, Professor of Law in the University of Berlin; translated from the German by Adalbert Albrecht, Associate Editor of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; with an Editorial Preface by Albert Kocourek, Lecturer on Jurisprudence in Northwestern University; and with Introductions by Orrin N. Cater, Justice of the Supreme FOSTER'S INCOME TAX. Mr. Roger Foster, of New York Bar, the author of various works, has presented for the consideration of the profession, a "Treatise on the Federal Income Tax under the act of 1913, he having heretofore written on the Federal Income Tax of 1894. The author states the purpose of the present treatise is to furnish a practical guide for the aid of lawyers, government officials and laymen in the interpretation and administration of this new law. The early appearance of this treatise, following upon the law's enactment, is to fill a present need rather than wait for judicial interpretation of the law itself. Aid, |