hesitate in taking all that the law gives him in establishing his right to the elective franchise, we own that we have not been able to discover; nor do we believe that the most stern moralist would be able to assign a reason for it. But then we have been asked, how can you defend an extension of the right of suffrage, which has the effect of" swamping the real constituency?" This is a question to which the Whigs have of late perpetually recurred in this discussion, and with an air of simplicity and innocence which might surely touch the most obdurate heart. We fear, however, that even this question-the last refuge of a losing cause thus applied generally to cases where votes have been obtained in order to strengthen the adverse political interest, we would beg to enquire what other ground can be assigned for the application to such cases of any expression implying reproach or obloquy ? No man, surely, will maintain that the motives from which property, or any right with regard to property, may have been obtained, can affect the nature of the right itself; and surely no one professing liberal principles will contend that the acquisition of such a right, with a view to the elective franchise, and thus, of course, to the extension of the constituency, and the enlargement of the basis of our representation, is not rather praise--will also meet with its answer with worthy than blamable. Neither can any one contend that the transfer of such rights with this view, provided it be a legal transfer, is not a fair and legitimate exercise of the right of property, and a fair and legitimate ex. tension of political influence. And if such a question is to be decided, not on its own principles, but by an appeal to the practice of our adversaries, surely no one will deny that they have been at least as diligent in what has been termed "the creation of votes for party purposes" as the Conservatives-with this only difference, that as the property of the country is against them, probably in at least the proportion of ten to one, they have, of course, found this source of influence limited in a like proportion. We have frequently heard it said, that all parties, whether Conservatives, Whigs, or Radicals, have, with regard to this matter, been equally uuscrupulous ;" and that they all have gone to the very verge of the law." 66 But we confess that we are quite unable to perceive why any one should have the slightest "scruple" in claiming the elective franchise in any circumstances, or on any species of right which are recognised by the Reform act as giving him a just title to it; nor can we understand why any one should not go to "the very verge of the law" in such a case. No doubt there may be many questions between man and man, where one party could not go to the very verge of the law without committing gross injustice to the other party. No honest man, for instance, would go to the very verge of the law in order to avoid the payment of his just debts. But why any one need even the most simple of their auditors. If On this part of the question it is plain that much might be said of the conduct of the Whig party as affording a refutation of their own argument; for if the increase of votes, in order to strengthen political influence, can, by any process of reasoning, be represented as "the swamping of the true constituency," how (we might ask) do they happen to have availed themselves of precisely the same method for this purpose to the utmost limit of their means and opportunities? This, however, is a view of the case on which we shall not dwell; because it does not appear to us that this or any similar question ought ever to be discussed in the spirit of mere recrimination. If the extension of Conservative influence in the way referred to is wrong, we have no wish to justify it by the conduct of our adversaries; and we will therefore not refer to it further than as it not merely gives an extremely bad grace to all that they have said on this subject, but serves more effectually to unmask their real motives. We desire the question to be judged of on its own merits; in other words, on the principles of the Reform Bill in founding our political rights on PROPERTY; and on this ground we feel assured that the country will at once acquit both parties of all political guilt in so far as they have merely availed themselves of property as the means of extending their political influence. It is quite clear, then, that the clamour of the Whigs on this subject is just the last resource of a beaten party -beaten on the very ground on which they probably believed that they had established their power for ever-and supported for the present by influences which must likewise speedily give way. We admit, however, that this by no means decides the whole question with regard to "fictitious votes ;" though certainly it in many ways goes very far to do so. The enquiry, however, still remains whether there is just ground for asserting that any considerable portion of our Scottish constituency have obtained the elective franchise on rights which of course on very different views from those which have just been adverted to are to be considered as “fictitious ;" and if so, whether there are any means of preventing this evil. Now we shall immediately show that in this enquiry the whole discussion, in order to be intelligible, either in its own nature or in its objects, must necessarily turn on this one point-namely, whether any thing has been left undone whereby a "fictitious vote" (according to the definition we shall presently give of that term) may be detected. We shall demonstrate, that so far as human means can avail for that purpose, nothing has been left undone; and that any farther legislative enactment on In the subject must be vain and fruitless. Any question, therefore, as to the frequency of the evil, even if it could be determined, is altogether idle. It of course necessarily follows from what we have just said, that no such question ever can be determined; but we think we may venture to state, there is rea son to believe that it is extremely infrequent. There is the best reason to believe this that the case admits of. Every vote which stands on the register has been decided by a competent court to be a good, and not a fictitious vote; and the only ground on which it can thenceforth be alleged to be fictitious is this, that the right on which it is founded has been made out by means of false evidence, or possibly the suppression of true evidence. Now, how is it possible to maintain that this is a frequent case? We shall see presently that every opportunity is given to object to the claimant's right, and to traverse the evidence by which it is supported; and yet that evidence (on the nature of which the whole question depends) has been held by the proper judicial authority to be true evidence. these circumstances, what ground any one can have for saying that the evidence is false, we cannot imagine. He may have good ground for saying this with regard to his own case, or any case in which he himself may have given false evidence in support of a vote, and thus become prone to suspicion of others; or he may have such ground where the property claimed on is his own, and where he therefore must know that the right in question is not possessed by the voter; but how there can be such ground in any other case requires an explanation which we have not yet met with. No one surely, who has considered the subject for a moment, can say, in any other case whatever, "I can prove that your vote was supported by false evidence;" because even in the very limited number of cases in which there can be the slightest pretence for saying this, it is clear that if his proof had been adduced in the court where that evidence was admitted, it might have been met by counter-evidence, by which it would either have been neutralized, or outweighed, or probably shown to be unfounded. Every one who is in the least degree acquainted with such matters, is aware that it is scarcely possible to observe too much caution in relying on private information in such cases, in opposition to the deliberate and well-considered judgment of a court having both parties fairly before it-and where any one says, in the face of such a judgment, that he knows that fictitious votes are prevalent, he proves merely this, that he understands nothing whatever of the subject. The presumption of course is, that there are none; and, as in every case, they involve, in one shape or other, the guilt of false evidence, and in some cases (as we shall immediately see) the imputation of perjury, or a readiness to commit perjury on the part of the voter, we think that no one whose mind is not poisoned to a hopeless extent, either politically or morally, can even suspect that there are many. This, we are assured, is the view which is taken of the subject by all who are familiar with the provisions of the Reform Act, and with the proceedings of those Courts of Registration which constitute by far the most important part of the machinery by which it operates. We firmly believe that the well-informed portion of the Whigs themselves, and more especially those of the legal profession, regard with utter contempt the notion of the existence of fictitious votes as a serious and prevalent evil; and that as for the idea of legislative interference on the subject, it has never once entered their thoughts. Many of them, doubtless, do not scruple to join in the clamour on this subject as a means of agitation; but we are convinced that not a man of them either believes the evil to be frequent, or within the reach of legislation. Sed dis aliter visum. A discussion on this matter has recently taken place in the House of Commons, and a Committee has been appointed for the investigation of it. It is probable that that Committee have already discovered the impracticable nature of the subject, and that the enemy with whom they have to contend, if not a mere shadow, does yet not readily assume any very tangible shape. It is not impossible that they may find some difficulty in discovering what a "fictitious vote" really is; and ha. ving already shown, in at least one important respect, what it is not, we propose now, for their information, to turn for a few moments to that other branch of the Enquiry. ought never to forget that "Definitions are dangerous ;" and we believe that, in the present case, it will be found impossible to adopt any definition which is altogether free from objection. We think, however, that we shall be tolerably safe in saying, under certain explanations to which we shall immediately advert, that a fictitious vote is one where the voter does not possess such a right as is recognised by the Reform Act as the foundation of the elective franchise. It will be observed, that we here use the word "right," and not the word "qualification ;" and we do so, because the latter term includes various circumstances, such as value, and time of possession, which do not seem to form proper elements in this question. The rights recognised by the Reform Act, described in terms which, though no doubt very general, are yet sufficiently specific for our present purpose, may be said to be three in number-property, liferent, and tenancy. Now, we think it may be said, that wherever there is not in the eye of law one or other of these rights, the vote may be said to be fictitious; and that no vote can be said to be fictitious where there is, in the eye of law, any one of these rights. But then what is the eye of law? It can manifestly be nothing else than the Registration Court. It is there that it must be determined whether the right in question is truly a right of property, liferent, or tenancy; and if the claim be brought fairly before it, and is sustained, it is ludicrous to speak of the vote which is thus created as "a fictitious vote." We need not say that it may be often a matter of extreme difficulty to determine whether, under the cirumstances of the case, a right really exists or not; and it is always a purely legal question. The claimant himself can, of course, form no satisfactory opinion on it; he may even think most unfavourably of his own claim. But whatever doubts or misgivings he might himself entertain on this subject, are set at rest by the judgment of the proper court; and until the recent clamour, we had imagined that all complaints, from whatever quarter, were thus set at rest also. But it must, of course, not be for gotten, that in order that this may In questions of this description, we hold true, it is necessary that the case should be fairly brought before the Court of Registration: or, in other words, that the facts of the case should be stated truly. It manifestly is only under this qualification of our definition of a fictitious vote that any such vote could have an existence; for we have seen that the judgment of the Court on the true facts of the case must at once stamp it with the character of legal reality. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, in order to render a vote fictitious, either that it should have been supported by false evidence, or that there should have been a suppression of evidence. It is impossible to conceive how there can be a fictitious vote without this ingredient of fraud on the part of the voter. We shall immediately see that in many cases it implies even the guilt of perjury on his part; and we think it can hardly fail to occur to our readers, that if those gentlemen, who lavish so much" eloquence" on this subject, are really aware of these circumstances, it says but little for their own moral perceptions that they should be so unsparing in such accusations, where, as we have already shown, they cannot, by any possibility, know them to be well-founded. This, then, being the nature of a fictitious vote, let us now see whether we have been correct in saying that there is nothing awanting in the Reform Act, or in the way in which it has been administered, in order to prevent such an abuse. This, it will easily be perceived, is in truth the only practical question arising in the present discussion. Now, it will be plain on a moment's reflection, that the two great means of security against false votes are, in the first place, to give publicity to the claims for enrolment; and, in the second place, to give the power of deciding on them to able and upright judges. In truth we cannot think of any other means for attaining this object. Is the Reform Act then deficient in either of these respects? With regard to the publication of the claims, in order that every one may have an opportunity of examining and objecting to them, and, of course, of checking, as far as possible, any fraud on the part of the claimant, it would be quite out of place here to explain the curious mechanism of lists, schedules, church-doors, schoolmasters, town-clerks, and sheriff-clerks, by which the Reform act professes to accomplish this purpose. It is sufficient to say, that in all our enquiries we have never once heard a word of complaint on this subject except from the claimants themselves, or a surmise that this part of the system did not at least work well for the objectors. Then as to the judges in our Registration Courts, it is well known that they consist of the sheriffs of our counties many of them among the highest names at the Scottish bar, and all of them men of character and legal acquirements-and, what is most important, of constant judicial experience. We believe there is not one among them who does not fully possess the confidence of all parties in the discharge of his duties under the Reform Act; and we have never yet heard a suggestion of any other class of men to whom these duties could be so safely intrusted. They are not merely laborious and harassing duties, but they demand a familiar and practical acquaintance with the whole of our legal system; for in the questions which continually arise, both as to doubtful rights and doubtful evidence, there is hardly any part of the law, even the most abstruse and complex, which is not continually put in requisition. Any set of persons, not of legal habits and experience, who should attempt to discharge the functions of a Court of Registration, would infallibly make themselves the laughing-stock, not only of the Bar, and of all the inferior practitioners, but of claimants, objectors, and public in general, before they had gone half way through the first claim. They would pursue their benighted path among schedules, objections, dispositions, wadsets, precepts,procuratories, infeftments, bonds, back-bonds, adjudications, teinds, feuduties, and feudal casualties, amidst one unceasing chorus of universal merriment. We are inclined to believe that the unforensic portion of the Committee who have undertaken to investigate this subject must already be fully convinced of this, and wish themselves well out of a scrape into which nothing but the inexperience of those with whom the discussion originated could ever have involved them. Why is it that we advert to these things? Not, surely, in order to speak disrespectfully of that Committee, which includes several names of the highest reputation, and which will, no doubt, do its duty in dismissing the subject as wholly impracticable, before they have broken many more of their teeth upon it. But we advert to it because we have perceived, in certain instances, a disposition to enter on the purely legal details of this question, and to pronounce boldly on certain claims as illegal, not only in manifest disregard of the sacred line of demarcation between legislative and judicial functions, but in utter ignorance of the law, or, at least, with only that smattering of it, which, perhaps, is still worse. It seems to be thought, in such instances, that a certain degree of general information and general ability, without legal acquirements, would not merely suffice in order to the discharge of the duties of our registration judges, but actually form a sufficient ground on which to review their decisions. There appears to be a sort of vague and half-formed notion in such cases, that that substantial justice, which is due both to the claimants and to the public, depends not so much on legal rules and principles, as on a sort of off-hand and easy application of what we suppose must be termed "plain common-sense." Now, we need hardly say, that this notion, though, like every thing which flatters ignorance, it may have a certain degree of popularity among the ignorant, contains within it the germ of all iniquity. We hope that we speak to no one needing to be told that (even if we were to put out of view the intricacy of legal rights), we never could preserve for a moment the purity and consistency of justice, without not merely those forms which are ancillary to this object, but of those legal principles which are the only dress in which justice can ever dwell among men. Common-sense is, no doubt, not only an excellent thing in itself, but the chief foundation of every thing else which is excellent ; but common-sense without law could no more show whether certain evidence ought to be admitted for or against a claim, than it could solve the Binomial Theorem. The only application which mere common-sense can possibly have to such cases, is to show the propriety of letting them alone; and leaving them to those who are competent to the determination of them. We have said that the decisions of these Courts must be held to be con clusive as to the reality of the votes created by them; so long at least as they are unaltered by a competent authority. We have no wish, therefore, to speak of any of these decisions even with that approbation which would imply a right of censure if we thought them wrong. But, without trespassing in this way on the sacred province of judicial determinations, we may just ask, with reference to our present subject, whether there is the slightest reason for saying that our Registration Courts have shown any favour to fictitious votes? Have not many claims been rejected on the sole ground of their being fictitious? And where then is shadow of reason for alleging that others have been admitted when their fictitious character was brought into the view of the Court? Our registration judges cannot be alleged to have acted without discrimination in this matter; and we look in vain for any argument which tends to show that they have not discriminated rightly. It is Never But they have done more than this; they have given to some of the provisions of the Reform Act an interpretation, as to which we believe that all lawyers do by no means concur, with the express view of preventing fictitious votes. We shall just mention two important instances of this. well known to every lawyer, that, under the terms of the Reform statute, it is extremely doubtful whether it was contemplated by the legislature that an objector in a disputed claim should have power to resort, in proof of his objection, to the oath of the claimant, and many serious doubts and difficulties have been stated as to giving to the act such a construction. theless, we believe that one and all of our Courts of Registration have given their sanction to this mode of procedure; and they have done so, of course, from an anxiety that, in every case, the whole truth should, as far as possible, be fully elicited. Every lawyer will at once understand us when we say, that, by most of our registration judges, this species of evidence has been, moreover, adopted on principles which render it much more unfavourable to the claimant than if it were viewed merely as an "oath of reference." Many persons may probably consider this mode of procedure as somewhat inquisitorial, and object to it on that ground; but no one, surely, will |