206 U.S.

Argument for the Cramp Company.

which the accounting officers had no authority or jurisdiction to allow. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426.

There was no necessity to protest; a protest would not have had any effect whatever.

The claim for damages here sued for was not a claim “under and by virtue of the contract"; it did not arise by reason of the fulfillment on the part of the Cramp Company of all the conditions, covenants and provisions that it undertook. It arose not under, but by reason of the violation of the contract by the United States.

A receipt even as comprehensive as this does not release such damages as are here claimed, and the general words upon established principles would be limited to the items specified. Coulter v. Board of Education, 63 N. Y. 365; 1 Edw. Ch. 34; 1 Cowan, 122, and cases there cited.

Here the company was not to receive anything except the balance of the special reserve of the contract price; nothing was to be considered with respect to the final release except for the work provided in the contract, not even the extra work and certainly not the damages for delay. Large amounts of extra work were done, but they were not to be considered or paid for in this accounting.

The second article of the contract provides for extra work and for the ascertainment of its value. Neither the extra work nor the speed premiums were to be embraced in this final receipt; it was a final receipt only for the balance of the contract work, and neither its language nor Article XIX of the contract extends it beyond that. Fire Insurance Co. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 577.

A receipt in the exact form of this, and upon a claim arising from delays on the part of the Government in supplying material, was held no bar to the suit in Pneumatic Gun Carriage Co. v. United States, 36 C. Cl. 71. See also McLaughlin v. United States, C. Cl.

The case of Phelan v. Mayor, cited by the United States is not applicable to the case at bar.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case turns on the release executed by the building company on May 18, 1896. It is contended by the claimant that it applies simply to claims springing out of the construction of the vessel, and therefore has no application to the matters for which the judgment was rendered against the Government. The word "construction," the company says, is limited to the mere matter of building; that is, the furnishing of materials, the doing of work, and does not include delays or other matters outside the building of the vessel.

To rightly understand the scope of this release we must consider the conditions of the contract, and especially the clause in it which calls for a release. The contract was a large one, the price to be paid for the work and material being over $3,000,000, and the contract was evidently designed to cover all contingencies. Provision was made for changes in the specifications, for penalties on account of delays of the contractor, deductions in price on certain conditions, approval of the work by the Secretary of the Navy, forfeiture of the contract, with authority to the Secretary to complete the vessel. The last paragraph contains the stipulations as to the amounts and times of payment with authority for increase of the gross amount upon certain conditions. The sixth clause of this paragraph makes special provision for the last payment, to be made "when all the conditions, covenants, and provisions of said contract shall have been performed and fulfilled by and on the part of the party of the first part," and "on the execution of a final release to the United States in such form as shall be approved by the Secretary of the Navy, of all claims of any kind or description under or by virtue of said contract." Evidently the parties contemplated and specially provided by this stipulation that the whole matter of the contract should be ended at the time of the final release and the last payment. That which was to be

released was "all claims of any kind or description under or by virtue of said contract." Manifestly included within this was every claim arising not merely from a change in the specifications, but also growing out of delay caused by the Government. The language is not alone "claims under," but "claims by virtue" of the contract-" claims of any kind or description." All the claims for which allowances were made in the judgment of the Court of Claims come within one or the other of these clauses. It may be that, strictly speaking, they were not claims under the contract, but they were clearly claims by virtue of the contract. Without it no such claims could have arisen. Now it having been provided in advance that the contract should be closed by the execution of a release of this scope it cannot be that the company, when it signed the release, understood that some other or lesser release was contemplated. It must have understood that it was the release required by the contract—a release intended to be of all claims of any kind or description under or by virtue of the contract, and that the form of words which the Secretary had approved was used to express that purpose. With that release stipulated for in the contract the company signed the instrument of May 18, 1896, which in terms purported to "remise, release and forever discharge the United States of and from all and all manner of debts, dues, sum and sums of money, accounts, reckonings, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, for or by reason of or on account of the construction of said vessel under the contract aforesaid." Now whatever limitation may be placed upon the words "for" or "on account of" the construction the provision for the release of all claims and demands whatsoever, "by reason of the construction of the vessel under the contract aforesaid," is a recognition of the contract, and includes claims which arise by reason of the construction of the vessel under it. "By reason of" may well be considered as equivalent to "by virtue of." It is only by reason of the performance of the contract in the construction of the vessel

that these claims arise. But for the contract, and the construction of the vessel under it, there would be no such claims. No payment of extra moneys is necessary to sustain this release. It is under seal, and the contract is itself full consideration. As of significance it must be borne in mind that the release referred specifically to the sixth paragraph of the nineteenth clause of the contract which provided for the character of the release. Indeed the general language of the release itself and the number of words of description in it show that it was the intent of the Secretary of the Navy to have a final closing of all matters arising under or by virtue of the contract.

Stipulations of this kind are not to be shorn of their efficiency by any narrow, technical and close construction. The general language "all and all manner of debts," etc., indicates a purpose to make an ending of every matter arising under or by virtue of the contract. If parties intend to leave some things open and unsettled their intent so to do should be made manifest. Here was a contract involving three millions of dollars, and after the work was done, the vessel delivered and accepted and this release entered, claims are presented amounting to over $500,000. Surely the parties never intended to leave such a bulk of unsettled matters. As bearing upon this matter, it may be noticed that while the release was signed and the contract between the building company and the Government closed on May 18, 1896, this action was not brought until August 10, 1897, nearly a year and a quarter thereafter.

We are of opinion that the parties by the release of May 18, 1896, which was executed in performance of the requirements of the original contract, settled all disputes between the parties as to the claims sued upon.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter a judgment on the findings for the defendant.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA and MR. JUSTICE MOODY took no part in the decision of this case.

206 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY v. KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.

No. 331. Argued April 17, 18, 1907.-Decided May 13, 1907.

A statute of Kentucky, making penal all shipments of liquor "to be paid for on delivery, commonly called C. O. D. shipments," and further providing that the place where the money is paid or the goods delivered shall be deemed to be the place of sale and that the carrier and his agents delivering the goods shall be jointly liable with the vendor, is as applied to shipments from one State to another an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and beyond the power of the State.

When, in a prosecution of an express company for a violation of this statute by an interstate shipment, it is averred in the indictment or stipulated by the prosecution that the shipment and delivery were made and done by the express company in the usual course of its business as a carrier, testimony that the consignee did not order the goods or that the goods were held by the agent of the company at the place of delivery for a few days to accommodate the consignee is immaterial.

ON February 17, 1904, a grand jury returned into the Circuit Court of Laurel County, Kentucky, an indictment against Joe Newland and the Adams Express Company, charging that "the said Joe Newland and the Adams Express Company, the latter being a partnership engaged in and carrying on the business of a common carrier of packages, goods, wares and merchandise, by the method known as express did in Laurel County, Kentucky, on the seventeenth day of February, 1904, unlawfully and willfully carry for and deliver to George Meece a parcel, package, shipment and quantity of intoxicating, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors to be and which was paid for on delivery at East Bernstadt in said Laurel County, same being at the time a shipment commonly known and called C. O. D. shipments, . said shipment and delivery being made and done at the time by said Joe Newland and said Adams Express Company in the usual course of business of said Adams Express Company."

VOL. CCVI-9