To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that
he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was
issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as
he appears to have had actual notice. In re Lennon, 548.
See INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES.
The tobacco company purchased from an internal revenue officer of the
United States revenue stamps to the amount of $4100.10, to be put
upon its tobacco as manufactured. April 2, 1893, its factory in New
York and all the contents were destroyed by fire. Among the con-
tents were the stamps so purchased. Of these, stamps to the value of
$1356.63 had not been used, and stamps to the value of $2743.47 had
been put upon packages of tobacco which were still in the factory,
unsold. The property was insured. In settling with the insurers the
latter paid the tobacco company the value of the destroyed stamps,
and it was understood that the insurers were entitled to whatever
might be received or recovered from the Government under the pro-
visions of the statute amending the laws relating to internal revenue.
Act of March 1, 1879, c. 125. The company under the provisions of
that act applied to the Treasury Department for the return of the
destroyed stamps. The rules of the department required the appli-
cant for such repayment to make oath that he had not theretofore
presented a claim for the refunding of the amount asked for, and
that its amount or any part thereof had not been received by him.
Instead thereof the company filed an oath that the amount had not
been claimed of the Government, and that no portion of it had been
received from the Government. The department having refused pay-
ment, the company thereupon brought this action in the Court of
Claims. Held, (1) That the action was properly brought in the name
of the insured for the use of the insurers; (2) That payment by the
insurer to the company did not bar the right of the latter to recover
from the United States; (3) That by recovering from the United
States the company would become the trustee of the insurers, who
were its equitable assignees; (4) That upon the facts found by the
Court of Claims the action could be maintained, as the payment by
the insurers constituted no bar; (5) That there was a substantial
compliance with the Treasury regulation concerning the oath when
the oath was filed on the part of the company of the fact of the
destruction, and that no claim for refunding had been presented to
the Government, and no portion of the claim had been paid by it;
(6) That the company had an insurable interest in the stamps de-
stroyed; (7) That it was too late to set up for the first time in this
court that the Government had the election to reimburse the claimant
by giving stamps instead of by payment in cash. United States v.
American Tobacco Company, 468.
1. The provisions respecting contracts, combinations and conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with for-
eign countries, contained in the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, “to protect
trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,"
apply to and cover common carriers by railroad; and a contract be-
tween them in restraint of such trade or coinmerce is prohibited, even
though the contract is entered into between competing railroads, only
for the purpose of thereby affecting traffic rates for the transporta-
tion of persons and property. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, 290.
2. The act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, "to regulate commerce," is not in-
consistent with the act of July 2, 1890, as it does not confer upon
competing railroad companies power to enter into a contract in
restraint of trade and commerce, like the one which forms the subject
of this suit. Ib.
3. The prohibitory provisions of the said act of July 2, 1890, apply to all
contracts in restraint of interstate or foreign trade or commerce with-
out exception or limitation; and are not confined to those in which
the restraint is unreasonable. Ib.
4. In order to maintain this suit the Government is not obliged to show
that the agreement in question was entered into for the purpose
of restraining trade or commerce, if such restraint is its necessary
effect. Ib.
5. This agreement, though legal when made, became illegal on the pas-
sage of the act of July 2, 1890, and acts done under it after that
statute became operative were done in violation of it. Ib.
6. The fourth section of the act invests the Government with full power
and authority to bring such a suit as this; and, if the facts alleged are
proved, an injunction should issue. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, C, 5;
TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 8.
1. When the construction of certain words in deeds or wills of real estate
has become a settled rule of property in a State, that construction is
to be followed by the courts of the United States in determining the
title to land within the State, whether between the same or between
other parties. Barber v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway
Co., 83.
2. A single decision of the highest court of a State upon the construction
of the words of a particular devise is not conclusive evidence of the
law of the State, in a case in a court of the United States, involving
the construction of the same or like words, between other parties, or
even between the same parties or their privies, unless presented under
such circumstances as to be an adjudication of their rights. Ib.
3. Parties to collateral proceedings are bound by the jurisdictional aver-
ments in the record, and will not be permitted to dispute them except
so far as they may have contained a false recital with respect to such
parties. In re Lennon, 548.
4. Where the requisite citizenship appears on the face of a bill, the juris-
diction of the court cannot be attacked by evidence dehors the record,
in a collateral proceeding by one who was not a party to the bill. Ib.
B. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.
1. This court has authority to reëxamine the final judgment of the highest
court of a State, rendered in a proceeding to condemn private property
for public use, in which after verdict a defendant assigned as a ground
for new trial that the statute under which the case was instituted and
the proceedings under it were in violation of the clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, forbidding a State to deprive any person of prop-
erty without due process of law, and which ground of objection was
repeated in the highest court of the State; provided the judgment of
the court by its necessary operation was adverse to the claim of Fed-
eral right and could not rest upon any independent ground of local
law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 226.
2. The libel in this case was dismissed by the trial court. The judgment
of that court was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and the case was
remanded for assessment of damages. After assessment and decree it
was again taken to the Court of Appeals, where the decree of assess-
ment was affirmed, whereupon a writ of certiorari from this court was
granted. Held, that, upon such writ, the entire case was before this
court for examination. Panama Railroad v. Napier Shipping Co., 280.
3. The dissolution of the freight association does not prevent this court
from taking cognizance of the appeal and deciding the case on its
merits; as, where parties have entered into an illegal agreement and
are acting under it, and there is no adequate remedy at law, and the
jurisdiction of the court has attached by the filing of a bill to restrain
such or like action under a similar agreement, and a trial has been had
and judgment entered, the appellate jurisdiction of this court is not
ousted by a simple dissolution of the association, effected subsequently
to the entry of judgment in the suit. United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 290.
4. While the statutory amount must as a matter of fact be in controversy, yet the fact that it is so need not appear in the bill, but may be shown to the satisfaction of the court. Ib.
5. There was printed in the record, as filed in this court what purported to be an extract from the closing brief of counsel presented to the Supreme Court of the State, in which a Federal question was discussed, and it was asserted orally at the bar here, that in the argument made in the Supreme Court of the State a claim under the Federal Constitution was presented. Held, that such matters formed no part of the record, and were not adequate to create a Federal question, when no such question was decided below, and the record does not disclose that such issues were set up or claimed in any proper manner in the courts of the State. Zadig v. Baldwin, 485.
6. The verdict of a jury determines questions of fact at issue and this court cannot review such determination, or examine the testimony further than to see that there was sufficient to justify the conclusions reached. Carter v. Ruddy, 493.
7. Under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, the power of this court in certiorari extends to every case pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeals and may be exercised at any time during such pendency, provided the case is one which, but for this provision of the statute, would be finally determined in that court. Forsyth v. Hammond, 506. 8. While this power is coextensive with all possible necessities, and sufficient to secure to this court a final control over the litigation in all the courts of appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly exercised, and only when the circumstances of the case satisfy this court that the importance of the question involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between two or more courts of appeal, or between courts of appeal and the courts of a State, or some matter affecting the interests of the Nation, in its internal or external relations, demands such exercise. Ib. 9. As, in the contests between the parties to this suit, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana had reached opposite conclusions as to their respective rights, and as all the unfortunate possibilities of conflict and collision which might arise from these adverse decisions were suggested when this application for certiorari was made, it seemed to this court that, although no final decree had been entered, it was its duty to bring the case and the questions here for examination at the earliest possible moment. Ib. 10. This court cannot review the final judgment of the highest court of a State even if it denied some title, right, privilege or immunity of the unsuccessful party, unless it appear from the record that such title, right, privilege or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" in the state court as belonging to such party under the Constitution or some treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 709. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 648.
11. The words "specially set up or claimed " in that section imply that if
a party in a suit in a state court intends to invoke for the protection
of his rights the Constitution of the United States or some treaty,
statute, commission or authority of the United States, he must so de-
clare; and unless he does so declare, "specially," that is, unmistakably,
this court is without authority to reëxamine the final judgment of the
state court. This statutory requirement is not met if such declaration
is so general in its character that the purpose of the party to assert a
Federal right is left to mere inference. Ib.
12. In cases brought here from state courts their decisions are final, in
matters of procedure, and on alleged conflicts between the statutes of
the State and its constitution. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook-
lyn, 685.
13. After the trial court and the Superior Court had disposed of this case
without any Federal question having been raised, the railroad com-
pany moved to set the judgment aside and transfer the case to the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the statutes, as construed by the
state court in its opinion, were invalid and in violation of the Consti-
tution. This motion being denied an appeal was granted to the Court
of Appeals where it was claimed in argument that the state statute as
construed impaired the obligation created by the charter of the com-
pany, and denied the equal protection of the laws, in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, that the record did not show that
a Federal question had been raised below in time and in a way to give
this court jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louis-
ville, 709.
See ADMIRALTY, 2;
CERTIORARI, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, C, 3;
PRACTICE;
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. When a decree of the Circuit Court, at a hearing upon pleadings and
proofs, dismissing a bill in equity for the infringement of a patent,
has been reversed by this court on appeal, upon the grounds that the
patent was valid and had been infringed by the defendant, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opin-
ion of this court, the Circuit Court has no authority to grant or enter-
tain a petition filed, without leave of this court, for a rehearing for
newly discovered evidence; and, if it does so, will be compelled by
writ of mandamus to set aside its orders, and to execute the mandate
of this court. In re Potts, 263.
2. A citizen of the District of Columbia cannot maintain an action against
a citizen of Wisconsin, on the ground of diverse citizenship, in a Circuit
Court of the United States in that State, even though a competent per-
son be joined with him as co-plaintiff. Hooe v. Jamieson, 395.
3. A writ of scire facias upon a recognizance to answer to a charge of
crime in a District Court of the United States is a "case arising under
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