they all gave themselves over for lost, when they thought the worm had penetrated into their dykes (c). (c) Such new forms as may prove destructive of the real substance of a government may be unwarily adopted, in the same manner as the superstitious notions and practices described in the author's work, entitled Memorials of Human Superstition, may be introduced into a religion, so as entirely to subvert the true spirit of it. CHAPTER XV. Further Observations on the Right of Taxation. What 513 THE generality of men, or at least of politicians, seem to consider the right of taxing themselves, enjoyed by the English nation, as being no more than the means of securing their property against the attempts of the crown; while they overlook the nobler and more extensive efficiency of that privilege. The right to grant subsidies to the crown, possessed by the people of England, is the safeguard of all their other liberties, religious and civil; it is a regular mean conferred on them by the constitution, of influencing the motion of the executive power; and it forms the tie by which the latter is bound to them. In short, this privilege is a sure pledge in their hands, that their sovereign, who can dismiss their representatives at his 514 pleasure, will never entertain thoughts of ruling without the assistance of them. If, through unforeseen events, the crown could attain to be independent of the people in regard to its supplies, such is the extent of its prerogative, that, from that moment, all the means the people possess to vindicate their liberty would be annihilated. They would have no resource left, except indeed that uncertain and calamitous one, of an appeal to the sword; which is no more, after all, than what the most enslaved nations enjoy. Let us suppose, for instance, that abuses of power should be committed, which, either by their immediate operation, or by the precedents they might establish, should undermine the liberty of the subject. The people, it will be said, would then have their remedy in the legislative power possessed by their representatives. The latter would, at the first opportunity, interfere, and frame such bills as would prevent the like abuses for the future. But here we must observe, that the assent of the sovereign is necessary to make those bills become laws; and if, as we have just now supposed, he had no need of the support of the Commons, how could they obtain his assent to laws thus purposely framed to abridge his authority? Again, let us suppose that, instead of contenting 515 itself with making slow advances to despotism, the executive power, or its minister, should at once openly invade the liberty of the subject. Obnoxious men, printers, for instance, or political writers, might be persecuted by military violence, or, to do things with more security, with the forms of law. Then, it will be said, the representatives of the people would impeach the persons concerned in those measures. Though unable to reach a king, who personally can do no wrong, they at least would attack those men who were the immediate instruments of his tyrannical proceedings, and endeavour, by bringing them to condign punishment, to deter future judges or ministers from imitating their conduct. It may even be added-that, circumstanced as the representatives of the people now are, and having to do with a sovereign who can enjoy no dignity without their assistance, it is most likely that their endeavours in the pursuit of such laudable objects would prove successful. But if, on the contrary, the king, as we have supposed, stood in no need of their assistance, and moreover knew that he should never want it, it is impossible to 516 think that he would then suffer himself to remain a tame spectator of their proceedings. The impeachments thus brought by them would immediately prove the signal of their dismissal; and the king would make haste, by dissolving them, both to revenge what would then be called the insolence of the Commons, and to secure his ministers. But even these are vain suppositions; the evil would reach much farther; and we may be assured that, if ever the crown should be in a condition to govern without the assistance of the representatives of the people, it would dismiss them for ever, and thus rid itself of an assembly which, continuing to be a clog on its power, would no longer be of any service to it. This Charles the First attempted to do when he found his parliaments refractory; and the Kings of France, in former times, really did, with respect to the general estates of that kingdom. And indeed, if we consider the extent of the prerogative of the King of England, and especially the circumstance of his completely uniting in himself all the executive and active powers of the state, we shall find that it is no exaggeration to say that he has power sufficient to be as arbitrary as the Kings of France were of old, 517 were it not for the right of taxation, which, in England, is possessed by the people. But here a most important observation is to be made ; and I entreat the reader's attention to the subject. This right of granting subsidies to the crown can only be effectual when it is exercised by one assembly alone. When several distinct assemblies have it equally in their power to supply the wants of the prince, the case becomes totally altered. The competition which so easily takes place between those different bodies, and even the bare consciousness which each entertains of its inability to obstruct the measures of the sovereign, render it impossible for them to make any effectual constitutional use of their privilege. That the crown in England should, on a sudden, ren- 521 der itself independent of the Commons for its supplies,that is, should on a sudden successfully assume to itself a right to lay taxes on the subject, by its own authority,— is not certainly an event likely to take place, nor indeed is it one that should, at the present time, raise any kind of political apprehension. But it is not equally impracticable that the right of the representatives of the people might become invalidated, by being divided in 522 the manner that has been just described. Such a division of the right of the people might be effected in various ways. National calamities, for instance, unfortunate foreign wars attended with loss of public credit, might suggest methods for raising the necessary supplies, different from those which have hitherto been used. Dividing the kingdom into a certain number of parts, which should severally vote subsidies to the crown, or even distinct assessments to be made by the different counties into which England is now divided, might, in the circumstances we suppose, be looked upon as advisable expedients; and these, being once introduced, might be continued. Another division of the right of the people, much H H |