very time and place where his services were most wanted. But in the mean time, a dismal apprehension had occurred to shake the nerves of Lord Wellesley. It haunted his imagination by day, and his dreams by night. At Fort-William or at Barrackpore, in drawing-room, or durber, his peace was still poisoned by sad forebodings

relative to Mr Stokes. Intelligence of Mr Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee would, of course, be wafted" from Indus to the pole." The Governor of the Mauritius would be roused by it from his dream of security, and then farewell to those air-born visions of conquest which gladdened the imagination of the Governor-General.

"The Secretary of the Supreme Government to Colonel the
Hon. A. Wellesley.

"MY DEAR SIR,

Calcutta, 7th December, 1800. "It has occurred to the Governor-General since closing his despatches by the Waller, that it may be of material importance to prevent Mr Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee with Admiral Rainier being publicly known. If intelligence of Mr Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee should reach Tranquebar, the French agents at that settlement (who must be apprised of Mr Stokes's recent return from the Isle of France) will probably at once conclude that the armament is destined against the Isle of France, and take some active measures for conveying intelligence of the armament to the Isle of France, and of the ground of their conjecture respecting its destination for that island.

"His Lordship therefore requests that you will suggest to the Admiral, the expediency of taking any precautions which may be practicable for preventing Mr Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee being generally known; and also for preventing the conveyance of any intelligence respecting the armament from Tranquebar to the Isle of France, by sea. His Lordsbip desires me to add, that the Admiral and you will be the best judges what measures can be taken for the above-mentioned purposes.

"The Governor-General, having ground to believe that a number of British subjects have voluntarily entered and served on board of the French privateers in the Indian seas, his Lordship requests, in the event of the enterprise against the Isle of France proving successful, you will endeavour to discover and apprehend all such persons, and that you will take the usual measures for bringing them to trial and punishment.

"I have the honour to be," &c.

On another occasion, the sensitive mind of Lord Wellesley seems to have been smitten with apprehension lest Mr Stokes should not receive from his brother all those delicate attentions to which he considers him to be entitled. It is gratifying also to observe by the following extract from one of his letters to Colonel Wellesley, that his praises of Mr Stokes were to be accompanied by-what was probably more to the taste of a navigator so intelligent a little solid pudding. "I beg you will be particularly kind and attentive to Mr Stokes, and that you will repose confidence in him, which you may venture with the utmost degree of security. He is a very honourable and honest man, of considerable knowledge in his own line, and of very uncommon talents. His ardour will not displease you. I have named him commissary of stores and provi

sions. If you should take the island, I desire he may be appointed intendant under you." In another letter Lord Wellesley expresses his strong desire that a naval force should accompany the expedition, since " Mr Stokes has stated it to be advisable that as large a portion of the troops as possible should be embarked in his Majesty's ships."

After so much preparatory flourish, it is surely time that Mr Stokes should make his appearance in good earnest. The lamps are lighted, the overture has been played, the curtain is ready to draw up, but the hero of the farce is not forthcoming. The actors are loudly demanding, where is Stokes? and Echo answers where! In tracing the circumstances connected with this armament, one cannot help feeling for Lord Wellesley, under the agonies of hope deferred, occa

Mr

sioned by these repeated disappointments." I am much concerned," he says in a letter to Colonel Wellesley, "to inform you that Mr Stokes will not reach Trincomalee so soon as I expected."

But the cruelest cut of all was yet to come. When Colonel Wellesley had been several weeks at Trincomalee,

and become master of all the circumstances connected with the intended operations, except those of which the invisible Mr Stokes formed the sole depositary, he proceeded without further delay to demolish the airy fabric excited by Lord Wellesley. We beg the reader to observe how the edifice crumbles at every touch.

"Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor-General.

"MY LORD,

Trincomalee, 22d January, 1801. "A month has nearly elapsed since I arrived here, but I have hitherto received no tidings of the Admiral or Mr Stokes. It is evident from the papers received from Mr Stokes, of which I am at present in possession, that he is of opinion that the attempt upon Mauritius should not be made, if it is not possible to reach the island before the month of February. It is probable, therefore, that it will be postponed, and that you will have to determine whether you will make the attack on the return of the season in April. As I think it desirable that you should be acquainted as soon as possible with certain circumstances, which in my opinion have altered the situation of affairs, I lose no time in writing to you.

"The circumstances of the island have altered in some degree, since Mr Stokes was there, and procured the information upon which you determined to undertake the expedition. In the first place, it is impossible to suppose that the enemy will not have suspected the real object of the armament, and will not have prepared for defence. Indeed, before I arrived at Madras, and before it was known that I was going there, I received letters from the western coast, stating that the armament was destined either for Mauritius, Egypt, or Batavia, and would be commanded by Sir J. Craig. The removal of the 88th regiment from Bombay to Pointe de Galle has made it very clear that it was not destined for Egypt; and the alteration of the rendezvous, and the removal of the squadron from the Straits of Malacca to Trincomalee, in consequence of the alteration of the plan, have made it equally clear that it was not destined for Batavia.

"Therefore, those who judge of the intentions of government by their acts, must have found out the real object of the expedition. But not only have the French had that mode of ascertaining our intentions, but Mr Webbe informed me of a circumstance at Madras, which proves that they must receive intelligence of them from what they must have deemed at the time the best authority.

"A French lady residing at Madras, knew that an expedition was about to sail against Mauritius, and she had been desired to make known the names of her friends upon the island, in order that they and their property might be protected. It cannot be doubted but that this intelligence flew to Tranquebar immediately, and as no object for the armament was defined, it must have obtained great credit. It is probable, therefore, that the French will be made acquainted with the design, and will prepare themselves accordingly.

"I acknowledge that I have never been very sanguine in my expectations of the success of Mr Stokes's plan to surprise the place, for many reasons; but I expected that the enemy would not have heard of the armament, would be unprepared, and their works in bad condition: this cannot be expected in April.

"In the second place, the number of men at present upon the island is greater than was stated by Mr Stokes.

"I conclude that the government of Fort St George will have communicated to you the accounts received at Tranquebar by the Esther. Two ships of war and several merchant ships intended for privateers had arrived at the island, and these must have added to its strength. But if we had been able to sail as first proposed, it is probable that we should have found that some of

them were gone out on a cruise, and the others unprepared for their defence. We cannot expect in April, that a ship will be out, or a man will be absent, and we must therefore reckon upon an addition to the numbers stated by Mr Stokes, of at least 1500 men. În this calculation I do not reckon upon the troops expected; but only upon the vessels and their men positively stated to have arrived. Upon this statement the question is, whether our numbers will be sufficient to ensure the object in April; and whether it would be proper to make a trial of Mr Stokes's plan.

"I want much information, which Mr Stokes alone can give, to enable me to decide upon his plan, and I therefore defer to write upon it till I see him. What I have above written may be, however, considered as independent of all particular plans, and applies only to the general question.

"The state of our provisions on the first of next month will be as follows:Four months' provisions remaining, for

Four months in the Rockingham

Six months nearly, in the other transports

Five months in the ship at Pointe de Galle, which brought

the 88th from Bombay

1080 men.

100

500

600

"This will give provisions for the whole number of Europeans for three months and a half, exclusive of some beef which I have taken from hence, and will last them more than four months, with the savings which I hope will be made upon the issue.

"The difference between this and my former statements upon this subject, arises from the want of the ship from Madras, which was to have carried 200 men, and to have been provided with provisions for them for six months; from the consumption of this month, in the ships occupied by the 10th regiment, the Bengal and Madras artillery at this place, and by the 88th regiment at Pointe de Galle; and from the deficiencies in the Rockingham, owing to the difficulty of embarking provisions at Madras in the bad season.

"I told you heretofore, that no refreshments could be procured upon this island for the troops; that if they had been landed, they must have lived upon their sea provisions; and therefore I thought it better to keep them in their ships, than to expose them in tents to the worst weather I have seen in India. Besides, so long as there was a prospect that the Admiral would arrive in such time as to enable us to undertake the expedition, I did not wish to increase the difficulty and trouble at the moment of our departure, by having so many more men to embark.

"The natives have been on shore ever since they arrived, but have been obliged to live upon their sea provisions till within this fortnight; and I propose to land the Europeans, as soon as I shall have seen the Admiral, if it shall be determined that we are not to sail immediately.

"I have the honour to be," &c.

Before the preceding despatch had time to reach its destination, Lord Wellesley received a communication from Admiral Rainier, in which he positively declined employing any portion of the squadron under his command in the proposed enterprise. The Admiral, it appeared, was Stokesproof, and declined holding any communication with the intelligent navigator on matters connected with the service. In short, it seemed as if Lord Wellesley's troubles connected with this individual were to have no end. All ears but his were deaf to the voice of the charmer, "charm he never so wisely," and the refusal of naval co-operation increased both his difficulties and perplexity.

In truth only one course, sanctioned by sound judgment, was open to him. The station of Trincomalee was very favourably adapted for protecting those portions of our Indian territory liable to European aggression. The peril threatened by the success of the French army in Egypt, was not only great but imminent. French influence was already felt in our relations with the native powers, and there can be no doubt that the approach of an army led by Bonaparte, would have roused a spirit of resistance so general as to have led inevitably to the entire overthrow of our power. At that period England felt the weakness of an empire originating in conquest and maintained by

force. No assimilation had taken place between the conquerors and the conquered. Our government, either in form or principle, had never been accommodated to the habits and prejudices of the people. We had respected nothing that was sacred in their eyes. Intercourse had brought with it no sympathy nor union of interests. The natives of both religions had felt humbled by the very protection they had been compelled to court, and would have instantly joined the standard of any invader sufficiently powerful to promise emancipation from their thraldom. Had a French army entered Hindostan, what myriads of hearts and hands would have been united against us! There is a moral in such a state of things which it is of some consequence that statesmen should remember.

When our Indian possessions were threatened by such danger, there can be no doubt that the policy so strongly enforced in Lord Wellesley's despatch of the 22d October was sound and judicious. He had no force disposable for foreign conquest. It was with the greatest difficulty that he had been able to detach 2000 Europeans to Trincomalee; and this force, even when increased by the addition of a weak battalion from Ceylon, and a body of native volunteers, was evidently inadequate to the objects which he was ambitious of achieving. all events, it was Lord Wellesley's

"SIR,

At

duty, as he himself most truly said, to retain this force in a central and commanding position instead of detaching it, as he was most imprudently soli. citous to do, on schemes of distant conquest.

But the mind of Lord Wellesley seems at that moment to have been a sort of pendulum, which could only oscillate between the Mauritius and Batavia. Exactly in proportion to its departure from the one was its approach to the other. Displaying remarkable acuteness in all his ordinary judgments, Lord Wellesley seems to have been affected by monomania in every thing connected with these expeditions. To give them up was, in his judgment, impossible.

Opposition had merely the effect of interesting his self-love in the cause, and inducing him to cling to them with a stronger and more convulsive grasp. Though the Admiral, therefore, had declared against the Mauritius project, Lord Wellesley still ventured to hope that he might be induced to bear some part in operations against Batavia. We should have thought that to make such a proposition, considering the tenor of his former despatches, must have been a matter of some delicacy and embarrassment. But Lord Wellesley seems to have got over this difficulty with astonishing facility, as will become apparent from the following official communication to his brother.

"The Governor-General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort William, 24th January, 1801. "Since the date of my last official despatch to you (December 6th, 1800) I have received advice from his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, the unfavourable tenor of which has unfortunately compelled me to delay the proposed expedition against the Isle of France.

2. This circumstance, combined with the general aspect of affairs in Europe and in India, requires an alteration in the measures which I had proposed to carry into effect, under a different view of our present situation and future prospects.

"3. I have therefore determined to resume the expedition against Batavia with the least possible delay; and it is my intention, that the whole force now assembled on the island of Ceylon shall be employed on this service.

"4. Under these circumstances I have judged it expedient to appoint MajorGeneral Baird to the chief command of the expedition against Batavia, and to appoint you to be second in command on that expedition.

5. Immediately after the reduction of Batavia, a proper garrison having been appropriated to the defence of that place, it is my intention that the remainder of the troops, together with such additional force as it may be advisable to apply to this service, from India, should proceed directly from Java to the attack of the Isle of France.

VOL. XLI. NO, CCLVI.

"6. The chief command of the expedition against Isle of France will be intrusted to you, with the same powers, and under the same instructions, with which you were furnished by my despatch of the 6th of December, 1800.

7. Major-General Baird will proceed from hence in the course of a few days for Trincomalee; on his arrival at that port, he will assume the general command of the troops to be employed in the first instance against Batavia.

"8. When you shall proceed from Batavia to the attack of the Isle of France, you will act under my instructions of the 6th of December, in the same manner as if the expedition against that place had taken effect in the month of December, 1800, as far as those instructions may be applicable to the actual circumstances of the case.

"9. The details connected with the resumed expedition against the Isle of France will be communicated to you hereafter. Vice-Admiral Rainier will communicate to you my despatches addressed to him under this date.