The Constitution as Political Structure

Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely down-played. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. The Constitution as Political Structure emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory. In its exposition of the textual and theoretical rationales for judicial enforcement of the structural values embodied in the Constitution, this book presents a principled alternative to the extremes of judicial abdication articulated by certain scholars and Justices on the one hand, and the result-oriented ideological involvement advocated in some quarters on the other. This work will be of great interest to scholars of law and political science.

Comentarios de la gente - Escribir un comentario

No encontramos ningún comentario en los lugares habituales.

Páginas seleccionadas


Political Structure Democratic Theory and Constitutional Text
2 Federalism the Constitution and American Political Theory
3 The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism
4 Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers
5 Legislative Delegation Pragmatic Formalism and the Values of Democracy
Liberalism Constitutional Theory and Political Structure
Table of Cases
Derechos de autor

Otras ediciones - Ver todas

Términos y frases comunes

Acerca del autor (1995)

Martin H. Redish is at Northwestern University School of Law.

Información bibliográfica