SREPORT C. C.
No. 1.

34th CONGRESS, HO. OF REPRESENTATIVES. 1st Session.

{

SAMUEL P. TODD.

[To accompany bill H. R. C. C. No. 1.]

MARCH 6, 1856.--Reported from the Court of Claims.

MAY 16, 1856. -Ordered to be printed.

SAMUEL P. TODD vs. THE UNITED STATES.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

The undersigned, by direction of the Court of Claims, in pursuance of law, herewith respectfully transmits the following papers in the case above mentioned:

1. Petition of Samuel P. Todd.

2. Opinion of the court.

[L. S.]

SAMUEL H. HUNTINGTON,
Chief Clerk Court of Claims.

SAMUEL P. TODD vs. THE UNITED STATES.

The following opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Gilchrist on Tuesday, in the case of Samuel P. Todd vs. The United States:

To the Court of Claims:

The petition of Samuel P. Todd, a purser in the navy of the United States, respectfully represents: That during the time he was on duty as such, he received, between the years 1812 and 1815, from Washington, a certain amount of money in treasury notes, to be used in making payments on account of the officers and others of the navy of the United States for pay accruing to them as such, and for which he has duly accounted to the government; that a portion of the same. notes so received was by him negotiated and sold, by direction and under the authority of the commanding officers, at a discount, for the purpose of paying off seamen and others who had served out the time for which they had enlisted in the United States Delaware flotilla, a force employed for the defence of the river Delaware during the late war with Great Britain; that the said discount paid thereon amounts to five hundred and seventy-four dollars and fifty cents, ($574 50,) which has been regularly charged in his accounts with the government, and vouchers rendered for the same, which are now on file in the office of the Fourth Auditor of the Treasury; that he has never

been credited with the amount aforesaid, the accounting officers alleging as a reason for not putting it to his credit, as follows:

It is true that the act of January 25, 1828, which forbids the payment of public money to any person for his compensation, who is in arrears to the United States, contains a proviso that it shall not be extended to balances arising wholly from the depreciation of treasury notes received by such person to be expended in the public service; but no authority has ever been given to the accounting officers, except by special acts in particular instances, to credit any disbursing officer with his loss upon such notes." Your petitioner would further represent that he has paid into the treasury of the United States the sum above stated, viz: five hundred and seventy-four dollars and fifty cents, ($574 50,) and respectfully asks to be relieved by such act as may authorize and direct the Fourth Auditor of the Treasury to admit the same to his credit, that it may be refunded and paid to your petitioner.

By leave of the court first had and obtained, the said Samuel P. Todd, in amendment of his petition, states that the court should. award him interest on the amount which may be found due him, and which has been so long and so unjustly detained from him.

He further states that he is the sole owner of this claim, never having assigned any portion thereof.

In consideration of the premises, he prays, as in his original petition, &c.

BIRCHETT & DOWNING,

Counsel for Claimant.

OPINION.

The claimant's allegations are, that, being a purser in the navy, and serving in the United States Delaware flotilla, he received, in his official capacity, from the government, between the years 1812 and 1815, certain sums of money, to be used in paying persons employed in the naval service, in treasury notes. A part of these notes was sold by him at a discount, under the authority of his commanding officers, for the purpose of paying off seamen and others. The discount amounted to the sum of $574 50, which he has charged in his accounts, and furnished vouchers therefor, which are on file in the office of the Fourth Auditor. The reason given by the accounting officers for declining to put this sum to his credit is, that no authority has ever been given them, except by special acts in particular instances, to credit any disbursing officer with his loss upon such notes. In answer to a call upon the Treasury Department for information relating to this claim, we have been furnished with a copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, dated on the 27th day of

e

January, 1855, and written in answer to a letter of the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, of the Senate, addressed to the department. The letter to which we refer was written by Mr. Dayton, the Fourth Auditor, and in it he states as follows: "Mr. Todd, during the last war with Great Britain, was purser of the Philadelphia station, and had charge of the accounts of the officers and men of the Delaware flotilla of gun-boats. In the year 1817 he rendered an account, in which he charged the sum of $574 for loss sustained by him on the sale of treasury notes, which were then at a discount in the market, and which he was compelled to exchange for smaller money to enable him to pay the men. This claim was disallowed; but upon what grounds, I have not the means of positively ascertaining. It has since been frequently renewed, however, and it would appear, from the correspondence of the office, that it was rejected from time to time, owing to the want of proper proof of the loss, and want of legal authority to make such an allowance. In the year 1839 the deficiency in the evidence was supplied as to a part of the claim, amounting to $313, by the production of the approval of the commandant of the flotilla. The receipts of brokers were produced for a portion of the remainder, showing that, in December, 1814, they had sold treasury notes for Purser Todd to the amount of $4,000, on which there was a discount of $240; but these vouchers were not approved by Commodore Rodgers, the commandant of the station. On one of the rolls, however, approved by the commodore, the following note is endorsed by the purser: The men whose names are herein mentioned were all paid off in Philadelphia bank notes, treasury notes having been negotiated for that purpose by direction of Commodore Rodgers.' The amount paid to the men alluded to was $2,630 31; and as the approval of Commodore Rodgers is directly under the note, and as the roll is dated on the 31st of December, 1814, during which month the notes were sold, I presume that the approval may be considered of the same force, to the extent of $2,630 31, as if it had been attached to the brokers' bills. The average discount on treasury notes during that month appears to have been per cent. Purser Todd, in one of his letters to this office, complained that he was not informed of the necessity of Commodore Rodgers' approval of the vouchers until some years after the first account was rendered, and that owing to the commodore's loss of memory, it could not then be obtained. It was the duty of the memorialist, however, being a purser in the navy, to be acquainted with the rules of the department, and to present his evidence, in the first instance, in the requisite form. Upon the statement of his account in 1849, a balance of several thousand dollars was found to be due from him to the United States, including the sum of $574, now in question, the whole of which balance he paid into the treasury, by order of the Secretary of the Navy.

6

"I think he has proved his loss on the negotiation of treasury notes, under the circumstances mentioned in his petition, to the amount of $470, or thereabouts."

From another letter, dated on the 4th of December, 1855, written by Mr. Dayton to the Secretary of the Treasury, it appears that the sum of $574 was paid into the treasury on the 11th of November, 1839.

By this statement of the Fourth Auditor it appears that, in the first place, the claimant satisfactorily proved a loss by the depreciation of treasury notes, amounting to the sum of $313. He then showed by the bills of the brokers a depreciation of 6 per cent. upon the sum of $2,630 31, amounting to the sum of $157 82, making in the whole the sum of $470 82, which agrees with the loss as estimated at the treasury. This sum of $2,630 31 is a part of the sum of $4,000 which was sold in the month of December, 1814. The claimant alleges that he is entitled to be allowed 6 per cent. on this sum, but he is allowed 6 per cent. on the sum only of $2,630 31. The difference between the sum claimed and the sum allowed is $82 18, and in the present stage of the case it is upon this sum only that any question arises; for upon the vouchers showing a loss to this extent the approval of the commodore was not produced.

The objection is, not that the notes, amounting to $4,000, were improperly sold, but that the proof adduced does not comply with the rules of the department so far as regards the sum of $82 18.

We start, however, with the fact, that in the month of December, 1814, the average depreciation on treasury notes was six per cent. The sum of $4,000, then received from the government in treasury notes, would pay the debts of the government only to the extent of $3,760. If, then, the purser had shown that he paid the officers and men the sum of $4,000, there would be competent evidence tending to prove that the United States were indebted to him in the sum of $240, over and above the money he had received; and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a jury would be authorized to come to that conclusion. But it is unnecessary to rely on this view of the case; for the statement of the department is, that the receipts of brokers were produced showing that, in December, 1814, they had sold treasury notes for Purser Todd to the amount of 4,000, on which there was a discount of $240. The question now is, not whether the amount of the depreciation should have been allowed at the treasury, but whether it should now be allowed by the United States. It is entirely proper that, for the methodical conduct of business at the treasury, rules should be established which the experience of its officers informs them are best adapted for that purpose. But such rules cannot, in a suit against the United States, supersede the ordinary principles and requirements of the law of evidence, nor can they add anything to what the law requires of a claimant in order to make out his case. The treasury notes have been sold by the brokers; their accounts of such sales, duly proved, are competent evidence, and the best evidence the nature of the case admits of to prove the extent of the depreciation. It was the duty of the purser to pay off the officers and men of the flotilla so far as the funds furnished him by the government would permit. But the notes were worth less than their nominal value by 6 per cent., and to the extent of 6 per cent. on the amount the purser may be considered as having paid his own money. Before his accounts were stated, on the 11th of November, 1839, the facts in this case would be sufficient to support an action for money paid; and after that date, and after he had paid the money into the treasury, the facts would support an action for money had and received. The approval

of the commodore upon the vouchers is to be regarded only as required by a rule of convenience at the treasury, but it cannot be considered in a court of law as a rule of evidence. Cases might undoubtedly occur where, under peculiar circumstances, a wanton disregard of the rules of the department might be indicative of fraud, or of such gross negligence in the claimant as might authorize the rejection of his claim; but nothing of the kind appears here. The fact that the purser was not informed of the necessity of the commodore's approval of the vouchers until some years after 1817, when the claim was made, can scarcely be considered gross negligence. If an officer's accounts be substantially correct, he can hardly be subjected to such a charge, because he is ignorant of merely formal proof not required by an act of Congress.

We shall therefore report a bill in favor of paying to the claimant the sum of $553, for which he has produced satisfactory evidence.

It is contended, on behalf of the claimant, that the United States should be charged with, and should pay, interest on the amount of the claim. If this be so, it is either because the court should report to Congress, that, in their judgment, the claimant is fairly and equitably entitled to interest, or because they should report that the United States are legally bound to pay interest on the amount ascertained to be due, upon the principal that, in the ordinary courts of law, enables a creditor to recover interest of his debtor.

In regard to the first of these reasons, it is proper to inquire into the principle that should govern the court in their adjudications upon the cases within their jurisdiction, either as belonging to one of the classes specified in the act, or as referred to the court by one of the houses of Congress. If a claim be alleged to be "founded upon any law of Congress," in the words of the act we must construe such law, and ascertain its meaning by applying it to those rules of construction which a wide and long-continued experience has determined to be the best adapted to that purpose; and the same course must be pursued where a claim is founded "upon any regulation of an executive department." If a contract with the government of the United States be the foundation of the claim, the nature and validity of such contract must be determined by the application of known and well settled principles of law. Without such principles to guide them, nò tribunal, no body of men, judicial or deliberative, can administer any other than that hasty and impulsive justice, whose decisions, as they would be uncontrolled by any rule, could never aid the citizen in ascertaining the extent and nature of his rights.

If the application of principles of law, considering the law as our rule of conduct, be necessary in the cases belonging to the classes specified in the act, it is equally so in regard to the claims referred to the court by either house of Congress. It seems sometimes to have been supposed that the language of the act on this point was comprehensive enough to authorize the court to recommend Congress to do anything it may be in their power to do-in fact, to pass any law that would not be a violation of the constitution. But our duties are not advisory. The language of the act does not authorize us to regard this tribunal as possessing any other qualities than those which pro