which he does in the new employment entitles him rightfully to be called by the old name. The sailor who is appointed the keeper of a lighthouse may have received his appointment because he was once a sailor, but nevertheless when he enters into the new service he is a lighthouse keeper and not a sailor. The occupation of dredging is not the only one for which life on the sea educates a man. There is a constant demand, for instance, for those who have an honorable discharge from the Navy for employment in civil life. The qualities of obedience, of daring, of fidelity, of the capacity for quick adaptation of insufficient means to the end which may be desired, all the result of training upon the sea, are qualities which are needed in many stations of civil life, but when men have reached those stations by reason of qualities developed in them while seamen they are no longer sailors. The work of the dredgemen and scowmen may be described in a sentence. They were digging a channel and emptying the material excavated in the sea. All those who were engaged in the work may fairly be described as either laborers or mechanics. They had nothing whatever to do with navigation. Neither the dredges nor the scows had steering gear, sails or other methods of self-propulsion. They were towed to the place where the work was to be done and there left to do it.

It does not seem to be important that for some purposes the scows and dredges were vessels, or those employed upon them for some purposes are deemed seamen. The question here is what were the men when they were engaged in the work of excavation? Were the men at that time employed as seamen, doing the work of seamen, or as laborers and mechanics, doing the work of laborers and mechanics? I think they then were laborers or mechanics, and employed as such, and that their occupation is determined, not by what they have done in the past, or by what their employers chose to call them, but by what they were doing when the Government invoked the law for their benefit. If they were then doing the work of laborers and mechanics, whatever they may have done in the past,

which constitutes a motive for their employment, or by whatever name they were employed, they were, or rather their labor was, within the restrictions as to hours prescribed by the law. Nor was their work in dredging incident to their employment on the dredges, but quite the reverse. They never would have been employed at all except for dredging. They never would have set foot on the dredge save to use it as a platform on which to do the work of laborers and mechanics. It should not be forgotten that the object of this statute, in which is embodied an expression of a great public policy, is to regulate labor of the kind named, and the men concerned are in or out of its prohibitions solely by reason of the kind of labor they perform. How can it be material here whether the dredge is or is not a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction or that in the construction of two specifically named statutes all those upon it are deemed to be seaman? There is no artificial statutory construction prescribed for this act, and what the men on it are is left, under this act, to be determined according to the truth and fact, and the test to be applied is the nature of the labor they actually perform. They were employed to do the work of laborers and mechanics, in the main they actually did that work, and whatever they did which was of the nature of seamen's work was a mere incident to the fact that they labored upon a floating platform instead of upon the dry. land.

It is conceded in the opinion of the court that the statute admits of an interpretation which brings these cases within it. May not more be said? Are not these cases fairly within the plain words of the act? If this be so, then the rule of strict interpretation, applicable to penal laws, a rule which has lost. all of its ancient rigor, if indeed it is now more than a lifeless form (United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628), cannot be used to take them out. When the intention of the legislature is reasonably clear, the courts have no duty except to carry it out. The rule for the construction of penal statutes is satisfied if the words are not enlarged beyond their natural mean

ing, and it does not require that they shall be restricted to less than that.

The impossibility or difficulty of applying this law to the operations of dredging, which upon the evidence, I think, amounts to no more than that it would result in an inconvenience, which the defendants may readily avoid by refusing to contract with the Government, is a consideration fit to be addressed to Congress rather than to this court.

I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE DAY concur in this dissent.

STONE v. SOUTHERN ILLINOIS AND MISSOURI BRIDGE COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 253. Argued March 24, 25, 1907.- Decided May 13, 1907.

Whether the statutes of a State authorize the incorporation of a bridge company to construct a bridge over a navigable river separating it from another State; whether such statutes confer the right of eminent domain on a corporation of another State, and whether such a corporation can exercise therein powers other than those conferred by the State of its creation, are all questions of state law, involving no Federal questions, and the rulings of the highest court of the State are final and conclusive upon this court.

The act of January 26, 1901, 31 Stat. 741, having authorized the construction by an Illinois corporation of a bridge and approaches across the Mississippi River, it is within the power of one of the States within which the bridge was constructed to authorize extensions thereof and connections therewith necessary and proper to make it available for the use contemplated by the statute, and although such extensions and connections were not within the plans and specifications of the bridge itself and its approaches as approved by the Secretary of War, the condemnation of land necessary for the bridge company to construct them is not in contravention of § 9 of the act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, making it unlawful to deviate in the construction of any bridge over navigable waters from the plans approved by the Secretary of War. 194 Missouri, 175, affirmed.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

206 U.S.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Shepard Barclay, with whom Mr. Madison R. Smith and Mr. Thomas T. Fauntleroy were on the brief, for plaintiffs in

error:

The laws of Congress governing the location and limits of the bridge and approach in question are paramount.

The defendant in error has no power to condemn that part of the land lying west of the 720-foot approach, as fixed by the Secretary of War, for the purpose of constructing and operating "terminal yards" and railroad terminals, or as part of the bridge.

To be a lawful structure the bridge must be built in accordance with the plans as recommended by said board of engineers and the Secretary of War and all requirements of the act observed.

The drawing which defendant in error offered to the Federal engineers, and which the Secretary of War approved, defines the western approach at 720 feet from the western pier as shown on the map. When defendant in error submitted its map and secured its approval as an accurate delineation of the western approach to the bridge, it became bound by its own act until, at least, the Federal supervising authority approved a change. Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Balt. & Ohio Co., 149 Illinois, 272; 30 Stat. 1151, § 9.

The legislation of Congress on this subject necessarily prohibits the operation of any local statute not in harmony therewith.

The entire approach to every such interstate bridge is considered by the legislation of Congress as subject to the supervisory control of the Federal authority. Where the bridge is once located and defined, the same cannot be changed without express authority. In re Bridge Co., 108 N. Y. 483.

The acts of Congress, authorizing the construction of this bridge, operate as limitations on the area of the structure (and its approaches mentioned therein as a part thereof).

The Federal act authorizing this bridge does not grant the right of condemnation of land for the purposes of the bridge. It mentions the defendant in error, the bridge company, as "a corporation created and organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois" (sec. 1).

Those laws do not confer on a bridge company the right of eminent domain, even in Illinois. Rev. Stats., Illinois, 1899, ch. 32, § 1, p. 433; Illinois State Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 208 Illinois, 420.

Mr. Martin L. Clardy, with whom Mr. Alexander G. Cochran was on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

On March 3, 1899, Congress passed an act providing, among other things:

"That it shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, etc.,

navigable river

over

any

of the United States until

the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained, and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War."

The act further provided:

"That when plans for any bridge or other structure have been approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War, it shall not be lawful to deviate from such plans either before or after completion of the structure, unless the modification of said plans has previously been submitted to and received the approval of the Chief of Engineers and of the Secretary of War." 30 Stat. 1151, sec. 9.

On January 26, 1901, Congress passed an act (31 Stat. 741) authorizing the Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge Company (defendant in error), a corporation of the State of Illinois, to erect, construct, maintain and operate a bridge and ap