allege that the law can afford any farther means of discovering the truth in such cases. Any one who shall say that he desires something still beyond this, of course just echoes the old complaint of the God of Folly, that man was not made with a window in his breast.

Again, it is well known to be a matter of much doubt, whether it was intended by the Reform Act that the right of a claimant, after he had once been admitted to the register, should ever again be called in question, unless in what is generally termed “ a change of circumstances." There is no part of the Reform law which has been the subject of more dispute than this; and the question is evidently a most important one. It is quite clear that much inconvenience and hardship may be imposed on a voter in allowing his right, year after year, to be brought into question; and we believe that many lawyers have formed a tolerably decided opinion that this is not authorized by the statute. Still, however, we have been told that most of our Registration Courts now proceed on the opposite view of the matter; and they do so plainly with the view of preventing fictitious votes. They think it right that a voter who may have obtained admission to the register on a fictitious title, should yet be liable to be called to account, if afterwards this should at any time be discovered or suspected. The case of every voter may thus be thoroughly sifted year after year; nay, year after year it may be twice sifted; for every one knows that, after a judgment in what we may term the original Registration Court, there is still open to all parties a court of appeal, consisting in some instances of three, and in others four of the sheriff's of as many adjoining counties.

What more, then, can the most zealous and enterprising of our Re-reformers suggest in order to prevent the alleged evil? It cannot surely be contemplated in any quarter, to intro. duce a change as to the nature of the rights forming the basis of the elective franchise; for no man can dispute, that the rights of property, liferent, and tenancy, are just those which comprehend, and certainly they do no more than comprehend, all the real interests of the country. We have indeed heard some faint surmises as to the abolition of the liferent qualifica

tion; probably because it is imagined that it affords peculiar facilities for the creation of votes for what are termed "political purposes,"-in other words, because it has become one of the most usual methods of strengthening and extending the wholesome influence of property. Any plan of this kind, however, argues such a profound ignorance of the whole structure of our legal system, that if ever it should see the light, it may safely be left to die its own natural death of helpless weakness. A life-renter, as every lawyer knows, is for the time a proprietor; and what should we say of the elective system which should exclude his right of proprietorship, while it admitted that of his own tenant? And yet this, in a legal point of view, is perhaps one of the least of the absurdities which would arise from any such change.

Neither can it be proposed to render these various rights, as they are recognised in the Reform Act, more definite. It is plainly impossible to define them otherwise, than merely by a distinct statement of them, applicable to the several cases in which they are to form the ground of the qualification; and no one pretends that this in general is not done in the Reform Act with sufficient accuracy. A moment's reflection must convince every one that the definition of these rights is the province, not of the legislature, but of the law-and therefore, of course, of the judge in each individual case which comes before him. In short, it is self-evident, that, in a case of this description, where a statute has enumerated the several rights contemplated by it, and has provided a sufficient legal machinery for the ascertainment and determination of them, the functions of legislation are exhausted.

The gentleman who introduced this subject in the House of Commons seems, however, to have adopted a view of the Reform statute, on a point of the utmost moment, which, if it were well-founded, would necessarily imply either the necessity of a new enactment declaratory of the true intention of the law, or that our Registration judges have erred egregiously in their interpretation of the act as it at present stands. He seems to think that it is not contemplated by the statute that persons should be admitted to the register in our Scottish counties, unless they possess the qualifica

tion of residence; and, if we understand him rightly, he is disposed to regard as more or less fictitious all votes where this qualification is awanting. We say "more or less fictitious;" for although we are quite at a loss to understand how the question at issue can be viewed as a question of "more or less"-how there can be degrees in legal rights-and more especially in the same rights ascertained by the judgment of the same Courts such is the only meaning which we can find in this gentleman's language. But, not to dwell on this rather startling circumstance, we would beg to ask, where there is to be met with, either in the act itself, or in its history, the slightest authority for in any way speaking of residence in connexion with our county voters? So far is it from being required by the act, that every one knows that it makes a clear distinction on this very point between county and town voters-with respect to the latter of whom it demands residence within a certain distance of the town for which they are registered. We have never been able to comprehend very distinctly the reasons of this last-mentioned provision of the statute, and we doubt whether it can be considered as altogether consistent with its general principles. There may, no doubt, be good reasons for forbidding non-residence in a clergyman or a local judge; but why personal presence should be required in order to give a right of voting-why our town constituencies should be subjected to the pains of incubation, not merely in order to hatch these votes at first, but to keep them alive ever afterwards, has always been to us among the higher mysteries of Reform. But although the authors of the statute may perhaps be thought by many to have erred in this instance, and to have imposed a certain degree of hardship on the non-resident owners of property in towns, in thus excluding them from the elective franchise, it must be evident, on a moment's thought, that they never could have dreamt of extending the same principle to county voters. For whatever may be the mere theory of the matter, it is plain that there is a wide practical difference between the two cases. There are persons without number possessing property in the country, whose avocations lead them to reside during the greater part of the year in towns; in Edinburgh alone,

there are probably some thousands of persons of this description. Would any man seriously propose to disfranchise such persons (many of them possessing large estates) as county voters? But then the converse of this does not hold true; there is no very considerble number of persons residing in the country who possess property in towns. This is the first and by far the most important ground of distinction. But farther, there are many persons who possess estates in two or more counties, and we have at least Sir Boyle Roche's authority for stating that they cannot reside at the same time on more than one of them. Is it then maintained that a great landed proprietor should, in such circumstances, be debarred by residing in one county from voting in any other? that a score of ten-pounders, deriving their daily bread from him, and as many of his own tenantry, should rejoice in the elective franchise, and that he should be for ever excluded from it? But the absurdity which is here so manifest, does not arise to any considerable extent from applying the principle in question to town voters; for there are no great number of persons who possess property in two or more different towns. And this, therefore, is the second ground of distinction between these two cases.

If we remember rightly, these views were expressly stated in the speech of the Lord Advocate of the day, in introducing the Scotch Reform Bill, so that we do not well know what to infer when it is said that the non-residence of county voters, if not contrary to the letter of the act, is yet inconsistent with its true spirit. Neither can we understand how it should be considered as derogatory, or in any way injurious to the resident constituency of a county, to possess their rights in common with the non-resident part of it. The latter must, from the very nature of the case, be far superior in wealth, station, and intelligence, to the greater proportion of the former; and the former have no conceivable interests, whether of a public or a private kind, in which the latter do not fully participate with them. How it can be thought that any given number of the inhabitants of a country village have reason to complain of being associated in the exercise of their political privileges with a like number of welleducated persons, be they merchants lawyers, tradesmen, or gentlemen of

independent fortune, having their ordinary residence in towns, and possessing property in the country, is a question which far transcends our feeble powers of reasoning. We would by no means speak of the one of these classes of voters as a more valuable element in a county constituency than the other. According to the principles of the Reform Act, we must hold that they are both valuable elements in it; but it is sufficient for our present purpose to say, that they have both equal rights, under one common charter, and that neither of them can be aggrieved by the other in fully exercising these rights.

It must be admitted, that the gentleman whom we have now referred to is, at least in one respect, true to his own reasoning; for, as a necessary and obvious consequence of his views as to non-residence, he seems to object to county votes on the kindred ground of plurality. After what we have just said, it can hardly be necessary to assure him, that he has been entirely misinformed as to the whole tenor of the Reform law on this sub

ject as completely misinformed as he appears to have been with regard to an establishment for the manufacture of votes-a sort of paper-mill, if we understand him rightly-alleged by him to exist in this city. We have never heard of such an establishment; and, on applying to a friend, who happens to be one of the inspectors of factories in this part of the island, we have been assured that it has no existence. We can forgive a young Member of Parliament, in whom we recognise a spirit, talent, and eloquence well worthy of a better cause for the intemperate language into which he seems to have been betrayed, in denouncing this imaginary institution; and we trust that he will forgive us for thus saying that he has been grossly imposed upon with regard to it probably by some wouldbe-witty Conservative.*

We are bound, however, to thank this gentleman for many parts of his really clever and promising speech; and for nothing more than that portion of it which so clearly illustrates the danger of ever forgetting the distinction between senatorial and judicial functions. He was too manly an

opponent not to grapple with what he conceived to be the true question; and he therefore not merely indicated his views as to that general principle of non-residence, of which we have just spoken, but gave several instances of what he conceived to be "fictitious votes." In doing so, he has at least earned those acknowledgments which are due to an adversary, who places the question on grounds on which it can be brought at once to a fair arbitrement.

Let us then, for one moment, consider these grounds, and try whether they are tenable. He mentions several cases, which he asserts the Registration judges to have decided in disregard or violation of the principles of the Reform law. Now, we ask, what is his authority for this assertion? or on what ground is it that the judgments of a competent court are thus made the subject of censure in a purely legislative discussion? Parliament has delegated to the Registration Courts the power of judging in this class of cases; are we, however, to understand that it has both delegated this power and retained itretained it, too, to the effect of admitting the most unrestrained condemnation of the decisions pronounced by them, in the common course of Parliamentary debate? If we are to have a different class of tribunals for the determination of such questions, let it be so when any arrangement to this effect is proposed we shall have an opportunity of considering whether it would transfer the jurisdiction to abler and better hands. At present we cannot conceive any plan by which this would be accomplished. But so long as the jurisdiction remains with the existing courts, we think we make no great demand on the justice of Parliament, in asking, that both the character of these courts, and their decisions, should be respected; and, above all, that they should not be liable to any animadversion, with regard to which there can be the slightest ground to suspect that it may be even tinged with political feeling.

But not to insist farther on so plain a subject, we would assume, for the instant, that there is no irregularity in bringing the judgments of our registration under so unusual and unceremo

nious a species of review; and appeal to any one who has attended to the subject, whether the instances which are mentioned by this gentleman as cases of "fictitious votes," and in which, therefore, our Courts of Registration must have decided erroneously, are cases in which any lawyer could hesitate for one moment in coming to the same determination. He first specifies a case of joint tenancy-and what, we would ask, is there in the Reform Act which prevents the admission of a county claimant on this ground? He next notices a case of life-rent where the proprietor becomes the tenant; and what kind of law, we would demand, would that be which should limit a life-renter in the choice of his tenant, or prevent him from letting the tenement to the proprietor? He next directs our indignation against a class of transactions in which the whole gravamen of the charge seems to be that the price has not been actually paid down in money, but that the right (of whatever kind) has been transferred on the receipt of an obligation for it. Is there any thing more common in practice than this? Credit we have always supposed to be, in such a case, just the same as money, if the party interested in the distinction between them chose to think so; and any interposition of the law in such a matter would be at least a novelty in legislation, These, and one or two other cases of a like description, on which it is quite needless to dwell, seem to us to be so entirely without application to the question as to "fictitious votes," that we cannot explain why they should have been referred to at all, except on one hypothesis, namely, that throughout his whole argument, and therefore in the citation of his cases, he is con tinually haunted by his peculiar views of the fictitious quality of non-residence. If he had stated instances in which claims had been admitted in circumstances where the rights on which they were founded were plainly defeasible at the will of the granter-or where the respective obligations of the parties were nullified by other legal obligations or generally, where they could not be attached by the creditors of the claimant though we might not have much admired the propriety of such a statement, it would yet at least have been intelligible; but we fairly own that the cases which he enumerates leave no other impression on our

mind but that which we have just mentioned.

But, then, asks some simpletonimposed on probably by the use of a Latin phrase is there no such thing as bona fides with regard to votes? and will it be maintained that this exists in the cases just referred to? To this we might perhaps answer by another question, and demand of our questioner, whether it is in Whig or Conservative votes that he conceives this to be so essential an element? For it is manifestly in the spirit of this interrogatory that the whole of this subject has been lately dealt with. But, waving this enquiry, we must observe, with regard to all votes, whether Whig or Conservative, that there has never been a more absurd misapplication of any term than in this instance. We cannot imagine what bona fides can have to do with a matter in which we must all of us "take the law for the fact." Suppose a case of property-what is meant by saying that a voter is or is not a bona fide proprietor? There may, no doubt, in many cases, be a question as to whether a person's possession has or has not been in bona fides, with a view to the claims which may arise against him on his being found by the decision of a competent court not to be the true proprietor. In such cases, the law requires a reasonable ground of belief of proprietorship on the part of the possessor, in order to protect him against such claims. But the belief of a voter on this subject is evidently a matter wholly foreign to the subject; for, in becoming a voter, he just ascertains, that whatever that belief may be, he is proprietor. He learns that he is so in the eye of law; and a question of right, let it be remembered, is in such a case purely a question of law. Even supposing a claimant to have all the doubts and scruples imaginable with regard to his claim, he may surely, with a perfectly safe conscience, go to the Registration Court, in order to be there informed whether it is a good claim, or otherwise; and to say that, after his right is considered and recognised by that court, he does not possess a bona fide vote, is to use language, of which we are quite unable to comprehend either the legal or the moral meaning. If there is any moral question here at all, it is of course settled by the legal judgment;

and from the very nature of the case, it can obviously be settled in no other way.

Önce more, then, it will be asked, what does the Whig clamour on this subject mean? the evil is doubtful and unfrequent, and there is no remedy; and once more we answer, we know not what it means, unless in so far as it may serve the purpose of mere agitation; but well do we know to what it tends. Its obvious and direct tendency just is to strengthen the hands of those who are of opinion that our elective rights should rest on no other foundation than the dignity of that common citizenship, of which every man is a "bona fide proprietor." There can be no question that it is the most powerful instrument for our universal-suffrage-men which can ever be placed within their reach; for if the alleged evil must be cured, it is manifest that theirs is the true and only remedy. So long as a property-qualification exists, the abuse in question must occasionally exist also; and those, therefore, who persist in saying that the abuse is intolerable, and must be removed, ought to be well prepared for the answer of the Radicals-Remove, then, the cause of it-abolish the property-qualification." Under our present system, these fictitious votes are weeds which will always spring up here and there along with the healthful produce of the soil, from which, however, it so happens that there is no possible means of distinguishing and separating them; if, then, we must get rid of them, how are we to escape the truly Radical conclusion, that both should be rooted out together? If we must extirpate these few small depredators, who thus defy the mouse-trap-it is quite clear that we must take the Radical plan of doing it, and pull down the house.

their rights are nullified by the intrusion of those who are to be regarded as mere lawless usurpers, it is at least not the fault of those who tell them so, if they are not thereby enlisted in the cause of pure Radicalism. They are directly invited to call in the aid of the non-electors, in order to "redress the balance" which, they are thus asked to believe, has been disturbed wrongfully.

This is a view of the subject which seems to us almost too plain for argument; and it is one which well deserves the consideration of all who, from whatever motive, have lent their countenance to this foolish clamour. Nor, we think, can it be necessary to point out the inevitable effect of every thing which has been lately said on this subject, in alienating the lower classes of our constituency from the present elective system. If, in defiance of all truth and reason, this description of persons are to be told that

VOL. XLI. NO, CCLVII.

Are the Whigs, then, prepared to meet the question of universal suffrage in the spirit of concession or of determined and uncompromising resistance? We ask this, not on views and principles which are now matter of history, but on that great principle of the Reform Act, on which we are content to take our stand in every part of this discussion. If true to this their own measure, their answer must be, that they will meet it as a question breathing national pestilence. If so, let them then beware of this clamour as to "fictitious votes," for assuredly it must be responded to by the voice of Radicalism as by its own echo. They will probably answer, that, if such be the case, the responsibility rests with the Conservatives, in abusing the provisions of the Reform Act. To this we might reply-waving any farther argument as to "the use or abuse" of the Act as to this matter, and any farther remark as to the common practice of all parties with regard to itthat the responsibility rests solely with the authors of that measure, who must, of course, answer for at least all its immediate consequences. But why should we have any debate as to the responsibility, when the only practical question manifestly is as to the course to be pursued in order to avert a result which, we are willing to believe, is equally deprecated by both parties? The Whig clamour, which so obviously tends to that result, is, no doubt, to the last degree foolish and unfounded, and can owe its progress and its influence only to noisy iteration. But it needs no very old experience to convince us of the momentous consequences which may sometimes arise from as slender beginnings; and we cannot but think, therefore, that Whigs and Conservatives are equally interested in abstaining from the agitation of this most unprofitable and impraeticable question.

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