of the artifices of a few designing men, who are exulting

among themselves (e).

255 In a word, those who are acquainted with republican

governments, and in general know the manner in which business is transacted in numerous assemblies, will not scruple to affirm that the few who are united, who take an active part in public affairs, and whose 256 station makes them conspicuous, have such an advantage over the many who turn their eyes towards them, and are without union among themselves, that, even with a middling degree of skill, they can at all times direct at their pleasure, the general resolutions; that,

(e) In Geneva, in the year 1707, a law was enacted, that a general assembly of the people should be held, every five years, to treat of the affairs of the republic; but the magistrates, who dreaded those assemblies, soon obtained from the citizens themselves the repeal of the law; and the first resolution of the people, in the first of those periodical assemblies (in the year 1712), was to abolish them for ever. The profound secrecy with which the magistrates prepared their proposal to the citizens on that subject, and the sudden manner in which the latter, when assembled, were acquainted with it, and made to give their votes upon it, have indeed accounted but imperfectly for this strange determination of the people; and the consternation which seized the whole assembly when the result of the suffrages was proclaimed, has confirmed many in the opinion that some unfair means had been used. The whole transaction has been kept secret to this day; but the common opinion on this subject, which has been adopted by M. Rousseau, in his Lettres de la Montagne, is this: The magistrates, it is said, had privately instructed the secretaries in whose ears the citizens were to whisper the suffrages: when a citizen said approbation, he was understood to approve the proposal of the magistrates; when he said rejection, he was understood to reject the periodical assemblies; and numberless instances might be drawn from ancient history, in confirmation of the above observations.

as a consequence of the very nature of things, there is no proposal however absurd, to which a numerous assembly of men may not, at one time or other, be brought to assent; and that laws would be wiser, and more likely to procure the advantage of all, if they were to be made by drawing lots, or casting dice, than by the suffrages of a multitude.

SECTION II.

The Subject continued.

THE first part of this chapter enters upon an enquiry of considerable importance at the present day; and as much is said that the Constitution is not only strengthened by the Reform Act, (as it is familiarly called), but that reform has not proceeded far enough without universal suffrage and vote by ballot, it becomes necessary to extend this enquiry still further— as to the advantages to be gained by the people in the establishment of such a constitutional suffrage.

In making that enquiry, it is not within the nature of this work, which is intended more as an illustration of the science of politics, considered as an exact science, to enter further upon the stability afforded to the constitution by the Reform Act, than is practically consistent with the well-being of the institutions of the country.

It is a well admitted axiom, that there must always be a counterbalancing power to support in proper health

the entire constitution; without this equilibrium it must fall.

Ancient institutions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long administration the descent to vice is insensible, but there is no re-ascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts. Burlamaqui, in his Principles of Natural and Political Law (1), collects the principal views which the sovereign ought to have in the enacting of laws. Among others he observes, that the laws ought to be such, that the subjects may be inclined to observe them rather of their own accord than through necessity, and that the sovereign ought not to be easily persuaded to change the established laws, and that frequent changes in laws certainly lessen their authority, as well as that of the sovereign.

The opinions expressed in the preceding section of this chapter, are in themselves conclusive, that universal suffrage and vote by ballot is impracticable in our constitution. Enough has also been said in this volume, shewing the effect of giving power to the people. We are at first to look at our great population, and secondly, to look at property as the standard of representation. What is the intent of the constitution? to promote civilization, and to protect our liberties, our religion, and our property. For these essential purposes the constitution has been established. It is said that the constitution has gained strength by the Reform Act. For it to gain strength, I apprehend that the balance of power, or, as Montesquieu terms it, the

(1) Part 3, ch. 1.

equilibrium must be maintained in all its due proportions: if this equilibrium be destroyed, so also is the whole constitution.

The establishment of universal suffrage and vote by ballot would destroy that equilibrium, by the return to parliament of that portion of the commons without property, to the exclusion of the other portion who have property, and the consequent government by the multitude, and the establishment of a tyrannical despotism, the destruction of property, and the subversion of the constitution. The very principle of universal suffrage is characteristic of democracy, and the principles of vote by ballot are irresponsibility and secresy. These principles are in direct opposition to the constitution, which is open and free. The Roman republic was destroyed through making the suffrage secret, for it was then no longer possible to direct a populace that sought its own destruction (2). observed by a noble writer and statesman of the present time (3), that "the government of the states of modern Europe rests upon property. The love of enjoying and the fear of losing an estate is the main principle of action with all who have an estate to keep or to lose. A democratic revolution cuts across the grain of this pervading principle; the well-known instability of a single popular assembly makes every man tremble for his fortune, and the welfare of his family. Hence all the old nobility, and all proprietors of every degree, are the enemies of a democratic form of government;

It is well and justly

(2) See upon this subject Montesq. Sp. Laws, b. ii. c. ii. (3) Lord John Russell. See his introduction to the Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe from the Treaty of Utrecht.

hence they join in the intrigues of displaced courtiers, and even in the aggressions of a foreign army; there remains no way of averting or blunting the edge of their hostility, but death, confiscation, the scaffold, and the almshouse. But what means are these for philanthropic reformers to employ!-to slay thousands, to beggar millions; not merely to take political power, and the means of advancement, from the hands of one set of men to put them into those of another, but to tear up society by the roots."

These are fearful consequences, and must, in every reasonable and unprejudiced mind, establish the principle so forcibly before laid down, that the multitude, in consequence of their being a multitude, are incapable of coming to a mature resolution (4).

The same noble writer thus most expressively inquires into the consequences attending such an evil state of society:" Is it nothing (he says) to banish the most civilized of a civilized community, and to raise the dregs of society to a place which they can only trouble by their impurity? Is it nothing to tear apart all the endearing dependencies, the grateful bonds that unite the highest with the lowest, and to strike a blow, that, in throwing down the palace, equally robs of subsistence the prince in the hall, and the poor at the gate? Is it a trifling matter to ruin the happiness of one whole generation? to set tenant against landlord—servant against master— spread the havoc of war, not only over the fields and the houses, but in the thoughts and the hearts of every family of a great community;" and proceeds to shew, that nothing can be gained by the experiment of a de

(4) See also b. 2, c. 5.