Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

ballot at a general election on account of his race or color, if exclusion from the primary renders his vote at the general election insignificant and useless, the result is to deny him the suffrage altogether. So to say is to confuse the privilege of membership in a party with the right to vote for one who is to hold a public office. With the former the state need have no concern, with the latter it is bound to concern itself, for the general election is a function of the state government and discrimination by the state as respects participation by negroes on account of their race or color is prohibited by the Federal Constitution.

Fifth. The complaint charges that the Democratic party has never declared a purpose to exclude negroes. The premise upon which this conclusion rests is that the party is not a state body but a national organization, whose representative is the national Democratic convention. No such convention, so it is said, has resolved to exclude negroes from membership. We have no occasion to determine the correctness of the position, since even if true it does not tend to prove that the petitioner was discriminated against or denied any right to vote by the State of Texas. Indeed, the contention contradicts any such conclusion, for it assumes merely that a state convention, the representative and agent of a state association, has usurped the rightful authority of a national convention which represents a larger and superior country-wide association.

We find no ground for holding that the respondent has in obedience to the mandate of the law of Texas discriminated against the petitioner or denied him any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

Judgment affirmed.

MISSOURI EX REL. GAINES v. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,

ET AL.

(305 U.S. 337 (1938))

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

No. 57. Argued November 9, 1938. Decided December 12, 1938.

1. The State of Missouri provides separate schools and universities for whites and negroes. At the state university, attended by whites, there is a course in law; at the Lincoln University, attended by negroes, there is as yet none, but it is the duty of the curators of that institution to establish one there whenever in their opinion this shall be necessary and practicable, and pending such development, they are authorized to arrange for legal education of Missouri negroes, and to pay the tuition charges therefor, at law schools in adjacent States where negroes are accepted and where the training is equal to that obtainable at the Missouri State University. Pursuant to the State's policy of separating the races in its educational institutions, the curators of the state university refused to admit a negro as a student in the law school there because of his race; whereupon he sought a mandamus, in the state courts, which was denied. Held:

(1) That inasmuch as the curators of the state university represented the State, in carrying out its policy, their action in denying the negro admission to the law school was state action, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 343.

(2) The action of the State in furnishing legal education within the State to whites while not furnishing legal education within the State to negroes, was a discrimination repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 344.

If a State furnishes higher education to white residents, it is bound to furnish substantially equal advantages to negro residents, though not necessarily in the same schools.

(3) The unconstitutional discrimination is not avoided by the purpose of the State to establish a law school for negroes whenever necessary and practicable in the opinion of the curators of the University provided for negroes. P. 346.

(4) Nor are the requirements of the equal protection clause satisfied by the opportunities afforded by Missouri to its negro citizens for legal education in other States. P. 348.

The basic consideration here is not as to what sort of opportunities other States provide, or whether they are as good as those

in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color. The admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the State. By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident having the same qualifications is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the discrimination. P. 348.

(5) The obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within its borders. P. 350.

(6) The fact that there is but a limited demand in Missouri for the legal education of negroes does not excuse the discrimination in favor of whites. P. 350.

(7) Inasmuch as the discrimination may last indefinitely-so long as the curators find it unnecessary and impracticable to provide facilities for the legal education of negroes within the State, the alternative of attendance at law schools in other States being provided meanwhile it can not be excused as a temporary discrimination. P. 351.

2. The state court decided this case upon the merits of the federal question, and not upon the propriety of remedy by mandamus. P. 352.

342 Mo. 121; 113 S. W. 2d 783, reversed.

CERTIORARI, post, p. 580, to review a judgment affirming denial of a writ of mandamus.

Messrs. Charles H. Houston and Sidney R. Redmond, with whom Mr. Leon A. Ransom was on the brief, for petitioner.

Messrs. William S. Hogsett and Fred L. Williams, with whom Mr. Fred L. English was on the brief, for respondents.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the laws of Missouri do not entitle the petitioner to be admitted as a student in the University of Missouri, and that those laws provide for the separation of the white and negro races for the purpose of higher education. The second part of the decision, fully recognizing petitioner's constitutional right to equal facilities for legal education, finds as a fact that the State has accorded him equal facilities which finding of fact, supported as it is by strong and uncontradicted evidence, is binding upon this Court. The absence of a substantial federal question is manifest.

Petitioner refused to avail himself of the facilities for a legal education provided by the State. If he had ap

plied to the Lincoln University curators for a legal education, it is to be presumed that they would have given it to him in accordance with their mandatory duty under the Act. His refusal to avail himself of his legal rights is fatal to his case.

The State of Missouri has not denied petitioner the equal protection of the laws by excluding him from the School of Law of the University of Missouri.

Separation of the white and negro races for purposes of education does not infringe the rights of either race guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Social equality is not a legal question and can not be settled by law or by the judgments of courts.

The facilities for legal education available to petitioner under the Lincoln University Act (§§ 9616 to 9624, R. S. Mo., 1929) are substantially equal to the facilities afforded white students in the School of Law of the University of Missouri.

In separating the races, and in determining the particular facilities to be used by the two races, the State is allowed a large measure of discretion; and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion as unconstitutional, except in case of a very clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.

The Lincoln University board of curators are not merely authorized, but are required, to reorganize the institution so that it shall afford opportunity to negroes equal to that accorded to white students; and, pending the full development of Lincoln University, are required, to arrange for the attendance of negro residents of the State at the university of any adjacent State, to take any course of study provided at the University of Missouri but not at Lincoln University; and they are not merely authorized, but are required, to pay the reasonable tuition fees for such attendance (§ 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929). The duty to do these things is mandatory and peremptory.

The responsibility and duty to carry out this plan has been placed by law-not upon these respondents, the curators of the University of Missouri-but upon the eurators of Lincoln University.

If petitioner pursues his legal rights and makes application to the Lincoln University curators for an education in the law, it will then become their mandatory duty (a) to establish a school of law in Lincoln University and to admit petitioner as a student therein; and (b) pending that, and as a temporary matter, to arrange for the attendance of petitioner in one or another of the schools of law already established in the Universities of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa or Illinois (all of which admit negroes), and to pay his tuition fees while he is attending such school.

« AnteriorContinuar »