to the mind without requiring a new effort of recollection as at first.

2d. The repetition of an exertion, or the frequent presence of a disagreeable object, is gradually productive of ease or indifference; because the pleasure or uneasiness that attends our perceptions or efforts is always diminished by being repeatedly felt. Things once disagreeable, such as the taste of tobacco, or the study of languages, often become even positively pleasing by habit; because the pain they once occasioned gradually departs, while the pleasure arising from activity remains, and renders them in some degree acceptable, and even sometimes ultimately objects of passionate desire.

3d. Habit, under the name of fashion, influences our opinion of what is morally right, by so diminishing the uneasiness with which we regard improper conduct when it is continually in our view, that at last we begin to account it a thing of course, and a part of the order of Nature. In this way the most absurd laws, religions, and prac tices come to be regarded with indifference and even with pleasure.

The same effect is sometimes produced by associating bad actions in the memory with the persons who committed them, and the situations which they occupy in society. Ordinary minds admire and regard with pleasure the powerful and the rich. This pleasure balances and over comes the sentiment of disgust with, which

they would otherwise regard their improper actions. Hence the vices of the great are regarded with less detestation than the vices of men who occupy lower stations in life. Thus adultery, though perhaps, without exception, the most pernicious crime that can occur in society, is less severely hated or punished by modern nations than to steal a chicken or to rob an orchard. Gallantry is the vice of the rich and the powerful, whereas petty thefts are committed by the poor. Thus, also, it is less disgraceful to plunder a province, and to murder half a million of men, than to violate our neighbour's property to the value of a shilling.

One good effect arising from the power of habit is the authority which it confers upon general rules. A man who has suffered from poverty, naturally tries to remedy the inconveniences of his situation. In doing so, he acquires habits of economy and industry, which do not forsake him even when they cease to be necessary. He teaches the same conduct to his children; who also learn to pursue it from habit, without much discernment of its propriety or wisdom. Thus men, on a thousand occasions, do what they see their neighbours do, and what they themselves have been accustomed to do, without once thinking of the reasonableness of their conduct. Many an honest an accounts falsehood a very bad thing, who would be very much puzzled to tell

why a man is bound to keep his word. In such cases, it is purely from habit that we respect the general rule, without recollecting, and often without comprehending the principle upon which it is founded. These general rules are to a great part of mankind instead of an enlightened mind. To steal is accounted a crime; and persons would startle at the idea of being guilty of it, who understand not the principles upon which the claim of exclusive property is founded. All men have enough of memory to remember a precept, or to learn to act habitually, and as if mechanically, upon it; but few men are capable, at all times, of discerning the reasons which ought to regulate their conduct, and of acting in consequence of them. By the force of habit, human society is thus made to possess a considerable degree of stability; and ignorant or unthinking men are made to perform the same actions that they would have performed, had they possessed far higher wisdom.

The power of habit, however, almost always implies imbecility of mind. Its influence arises from the weakness or inactivity of the voluntary power of the understanding, which enables the memory and its associations to rule the mind. So far, at least, as the force of habit tends to obscure the discernment of good and evil, or the difference betwixt what is rational and what is degrading and unwise, it ought to be resisted.

The mind ought, at all times, to preserve itself awake and alive to the perception of truth. It ought to elevate itself above local practices and prejudices, and to regard man as he is by nature, and as he ought to become. It ought to judge of actions from their tendency to produce true excellence or defect, and not from the notions that men in particular ages or situations have formed of them. But it is difficult for a man who is continually immersed in the hurry of ordinary affairs, to avoid acquiring the ideas that pass current among those with whom he associates. Hence he ought, at times, to retire for a short period from the embarrassment of society, and to converse with Nature. He ought to consider anew the general plan upon which this world is conducted, the design for which it was contrived, and the means by which that design is accomplished. Thus his conversation, not being always with man, but sometimes also with the skilful Contriver of the universe, he will be prevented from contracting narrow habits and prejudices; and while he acquires vigour and ingenuity by performing a part of the ordinary business of life, his mind will be enabled to retain alive its discernment of the general purposes of its existence, and what ought to be the great object of its pursuit.

Even general rules ought, as far as possible, to be laid aside; and we ought to endeavour to act,

not from the rule, but from the reason of the rule. Thus it is a rule, that a prisoner of war ought not to break his parole, or the promise made by him not to run away, or not to serve till he is exchanged. This promise ought to be strictly obeyed; not merely because it is the practice to do so, or infamous to do otherwise, but because a contrary conduct would tend to injure the growing spirit of humanity and mutual confidence, which, in modern Europe, has divested war of many of its evils. While a man thus takes care, on every occasion, to consider the ultimate tendency of his actions, his understanding will be preserved in an acute and vigorous state, and in every part of his existence he will be a rational and enlightened being.

CHAP. XIX.

REVIEW OF THE VALUE OF THE PASSIONS.

To understand correctly the moral value of the human passions, has always appeared to me a point of very considerable difficulty. Our pas