1618, announcing the elevation of Mustapha to the throne, and remained there till the beginning of May. But though we are in possession of his most confidential intercourse with his own court during the period of his residence, not a trace of any such interference appears. His negotiations are limited to the unimportant demand, that the Republic should make good the losses of certain Turkish merchants, whose goods had been captured by Ossuna on board of two of the vessels belonging to the Republic. If he had really succeeded in so humbling the pride of the Republic, as to compel from Venice so degrading a sacrifice to Turkey as the massacre of the unfortunate adventurers supposed to be engaged in the intended crusade, would not some traces of so important an affair appear in his communications to Constantinople? Objections might, in fact, be multiplied without end to the theory of Chambrier; but those we have already mentioned secm sufficient to satisfy the enquirer as to its baseless and improbable character.

The hypothesis of Daru, which may be considered the latest upon the subject, must be admitted to be in the highest degree bold and original, since it actually goes to reverse completely the relative positions of the parties, to exculpate Spain from any conspiracy against Venice, and to represent Venice as the true conspirator in aiding a supposed enterprise of its treacherous subject Ossuna, against the Spanish dominions in Italy. Daru denies entirely the existence of any actual conspiracy against Venice, and considers the numerous executions which took place as a barbarous measure of state policy on the part of Venice, to conceal the intrigues against Spain, in which they had engaged with Ossuna, by the unsparing destruction of all who were, or were supposed to be, in possession of the truth. This, it must be admitted, is a grave accusation; for it converts the just punishment of abandoned criminals into a base and treacherous massacre of men, who were only following out the projects and designs of the Republic itself. It would require strong evidence to establish such a charge,

Daru, vol. iv. c. 31.

which thus goes not merely to subvert the received notions on the subject, but to brand a nation with a stain, the foulest, perhaps, with which her annals, blotted, as they too often are, with treachery and bloodshed, are deformed.

It must be admitted that Daru has spared no pains to support the accusation which he makes. He has treated the subject of the Spanish conspiracy in two portions of his work, one historical, the other critical, † with great care, great extent of historical reading, and infinite ingenuity. He began his investigations, as he says himself, with no wish to establish a system, but simply to examine, with more attention than had been previously given to the matter, the different authorities, published or unpublished, by which light might be thrown on this mysterious transaction, and he has told us, with great fairness, how the leading idea of his theory was sug gested to him. "My researches," says he, "led me to the knowledge of two facts which I considered certain.

"In examining the correspondence of the Ambassador of France, I found the revelations by which the Venetian Government had been informed of the existence of a conspiracy formed against it by the Duke of Ossuna and the Marquis of Bedamar. These revelations bore a date long preceding the date when the conspiracy was said to be discovered; if, then, a conspiracy existed, it was not unknown to the government; they could not then be much alarmed at it, since they had been made aware of it so long before. There was, therefore, error or falsehood in the common accounts, when it was said they were made acquainted with it only in May 1618.

"The letters of the ambassadors informed me that these revelations were made by Captain Jacques Pierre. I had before my eyes the original minute of them in the handwriting of Captain Renault. It followed, that Jacques Pierre and Renault were not conspirators; yet both had been sacrificed as such.

"I found, in the accounts of the conspiracy, that among the French who were said to be implicated, there

was a near relation of the Maréchal de Lesdiguieres. This suggested to me the idea of examining whether, in the life of that nobleman, any mention was made of this incident. I found, then, that at the same time the Duke of Ossuna had conceived his project of possessing himself of the crown of Naples. This was a beam of light to me. The Viceroy could not, at the same time, have conspired against Venice, to take possession of it in name of Spain, and against Spain to deprive it of a kingdom. The biographer of Lesdeguieres, who was his secretary, relates all that took place in the cabi net of his master relative to the projects of the Duke to usurp the crown. He states positively, that the governments of France, of Holland, of Turin, and Venice, had been initiated into his projects. The Neapolitan, Venetian, and other historians, confirmed in part these different circumstances. The Venetians, then, could not have believed that the Duke of Ossuna was really conspiring against their Republic, since they were aware that he was engaged in totally different projects, in which their aid was indispensable to him.

"By this train of reasoning I was conducted to this consequence: The Duke of Ossuna, Jacques Pierre, and Renault had not conspired against the Republic. The Venetians knew the real projects of the Duke of Ossuna, and had proof of the innocence of Jacques Pierre and Renault. It remained to find a motive sufficient to account for the accusation of the former, and their sacrifice of the latter.

"According to Daru, Ossuna had, almost immediately after his appointment to the Viceroyalty of Naples, begun to conceive the design of seizing on that kingdom, and rendering himself independent of Spain. This scheme had been secretly communicated to the different powers of Europe who were hostile to Spain, by all of whom his designs were furthered and approved. Venice, though she had not actually pledged herself to any assistance, was favourable like the rest. The main object was, gradually, and without exciting the suspicions of Spain, to assemble an army sufficient to carry the project into effect. Savoy and Holland secretly furnished assistance both by troops and arms. Four thousand Dutch troops, who were

then in the service of Venice, were, with the consent of Holland, to pass into the service of the Duke. But to have allowed this to be done openly, and with the apparent consent of Venice, would have excited suspicions on the part of Spain, which the Venetian Government were anxious to avoid ;-their approbation of Ossuna's schemes being, of course, conditional on their success. All that they were at present disposed to do was to wink at the secret plans by which these mercenaries were to be seduced from their service into that of the Duke.

66

For this purpose Pierre and Renault were despatched by Ossuna to Venice. But the true object of their visit was concealed even from these agents against themselves. Of Ossuna's ulterior designs on the throne of Naples they were kept in ignorance; they knew not that what he had in view was to seduce the Dutch soldiers of Venice into his service; on the contrary, they believed, and were taught to believe by Ossuna himself, that his designs were directed against Venice, and that they were sent for the purpose of organizing and carrying into effect a real conspiracy against that city. Whether from terror or treachery, Pierre soon after his arrival communicated to the Venetian Government the existence of the conspiracy which he himself actually believed. The Venetian Government, better informed of the intentions of Ossuna, and his dependence on them, paid no attention to the supposed plot. Pierre and Renault continued to press Ossuna to furnish them with the assistance promised, and to give the signal for the decisive step. Ossuna, who had no such object in view, delayed from time to time, under all possible pretexts, in such a way as to excite the suspicions even of Pierre as to his sincerity. But his imprudence gradually led the Spanish Government to suspect his designs: the Neapolitan nobles despatched a Capuchin friar, Lorenzo, to Madrid to communicate their suspicions. Ossuna attempted to arrest him on his way, but failed. He saw that his designs must now be discovered, and that his ruin was certain. Venice in the mean time, apprised, through its ambassadors in Paris and Madrid, of the suspicions excited against Ossuna, and of the probable failure of his designs, determined to

draw back, and even to extinguish all traces of their having been accessary to his treasonable schemes. The conspiracy which had been revealed to them a year before, and of the nonexistence of which they were aware, appeared to afford a favourable pretext for removing all those who had been concerned in the scheme of Ossuna; on pretence that they had discovered a design against Venice itself, in which Spain was concerned, they put to death all who had in any way been connected with the designs of Ossuna; and by so doing, before Spain had even manifested any displeasure against the Duke, they were enabled, instead of being themselves accused, to take the initiative in the accusation. To this Machiavellian policy, Pierre, Renault, and his companions, though truly innocent of any conspiracy, were sacrificed."

This is in substance Daru's solution of this long agitated problem. We shall now endeavour to ascertain how far the grounds on which it rests are founded in truth, and how far, if true, they could rationally account for the supposed effect.

I. It is evident that the whole theory depends on the establishment of one proposition, namely, that previous to the supposed discovery of the conspiracy in May 1618, the Venetians were to some extent implicated in the designs of Ossuna on the kingdom of Naples. Except to conceal their participation in these, they had no motive, according to Daru, for the executions which took place, or for the invention of a pretended conspiracy.

But here a formidable difficulty meets Daru in the outset. The biographer of Lesdeguieres, Louis Videl, on whose authority he mainly relies as to the proof of Ossuna's treasonable project of the seizure of the Crown of Naples, places the date of that project only in 1619. Leti does the same. Of course, a project conceived only in 1619 could not account for the exe. cutions of 1618.

Daru's attempt to get quit of the difficulty seems wholly unsatisfactory. He endeavours to make out, that though placed by Leti and Videl under the date of 1619, the project against Venice was of an earlier date; because it is mentioned in connexion with various other events which took place, some in 1617, some in 1618.

But all doubt, at least as to the meaning of these writers, is put an end to by the decisive facts, that both of them expressly mention that the enterprise against Venice preceded the project against Naples; while Leti, Nani, and the Neapolitan historian Giannone actually ascribe the desperate scheme of seizing on the Neapolitan throne to the failure of the conspiracy against Venice, and the consequent disgrace of Ossuna at the Court of Madrid. The position, then, in which this point, which is the basis of the whole hypothesis, stands, is, that not one single historian places the design of Ossuna against Naples earlier than 1619; while every historian who has touched on the subject, including those who were themselves connected with the negotiation (for such was the position of Videl) expressly state that they took place in that year, and in consequence of the failure of his previous scheme against Venice.

But the statement, says Daru, that Ossuna was engaged in a conspiracy against Venice in 1618, and that he had engaged Venice in his schemes on Naples in 1619, involves an inconsistency. The historians who represent Össuna as engaged in both schemes" have not perceived that the one necessarily excludes the other." If this necessity be really so palpable, it is singular that four such writers as Videl, Leti, Giannone, and Nani should never have perceived it; nay, that they do not even allude to it as a difficulty in the case at all. And where is the necessary incompatibility? Daru asks, "Would Ossuna have dared to reckon on the assistance of the Republic, after having made an attempt on its existence; and how, immediately after the failure of one plot, should he have had time to frame another requiring so many negotiations and preparations?" To this objection there are several answers.

The resentments of nations are not like those of individuals. Ossuna might naturally enough believe, that if Venice felt that she could serve her own interests by injuring Spain, she would not be prevented from so doing, because she was at the same time promoting the cause of one who had firmly conspired against her. Besides, there can be no doubt that, though Beda. mar and Ossuna were the agents, the

Court of Spain was the true party responsible; and it was against Spain, as the real conspirator, rather than the mere agents in the affair, that the resentments of Venice would be directed, supposing that with that politic government resentment of the past would ever be allowed to stand in the way of present or prospective advantage.

That Ossuna then might apply to Venice for aid in 1619, though engaged as a conspirator against her in 1618, is by no means difficult to conceive. That Venice might even have entered into his schemes, would be, in our eyes, by no means improbable. Changes of policy as singular occur perpetually in the history of the time. But, after all, when Ossuna did open his negotiations with Venice in 1619, what was the result? Why, a positive declinature on the part of Venice to interfere in any such scheme. We have the secret despatches of Spinelli, the Venetian resident at Naples, in which he gives an account of the communication made to him by the agents of the Viceroy at Naples. We have the answer of the Republic, declaring their determination to have nothing to do with any such movement in Italy, and directing Spinelli, in the event of any renewal of the proposal, to put a negative upon the matter at once (se egli pur iterasse, tu debbi troncare assolutamente tali propositi). We have the whole correspondence of Spinelli before and subsequent to the date of the proposal to which we have alluded (15th May, 1619), and not a trace appears of any sanction on the part of Venice to the designs of Ossuna.

This communication of Spinelli is extremely important, then, in two views. First, it confirms the other evidence, that Venice was not even applied to by Ossuna to aid his views against Naples till after the date of the alleged conspiracy; and, second, it goes far to negative the supposition that Venice agreed, at any time, to lend any countenance to his schemes.

But Daru is hardy enough to at

tempt to convert what appear to others formidable objections into actual ar guments in support of his own view. Thus it seems to him to occasion no difficulty that during the very time when he supposes that Venice was secretly aiding his scheme of rebellion, Ossuna, notwithstanding that peace had been concluded, was still carrying on hostilities against Venice. This was merely done, he conceives, as a blind, and to enable him to keep on foot a naval force without suspicion. The battles, he alleged, were mere mock-fights, in which scarcely a man fell, or a ship was taken; and from this he concludes that neither party were in earnest in their pretended hostilities.

Now, to infer, in the case of any Italian campaign, that the parties were not in earnest because the actions were indecisive, would surely be rash enough. We all know from Grucciardini that Italian hostilities were frequently as harmless as the encounter of Gymnast and Tripet, and that, notwithstanding, the contending parties were very cordially at war with each other. But, after all, the hostilities of 1617 and 1618 between Ossuna and the Venetian Republic, though indecisive, were by no means so very trifling as he assumes. We find him seizing and confiscating two of their most richly laden vessels: we find the Doge Giovanni Bembo writing to Vincenti, the confidential resident of the Republic at Milan, in March, 1618, that Ossuna is making preparations for war, and that no peace is to be looked for while he is governor of Naples. find him again reiterating his complaints to the same person, in another letter of July, 1618; ‡ immediately after the discovery of the conspiracy, we find the new Doge Antonio Priuli writing to the same person, in September, || also complaining of the continued hostilities of Ossuna; we have Ossuna exhibiting afterwards to Spinelli, in vindication of his own conduct in ravaging their coasts, a confidential communication from the Spanish Court, dated 20th June, 1617, §

We

directing him to send all the ships he could into the Gulf of Naples, but in his own name, and to do the Republic all the injury in his power. To his friends Ossuna did not conceal the deep hatred he bore to the Venetians. Spinelli reports one expression which is decisive as to this point, and most important as to his participation in the conspiracy :-" I will take Venice; I would willingly bathe myself in the blood of these noble Venetians!"

Is it possible, in the face of these and many such circumstances, seriously to question, as Daru does, whether the war was a war at all, or to suppose that, during all this time, a secret understanding prevailed between that state, whose vessels were thus captured, whose doges complain, in their confidential letters, that there is no chance of peace while Ossuna remains governor of Naples, and this same Ossuna, who hopes to take Venice within a year, and to bathe himself in the blood of its inhabitants?

It may appear, perhaps, that we have been needlessly minute on this point; but as it forms the cardinal point of Daru's theory, the weight due to his authority required that it should be investigated with some care. The conclusion to which we come is, that all the evidence goes to negative completely the supposition of any secret understanding between Venice and Ossuna prior to the supposed date of the conspiracy, and consequently to strike out from beIneath it the foundation on which the hypothesis of Daru rests.

II. But we shall assume, for argument's sake, that Ossuna's schemes of royalty had been formed as early as Daru places them, in 1617; we shall assume that Venice was aware of these, and disposed tacitly to aid them; and then let us see how the rest of his theory coheres, and how far it is reconcilable with common

sense.

The only extent to which Daru maintains that Venice was implicated in the schemes of Ossuna is, that that state had agreed to favour his scheme of seducing its Dutch auxiliaries into his service. To effect this very simple end, it must be admitted that the strangest and most complicated machinery ever devised was adopted. The agents of Ossuna, Pierre, and Renault, it is admitted by Daru, are sent to Venice, believing that their mission is to conspire against Venice. Under this impression, it is admitted, they all along acted. The persons whom they seduce into their schemes had all the like belief. For this purpose, they prepared their arms, their ammunition; not one of them knew that Ossuna's only object is to recruit his army by the addition of the Dutch auxiliaries. Even Bedamar-the politic, subtile, and farseeing ambassador-according to St Real, is deceived; he believes the conspiracy real; he holds a nocturnal interview with the chief conspirator, Pierre, in which the attack on the city is discussed. All the world, in short, believes the conspiracy real except Ossuna himself and the Venetian Government. Was there ever, then, a more violent demand upon our belief than is made by Daru in maintaining that the real object of all this apparatus of conspiracy was the comparatively harmless and unimportant project of seducing some thousand Dutchmen into the Duke's service, and that, to promote that end, Venice was willing to submit to the fearful risk to which she was obviously every day exposed-namely, that, without waiting for the final authority from Ossuna, those troubled spirits, who fully believed his purposes against Venice to be real, might, of their own accord, proceed to carry the scheme into effeet, and convert an imaginary conspiracy into an actual one? Surely any remote danger which might arise to the state from the discovery that