to one Russ, for spreading liquid manure on land. The hose is wound on a reel supported on a wheeled frame. One end of the hose is connected to the fixed reservoir from which the manure is drawn, and the other is connected with the hollow journal, at the end of which is a receptacle with holes in it, like a water sprinkler, from which the manure is spread upon the ground. The reel is moved forward, from and back to the reservoir on the land to be treated, while the hose is reeled off and on with the movement of the reel. In this device the liquid enters at what is usually the nozzle end of the hose, and is discharged from the hollow journal, taking an opposition direction from that which it takes in complainant's device; but this does not, of course, change the principle of its working. The same thing is true of another English patent, of 1868, issued to one Headley, for a water sprinkler, which consisted of a wheeled frame carrying a windlass or drum, the axis of which was made hollow, and upon which a hose was wound. One end of the hose was connected to the hollow axis, while the free end was fitted with suitable connections for attaching it to hydrants or standards supplying water under pressure. At the end of the hollow axis were affixed suitable distributing media. The inventor stated the device could be used for extinguishing fires by attaching the free end of the hose to a fire engine.

It will thus be seen that in the use of a hose and reel in fire engines, and other machines for throwing water and other liquid, it was old, by means of a hollow journal, to secure one end of the hose permanently to the source of supply, and to force the water or other liquid through the hose while the hose was wound upon the reel.

To escape the manifest conclusion that application of such a device to a chemical fire engine did not involve any invention, the contention of counsel is that the use of such a device was poorly adapted to ordinary fire engines, where the propulsion of the water through the hose and out of the nozzle is caused by a pressure exerted at one end of the column of water, because the resistance caused by the curved sides of the hose, when wound, would so reduce the propulsive force at the nozzle as to make it impossible to throw the water a practicable distance; but that in the chemical fire engines this difficulty of resistance is entirely absent, because the force by which the mingled water and carbonic acid gas are thrown from the nozzle of the pipe is not applied only in the generator, but is generated in the hose as well. It is said that the mixture of carbonic acid and water is self-propelling, and, in addition, that the union of all of the bicarbonate of soda and sulphuric acid is not completed in the generator, but that particles of each, un-united, are carried along the escape pipe, to settle together at every turn and elbow in the pipe, there to unite, and to generate additional carbonic acid gas, and new pressure. On the ground that an ordinary knowledge of mechanics would lead one not to use the hollow journal reel as an improvement of the ordinary fire engine, it is claimed that the use of this device in a chemical fire engine did involve invention, for its use could only be suggested by the discovery

that the device when used in chemical engines did not encounter the difficulty which made it impracticable in ordinary fire engines.

If it were true that the hollow journal reel was wholly impracticable in machines for throwing water through a wound hose where the pressure is applied in the usual way, and that this fact was well known and plainly manifest to every one, we might be compelled to acknowledge the force of the argument, but this is not true. This is shown by the fact that devices have been made, and patents have been granted, for hollow journaled reels to be used for fire engines and kindred purposes, in which water is expelled by force applied in the ordinary manner. There is the Dillon reel, patented at an earlier date than complainant's. It was for extinguishing fires in a house. It consists of a reel journaled in a bracket to be hung against the wall. The axis of the reel is hollow, and is permanently connected at one end with some source of supplying water under pressure, and at the other with the hose. The hose is wire lined, so as to enable the water to pass through it freely, even when wound on the reel. It is said that Steiner conceived his invention before the date of the Dillon application, and the court below seems to have conceded this. Whether Dillon's conception of his device antedated that of Steiner, is not material here. We only refer to Dillon's patent to show, what also appears from Headley's, that the impracticable character of the hollow journal reel in fire extin guishing machines, where water is thrown by force applied in the usual way, is not known or recognized by the ordinary mechanic, and does not seem to be well understood in the patent offices of England and America. In other words, the hollow reel is not so plainly inapplicable to ordinary fire engines that a patent for such a device like the Headley patent would not naturally suggest its use in a chemical engine. The new use is not an analogous use. It is the same use. It seems clear to us, therefore, that it did not involve invention to take the hollow reel from the ordinary fire engine or water sprinkler, and put it on a chemical engine. The introduction of the hollow journaled reel in the chemical fire engine was nothing but the application of an old device to a similar subject, with little or no change in the manner of application, and with no result substantially distinct in its nature. The hollow journaled reel may have been better adapted to the use in the chemical engine than in the ordinary steam pressure pump engine; but this, it seems to us, is a mere difference in degree of the result, and did not involve, in bringing it about, anything but what would naturally occur to one skilled in the art. Similar cases may be found in Roller-Mill Co. v. Walker, 138 U. S. 124, 11 Sup. Ct. 292; Electric Co. v. La Rue, 139 U. S. 606, 11 Sup. Ct. 670; Blake v. City and County of San Francisco, 113 U. S. 679, 5 Sup. Ct. 692; Pennsyl vania R. Co. v. Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co., 110 U. S. 490, 4 Sup. Ct. 220; Preston v. Manard, 116 U. S. 661, 6 Sup. Ct. 695.

For the reasons given, the decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs.

NORTON et al. v. EAGLE AUTOMATIC CAN CO.

(Circuit Court, N. D. California. November 27, 1893.)

1. PATENTS INJUNCTION-VIOLATION-CONTEMPT.

Violation of an injunction is not excused by the fact that the infringing machine is made according to a junior patent, for, on a question of infringement, such patent cannot be introduced, even as prima facie evidence of a substantial difference. Blanchard v. Putnam, 8 Wall. 420, applied. Truax v. Detweiler, 46 Fed. 118, and Harrow Co. v. Hanby, 54 Fed. 493, disapproved.

2 SAME-INFRINGEMENT.

The Norton patent for a can-heading machine (No. 267,014) is infringed by a machine made according to the Merriam patent of June 3, 1884.

In Equity. Proceeding to punish defendant for contempt in violating an injunction issued in the suit of Edward Norton and Oliver W. Norton against the Eagle Automatic Can Company for infringement of letters patent No. 267,014, issued November 7, 1882, to Edwin Norton, for a can-heading machine. Defendant adjudged guilty.

For report of decision on motion for preliminary injunction, see 57 Fed. 929.

Munday, Evarts & Adcock and Estee & Miller, for complainants. John L. Doone, Pillsbury & Hayne, and S. C. Denson, for respondent.

MCKENNA, Circuit Judge, (orally.) The plaintiffs' patent is for applying, automatically and exteriorly, can heads to can bodies. It was construed in Norton v. Jensen, 1 C. C. A. 452, 49 Fed. 859, very broadly, and held of a primary character; "standing," to quote the court, "at the head of the art, as the first machine ever invented for applying tight exterior fitting can heads to can bodies automatically, and appellees are entitled to a broad and liberal construction of the claims of their patent."

The order of injunction was for the defendant, its agents and servants, to "absolutely desist and refrain from making, using, or selling any machine for putting on the ends of fruit or other cans which is an infringement of the claims of letters patent of the United States No. 267,014, granted to Edwin Norton on November 7, A. D. 1882; also, from making or selling any machine for applying to can bodies heads fitting outside of the same, containing the combination of a device for sizing the exterior diameter of a can body to conform to the exterior diameter of the can head, and holding the same so sized while the head is applied; said sizing and holding device having its end enlarged to fit the exterior diameter of the can head so as to leave an annular space between it and the can body for the reception of the flange of the can head, with a device for forcing the can head into the said annular space, and thereby applying the head outside of the can body,-or any colorable imitation or evasion or equivalent thereof." There was also a prohibition against using the above device in combination with other devices

for delivering the can bodies to the heading machine. kind was the machine especially enjoined.

Of the latter Counsel for the defendant contend that the patent to Norton only covers the latter combination, the automatism consisting in not only applying the can heads to the bodies, but in delivering them,-in other words, an organized machine consisting of a feeding device and a heading device. But the order of the court precludes this contention. It enjoins the use, as I have already quoted, of "the combination of a device for sizing the can body with a device for applying the can head exteriorly," and the order of the court. seems to be justified by the first claim of the patent.

It is this part of the order with which we are now concerned, and the use of a machine containing the combination described in the order, or, to quote the order, "any colorable imitation or evasion or equivalent thereof," is within its prohibition. The defendant uses a machine made under a patent to C. R. Merriam, issued June 3, A. D. 1884. It is not necessary to explain the details of it. Considering the broad construction given to the Norton patent by the court of appeals in Norton v. Jensen, supra, I think it is infringed by the Merriam machine. But defendant contends, if this be made to appear after judicial inquiry and consideration, it is not obviously so, and that defendant is excused, by the fact of the patent to Merriam, and the advice of counsel, from a willful violation of the 'order of the court. Abstractly, it would seem that, if the plaintiffs' patent was prima facie evidence of novelty, (difference from all things before it,) a subsequent patent to the defendant, or for a device used by defendant, would be prima facie evidence of novelty, (difference from all things before it, and hence from the plaintiffs' device,) and hence would be admissible in evidence on the issue of infringement, and its use would be innocent; and it was so held in Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 271. But this case was overruled in Blanchard v. Putnam, 8 Wall. 420. The court said:

"What the jury have to determine is, does the machine of the defendant infringe the machine of the plaintiff? And, if it does not, then the defendant is entitled to a verdict. But, if it does infringe the plaintiff's machine, then the plaintiff is entitled to his remedy; and it is no answer to the cause of action to plead or prove that the defendant is the licensee of the owner of another patent, and that his machine is constructed in accordance with that patent."

In both cases the patent under which defendants, respectively, claimed was issued subsequently to those under which plaintiffs, respectively, claimed.

In Truax v. Detweiler, 46 Fed. 118, it was held, on the authority of Onderdonk v. Fanning, 2 Fed. 568, that the issuing of a later patent is prima facie evidence that there are substantial differences between the devices described in the two patents; and, in the case cited from 2 Fed. it was decided that the new patent shows that the action of defendant was not so plainly colorable as to entitle plaintiff to an attachment against the defendant for contempt. It was also held as late as March 2d of this year, in Harrow Co. v. Hanby, 54 Fed. 493, that, in a suit for infringement, the fact that the defendant's machine is patented is prima facie proof that it does not

infringe. To sustain this doctrine the court quotes Brown v. Selby, 2 Biss. 457, (a circuit court case,) and quotes Burden v. Corning, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 477, 497, which case, as we have seen, was overruled in Blanchard v. Putnam, supra. But the cases at circuit may be reconciled with Blanchard v. Putnam, applying them no further than affecting intention.

At any rate, I cannot say, in view of them and the advice of counsel, that defendant acted in willful contempt of the order of the court. In view, however, of the construction of the Norton patent by the circuit court of appeals, and the decisions on it of the circuit court, I do not consider defendant blameless. It would have been more considerate to have taken the judgment of the court on the Merriam machine before using it, and risking disobedience of the order of the court and injury to plaintiff. Therefore, I think it should be punished by at least a nominal fine, and the cost of the proceedings.

The defendant is therefore adjudged guilty of contempt, and is fined the sum of five dollars, and ordered to pay plaintiffs the costs of this proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees.

UNITED STATES CREDIT SYSTEM CO. v. AMERICAN CREDIT INDEMNITY CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. December 5, 1893.

1. PATENTS-INVENTION.

The use of sheets or tables with spaces and headings suitable for record. ing business transactions as part of a scheme for insuring merchants and traders against excessive losses by bad debts, possesses no patentable novelty. 53 Fed. 818, affirmed.

2. SAME "MEANS FOR SECURING AGAINST EXCESSIVE LOSSES BY BAD DEBTS." Patent No. 465,485, issued December 22, 1891, to L. Maybaum, for "means for securing against excessive losses by bad debts," is void for want of patentable novelty.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

In Equity. Bill by the United States Credit System Company against the American Credit Indemnity Company for infringement of patent. A demurrer to the bill was sustained. 53 Fed. 818. Complainant appeals. Affirmed.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for the southern district of New York dismissing the bill of complaint. The suit was brought on letters patent to Levy Maybaum, dated December 22, 1891, No. 465,485, for "means for securing against excessive losses by bad debts." Defendant demurred to the bill, which was in the usual form, the objections presented being not to the form of pleading, but to the sufficiency of the patent itself.

Rowland Cox, for appellant.

Edgar M. Johnson, (Hoadly, Lauterbach & Johnson, on the brief,) for appellee.