Opinion of the Court.

Counsel for appellant earnestly contend, that by comparing the law in force, with the act of 1872, to which it is an amendment, it will appear that gas companies are mentioned in section 32 by an oversight on the part of the legislature. On the other hand, appellee's counsel maintain, that by the same means it will be made clear that the intention was to subject their capital stock to assessment by the Board of Equalization, and in support of that view cite, by way of argument, a very clear and satisfactory opinion rendered by Judge BLODGETT, in Williams v. Rees, 9 Biss. 405. We have examined the two acts with reference to what is said in support of the respective positions of counsel, and are unable to find anything in them to justify the construction contended for by appellant. Section 32 of the act of 1872 was in the following language: "Banking, bridge, express, ferry, gravel-road, gas, insurance, manufacturing, mining, plank-road, savings bank, stage, steamboat, street railroad, transportation, turnpike, and all other companies and associations incorporated under the laws of this State, (other than banks organized under the general banking laws of this State,) shall, in addition to the other property required by this act to be listed, make out and deliver to the assessor a sworn statement of the amount of capital stock," setting forth particularly, etc. When this section was adopted, the legislature evidently understood gas companies to be distinguishable from manufacturing companies, else why name both? If manufacturing companies were understood to include gas companies, why should the latter be expressly named? When the subsequent legislature took manufacturing companies out of that section, and transferred them to the proviso in clause 4 of section 3, and left gas companies in section 32, it must have intended to treat the two differently, still understanding the former did not include the latter.

We are satisfied those companies are not within the intent and meaning of clause 4 of section 3, but were intentionally left by the legislature in section 32. What consideration may

Opinion of the Court.

have moved the General Assembly to distinguish these from other manufacturing companies,-whether because of special privileges sometimes accorded them in the use of streets, to convey, by pipes, gas to consumers, or because, owing to the peculiar nature of their product, it can not be subjected to assessment and taxation as can the articles made by other manufacturing companies,-we do not deem it important to consider. We think the legislative will sufficiently appears in the act itself, and especially when considered with reference to the act to which it is amendatory.

The remaining question is, does the statute, thus understood, contravene section 1 of article 9 of the constitution of this State? We have already seen that the legislature has distinguished gas companies from purely manufacturing companies, and, for the purpose of taxing their capital stock, classed them with banking, mining and other corporations mentioned in section 32, supra. If we are correct in this conclusion, the case of Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finlen, 124 Ill. 666, is directly in point, and decisive of the question here presented. There the coal company sought to enjoin the extension of a tax against its capital stock and franchise, assessed by the State Board of Equalization, on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional; but we held otherwise, adhering to what had been previously decided in Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis Railroad Co. 76 Ill. 579.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Syllabus.

ASAHEL GAGE

v.

WILLIAM W. STEWART et al.

Filed at Ottawa January 25, 1889.

1. TAX TITLE-notice-as.a prerequisite to a deed. A strict compliance with the statute in respect to the service of notice of the purchase and when the time of redemption will expire, and of the proof thereof, is a prerequisite to the making of a valid tax deed.

2.

SAME-notice—amendatory act of 1879—its operation as respects sales made prior thereto. The requirements of section 216 of the Revenue law, as amended in 1879, not included in that section before such amendment, are, that service of notice shall be had upon "the owner of or parties interested in said land or lot, if they can, upon diligent inquiry, be found in the county," etc. Provision is made for publication in case the land or lot is unoccupied, or the person in whose name it is assessed, or the owners or parties interested therein, can not be found in the county, or if the owners, etc., are unknown to the purchaser or his assignee, publication may be made as to them, as unknown owners, etc.

3. This amendment of 1879 was intended to take effect in presenti as to all notices to be thereafter served, and to apply to all purchasers at tax sales and their assignees, irrespective of when the sales for taxes were made. The amended act applied to all steps to be taken after it went into effect, and which could be performed according to its requirements. This construction does not give the act a retrospective operation.

4. A retrospective effect will not be given to a statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly manifested. But no such effect is sought to be given to this statute. It, for the protection of those having the right to redeem, required that notice be served upon the owner, if to be found in the county, at least three months before the expiration of the time of redemption. The amendment in no way affects or applies to the sale, or any of the precedent steps lawful under the former statute, but relates solely to acts to be performed by the purchaser or his assignee subsequent to its taking effect, and by which his inchoate right in the land may ripen into a title.

5. These requirements-of giving notice of the sale, when the time of redemption will expire, and making proof thereof to the clerkare in the nature of remedies to be pursued by the purchaser or holder of the certificate of purchase, to mature and perfect his title to the land

Brief for the Appellant.

under the tax sale. As to all those acts which could be performed by the purchaser or his assignee after the statute became in force, it necessarily operated prospectively.

6. This amendatory act of 1879, in requiring notice to be served on others, not before included, of the time when redemption from a tax sale would expire, is not void, as impairing the obligation of the contract between the State and the purchaser at the tax sale.

7. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF STATUTES-to what extent allowable. It is competent for the legislature, in its discretion, to regulate or change the methods of conducting public business, and to impose such restrictions and conditions upon those having contracts with the State as public policy may demand, although such restrictions, conditions or changes may require the observance of new forms by the public officers or by the party to the contract. The exercise of such power is, in effect, the same as the exercise of the power for the enforcement of contracts. Within the limitation that the right itself shall not be impaired, it is to be regarded as within legislative control.

8. A law, however, which deprives a party of all legal remedy, or imposes impossible conditions to the assertion of his right, will necessarily be void. The power of the legislature in this regard is subject to the limitation that every provision of substantial benefit in the contract must be preserved. No new conditions can be imposed requiring the payment of additional consideration, or that may hinder or prevent the purchaser or his assignees from acquiring title, or extending the time of redemption.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. LORIN C. COLLINS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. AUGUSTUS N. GAGE, for the appellant:

The law in force when the tax sale took place required service of the notice on, first, the occupant of the land; and second, the person in whose name the land was listed or taxed, if to be found in the county. The property, here, was taxed in the name of A. C. Stewart, and he was dead, and the notice was served on his heirs, and the only persons in the actual occupancy of the land. Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11; Garrick v. Chamberlain, 97 id. 620; Frew v. Taylor, 106 id. 159.

It is also objected, that the affidavits do not show service on the owners or parties interested in the property. At the time

Brief for the Appellees. Opinion of the Court.

of the tax sale, these persons were not required to be served. All persons were duly served that the law required to be served when the sale was made.

Mr. H. S. MCCARTNEY, for the appellees:

The act of 1879, imposing additional duties on purchasers at tax sales to entitle them to deeds, is a valid enactment as to sales made before its passage. State v. Hundhausen, 24 Wis. 196; Curtis v. Morrow, id. 669.

The affidavits fail to show a sufficient service. Price v. England, 109 Ill. 395; Davis v. Gossnell, 113 id. 121; Gage Bailey, 100 id. 531.

Mr. JUSTICE SHOPE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill filed by appellees, to set aside as clouds upon their title to certain lots in the city of Chicago, three certain tax deeds held by appellant. An answer was filed to so much of the bill as related to two of said deeds, and a demurrer interposed to the residue of the bill, which averred the invalidity of the third of said deeds,—which demurrer was overruled by the court. Appellant electing to abide by his demurrer, the cause was heard upon the issues presented by the answer, and a decree rendered in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

The only questions here presented, relate to the overruling of the demurrer, and the rendering of the decree upon the allegations of the bill as to the last of said deeds.

The deed in controversy bears date March 9, 1881, and is based upon a sale for taxes made October 21, 1878, and from which redemption expired October 21, 1880. The bill, after setting forth the title of appellees, alleges that defendant claims title under said deed; that it is void; that in making proof to the county clerk preliminary to its execution, appellant did not comply with the law, for the reason that the affi

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