ed along the Kaitna, but right across from that river to a nullah on the British right in the neighbourhood of Assye. Our troops had no sooner crossed the river than the enemy opened on them a tremendous fire of artillery. They had at least 150 pieces in the field, and it was well served. The picquets and 74th regiment in particular suffered severely, and a body of Marhatta horse charged them with temporary success. Colonel Maxwell with the British cavalry, however, soon came up,and they were driven back in confusion and with heavy loss.

The cavalry, following up their success, charged a large body of infantry, amid a shower of musketry and grape, and routed them with great slaughter. In this operation their brave leader, Colonel Maxwell, was killed. The Sepoys, too, behaved with admirable courage. They charged the enemy's

« SIR,

guns, and actually. bayoneted the gunners at their posts. Their ardour, however, was too great, and but for the steady advance of the 78th regiment on their left, they would probably have been destroyed. At length the Marhatta line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry, executing another charge, made great havoc among their broken infantry. The victory was complete. The whole of the enemy's army made a confused retreat, leaving to the victors upwards of 100 pieces of artillery.

Success, however, was purchased at a heavy price. The killed and wounded amounted to one-third of the army, an immense slaughter, exceeded only at Albuera. We refrain from giving the public despatch of General Wellesley, containing the particulars of his victory. The following letters will, we think, be found more interesting.

"Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803. "I attacked the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday with my division, and the result is, that I have taken about sixty pieces of cannon. The action was very brisk indeed, the fire from the enemy's cannon the hottest that has been known in this country for some time; and our loss in officers and men has been very great. Among others, your brother in the 74th is wounded; Colonel Maxwell was killed; Colonel Harness, Colonel Wallace, and I, and I believe every officer of the staff, had horses shot under us. "Scindiah's infantry behaved remarkably well, and stood to their guns to the last; but their execution was with them only. I do not believe that they carried away more than two, and I doubt whether they have got even that number.

"I will write to the Governor-General in detail upon the subject of this action, as soon as I can get accurate returns of the killed and wounded, and of the ordnance taken.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"The enemy fled towards the Adjuntee Ghaut, and I believe have descended it."

"SIR,

66

· Major-General the Hon. A Wellesley to Major Shawe.

The

Camp, 25th September, 1803. "You will be surprised to see in my report to the Governor General, that we have taken ninety pieces of cannon, instead of sixty, as I told you. fact is, that I counted sixty-seven myself, on the morning of the 24th; I was not certain that I was correct; but now I believe that we have taken nearer one hundred than ninety pieces. I know that we have got seventy brass guns and howitzers, and above twenty iron. I intend to destroy the latter, and to send the former first to Dowlutabad, and then to Ahmednuggur.

"The enemy are down the Ghauts in great consternation. Colonel Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I must halt till I can get back my doolies, after placing the sick in Dowlutabad.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"Your brother's wound is doing well. He will not be obliged to quit the army."

The battle of Assye has given rise to much difference of opinion and some discussion. Was it sound policy in General Wellesley to attack the Marhatta army on the 23d? or should he have waited for the coming up of Stevenson on the following day? Whether the reader decide these questions affirmatively or negatively, he will have high authority on his side. The opinion of Sir Thomas Munro was decidedly adverse to the course followed by General Wellesley, and in the correspondence of these great men, there is a very interesting discussion of the subject. This we shall lay before our readers, without obtruding an opinion

where it could be expected to have no weight. In truth it is scarcely possible to form one, without more accurate knowledge of the character, discipline, and tactics of a Marhatta army, than any one who has never served in India can be supposed to possess. But, where conflicting opinions of such high authority can be adduced on a military question, nothing can be more interesting than to learn the reasons on which they are founded, and observe by what arguments they are supported.

On receiving intelligence of the victory, Sir Thomas thus writes to General Wellesley.

"To Major-General Wellesley,

"DEAR GENERAL, Raydroog, 14th Oct. 1803. "I have scen several accounts of your late glorious victory over the combined armies of Scindiah and the Bererman, but none of them so full as to give one any thing like a correct idea of it; I can however dimly see through the smoke of the Marhatta guns (for yours it is said were silenced), that a gallanter action has not been fought for many years in any part of the world. When not only the disparity of numbers but also of real military force is considered, it is beyond all comparison a more brilliant and arduous exploit than that of Aboukir. The detaching of Stevenson was so dangerous a measure, that I am almost tempted to think you did it with the view of sharing the glory with the smallest possible numbers. The object of his movement was probably to turn the enemy's flank, or cut them off from the Ajunla pass. But these ends would have been attained with as much certainty and more security by keeping him with you. As a reserve he would have supported your attack, secured it against any disaster, and when it succeeded he would have been at hand to have followed the enemy vigorously. A native army once routed, if followed by a good body of cavalry, never offers any effectual opposition. Had Stevenson been with you, it is likely you would have destroyed the greater part of the enemy's infantry; as to their cavalry, when cavalry are determined to run, it is not easy to do them much harm, unless you are strong enough to disperse your own in pursuit of them. Whether the detaching of Stevenson were right or wrong, the noble manner in which the battle was conducted makes up for every thing. Its consequences will not be confined to the Deccan; they will facilitate our operations in Hindostan by discouraging the enemy, and animating the Bengal army to rival your achievements.

"I had written thus far when I received your letter of the 1st of October, and along with it, another account of your battle from Hyderabad. It has certainly, as you say, been a most furious battle;' your loss is reported to be about 2000 in killed and wounded. I hope you will not have occasion to purchase any more victories at so dear a price."

Of course it could not be pleasant to a young general, ambitious of glory and elate with recent victory, to learn that grave doubts on the subject of his achievement were entertained by one whose judgment he esteemed. He had never before (except in the case of Doondiah) commanded an army in the

field, and it was necessarily somewhat mortifying to be obliged to vindicate a victory with as much care and ingenuity as if he had been apologizing for a defeat. We think something of these feelings are apparent in the letter which we subjoin.

66

Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut.-Colonel Munro.

"MY DEAR MUNRO,

Camp at Cherikain, 1st November, 1803. "As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor-General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger, than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22d, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jalna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary,-first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day: secondly, because it was to be apprehended, that if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23d, we were not much more than eight miles. As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous, that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

"The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun. I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23d. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry was about to follow, but was still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if it remained still upon the ground. I apprised Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

"When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning; and at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp, in which they should know it was: I therefore determined upon the attack immediately.

"It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on; but some were; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

"Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one-half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the picquets which were on the right of the first line.

When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the picquets to keep out of shot from that village; instead, of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the picquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies. Another evil which resulted from this mistake, was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the picquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

"After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made.

"However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the picquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against Assye.

"After the action, there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

"Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

"The enemy passed the night of the 23d at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never stopped till they had got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23d, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men. I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference. Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry Ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjuntee Ghaut, and stopped Scindiah. Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army. I ascended the Ghaut on the 25th, and have marched a hundred and twenty miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If that is the case, I shall soon begin an extensive operation there.

"But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such

is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

"Believe me," &c.

It is doubtful whether the preceding vindication had the effect of inducing Sir Thomas to change his opinions. His reply is unquestionably written

"DEAR GENERAL,

with great talent, and is inserted here to complete the correspondence, and enable the military reader to understand the discussion in all its bearings.

"To Major-General Wellesley.

Cawderabad, 28th November, 1803. "I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and have read with great pleasure and interest your clear and satisfactory account of the battle of Assye. You say, you wish to have my opinion on your side; if it can be of any use to you, you have it on your side, not only in that battle, but in the conduct of the campaign: the merit of this last is exclusively your own. The success of every battle must always be shared, in some degree, by the most skilful general with his troops. I must own, I have always been averse to the practice of carrying on war with too many scattered armies, and also of fighting battles by the combined attacks of separate divisions. When several armies invade a country on different sides, unless each of them is separately a match for the enemy's whole army, there is always a danger of their being defeated one after another; because, having a shorter distance to march, he may draw his force together, and march upon a particular army, before it can be supported. When a great army is encamped in separate divisions, it must, of course, be attacked in separate columns. But Indian armies are usually crowded together on a spot, and will, I imagine, be easier routed by a single attack than by two or three separate attacks by the same force. I see perfectly the necessity of your advancing by one route, and Colonel Stevenson by another, in order to get clear of the defiles in one day; I know, also, that you could not have reconnoitred the enemy's position without carrying on your whole army; but I have still some doubts whether the immediate attack was, under all circumstances, the best measure you could have adopted. Your objections to delay are, that the enemy might have gone off and frustrated your design of bringing them to battle, or that you might have lost the advantage of attack, by their attacking you in the morning. The considerations which would have made me hesitate are, that you could hardly expect to defeat the enemy with less than half the loss you actually suffered; that after breaking their infantry, your cavalry, even when entire, was not sufficiently strong to pursue any distance, without which you could not have done so much execution among them as to counterbalance your own loss; and lastly, that there was a possibility of your being repulsed; in which case, the great superiority of the enemy's cavalry, with some degree of spirit which they would have derived from success, might have rendered a retreat impracticable. Suppose that you had not advanced to the attack, but remained under arms, after reconnoitring at longshot distance, I am convinced that the enemy would have decamped in the night, and as you could have instantly followed them, they would have been obliged to leave all or most of their guns behind. If they ventured to keep their position, which seems to me incredible, the result would still have been equally favourable: you might have attacked them in the course of the night; their artillery would have been of little use in the dark; it would have fallen into your hands, and their loss of men would very likely have been greater than yours. If they determined to attack you in the morning, as far as I can judge from the different reports that I have heard of the ground, I think it would have been the most desirable event that could have happened, for you would have had it in your power to attack them, either in the operation of passing the river, or after the whole had passed, but before they were completely formed. They must, however, have known that Stevenson was approaching,