is but approved of, (you may condemn the devil as much as

you please,) my point is gained; the wisdom of God in the permission of sin is acknowledged. Pray speak plainly.

A. Indeed, sir, "I do doubt, whether God does in fact, and therefore whether he is obliged to do, what is most for his declarative glory." (p. 13.) And I do believe, it had been infinitely better if sin had never been. (p. 20. 24.)

B. Why then do you profess firmly to believe, that the whole of the divine conduct" is good, right, best ;" and that " supreme wisdom cannot err?" And that "all the divine dispensations are to be heartily acquiesced in, as being supremely wise?" (p. 14. 31.) How can these things be consistent ?

Had you, sir, justified your Maker, fully acknowledged the wisdom of God in the permission of sin; and wherein my solutions of difficulties appeared to you not sufficient, had you given better; still endeavouring to justify the ways of God to men, and to assist the people of God in their belief of the wisdom of all the divine conduct; and so to animate their love, and quicken their obedience; you had merited the thanks of the public, and the love of all pious people, and might have been approved of, even in heaven. But, do you think, Almighty GOD will be pleased, to have his conduct in the permission of sin disputed against, and set in the "most horrible, deformed light possible," by one of his own subjects, who ought to love him, approve of all his ways, and plead his cause, in this revolted world? Or do you expect, that the friends of God in heaven or earth, will be suited with your ATTEMPT, who are all united in believing concerning God, as it is written in Deut. xxxii. 4. He is the rock, his work is perfect. For all his ways are judgment: a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he?

A. Whether what I have published, is consistent or no, I should be extremely glad of a reply to my objections. (p. 30.) B. A full reply to almost all your objections has been already given; partly in Mr. Edwards on Liberty, partly in my sermons on the Wisdom of God in the permission of Sin, and still more fully in Mr. Hopkins' Sermons on Rom. iii. 5. 8. to which you may be referred.

A. But there is one argument, on which I lay great weight. Yea, on which I build my whole scheme, viz. that as "God does not in fact, so he is not obliged to do, what is most for his declarative glory." An argument you have none of you answered. I have expressed it in these words, viz.

"It is allowed by all, that God is infinite in power, and that space is infinite. Now here is evidently room for endless displays of divine glories. In no definite period of time, in no given quantity of space, can there be a full discovery of God's glories; because they are absolutely infinite. And therefore may we not with the utmost safety affirm, there is not now such a display? We know there is now a greater display of God's various natural and moral perfections, than seven thousand years ago: for there are now multitudes of rational beings, which then were not; and an infinity of other objects, in which are surprising manifestations of wisdom, power, and goodness, &c. Had God been obliged to make as great displays, as he could of his perfections, he must from eternity have produced into existence all possible beings; the contrary of which is evident. And may we not be naturally led from this to doubt, whether God has so much glory from the things which now exist, as he might have had? Especially when we consider the obvious defects and blemishes there are; and can easily imagine how these might be corrected by infinite wisdom." (p. 13.)

B. True, sir, we have none of us answered this argument. Nor did we expect it would be used by any in this country, as I believe, it never was before. It has often been used by professed atheists, in other countries; who, from the pretended defects of the natural world, have argued that it could not be the work of an absolutely perfect Being; and so that we have no evidence that there is such a Being. And it has been abundantly answered by some of the most learned writers in our nation, in their attempts to establish the belief of a God, i. e. of an absolutely perfect Being.

Suffer me, sir, to give you two or three short extracts out of Dr. Cudworth's intellectual system, where, writing in confutation of Atheism, he says, "Their rst objection is against providence, as to the fabric of the worid, from the faultiness

of the Mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; quia tantâ stat præditu culpâ ; that, because it is so ill made, therefore it could not be by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God or perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does, therefore, ipso facto suppose all tnings to be well made; and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient Theologers." (p. 875.) As in some modern Theists, who pretend to solve the difficulty by saying, " quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum, because God is no where bound or obliged to the best," he shows the absurdity of their scheme, p. 873, &c. In p. 874, he says, "God is an impartial balance, weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportion, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility, much less by the law and command of any superior, but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well made; and as they should be; and vice versa. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as one thing therein is made ineptly.”

And having spent several pages in answering various objections of atheistical writers against the works of creation and providence, he concludes the whole, (p. 899,) in these words: "And now, having fully confuted all the atheistical grounds, we confidently conclude, that there is one only necessary existent, the cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all things that were fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all." Thus far Dr. Cudworth.

And this, doubtless, is the belief of Christian divines in general, of whatever denomination. To be sure, Dr. Whitby is full in it. These are his words: "As it would be in us an intolerable piece of insolence to say, against the plainest declar

ations of the scripture, that God did not in wisdom make the world, because we are not able to discern the wisdom of all things framed in it; so must it be an equal insolence in us to say, God doth not act in the preserving it, and in the ordering of affairs in it, according to the measures of true goodness, because we cannot dive into the reasons of his dispensations." See Dr. Whitby's Discourses, 2d edit. p. 495.

To which let me add a short extract out of Dr. Turnbull's Christian Philosophy, p. 35. "The creation of an all-perfect mind must be the image of its Creator; and therefore it must be perfect, it must be chosen by infinite wisdom and goodness as the most perfect system, that is, the system in which the greatest quantity of happiness and perfection obtains, that can, in the nature of things take place; and this being the case, all the seeming imperfections and evils in it, are such only in a partial view; and with respect to the whole system they are goods."

Yea, Mr. Chubb himself, though justly numbered among infidel writers, had juster notions of God's moral character, than to think, that God might do better than he does. These are his words: "I shall take it for granted, that God is, and that he is necessarily, an immense, eternal, all-knowing, all-powerful, a self-sufficient, and an unchangeable Being. This being allowed, from hence it will follow, that as God is always capable of doing what is most worthy and valuable in itself, and which in the nature of things, is right, good, best, and fittest to be done, seeing he knows wherein the goodness, fitness, and valuableness of every action lies: so he always will act thus, because right, good, fit, &c. are so very beautiful, and excellent in themselves; and are so preferable, in the nature of things, to their contraries, that they always will afford a proper and sufficient motive, &c." Tracts, p. 252.

But to come to a more particular consideration of your argument, the grand argument on which your whole scheme is built; yea, the only argument you use, to prove that God might permit sin, although he knew it was not for the best; not most for his glory, or the good of the system: and that therefore we can have no certainty that he would not, from

the absolute perfection of his nature. And this, in a few words, is the sum of it.

God in the work of creation has not done his best, but might have done infinitely better. If this be so in one instance, it may in another. Therefore we can have no assurance, from the absolute perfection of the divine nature, that God means to do what is best in his works of providence; but have reason to think he might have done infinitely better.

Well, if it be really so, that God does not mean to order the affairs of the universe in the best manner, I have had too good an opinion of God, and have put too much confidence in him. And I must learn, for the time to come, to have lower thoughts of God, and higher thoughts of myself. I must begin to think myself a suitable judge, to set up and censure God's works and ways, and point out wherein he might have done better; not in the least suspecting, that God is wiser and better than I am, and more able and willing to order things for the best; or that it savours of arrogance and pride, for a worm of the dust, to say to the infinitely wise God, "In this, O Lord, and in that, thou mightest have done better. Had I been at thy right hand, chief director, I could have laid a plan for a better natural world, and for a better moral system." Not once imagining, that God may have wise reasons for all his works and all his ways, which lie beyond my reach; but rather confident, that he had no good reason; because I see none. Wherefore I may venture safely to censure, as unwise, any steps of divine providence, the wisdom of which I do not see. And so, the more blind I am to the wisdom of the divine ways, the more faults I may find, and the more fully point out the divine errors. And so, God must no longer be esteemed as always acting agreeable to infinite wisdom; because I cannot see it; and, in the vanity of my mind, I am entered into a way of thinking and reasoning, that is the result of the greatest folly, and pregnant with the grossest blasphemy.

A more particular answer to your argument is, sir, I humbly conceive, really needless. For, if I can imagine to my own fancy, a better natural world, and a better moral system; yet, as I do not know that my own imaginations are right, I have