such laws as the executive power may condescend to propose to them. At the opening of every session, they of themselves take into their hands the great book of the state; they open all the pages, and examine every article. When they have discovered abuses, they proceed to inquire into their causes:- when these abuses arise from an open disregard of the laws, they endeavour to strengthen them; when they proceed from their insufficiency, they remedy the evil by additional provisions (b). Nor do they proceed with less regularity and free- 236 dom, in regard to that important object, subsidies. They are to be the sole judges of the quantity of them, as well as of the ways and means of raising them; and they need not come to any resolution with regard to them till they see the safety of the subject completely provided for. In a word, the making of laws is not, in such an arrangement of things, a gratuitous contract, in which the people are to take just what is given them, and as it is given them:-it is a contract, in which they buy and pay, and in which they themselves settle the different conditions, and furnish the words to express them. The English parliament have given a still greater extent to their advantages on so important a subject. They have not only secured to themselves a right of proposing laws and remedies, but they have also prevailed on the executive power to renounce all claim to 237 (b) No popular assembly ever enjoyed the privilege of starting, canvassing, and proposing new matter, to such a degree as the English parliament. do the same. I indeed confess, that it seems very natural, in the modelling of a state, to intrust this very important office 238 of framing laws to those persons who may be supposed to have before acquired experience and wisdom in the management of public affairs. But events have unfortunately demonstrated, that public employments and power improve the understanding of men in a less degree than they pervert their views; and it has been found in the issue, that the effect of a regulation which, at first sight, seems so perfectly consonant with prudence, is to confine the people to a mere passive and defensive share in the legislation, and to deliver them (c) The king, indeed, at times, sends messages to either house; and nobody, I think, can wish that no means of intercourse should exist between him and his parliament. But these messages are always expressed in very general words: they are only made to desire the house to take certain subjects into their consideration: no particular articles or clauses are expressed; the commons are not to declare, at any settled time, a solemn acceptance or rejection of the proposition made by the king; and, in short, the house follow the same mode of proceeding, with respect to such messages, as they usually do in regard to petitions presented by private individuals. Some member makes a motion upon the subject expressed in the king's message: a bill is framed in the usual way: it may be dropped at every stage of it; and it is never the proposal of the crown, but the motions of some of their own members, which the house discuss, and finally accept or reject. up to the continual enterprises of those who, at the same time that they are under the greatest temptations to deceive them, possess the most powerful means of effecting it. If we cast our eyes on the history of the ancient governments, in those times when the persons intrusted with the executive power were still in a state of dependence on the legislature, and consequently were frequently obliged to have recourse to it, we shall see almost continual instances of selfish and insidious laws proposed by them to the assemblies of the people. And those men, in whose wisdom the law had at first placed so much confidence, became, in the issue, so lost to all sense of shame and duty, that when arguments were found to be no longer sufficient, they had recourse to force; the legislative assemblies 239 became so many fields of battle, and their power a real calamity. I know very well, however, that there are other important circumstances besides those I have just mentioned, which would prevent disorders of this kind from taking place in England (d). But, on the other hand, let us call to mind that the person who, in England, is invested with the executive authority, unites in himself the whole public power and majesty. Let us represent to ourselves the great and sole magistrate of the nation pressing the acceptance of those laws which he had proposed, with a vehemence suited to the usual importance of his designs, with the warmth of monarchical pride, (d) I particularly mean here the circumstance of the people having entirely delegated their power to their representatives; the consequences of which institution will be discussed in the next chapter. which must meet with no refusal, and exerting for that all his immense resources. purpose It was therefore a matter of indispensable necessity, that things should be settled in England in the manner they are. As the moving springs of the executive power are, in the hands of the king, a kind of sacred depositum, 240 so are those of the legislative power in the hands of the two houses. The king must abstain from touching them, in the same manner as all the subjects of the kingdom are bound to submit to his prerogatives. When he sits in parliament, he has left, we may say, his executive power without doors, and can only assent or dissent. If the crown had been allowed to take an active part in the business of making laws, it would soon have rendered useless the other branches of the legislature. CHAPTER V. SECTION I.-As to whether it would be an Advantage to public Liberty, that the Laws should be enacted by the Votes of the People at large. BUT it will be said, whatever may be the wisdom of the English laws, how great soever their precautions may be with regard to the safety of the individual, the people, as they do not themselves expressly enact them, cannot be looked upon as a free people. The author of the Social Contract carries this opinion even farther; he says, that, " though the people of England think 241 they are free, they are much mistaken; they are so only during the election of members for parliament: as soon as these are elected, the people are slaves-they are nothing (a).” Before I answer this objection, I shall observe that the word liberty is one of those which has been most misunderstood or misapplied. Thus, at Rome, where that class of citizens who were really masters of the state, were sensible that a lawful regular authority, once trusted to a single ruler, would put an end to their tyranny, they taught the people to believe, that, provided those who exercised a military (a) See M. Rousseau's Social Contract, chap. xv. |