by the Tenth Amendment. This amendment, which was seemingly adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the National Government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification in the organic act, and that if in the future further powers seemed necessary they should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending that act. It reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The argument of counsel ignores the principal factor in this article, to wit, "the people." Its principal purpose was not the distribution of power between the United States and the States, but a reservation to the people of all powers not granted. The preamble of the Constitution declares who framed it, "we the people of the United States," not the people of one State, but the people of all the States, and Article X reserves to the people of all the States the powers not delegated to the United States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the States not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, and all powers of a national character which are not delegated to the National Government by the Constitution are reserved to the people of the United States. The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things they could not foresee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the circumstances which might call for the exercise of further national powers than those granted to the United States, and after making provision for an amendment to the Constitution by which any needed additional powers would be granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not so delegated. This Article X is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to be considered fairly and

liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning. As we said, construing an express limitation on the powers of Congress, in Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 288:

"We are not here confronted with a question of the extent of the powers of Congress but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on its action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule and spirit of construction must also be recognized. If powers granted are to be taken as broadly granted and as carrying with them authority to pass those acts which may be reasonably necessary to carry them into full execution; in other words, if the Constitution in its grant of powers is to be so construed that Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the powers granted, it is equally imperative that where prohibition or limitation is placed upon the power of Congress that prohibition or limitation should be enforced in its spirit and to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed. Especially is this true when in respect to grants of powers there is as heretofore noticed the help found in the last clause of the eighth section, and no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions and limitations. The true spirit of constitutional interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose."

This very matter of the reclamation of arid lands illustrates this: At the time of the adoption of the Constitution within the known and conceded limits of the United States there were no large tracts of arid land, and nothing which called for any further action than that which might be taken by the legislature of the State, in which any particular tract of such land was to be found, and the Constitution, therefore, makes no provision for a national control of the arid regions or their reclamation. But, as our national territory has been enlarged, we have within our borders extensive tracts of arid lands

which ought to be reclaimed, and it may well be that no power is adequate for their reclamation other than that of the National Government. But if no such power has been granted, none can be exercised.

It does not follow from this that the National Government is entirely powerless in respect to this matter. These arid lands are largely within the Territories, and over them by virtue of the second paragraph of section 3 of Article IV heretofore quoted, or by virtue of the power vested in the National Government to acquire territory by treaties, Congress has full power of legislation, subject to no restrictions other than those expressly named in the Constitution, and, therefore, it may legislate in respect to all arid lands within their limits. As to those lands within the limits of the States, at least of the Western States, the National Government is the most considerable owner and has power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting its property. We do not mean that its legislation can override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation. While arid lands are to be found, mainly if not only in the Western and newer States, yet the powers of the National Government within the limits of those States are the same (no greater and no less) than those within the limits of the original thirteen, and it would be strange if, in the absence of a definite grant of power, the National Government could enter the territory of the States along the Atlantic and legislate in respect to improving by irrigation or otherwise the lands within their borders. Nor do we understand that hitherto Congress has acted in disregard to this limitation. As said by Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court in Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Company, 188 U. S. 545, 554, after referring to previous legislation:

"It may be observed that the purport of the previous acts is reflexively illustrated by the Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388. That act appropriated the receipts from the sale and disposal of the public lands in certain States and Territories

to the construction of irrigation works for the reclamation of arid lands. The eighth section of the act is as follows:

"SEC. 8. That nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of the water acquired under the provisions of this act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.'

But it is useless to pursue the inquiry further in this direction. It is enough for the purposes of this case that each State has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams and other waters. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; St. Louis v. Myers, 113 U. S. 566; Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371; Kaukauna Water Power Company v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Company, 142 U. S. 254; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; Water Power Company v. Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349; Kean v. Calumet Canal Company, 190 U. S. 452. In Barney v. Keokuk, supra, Mr. Justice Bradley said (p. 338):

"And since this court, in the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 id. 443, has declared that the Great Lakes and other navigable waters of the country, above as well as below the flow of the tide, are, in the strictest sense, entitled to the denomination of navigable waters, and amenable to the admiralty jurisdiction, there seems to be no sound reasons for adhering to the old rule as to the proprietorship of the beds and shores of such

waters. It properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from extending (if it could extend) its survey and grants beyond the limits of high water."

In Hardin v. Jordan, supra, the same Justice, after stating that the title to the shore and lands under water is in the State, added (pp. 381, 382):

"Such title being in the State, the lands are subject to state regulation and control, under the condition, however, of not interfering with the regulations which may be made by Congress with regard to public navigation and commerce. Sometimes large areas so reclaimed are occupied by cities, and are put to other public or private uses, state control and ownership therein being supreme, subject only to the paramount authority of Congress in making regulations of commerce, and in subjecting the lands to the necessities and uses of comThis right of the States to regulate and control the shores of tide waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the Crown in England. In this country the same rule has been extended to our great navigable lakes, which are treated as inland seas; and also, in some of the States, to navigable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Ohio, and, in Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of the State; but it depends on the law of each State to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the State over the lands under water shall be exercised."

merce.

It may determine for itself whether the common law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any State. It is undoubtedly true that the early settlers brought to this country the common law of England, and that that common law throws light on the meaning and scope of the Constitution of the United States, and is also in many States expressly recognized as of controlling force in the absence of express statute. As said by Mr.