App. Div.] Second Department, March, 1910. also is, and the court has found as matter of fact, that the mean high-water mark at the time of the opening proceedings was never less than 600 feet from the southerly side of Surf avenue. In view of the shifting character of the high-water line of land fronting on the ocean, and in view of the character of the proceedings which clearly indicated a purpose to open the street for the entire distance between Surf avenue and the Atlantic ocean, if this were the only difficulty with defendants' position, we think that we should have little difficulty in holding that the proceedings were effective to open the street for the entire distance, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the map. (Dean v. Mayor, etc., 167 N. Y. 13.) The difficulty with defendants' position antedates this and is more serious in character. In 1869 the Legislature passed an act appointing commissioners to lay out a plan for roads and streets in the towns of Kings county. (Laws of 1869, chap. 670.) By that act it was, among other things, provided that "After the establishment or adoption of such permanent plan, no street or avenue shall be laid out in said towns, or either of them, except in accordance with said plan so adopted, and all streets or avenues afterwards opened, widened or improved shall be made to conform to such permanent plan and the lines thereof." This act was amended or supplemented in subsequent years, but not in respect to matters which are of importance here. (Laws of 1870, chap. 609; Laws of 1872, chap. 331; Laws of 1874, chap. 581.) In 1874 the official map or plan of streets in the town of Gravesend was filed, on which West Twenty-third street was shown as extending from Canal avenue to Surf avenue. It did not extend southerly from Surf avenue toward the ocean. In 1875 an act was passed to confer on boards of supervisors further powers of local legislation and administration. (Laws of 1875, chap. 482.) By this act, as amended in 1881 (Laws of 1881, chap. 554), boards of supervisors in any county containing an incorporated city of 100,000 inhabitants or upward, when any territory within such county and beyond the limits of such city has been mapped out into streets and avenues in pursuance of law, were authorized to establish " a plan for the grades of such streets and avenues, the laying out, opening, grading, construction, closing and change of line of any one or more of them." Thereafter, and on November 25, 1885, the com Second Department, March, 1910. [Vol. 137. mittee on streets, avenues, roads and railroads of the board of supervisors of Kings county, to whom by previous resolutions had been referred the subject of the proposed change of lines of a large number of streets, including among others West Twentythird street, between Canal avenue and the Atlantic ocean, made their report. It was to the effect that they had received from the necessary town officers, specified in chapter 554 of the Laws of 1881, a certificate that certain changes in the lines of various streets and avenues, including among others West Twentythird street from Canal avenue to the Atlantic ocean, were proper and necessary for the public interest. They thereupon offered for adoption a resolution to alter the map filed in the office of the register of Kings county and in the office of the town clerk of the town of Gravesend, by the commissioners appointed as aforesaid, so far as the same related to a large number of streets, specifying them, and among others West Twenty-third street from Canal avenue to the Atlantic ocean. The resolution contained a preamble, reciting the certificate from the town officers, and recommending changes in the line of various streets and avenues SO as to make them conform to the plan laid down on a certain map thereto annexed, entitled "Map showing the proposed change of lines, etc., of certain streets and avennes on Coney Island, in the town of Gravesend," and the opening of said streets, including among others West Twenty-third street from Canal avenue to the Atlantic ocean. The enacting clause of the act is in the following words: "Section 1. The map filed in the office of the Register of the County of Kings, and the office of the Town Clerk of the town of Gravesend, by the Commissioners appointed to lay out a plan for roads and streets in the towns of Kings County, is hereby changed and altered so far as the same relates to * * West Twenty-third street * * * * Said changes and alterations shall conform to the changes and alterations shown on the accompanying map, entitled, "Map showing the proposed change of lines, etc., of certain streets and avenues on Coney Island, in the town of Gravesend,' which map is hereto annexed and forms part of this resolution." (See Suprs. Min. Kings Co. 1885, pp. 864-879.) That map showed a change in the easterly and westerly lines of Twenty-third street, by which App. Div.] Second Department, March, 1910. the street was moved a short distance further to the east, and it also showed a continuation of the lines of that street south of Surf avenue to a point in a line nearly parallel with Surf avenue and distant 300 feet southerly therefrom. It clearly appeared from this map that the mean high-water line of the Atlantic ocean was some distance to the south of the southerly line of the street as laid down on the said map, and the evidence in the case justifies the finding of the learned trial court that at this time the mean highwater mark of the Atlantic ocean at West Twenty-third street was not less than 600 feet south from the southerly line of Surf avenue. In view of the prohibition contained in the act of 1869, above referred to, and in view of the fact that West Twenty-third street had not been laid down upon any map, either in accordance with the provisions of that act or by authority of the board of supervisors under the act of 1881 referred to, we think that the court had no jurisdiction to open West Twenty-third street beyond the most southerly point shown on the map above referred to as the map to be filed in connection with the resolution of the board of supervisors, adopted in 1885. Neither the title of an act, nor a preamble contained in it, car control the plain words thereof, nor extend its purview to objects mentioned in either title or preamble but not in the act itself. (2 Lewis Suth. Stat. Const. [2d ed.] §§ 339, 389.) Notwithstanding this, if under the proceedings taken to open West Twenty-third street it had been actually opened to the Atlantic ocean, and the owner of the abutting property through whom plaintiff claims title had not objected to such proceeding, and had accepted and received an award for all of the land lying between the southerly side of Surf avenue and high-water mark on the Atlantic ocean, it might be that he would be estopped from claiming that the proceedings were not effective for such purpose, and if they were effective to open it to the high-water mark as then existing, doubtless any change in the actual location thereof by accretion or erosion would simply add to or diminish the extent of the street. But as the case stands he cannot be concluded upon the ground of estoppel for anything more than the land actually taken and for which he was compensated, and it appears, and the court has found, that the southern boundary line of that land was some distance to the north of the actual high-water line at the time when the proceedings were taken. Inasmuch as the structures com Second Department, March, 1910. [Vol. 137. plained of are entirely south of the southerly line of West Twentythird street as measured on the street opening map, we think the city had no right to interfere with plaintiff's possession or occupation of this land, and that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs. HIRSCHBERG, P. J., WOODWARD, JENKS and CARR, JJ., concurred. Judgment affirmed, with costs. GRACE L. FINN, Respondent, v. SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Where a plaintiff unreasonably neglects to prosecute an action, the court, on motion of the defendant, may in its discretion dismiss the complaint. Proof that younger issues have been tried in their regular order makes a prima facie case of unreasonable neglect and casts upon the plaintiff the burden of showing that the neglect was not unreasonable. Action to recover on a fire insurance policy dismissed for failure to prosecute. The discretion of the Special Term in refusing to dismiss a cause for failure to prosecute is reviewable by the Appellate Division. RICH, J., dissented. APPEAL by the defendant, the Scottish Union and National Insurance Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 10th day of January, 1910, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. Donald McLean [David Asch with him on the brief], for the appellant. Joseph H. San [Max D. Steuer with him on the brief], for the respondent. BURR, J.: When the plaintiff unreasonably neglects to proceed in the action the court may in its discretion, on motion of the defendant, dismiss App. Div.] Second Department, March, 1910. the complaint and render judgment accordingly. (Code Civ. Proc. § 822.) Proof that younger issues have been tried in their regular order on the calendar makes out a prima facie case of unreasonable neglect. (General Rules of Practice, rule 36; Fisher Malting Co. v. Brown, 92 App. Div. 251.) While the court may relieve a plaintiff from the consequences of his neglect to bring an action to trial, before it is authorized to exercise its discretion in his behalf it must be made to appear that such neglect has not been unreasonable. (Regan v. Milliken Bros., 123 App. Div. 72.) The history of this case discloses a willful and persistent purpose on the part of the plaintiff to delay the trial of the issues, in the hope, doubtless, that the witnesses necessary to establish the defense may be scattered or lost track of, and the obtaining of documentary evidence made more difficult. The action was brought October 21, 1901, to recover for an alleged loss of property covered by a policy of insurance issued by the defendant. The fire occurred October 22, 1900. The action was brought just one day before the short Statute of Limitations would have run. Although issue was joined in January, 1902, the case was not put upon the calendar until April, 1903. Just about that time younger issues were about to be reached on the general calendar, and the purpose doubtless was to avoid a motion at that time to dismiss for want of prosecution. A new calendar was made up in June, 1903, but the case was not placed upon it. It did not appear upon the calendar again until sometime in 1904. In April, 1905, it was reached on the regular call and, there being no appearance for the plaintiff, the complaint was dismissed and judgment of dismissal entered. A motion was thereafter made to open the default, the excuse offered being neglect on the part of the then attorney for the plaintiff to be watchful of the calendar and failure upon his part to notice that the case was likely to be called. This motion was granted on payment of thirty dollars costs. Even then the case was not restored to the calendar, and in May, 1906, a motion was made to dismiss for want of prosecution. Just why that motion was not granted we are unable to determine. From the order, which is made a part of the record on this appeal, it would appear that no answering affidavit on the part of the plaintiff was submitted. In opposition to this motion an affidavit of plaintiff's attorney, verified at about that time, |