Oswego township a sum sufficient as shown by the said certificate of the auditor of state to pay the interest on said bonds adding not to exceed 10 per cent. for delinquencies provided that such levy shall be made on all such property as would under existing laws be holden for the payment of the bonds or judgments thereon that may be funded, taken up, satisfied or paid under and by virtue of the provisions of this act;" that in the eleventh year after the issuance of the bonds, and annually thereafter, the county commissioners shall levy a tax to create a sinking fund to pay the bonds; that the commissioners provided for in the act shall invest it; and that, if any of the county commissioners fail to vote for the levy of such a tax, they and their sureties shall be liable in a civil action to the owners of the coupons for the full amount that should have been, but was not, levied.

Sec. 7. That if the county commissioners fail to levy this tax in any year the county clerk shall add the proper amount to that levied by the commissioners, and distribute it ratably on all the taxable property of Oswego township; and, if he fails to do so, he and his sureties shall be liable in a civil action, to the owners of the coupons that should have been levied for, to the full amount thereof.

Sec. 8. That if, when the tax roll of Oswego township comes to the county treasurer, the tax provided for in the act has not been levied, or placed on the tax roll, he shall place it there, and shall collect it; and, if he fails to do so, he and his sureties shall be liable in a civil action, to the owners of the coupons that should have been paid from such levy, to the full amount thereof.

Sec. 9. "That for the purpose of compromising the bonded indebtedness and the judgments thereon of the said township of Oswego, and for the issuing of the bonds and coupons provided for by this act C. M. Condon, J. B. Draper and Thomas Shrout of the county of Labette are made and declared the commissioners and the agents of said township of Oswego;" that bonds issued under the act shall be signed by their chairman and attested by their clerk, "and in the compromising and funding of the said indebtedness of said township the said commissioners shall have full power to do all things needful; provided that no portion of said indebtedness shall be compromised by said commissioners at a higher rate than thirty cents on the dollar;" and that, for any violation of the provisions of the act by either of the commissioners, he shall be deemed guilty of a felony.

Sec. 10. That if any one of the commissioners fails to accept the position tendered him, or if, after accepting, he dies or resigns, the judge of the judicial district in which Labette county is situated shall fill the vacancy, and that the commissioners shall give bonds for the faithful discharge of their duties.

When this act was passed there was a general law in force in the state of Kansas, authorizing every county and township in that state, after a favorable vote of its electors, to compromise and refund its indebtedness, and to issue new bonds therefor, not exceeding its actual outstanding indebtedness in amount.

W. H. Rossington and Charles Blood Smith, (E. J. Dallas, on the brief,) for plaintiff in error.

W. F. Rightmire and F. H. Atchinson, for defendant in error.
Before CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question in this case is the constitutionality of the act of the legislature of Kansas under which these bonds and coupons were issued. Before entering upon the discussion of this question, it is well to note the purpose and extent of the authority vested in the commissioners appointed by the act to issue these bonds. They were not empowered to contract for the purchase of any property, or for the performance of any work, on behalf of the township. They were not authorized to incur any new debt, or to increase any

old indebtedness of the township. The act did not provide for the payment of any salaries or compensation to these agents, even. It did not enable them to add one dollar to the burden of taxation which rested on the property of the township. Laying aside the authority to invest the sinking fund 12 years after the bonds were issued, which is immaterial here, the entire power given to these commissioners was to act as a board of auditiors, to receive, calculate the amount due upon, and destroy, the old bonds of the township as fast as their owners would consent to cancel and surrender them for new bonds to be issued by the commissioners for only 30 per cent. of the amount justly due. In effect, the act empowered the commissioners to reduce the bonded debt of this township 70 per cent., and to certify that the remaining 30 per cent. of its debt, and no more, was still owing, with certain interest, and this is the sum and substance of its offending. We turn to the consideration of the objections to its validity.

The principal objection, and the one that was sustained by the court below, is that the passage of this act was a violation of section 17, art. 2, of the constitution of Kansas, which provides that:

"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state, and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted."

This refunding act is, without question, a special law, and it is contended that it is void because a general law could have been made applicable to the case of this township, and also because it prevents the uniform operation throughout the state of the general laws for the refunding of debts; of the general laws fixing the number and names of township officers, and defining their duties, of the general law providing for the filling of vacancies in township offices; and of the laws establishing the courts, and prescribing their jurisdiction. We are spared the labor of examining this question. It was settled by the supreme court of Kansas, by a long line of unvarying decisions, before these bonds were issued. No provision of the national constitution, or of the national laws or treaties, is in question. In determining rights dependent entirely upon the interpretation of the constitution and laws of a state, the national courts uniformly follow the rules of construction and interpretation announced by the highest judicial tribunal of that state where such rules were established before the rights in question accrued. Dempsey v. Township of Oswego, 4 U. S. App. 416, 2 C. C. A. 110, 51 Fed. 97; Rugan v. Sabin, 10 U. S. App. 519, 3 C. C. A. 578, 53 Fed. 415, 416; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425, 439, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759, 763, 7 Sup. Ct. 736.

In State v. Hitchcock, (decided in 1862,) 1 Kan. 178, the highest judicial tribunal of that state held that a special law locating the county seat of Franklin county was constitutional and valid, notwithstanding the fact that it prevented the operation in that county of a general law of that state then in existence, providing for the location of county seats. Chief Justice Ewing, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"The legislature must necessarily determine whether their purpose can or cannot be expediently accomplished by a general law. Their discretion and sense of duty are the chief, if not the only, securities of the public for an intelligent compliance with that provision of the constitution. Whether we could, in any conceivable case presenting a flagrant abuse of that discretion, hold a private law invalid, as contrary to that provision of the constitution, we need not decide; but we would certainly not hold such a law invalid merely because it would, in our opinion, have been possible to frame a general law under which the same purpose could have been accomplished."

The rule thus announced in the first volume of the Kansas Reports has been affirmed and adhered to in that state ever since. It is true that in Darling v. Rodgers, 7 Kan. 592, and Robinson v. Perry, 17 Kan. 248, general laws which applied to certain counties, only, were held void because they did not have a uniform operation throughout the state; but the act in question here is not a general law, and no special law of the character here presented has ever been held invalid in that state, so far as we are aware, either because it prevented the uniform operation of a prior general law, or because a general law might have been made applicable to its subject-matter. On the other hand, every such special law that has been presented to the supreme court of that state has been sustained. In 1873, in Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 28, a special law authorizing a school district to issue bonds to build a schoolhouse was sustained, although there was a general law in force, the operation of which in that district must have been prevented by the special act. Mr. Justice Brewer, then a judge of the supreme court of Kansas, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"It may be conceded that this is a special law; that it authorizes the issue of bonds in a manner and upon conditions different from those prescribed by the general statute therefor. It is evident, also, that the result 'could be accomplished by a general law, or, in the words of the constitution, that a general law could be made applicable, for a general law is on the statute book under which great numbers of school districts have issued bonds. Why this distinction was made, we do not know, and there is nothing in the record to enlighten us thereon. We may imagine many reasons, but it is useless to speculate. It is enough, in the absence of any showing as to the facts, that we can see that there may have been good and sufficient reasons."

In Commissioners v. Shoemaker, (decided in 1882,) 27 Kan. 77, a special act had been passed, excepting the county clerks and county treasurers of two counties from the operation of a general law then in force, fixing the salaries of county officers throughout the state, and it was sustained. In Washburn v. Commissioners, (decided in 1887,) 37 Kan. 217, 221, 15 Pac. 237, while there was a general law in force authorizing the county commissioners of any county in the state to build a jail and jailer's residence after a vote of the electors of the county approving the project, a special law had been passed, authorizing the county commissioners of Shawnee county to build a jail and jailer's residence, to levy a tax of six mills upon the taxable property of the county, and to issue scrip to pay for the buildings, without submitting the project to a vote of the electors, and this law was sustained by the supreme court of Kansas. State v. Sanders, (decided in 1889,) 42 Kan. 228, 233, 21 Pac. 1073,

In

that court, in answer to the suggestion that the special law then before it prevented the uniform operation of a prior general law, and that there was a general law applicable to its subject-matter, cited the authorities to which we have referred, and declared that:

"The interpretation which was placed upon this provision of the constitution at an early day, and which has been accepted and acted upon by both the legislature and the courts since that time, must be regarded as settled, and binding upon the court, whatever the views of the present members might be." See, also, City of Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34, 12 Pac. 332; Elevator Co. v. Stewart, 50 Kan. 378, 32 Pac. 33.

In view of this long-established and uniform interpretation by the highest judicial tribunal of Kansas of the provision contained in section 17, art. 2, of the constitution of that state, the objection to this law founded upon that provision ought not to be, and cannot be, sustained by the federal courts. The interpretation given by the state court must be followed, in the interest of a wise public policy, of uniformity of decision and harmony of action between the two systems of jurisprudence, and of stability and certainty in the rights of citizens. It would be intolerable that these bonds, issued and sold upon the faith of this uniform interpretation of the constitution by both the legislature and the courts of Kansas for 23 years before their issuance, should be held valid and enforced in the state courts, and should be declared void in the federal courts, when no impingement upon the federal constitution, laws, or treaties, and no question of commercial or general law, demands an independent examination and determination of this question by the latter.

The second objection interposed to this act is that it was passed in violation of section 1, art. 12, of the constitution of Kansas, which provides that:

"The legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers. Corporations may be created under general laws; but all such laws may be amended or repealed."

This provision is found in the article of the constitution entitled "Corporations," and most of the provisions of that article relate to private corporations. Section 5 of the article, however, provides

that:

"Provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns and villages; and their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power."

The perusal of these sections at once suggests the thought that the restriction of section 1 relates to corporations proper, only,— to private corporations, and cities, towns, and villages, and that it in no way restricts or affects the legislative authority over counties, townships, and school districts. We are also relieved from a consideration of this question. The supreme court of Kansas decided it in 1873, and has constantly adhered to that decision. In Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 28, 31, in which a special law was under consideration which conferred upon a school district authority to build a schoolhouse, and to issue bonds to pay for it, on terms different from those of a general law then in force, giving such authority,

this question was presented and determined. Mr. Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the court, in speaking of the effect of section 5, said:

"On the other hand, in order that there might be no question whether this article was intended for other than private corporations, section 5 names certain public corporations to which its provisions extend. It was probably well that these were named, to avoid question, for all the sections other than the fifth have reference-principally, at least-to private corporations. Yet, as these are corporations proper, there would be weighty reasons for holding them included, even though not in terms named. But with reference to counties, townships, and school districts the case is different. True, they are called in the statute 'bodies corporate.' Gen. St. p. 253, § 1; Id. p. 1082, § 1; Id. p. 920, § 24. Yet they are denominated in the books, and known to the law, as 'quasi corporations,' rather than as corporations proper. They possess some corporate functions and attributes, but they are primarily political subdivisions,-agencies in the administration of civil government, and their corporate functions are granted to enable them more readily to perform their public duties."

After an exhaustive examination of the authorities, he says:

"The conclusion to which these investigations have led us is that, among public corporations, only corporations proper are included within the scope of article 12 of the state constitution, and that a school district is only a quasi corporation, and not covered by its provisions."

This decision has been uniformly followed by the supreme court of Kansas, and it is decisive of this objection in this court. State v. County of Pawnee, 12 Kan. 426, 439; Commissioners v. O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58, 61; Eikenberry v. Township of Bazaar, 22 Kan. 556; Marion Co. v. Riggs, 24 Kan. 255, 258. In the two cases last cited, it is held that counties, townships, school districts, and road districts are not liable for neglect of public duty; that they exist only for the purposes of the general political government of the state; that all the powers with which they are intrusted are the powers of the state, and all the duties with which they are charged are the duties of the state; that in the performance of governmental duties the sovereign power is not amenable to individuals; and, therefore, that these organizations are not liable for such neglect, in the absence of a statute imposing such a liability.

The third objection to the constitutionality of this law is that its passage was in violation of section 16, art. 2, of the constitution of Kansas, which provides that:

"No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."

The title of this act is, "An act to enable the township of Oswego, county of Labette, to compromise and refund its present indebtedness." The provision here cited is common to the constitutions of many states, and it has frequently been the subject of judicial construction. The settled rule for its interpretation is that, where the subject of the bill is clearly stated in the title, the law will not be held obnoxious to this clause of the constitution on account of the presence in it of any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title, or that would be naturally suggested by it as necessary or proper to the complete accomplishment of the purpose