inalienable rights "of the plaintiff as a citizen of the United States secured or guaranteed to him by that Amendment." Residence in its legal sense is made up of two distinct elements: first, the physical, tangible fact of removal into the State; and second, the quo animo or intent with which such removal is made. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350. As to how to prove that a resident is entitled to vote, see Fenwick v. State, 63 Maryland, 241; Fisk v. Chester, 8 Gray, 508; Cooley's Const. Law (7th ed. 1903), 524; 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), title Evidence, page 550, and cases there cited; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), title Constitutional Law, page 950, and cases there cited. The Court of Appeals have decided in several cases that legislation of this sort relating to persons abandoning their homes in Maryland and removing from the State into other States, is constitutional and valid. Act of 1890, ch. 573, sec. 14; Act of 1901, ch. 2; Code, Art. 33, title Elections, § 25a; Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Maryland, 70, 72; Southerland v. Norris, 74 Maryland, 326; Sterling v. Horner, 74 Maryland, 573; McLane v. Hobbs, 74 Maryland, 166; Bowling v. Turner, 78 Maryland, 595; Thomas v. Warner, 83 Maryland, 20; Howard v. Skinner, 87 Maryland, 559. By their judgment in the present case they have decided that this section 25B is nothing but a lawful regulation of the evidence necessary to prove what constitutes "residence." Citizenship and suffrage are by no means inseparable; the latter is not one of the universal, fundamental, inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator, but is altogether conventional. Suffrage is not a right of property or absolute personal right. Anderson v. Baker, 23 Maryland, 531, 629; Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, 276; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Indiana, 38; Black's Constitutional Law, 466; Story on Constitution, § 581; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Massachusetts, 497; Stone v. Smith, 159 Massachusetts, 413; 16 Alb. Law J. 272; United States v. Susan B. Anthony, 11 Blatch. C. C, 202; Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 California, 43; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178; United States v. Reese, 92 Since the Fifteenth Amendment the whole control over suffrage and the power to regulate its exercise is still left with and retained by the several States, with the single restriction that they must not deny or abridge it on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 636, 644; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127. There are, it is true, the two provisions, first, that while "the times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the places of choosing Senators." Constitution, Art. I, sec. 4; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263. As 25в does not conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment but in express terms applies to "all persons," it does not impair, abridge, affect, or even touch any privilege or immunity of the plaintiff in error which is covered by the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. 8. 213; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 582; Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475; James v. Bouman, 190 U. S. 127. And see also Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Neale v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 326; Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 401. The protection designed by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; In re Taylor, 48 Maryland, 28; In re Maddox, 93 Maryland, 728, 729. As to the privileges and immunities belonging to the citi 1 1 1 zens of a State, these "must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested," that is, with the State in which the citizen resides. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 74; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 401. By removing into Maryland the plaintiff became a citizen of that State and voluntarily subjected himself to the operation of her laws. Why then shall he not be bound by them? As to equal protection of the laws the equality extends only to civil rights as distinguished from those that are political or arise from the form of the government and its mode of administration. Field, J., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 637. Equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369. The clause is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction in the several courts as to subject matter, amount or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right in like cases and under like circumstances to resort to them for redress. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 30; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 615. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited, but legislation, which in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the Amendment. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 134; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 163; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 32; Soon Ling v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 523; Kentucky R. R. Tax Case, 115 U. S. 337; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 71; Dow v. Biedelman, 125 U. S. 691; Missouri R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 209; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 687; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 582; Minnesota R. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 606; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. W., 153 U. S. 389; St. L. & San Fran. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 24; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. W. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 155; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Ins. Co. v. Warren, 181 U. S. 73; Ins. Co. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730; Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 402; Brannon on 14th Amendment, ch. 16; on Equal Protection of the Laws, 315, 380; Guthrie on 14th Amendment, 106, 142. Tests, qualifications, disqualifications, denials, abridgments, distinctions, inequalities, may still lawfully be made at the pleasure of the States, provided only they do not discriminate against the negro. If they apply equally, impartially and uniformly to white and black citizens alike, they are not condemned by the letter or the spirit of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. They may perhaps cost the States a reduction in their Congressional representation in the proportion in which the number of adult males disfranchised by such state legislation bears to the whole number of its adult male population. But this is the only legal consequence, and there is no warrant for the contention that the Federal judiciary can also declare such legislation absolutely void. MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the above statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court. This is not a case of a statute of the State having been passed subsequently to the time when the individual had removed from another State or from a Territory or from the District of Columbia into the State of Maryland. There is, therefore, no alteration of any possible rights which the plaintiff in error might have already acquired and which he might claim were taken from him by the passage of such statute. On the contrary, this statute took effect on March 29, 1902, more than two months prior to the removal of the plaintiff in error from Washington in the District of Columbia to Montgomery County, within the State of Maryand. The objections of a Federal nature, which are made by the plaintiff in error, to the validity of the statute are set out in his petition, and are also contained in the above statement of facts, and are substantially reproduced in his assignment of errors. We are of opinion that the statute does not violate any Federal right of the plaintiff in error which he seeks to assert in this proceeding. The statute, so far as it concerns him and the right which he urges, is one making regulations and conditions for the registry of persons for the purpose of voting. It was only for the purpose of thereafter voting that the plaintiff in error sought to be registered, and it was the denia of that right only which he can now review. His application for registry as a voter was denied by the board of registry solely because of his failure to comply with the statute. What ever other right he may have as a citizen of Maryland by reasor of his removal there with an intent to become such citizen, is not now in question. So far as appears no other right, if any he may have, has been infringed by the statute. The simple matter to be herein determined is whether, with reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in Maryland, the legislature of that State had the legal right to provide that a person coming into the State to reside should make the declaration of intent a year before he should have the right to be registered as a voter of the State. The privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. It may not be refused on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution. The State might provide that persons of foreign birth could vote without being naturalized, and, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, supra, such persons were allowed to vote in several of the |