of pride, or become ungrateful to the man whose vast genius achieved it, but simply because they can now expect to find in any work on the subject merely a recapitulation of details with which they are already intimately acquainted. But when Wellington lays open the volumes of his secret correspondence, the case becomes very different, or rather is entirely reversed. The interest is then heightened by the very circumstances to which we have alluded. The portions of the work which afford us the highest gratification, are those connected with events, with the details of which we are most familiar, and which, by their magnitude and political importance, have left on our minds the most deep and durable impression. It is of course necessary to have understood and appreciated the result, before we can derive pleasure from the elucidation of the circumstances in which it originated. Though we have no doubt, therefore, that the portions of Wellington's correspondence more immediately connected with his great victories, are those which will most forcibly arrest the attention of the public, yet there are some interludes-if we may so call them of his life, which, though unconnected with success of any kind, and terminating in no remarkable result, are by no means without interest, as illustrating the character of the man. The reader will enjoy many opportunities of observing how Wellington thought and acted in the more brilliant periods of his career. It is our present object to exhibit him in a position where, from the ignorance and mismanagement of others, success was impossible. The circumstances connected with the episode, to which we are about to direct attention, are but little known, and but for the interest arising from the correspondence connected with it, unworthy of being more so. But the life of Wellington, like the picture of a great master, is deserving of minute study, and the portions involved in the deepest shadow will be found, on careful examination, to be entitled to equal admiration with those on which the artist has concentrated his light. There is no doubt that whatever Lord Wellesley may have become since, he was, at the period of his go vernment in India, a man of very con siderable talents. The promptitude and decision of his measures in the Mysore war, have received merited applause from all writers on Indian affairs. The complete success, however, in which it terminated, had the effect of whetting his appetite for military operations so powerfully, that after the restoration of peace, visions of conquest in other quarters seem perpetually to have haunted his imagination. At the period in question, there was a very small amount of force in India, either naval or military, disposable for such objects, but this deficiency of offensive means had neither the effect of damping his ardour for the acquisition of fresh laurels, nor of inducing him to delay the execution of projects, which, when examined in detail, by no means appear to have originated in "absolute wisdom." Allowing Lord Wellesley, therefore, full credit for the general vigour and success of his administration, we fear it must be conceded that he had his weak points. Few men are without vanity, and certainly Lord Wellesley was not of the number. The world in those days thought highly of his merits, yet, in his own opinion, by no means so highly as they deserved. No man had a keener relish for praise, or could be more solicitous to obtain it. Lord Wellesley's great object consequently was to make an impression. His faculties were continually on the stretch to attract applause, by some striking and unanticipated result. Ordinary approbation was not enough for him; he was not satisfied, unless he succeeded in exciting surprise and admiration by some brilliant coup d'état. In short, Lord Wellesley seems to have been affected by a sort of mental St Vitus' dance. His activity never slumbered, and his restless impatience of inaction was continually goading him to enterprise. That his enterprises were not always judicious, will be made apparent by the details to which we now solicit the attention of the reader. The first of Lord Wellesley's projects was to gain possession of the settlement of Batavia. It appears that the surrender of Surinam had induced the King to imagine that the other Dutch settlements might be gained on similiar conditions, and he accordingly addressed a private and secret communication to Lord Wellesley, in hi individual capacity, authorizing him to take measures for inducing the settlement of Batavia to accept his Majes ty's protection. There appears to have existed not the smallest ground for supposing that the Batavese contemplated any change of allegiance. No wish for British protection had been expressed by any portion of the inhabitants. No negotiations had taken place; no understanding been established with the authorities, and altogether so visionary was the project of thus acquiring this important colony, that it seems never to have been entertained by any of the King's Ministers. We are warranted in so concluding, both because not a syllable relating to it is to be found in the published despatches of Lord Wellesley or Mr Dundas, and because, had it been otherwise, the recommendation would have been transmitted to the Governor-General, through the regular channel, instead of being made the sub. ject of a private and personal communication from the King to Lord Wellesley in his non-official character. Altogether the affair is curious, as showing the keen interest felt by George III. in the concerns even of his most distant dominions, and that he occasionally exercised an influence on political measures of which his responsible advisers were by no means aware. of Lord Clive, however, and his representations of the danger to which any diminution of military force must expose the Company's possessions, were ineffectual. Lord Wellesley wrote immediately to Admiral Rainier, requiring the co-operation of the naval force at his disposal, and explaining his views in detail. The despatch informed the Admiral that it was by no means his intention "to attempt to reduce or to retain Batavia by force," but merely to send there "several ships of war, with a force sufficiently numerous to furnish an ostensible justification to the Governor-General to surrender the colony into our hands." In case, however, the Governor-General should not think proper to take advantage of this "ostensible justification," and should prefer retaining his own office and the colony, then we are left to conclude that the Admiral-after expressing, of course, his regret and astonishment at the bad taste of this perverse functionary— was to put about ship and return whence he came. to The service thus proposed was certainly not a brilliant one, and though Lord Wellesley endeavoured heighten its attractions by assurances that "the warehouses at Batavia contained public property to a very large amount," and that a considerable proportion of this might be expected to find its way into the pockets of the captors, the Admiral seems to have been by no means ambitious of engaging in it. The intention of Lord Wellesley was simply to invite the Governor of Batavia to give up the colony. Not a shot was to be fired, and the guns could be of no use, and it is only when acceptance is enforced by these, that a British Admiral is acIn a customed to send invitations to an enemy. The reply of Admiral Rainier, therefore, was unfavourable to the wishes of the Governor-General, and the result was the postponement of the expedition till " a more convenient season." The suggestion of his sovereign was too much in accordance with the inclinations of Lord Wellesley not to be immediately acted upon, and he determined, without delay, to fit out an expedition to Batavia. On announcing this intention to Lord Clive, then Governor of Madras, that nobleman expressed, in the strongest manner, his conviction of the imprudence and impolicy of the project. letter to Colonel Wellesley on the subject, he says " Previous to the receipt of Lord Mornington's private letter, I had, in a despatch of the 24th instant, fully stated to his Lordship my sentiments upon the inexpediency and danger of further weakening our present incomplete and divided army; and I have not scrupled to give it as my opinion, that in the actual state of affairs in the Carnatic and Mysore, it will be most for the public good to attempt the attainment of the object of his Majesty's commands by a naval blockade only." The remonstrances In truth the affair is utterly without interest, except from Colonel Wellesley's being in some measure connected with it. The command of the military force amounting to 1200 men was offered to him, and the circumstance is worthy of record from the high testimonies to his merit, and the value of his services, which it drew from Lord Clive and some of the most distinguished men in India. The former expresses himself thus in a letter to Colonel Wellesley. " In sending you, therefore, the offer of the command of the land forces about to sail to the eastward, I have no hesitation in recommending in the strongest terms, and in requesting you-if I may be permitted to do so-to remain in a situation which I have long felt and still feel that you fill with singular advantage to our own country, as well as to Mysore; a situation in which for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct are indispensable, and in which your acquired knowledge and experience, especially in the event of active operations, must give you the advantage over other men, and in which I should find it not only difficult but impossible to replace you to my satisfaction." Under these circumstances the course adopted by Colonel Wellesley may be anticipated. In Mysore he held perhaps the most important command in India. Active operations against Doondiah were about to commence, and he at once declined the command of the troops destined for Batavia, adding in his letter to Lord Clive, that no prospect of advantage or credit to be gained elsewhere should induce him to relinquish his command in Mysore at so interesting a period. In the propriety of this decision it appears from the following letter that Lord Wellesley acquiesced. Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract). "MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort William, 6th June, 1800. "Lord Clive has pressed for your continuance in Mysore with an earnestness so honourable to you, that I think you cannot accept the command of the forces destined for Batavia; indeed, I suspect that you could not quit Mysore at present. Your conduct there has secured your character and advancement for the remainder of your life, and you may trust me for making the best use of your merits in your future promotion. "Ever, my dear Arthur," &c. For several months after this period we discover no traces of the existence of the Batavia project; but in the following October we find that it "is not dead, but sleeping." At the same time we are informed that its slumber is to remain unbroken for the present. In a despatch, dated October 22d, to Admiral Rainier, Lord Wellesley writes as follows. "I am decidedly of opinion that the British Government of India would not be justified in undertaking or prosecuting any expedition, the necessary effect of which must be, to remove the strength of your Excellency's squadron to any considerable distance, to the eastward, for any long period of time. same objection applies in a certain degree, to the detachment of any part of our military force in the present conjuncture for the purposes of any foreign conquests unconnected with an increase of our means of defence against the probable point of danger. This objection applies most powerfully to any detachment of our European force; the whole disposable amount of which throughout India does The not at this time amount to ten thousand men." Alluding more particularly to Batavia, in a subsequent part of the despatch, he again expresses his conviction that any attempt on that colony in the existing circumstances of India would be utterly unjustifiable. The time was come, he said, when "the pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy and advantageous, must yield to the necessity of self defence," and he assures the Admiral that "the absence of our fleet and of any part of our disposable European force might be fatal to our existence in India." Having thus made the Admiral fully aware of the danger and impolicy of engaging in aggressive operations at a conjuncture so critical, Lord Wellesley proceeds to point out to him the measures which, in his judgment, are most proper to be adopted. In the first place, he strongly recommends the blockade of Batavia to be immediately given up. In the second, he states that, after much consideration, he had selected Trincomalee as the station most favourable for protecting the western coast of India, or proceeding up the Red Sea to co-operate with the British army in Egypt, as would probably be necessary. At Trincomalee, therefore, he had determined on assembling all his military disposable force, and strongly urges the propriety of its being made the chief rendezvous of the naval squadron. He also expresses a very earnest desire that the Admiral should personally repair to Trincomalee as speedily as possible, in order to concert measures with Colonel Wellesley, whom he expresses his intention of investing with the chief military command. On the 22d of October, therefore, it was the firm and settled conviction of Lord Wellesley that "the pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy and advantageous," would be most rash and dangerous. Before the 5th of November, however, it appears that a striking change had taken place in his opinions. On that day we find him engaged more appropriately than consistently-in arranging a gunpowder plot against the Mauritius. The following extract is from a letter to Colonel Wellesley, announcing his appointment to command the armament about to be assembled at Trincomalee. "Intelligence which I have received has satisfied me that a blow might now be struck, with every prospect of success, against the Isle of France. If the state of my accounts from Europe and Egypt should leave me at liberty to make such an attempt, at the close of the month of December, my anxious wish is, that you should proceed, on or about the 25th of December, from Trincomalee directly to the Isle of France, and carry into execution the plan contained in the papers enclosed in my letter B of this date, provided you and the Admiral, after full consideration, should judge that plan to be practicable, with the means which I can enable you to command, and within the period of the season stated in the plan. "The enclosures of this letter, and of my letter B of this date, contain such ample details as to require no explanation from me. You will meet the Admiral and Mr Stokes at Trincomalee. In the mean while, I shall furnish you with such information as I possess respecting the expedition formerly projected against the Isle of France, directing your attention to the various changes of circumstances which favour the plan of Mr Stokes, and also stating such observations as occur to me on the general principles of the plan. The particular details of the project involve many questions purely naval or military, on which the Admiral and you must be more competent to decide. "It is necessary to apprise you that I have observed the strictest secrecy with regard to my views against the Isle of France. I have not yet communicated them even to Lord Clive. If I judge it advisable to disclose them to him, I will give you timely notice. "Ever yours, dear Arthur," &c. In order to explain this striking change of opinion, it is necessary to state that an "intelligent navigator," named Stokes, to whom allusion is made in the preceding extract, had in the interval been admitted to the honour of communicating with Lord Wellesley. It appears that this person, about six months before, had been made prisoner, and passed several weeks in the Mauritius. His report was, that the island at the period of his detention, was very weakly garrisoned, and might easily be captured by a British force. Whatever might be the pretensions of Mr Stokes, he had certainly no reason to complain of the degree of credit accorded both to his facts and his opinions by the Go vernor-General. But there are some singular circumstances connected with this "intelligent navigator." Throughout these transactions, we hear a great deal of Mr Stokes, but see nothing. His shadow is continually flitting across the stage, but he never appears on it. His presence seems to have gladened no visual orbs but those of Lord Wellesley. To every one else, he was "an invisible thing, a voice, a mystery." His approach is loudly announced, but he never comes, and when the curtain drops at the conclusion of the drama, we are left in a state of most perplexing doubt, whether Mr Stokes be a true living man, eating, drinking, and tobacco-chewing, like other navigators equally in telligent, or merely a phantom conjured up by the imaginative brain of the Governor-General. No doubt much might be said on both sides of a question, fortunately not of importance proportionate to its difficulty of solution, but this at least is certain, that whether denizen of earth or air, navigator, spirit of grace, or goblin damned, upon his advice and unsupported testimony, did Lord Wellesley fit out an expedition to the Mauritius, an island both naturally and artificially of great strength, and to capture which if at all suitably garrisoned,the force at his disposal was wholly inadequate. The merits and qualities of this intelligent but mysterious navigator form the subject of the following very interesting letter. "Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. "MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort William, 5th November, 1800. "I enclose in this letter copies of several papers which I have received from Mr C. Stokes, containing suggestions for an attack on the Isle of France. The sketch which accompanies these papers is imperfect, and was hastily copied from a very accurate original survey, during Mr Stokes's passage down the river to the packet destined to convey him to the Admiral. I do not expect that these papers, without much personal explanation from Mr Stokes, can enable you to form a competent judgment of his plan. My only object in forwarding these papers to you at present, is to save you the time which you must have otherwise employed in reading these papers after Mr Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee. "This letter will probably reach you before you can arrive at that place, where I trust you will find Mr Stokes and the Admiral. "It is only necessary to add some account of Mr Stokes's character, and of his means of information on the subject of these papers. I have every reason to believe his character perfectly unexceptionable. You are aware that he accompanied me on board the Virginie. As an evidence, I know no man more deserving of credit. "With regard to his means of information, he has resided three several times in the Isle of France: First: Previously to the war, when he proceeded to the Isle of France from America, on a commercial speculation. Secondly: He was taken prisoner in the year 1795, and detained for some time in the island. Thirdly: He was again taken prisoner and carried into the Isle of France early in the month of July last, and he remained in the island until the commencement of the month of August. "Ever yours, dear Arthur," &c. Immediately on his appointment to command the armament at Trincomalee, Colonel Wellesley repaired there and entered zealously on the task of completing its equipment for service. But Lord Wellesley's ardour on the subject of the expedition appeared by no means to have been contagious; at all events, both Lord Clive and the Admiral escaped the infection. Weeks passed and neither the latter nor any part of his squadron appeared at Trincomalee. Indeed, his astonishment may readily be conceived, when, after having read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested the contents of the despatch of the 22d of October, he became aware that on the 5th of November Lord Wellesley was actually busied with arrangements for an attack on the Mauritius. How Lord Wellesley explained the inconsistency between his words and his measures, or whether he attempted explanation at all, we have no means of ascertaining, since all the documents which could throw light on these projects have been carefully excluded from the collection of his despatches edited by Mr Martin. But whatever impression may have been produced on the mind of Admiral Rainier, by the strange contradictions of the Governor-General, certain it is that he did not suffer them to influence his movements. Trincomalee he did not come, and what was perhaps of still higher con sequence, Mr Stokes also was found absent by Colonel Wellesley, at the Το |