tled on the sovereign in lieu of them every year afterwards changed in favour of the nation, and in the last year of the reign of His late Majesty William IV. the amount of the crown revenues was 3,248,2087. 1s. 11d., while the annuity granted to his majesty for the civil list in lieu of those revenues was only 510,000l.; at the same time it should be taken into consideration, that this sum was granted specially for the support of his majesty's household and of the honor and dignity of the crown, and relieved from the allowances or salaries that had been paid from the civil list by former sovereigns, which had no immediate connection with the royal dignity or personal comfort of the sovereign, but which belonged rather to the civil government of the state. The civil list of the crown was, by the statute passed upon the accession of his late majesty before referred to, relieved from these expenses, which in the reign of George IV. amounted to 600,000l. a year, and are now provided for in supply, or from the consolidated fund; and it has not been found necessary, during the last two reigns, to apply to parliament for the means of defraying any increased expenditure beyond the amount of the annuity.

Her present most gracious Majesty Queen Victoria has also placed, without reserve, her interest in the hereditary and temporary revenues of the crown, to which she became entitled upon the demise of His late Majesty William IV., at the disposal of the nation; and the parliament have granted her majesty in lieu of those revenues an annuity of the following sums, viz.— 60,000%. for her majesty's privy purse (5), 131,2607.

(5) This amount has been the privy purse of the sovereign for above

for salaries for the several departments of the royal household, and superannuations and retired allowances; 172,500l. for expenses of the household; 13,2001. for royal bounty, alms, and special services; 8,0401. for unappropriated monies; and her majesty is empowered to grant pensions in every year to the extent of 1,2001. The pension list of 75,000l. granted in the late reign is not included in her majesty's annuity, but is made a subject for investigation by the parliament.

The revenue of Queen Elizabeth was 600,0007.; that of King Charles I. was 800,000l.; and 1,200,0007. was granted by parliament to Charles II.; while that of the Commonwealth was 1,500,000l.: a further convincing proof, if any were wanted, that the people are never gainers by violent revolutions. The civil list revenue granted to King William, after the Revolution, including the hereditary duties, amounted to 700,000l., which was continued to Queen Ann and George I., and in the reign of George II. was nominally augmented to 800,000l.; but in fact was considerably more.

Factious persons are continually making complaints against the revenue so granted by parliament; yet looking at the sums formerly granted, (to say nothing of that granted to Oliver Cromwell), the private revenues and prerogatives given up to the public, and the diminution in the value of money, compared with what it was worth in the last two centuries, every

half a century. During the late reign, there being a queen consort, a further sum of 50,000l. was allotted, making for their Majesties' privy purse, 110,000l. a year.

H

impartial person must admit these complaints to be void of any rational foundation; and that it is impossible to support that dignity which the sovereign of this mighty empire should maintain, with an income in any degree less than what has been established by parliament.

Among the rights of an inferior nature are those of possession belonging to the sovereign; as such, may be reckoned the ancient jewels of the crown, which, being heir-looms, cannot be disposed of by will.

CHAPTER VII.

The Boundaries set to the Royal Prerogative-continued.

THE force of the prerogative of the Commons, as 78 shewn in the first section of the last chapter, and the facility with which it may be exerted, however necessary for the first establishment of the Constitution, may nevertheless prove too considerable at present, when it is requisite only to support it. There might be the danger, that, if the parliament should ever exert their privilege to its full extent, the prince, reduced to despair, might resort to fatal extremities; or, that the Constitution, which subsists only by virtue of its equilibrium, might in the end be subverted.

Indeed this is a case which the prudence of parliament has foreseen. They have, in this respect, imposed laws upon themselves; and without touching the prerogative itself, they have moderated the exercise of it.

This conduct of the parliament provides an admir- 79 able remedy for the accidental disorders of the state. For though, by the wise distribution of the powers of 80 government, great usurpations are become in a manner impracticable, nevertheless it is impossible but that, in consequence of the continual, though silent, efforts of the executive power to extend itself, abuses will at length slide in. But here the powers, wisely kept in reserve by the parliament, afford the means of remedying them. At the end of each reign, the civil list, and consequently that kind of independence which

it procured, are at an end. The successor finds a throne, a sceptre, and a crown; but he finds neither power, nor even dignity; and before a real possession of all these things is given him, the parliament have it in their power to take a thorough review of the state, as well as correct the several abuses that may have crept in during the preceding reign; and thus the Constitution may be brought back to its first principles.

England, therefore, by this means, enjoys one very great advantage, one that all free states have sought to procure for themselves: I mean that of a periodical reformation. But the expedients which legislators have contrived for this purpose in other countries, have always, when attempted to be carried into practice, been found to be productive of very disadvantageous 81 consequences. Those laws which were made in Rome, to restore that equality which is the essence of a democratical government, were always found impracticable; the attempt alone endangered the overthrow of the republic; and the expedient which the Florentines called ripigliar il stato, proved nowise happier in its consequences. This was because all those different remedies were destroyed beforehand, by the very evils they were meant to cure; and the greater the abuses were, the more impossible it was to correct them.

But the means of reformation which the parliament of England has taken care to reserve to itself, is the more effectual, as it goes less directly to its end. It does not oppose the usurpations of prerogative, as it were, in front-it does not encounter it in the middle of its career, and in the fullest flight of its exertion; but it goes in search of it to its source, and to the principle of its action. It does not endeavour forcibly to overthrow it; it only enervates its springs.