Re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401; 1 Cook, Stock & Stockholders, § 408; Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' & T. Bank, 20 N. Y. 501; Brinkerhoff Farris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Home Lumber Co. 118 Mo. 447 cross bill, we shall restore the interest owned [est and most unequivocal kind, and such auby the plaintiff on the books of the company thority must be contained in the charter or the to the names of the original members, and in- statute. vest them with an apparent right to dividends and participation in the business to which they are not entitled, and which might be an injury to all concerned. The books of the company defendant do not show that the plaintiff is en titled to vote or participate in profits in respect to these shares, and it can therefore suffer no injury from an unauthorized transfer. Let a decree be drawn dismissing both the plaintiff's bill and the cross bill filed by the defendant, at the costs of the plaintiff; and, at the time of settling the decree, the court will hear either party upon any exceptions to the findings of fact or of law which they may file, respectively, within ten days after notice of the filing of this opinion." Messrs. Knox & Reed, Hinckley & Rice, Weil & Thorp, and Roberts & Carter, for appellant: The Producers' Oil Company, Limited, has no power or authority to adopt by-laws. If such corporations are not quasi corporations, but unincorporated associations, with all the powers and liabilities of general partnerships, except as modified by statute or the articles of association, they then have no power to adopt by laws unless given by statute or by the articles of association. The latter are silent on the subject, and no statute gave such authority until the act of June 9, 1895. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, N. S. p. 1060; Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. 573; Thomas v. Ellmaker, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 98; Niblack, Mut. Ben. Soc. § 16; 1 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 491. If such associations are quasi corporations, with all the powers incidental thereto, except as modified by statute or the articles of association, then they have the power to adopt bylaws, and of course are governed by the laws relating to corporations with reference to such by-laws, which laws declare this by-law to be void. There is a distinction between "by-laws" and "rules and regulations" recognized by all lawwriters. By-laws are intended to control the action of the corporation. "Rules and regulations" are intended to control the conduct of third persons dealing with the corporation. Waterman, Corp. § 77; 1 Morawetz, Corp. 501; Boisot, By-Laws of Priv. Corp. § 5; 1 Thomp. Corp. § 937; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 705. The words of both the act of 1874 and 1885 apply, not to restrictions upon transfer, but to the formal requisites to make a transfer effectual, to the formalities of transfer. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 64, citing Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382; Feckheimer v. National Exch. Bank, 79 Va. 80; Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S. 800, 26 L. ed. 532; Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377; Com. v. Gill, 3 Whart. 228; Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 33 L. R. A. 107; Driscoll v. West, B. & C. Mfg. Co. 4 Jones & S. 488, 59 N. Y. 96; Bank of Atchison County v. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431. Only one restriction is anywhere provided for by the act, that is, election to membership of transferees not already members, in the absence of rules and regulations doing away with such election, and therefore no other restriction can be added. By implication all other restrictions are excluded. Coast Line R. Co. v. Savannah, 30 Fed. Rep. 649; Diligent Fire Co. v. Com. 75 Pa. 291; Raynor v. Beatty, 9 W. N. C. 201. Having authorized the adoption of rules and regulations for some purposes, power to adopt them for other purposes is cxcluded. Ang. & A. Corp. § 375; Child v. Hudson Bay Co. 2 P. Wms. 207; Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co. 19 R. I. -- 29 L. R. A. 429. The alleged by-law or rule and regulation is void, because not within the scope of subjects to be controlled by by-laws or rules or regulations. These associations are quasi corporations. Oak Ridge Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa. 147; Stevens v. Philadelphia Ball-Club, 142 Pa. 52, 11 L. R. A. 860; Patterson v. Tidewater Pipe Co. 12 W. N. C. 452; Hill v. Stetler, 127 Pa. 161; Whitney v. Backus, 146 Pa. 29; Brier Hill Coal & I. Co. v. Atlas Works, 146 Pa. 290; Taylor, Priv. Corp. § 7; 1 Bl. Com. 475; Laflin & R. Powder Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. Waterman, Corp. §§ 72, 83; Ang. & A. Corp. 434, 14 L. R. A. 690; Billington v. Gautier §§ 325, 345; 1 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 491; Steel Co. 19 W. N. C. 339; Com. v, Sandy Cook, Stock & Stockholders, $ 700A: 1 Thomp. Lick Gas, Coal, & Coke Co. 16 Phila. 599. Corp. 935; 2 Kyd, Corp. 122; Taylor v. GrisAssociations with the powers of the Pro-wold, 14 N. J. L. 227, 27 Am. Dec. 33. ducers' Oil Company, Limited, are held to be corporations by the Federal Supreme Court. Liverpool & L. Life & F. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 566, 19 L. ed. 1029. As corporations, whether quasi or in fact, no good reason can be shown why they should not be governed by the analogies of corporation law, by whatever name the association may be called. The right to vote upon stock cannot be denied or abridged because of alleged wrongful motives influencing the holder in buying and holding the stock. 1 Cook, Stock & Stockholders, § 618, citing Pender v. Lushington, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 70; Re Stranton, Iron & S. Co. L. R. 16 Eq. 359; People, Barker, v. Kip, 4 Cow. 383, note; State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 290; Moffatt v. Farquhar, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 591; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Elkins, 37 N. J. Eq. 273; Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174, 17 L. R. A. 237; Farmers' Loan No such by-law can be adopted by any cor- & T. Co. v. New York & N. R. Co. 150 N. Y. poration without express authority of the clear- | 410, 34 L. R. A. 76. Waterbury v. Merchants' Union Erp. Co. 50 Barb. 157; Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174, 17 L. R. A. 237. Messrs. Watson & McCleave and Samuel S. Mehard, for appellees: The plaintiff cannot extend his membership in the defendant company from the one threehundredth part to over a majority of its capital, without a novation of the contract under which the company was formed, and this can be effected only by the mutual consent of the parties. The defendant company was formed by the contract of its members. Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249; Hill v. Stetler, 127 Pa. 145; Vanhorn v. Corcoran, 127 Pa. 255, 4 L. R. A. 386; Lennig v. Penn Morocco Co. 16. W. N. C. 114; Crowther v. Upland Industrial Co-Op. Asso. 1 Del. Co. Rep. 264: Small's Estate, 151 Pa. 5; Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. 569; Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321; Jaffe v. Krum, 88 Mo. 669; Allen v. Long, 80 Tex. 261; Imperial Refining Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574, 3 L. R. A. 503; Carnegie v. Hulbert, 10U. S. App. 454, 53 Fed. Rep. 10, 3 C. C. A. The relation of members in such an associa-391; Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 682, 32 L. tion results entirely from the contract entered ed. 801; Robbins v. Butler, 24 Ill. 387; Dennis into by them in forming the company, whether v. Kennedy, 19 Barb. 517; Taft v. Ward, 106 it be viewed from the standpoint of a partner- Mass. 518. ship or from that of a corporation. Lindley, Partn. *1; 1 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. 1st ed. § 2, 3, 12, 27-31, 126–135. The contract whereby the defendant company was formed cannot be changed save by the mutual consent of the parties. Stone v. Miller, 16 Pa. 450; Potter v. McCoy, 26 Pa. 458; Hartley v. Kirlin, 45 Pa. 49; Kemmerer's Appeal, 102 Pa. 558; Walstrom v. Hopkins, 103 Pa. 118; 1 Parsons, Contr. *220; 1 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. 1st ed. § 321. The contention of the plaintiff involves a material change in the contract under which the defendant company was formed. The statutes under which the defendant company was organized do not involve consent to an extension of membership without further action of the parties. Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. 569. Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use. Bl. Com. *59: Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 4; Black, Interpretation of Laws, 35; Bradbury v. Wagenhorst, 54 Pa. 180; Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 35 Am. Rep. 670; Pittsburgh; v. Kalchthaler, 114 Pa. 547. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of the act is a most improbable one. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 23; Com. v. Shopp, 1 Woodw. Dec. 123; Packer v. Sunbury & E. R. Co. 19 Pa. 211; Howard Asso.'s Appeal, 70 Pa. 344. The spirit and reason of the statutes likewise forbid an extension of plaintiff's membership without the consent of his fellows. 1 Bl. Com. *61. If the meaning of the statute is doubtful as to rule governing transfers to members, the construction must follow the common law, which requires the express consent of all the partners to an enlargement of a partner's membership. Black, Interpretation of Laws, 110; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148; Doner v. Stauffer, 1 Penr. & W. 198, 21 Am. Rep. 370; Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. 76: Cooper's Appeal, 26 Pa. 262; Vandike's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9; Parsons, Partn. SS 106, 108; Cochran v. Perry, 8 Watts & S. 262. The rules of the common law have been ap. plied to partnership associations formed under the act in question, except where expressly changed by the provisions of the act by this court in numerous cases. The rule was authorized by the statute. Laflin & R. Powder Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 14 L. R. A. 690; Ang. & A. Corp. 11th ed. § 342. The purpose of the plaintiff to gain control of the defendant company, and to so manage its affairs as to supply the Producers' oil to the Standard Oil Company is wrongful, and aid will not be given by a court of equity to enable him to carry it out. Forrest v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. 4 De G. F. & J. 126; Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174, 17 L. R. A. 237; Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434, 36 Am. Rep. 671. McCullum, J., delivered the opinion of the court: We think the court below entered the proper decree in this case. The plaintiff filed his bill to compel the defendant company to concede to him the rights of a member as to shares of which he was merely a transferee. The shares so held by him, together with the shares he subscribed for, represented a clear majority of the capital of the company. On payment of his subscription in accordance with its terms, he was duly elected to membership in the company, and he then received from it a certificate for 300 shares of its capital, of the par value of $10 each, that being the number of shares for which he had subscribed. Afterwards, and prior to the institution of this suit, he purchased from the National Transit Company 29,764 shares, and from other persons 131 shares, making in all 29,875 shares in addition to his original 300 shares. The shares thus purchased by him were shares which members of the defendant company had sold, and which the parties from whom he had purchased had bought. The National Transit Company was then one of the companies affiliated with the Standard Oil Company and controlled by what is known as the "Standard Oil Trust," in which the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of his purchase. His avowed purpose in making the purchases mentioned was to obtain control of the defendant company, and change its policy from what he characterized as "gad fly" competition with the Standard to such competition as he believed would be unobjectionable to it. There is reason to believe that he could not have obtained the stock but for the assurance that he would use the power he supposed it would give him to accomplish his declared purpose. While it is probable the accomplishment of his purpose would be advantageous to him, it is very clear that the other members of the defendant company regarded his scheme as fatal, if carried out, to the principal object in- 1 of said court." It will be observed that the tended to be achieved by the organization of the company, and as destructive of their interests in it. The principal and controlling question raised by the bill and answer is whether the plaintiff is entitled, by reason of his election to membership in the defendant company, on payment of his subscription, to have transferred to him on the books of the company and to vote the shares purchased as above stated. The plaintiff contends that he is, and the defendant company contends that he is not. The argu ments in support of and against their respective contentions are exhaustive and able, but an extended review of them is not deemed essential to a proper determination of the question we have to consider. It is conceded that the plaintiff has no right to vote the shares he purchased as above stated if the rule of June 5, 1894, is valid. It appears from the tenth finding of fact that the rule was adopted by the vote of a majority in number and value of interests of the members of the defendant company. To determine whether it was in the power of the company to establish the rule, we must look to the statutes under which it was organized. As bearing on this question it is sufficient to refer to the act of June 25, 1885 (Pub. Laws, 182), which is amendatory of the 4th section of the act of June 2, 1874 (Pub. Laws, 271). It is as follows: "Interests in such partnership associa tions shall be personal estate, and may be transferred, given, bequeathed, distributed, sold, or assigned under such rules and regulations as such partnership associations shall from time to time prescribe by a vote of the majority of the members in number and value of their interests; and in the absence of such rules and regulations the transferee of any interest in any such association shall not be entitled to any participation in the subsequent business of such association, unless elected to membership therein by a vote of a majority of the members in number and value of their interests. And any change of ownership, whether by sale, death, bankruptcy, or other wise, which occurs in the absence of any rules and regulations of such associations regulating such transfer, and which is not followed by election to membership in such association, shall entitle the owner or transferee only to the value of the interest so acquired at the date of acquiring such interest, at a price and upon terms to be mutually agreed upon, and in default of such agreement, at a price and upon terms to be fixed by an appraiser to be appointed by the court of common pleas of the proper county, on the petition of either party, which appraisal shall be subject to the approval 39 L. R. A. statute makes no distinction between a transferee who is a member of the partnership association and a transferee who is not a member of it. The language of the statute fairly excludes such distinction, and there is nothing in the articles of association which warrants it. It is a distinction which, if made, would enable a member of the association to obtain a controlling interest in it by a purchase of a sufficient number of the shares to defeat the controlling purpose of its organization, and to impair, if not absolutely destroy, the interests of the other members. If the legislature had intended to make this distinction, it could and presumably would have done so in a few words. The absence of anything in the statute indicative of a purpose to make it tends to confirm the view that members who purchase shares sustain the same relation to them as purchasers who are not members. Of what avail is it to deny to a stranger who buys shares of the capital of the association the right to vote them without its consent, manifested by his election to membership therein, while a member of the association who desires to obtain control of it, to defeat the purpose for which it was organized, and to change its policy, in the interest of a rival company, is allowed to vote without its consent the shares he has purchased? It seems to us that a construction of the statute which admits of such results is opposed to the spirit as well as the letter of it, and that so much of the rule of June 5, 1894, as puts the member who purchases shares on the same footing with respect to them as the strangers who purchase shares is in clear accord with and authorized by it. We cannot assent to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant company is a corporation, and restricted in the adoption of by laws, rules, and regulations for its government to such as it is within the power of the latter to prescribe. It may be conceded that the defendant company has some of the qualities of a corporation, but it is nevertheless a partnership association, governed by the statutes and articles under which it was organized, and the rules and regulations it may prescribe in execution of the powers with which the statutes have invested it. We concur in, and need not add anything to, what the learned judge of the court below has so well said on this point, and in respect to the agreement or understanding between the parties when the company was organized. In accordance with the views expressed in this opinion, we overrule the specifications of error. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed, at the cost of the appellant. WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT. 2. The riparian rights of a patentee of the government attach by relation at the very inception of his title, and will be protected as against subsequent appropriation of the water naturally flowing over the land. 3. Existing riparian rights are not affected by Laws 1873, p. 520, regulating irrigation and 4. The doctrine of appropriation of the land productive. (July 2, 1897.) APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima County in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought to en- The facts are stated in the opinion. This case is one of first impression in the appellate court. In Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co. 1 Wash. 566, the court says: "It is the opinion of the court that the prior appropriator of the flow of any water over the public lands of the United States has a vested right therein." The common-law right to running water is that every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run (currere solebat) without diminution or alteration. 3 Rawle, 84, 23 Am. Dec. 102: Brown v. Bush, 3 Kent, Com. *439; M'Calmont v. Whitaker, 45 Pa. 66; Van Hoesen v. Coventry, 10 Barb. lotson v. Smith, 32 N. H. 94, 64 Am. Dec. 355; 518: Moffett v. Brewer, 1 G. Greene, 348; TilBealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208; Davis v. Getchell, 50 Me. 602, 79 Am. Dec. 636. But in England and in all the older states irrigation was unknown as a reasonable use of running water. Angell, Watercourses, 7th ed. § 120. In Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 496, 38 Am. Dec. 106, the court says irrigation is by no means essential, and cannot therefore be considered a natural want of man. The use of water from the lands and running customary law without legislation, either constreams by miners and irrigators grew into gressional or local, and valuable properties were created before the act of 1866, the substantial provisions of which act have been placed in the Revised Statutes of the United States as § 2339. Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 507, 22 L. ed. 414; Basey v. Gallagher, 87 C. S. 20 Wall. 670, 22 L. ed. 452; Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 25 L. ed. 240; Broder v. Natoma Water & Min. Co. 101 U. S. 274, 25 L. ed. 790. This act of Congress merely confirmed and established the customary local law. The common-law doctrine of riparian rights, that every riparian owner is entitled to the natural flow of the stream through his land as it is wont to run, is not applicable to the streams in Yakima and Kittitas counties, but rights should be determined by the doctrine of prior appropriations. In Ellis v. Pomeroy Improv. Co. 1 Wash. 572, it was there decided: "Watercourses on the public lands of the United States are sub-man for the common law. ject to appropriation by use in accordance with local customs and laws; and vested rights so acquired cannot be devested by relation back of a patent granted." The common law was made for man, not In Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, it was held: "Where one has appropriated the waters of a stream flowing across public lands, by erecting on his own land a ditch, one acquiring title from the United States takes subject to such appropriation." Cook v. Hewitt, 4 Wash. 749, and Rigney v. Tacoma Light & W. Co. 9 Wash. 576, 26 L. R. A. 425, are not from the arid district. mon law of England so far as it was applicable The colonists brought with them the com. to their new conditions. The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the organic act and laws of Washington territory, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this territory. The question whether the use of water in existence is a question of fact, and not of law. any particular locality is necessary to man's Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 142. In Isaacs v. Barber, 10 Wash. 124, 30 L. R. Much of the confusion and uncertainty exA. 665, it was held that "the right to prior ap-isting on the water question arises from a failpropriation of water upon the public domain ure to distinguish what is law and what is fact for mining and other beneficial purposes has in the application of the common law. been established by a custom so universal that courts must take judicial notice thereof." NOTE. For rights of prior appropriators of water as affecting the subject of riparian rights, see Isaacs v. Barber (Wash.) 30 L. R. A. 665, and note. Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Com. v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534; People, Loomis, v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 482. The common-law doctrine of riparian rights is unsuited to the condition of our state, and this case should have been determined by the application of the principle of prior appropriation. Reno Smelting, M. & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 4 L. R. A. 60: Drake v. Earhart, 2 Idaho, 716; Stowell v. Johnson, 7 Utah, 215; Moyer v. Preston (Wyo.) 44 Pac. 845; Clough v. Wing (Ariz.) 17 Pac. 453; Trambley v. Luterman, 6 N M. 15; Black's Pomeroy, Water Rights, § 106. Legislation confirms the custom of appropriation, and abrogates riparian rights in Yakima county. Laws 1873, p. 520; Laws 1895-96, 508; Black's Pomeroy, Water Rights, §§ 106-108, 113. Messrs. D. J. Crowley and Whitson & Parker, for respondents: Under the common-law rule the riparian owner might make reasonable use of flowing water for the purpose of irrigation. Black's Pomeroy, Water Rights, SS 150, 151, 153, 155, 157; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Jones v. Adams, 19 Nev. 78; Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 286; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Ferris, 2 Sawy. 199; Washb. Easements & Servitudes, 2d ed. p. 240; Elliot v. Fitchburg R. | Co. 10 Cush. 194, 57 Am. Dec. 85; Swift v. Goodrich, 70 Cal. 103. Sce also Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 23 Am. Dec. 504; Gillett v. Johnson, 30 Conn. 180; Farrell v. Richards, 30 N. J. Eq. 511; Tolle v. Correth, 31 Tex. 362, 98 Am. Dec. 540; Stanford v. Felt, 71 Cal. 249; Gould v. Stafford, 77 Cal. 66; Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 84 Am. Dec. 631; Anaheim Water Co. v. Semitropic Water Co. (Cal.) 30 Pac. 623. Water for irrigation in arid countries is a natural want. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 38 Am. Dec. 106; Kinney, Irrigation, SS 157, 158. The right of appropriation exists so long as the lands are the public lands of the United States; whenever the government parts with its title it grants to its patentee, as an incident, any water flowing over it which had not been appropriated prior to the inception of his title. Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 670, 22 L. ed. 452; Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541, 33 L. ed. 761; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Ferris, 2 Sawy. 176; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dang berg, 2 Sawy. 451. The history of legislation and constitutional enactment in this state has conclusively recognized the riparian doctrine. Wash. Const. art. 21; Acts 1889-90, p. 719, SS 44, 46, 48, 57; 1 Hill's Code, § 1761-1763, 1765, 1774, 1737; Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co. 1 Wash. 566; Isaacs v. Barber, 10 Wash. 133, 30 L. R. A. 665; Crook v. Hewitt, 4 Wash. 749; Rigney v. Tacoma Light & W. Co. 9 Wash. 576, 26 L. R. A. 425. No court where the other view has been taken has ever answered satisfactorily the comprehensive and able arguments contained in Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249. See also Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Kinney, Irrigation, 191, 208; Black's Pomeroy, Wa ter Rights, 145, 150, 158; Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136; Lehigh Co. v. Independent Ditch Co. 8 Cal. 323; Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304. The doctrine of appropriation applies only to public lands. Gould, Waters, § 240; Black's Pomeroy, Water Rights, 30; Curtis v. La Grande Hydraulic Water Co. 20 Or. 34, 10 L. R. A. 484. When a patent issues the title relates back to the initiatory act, riz., the date of settlement. Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541, 33 L. ed. 761; Kinney, Irrigation, § 210; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 337, 23 L. ed. 426; Stark v. Starr, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 418, 18 L. ed. 929; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 2 Sawy. 450; Larsen v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 19 Ör. 240; Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304; Faull v. Cooke, 19 Or. 455. Oregon has the same statute substantially as Washington on condemnation of riparian ownership, quoted at § 499, Kinney on Irrigation.. That court has steadily maintained the doctrine of riparian ownership. Oregon Iron Co. v. Trullenger, 3 Or. 1; Taylor v. Welch, 6 Or. 199; Shively v. Hume, 10 Or. 76. In Kansas the doctrine of riparian rights is upheld, although the statutes of that state seem to recognize as fully as those of this state the taking of water by appropriation. Kinney, Irrigation, SS 427, 442. In North Dakota the riparian doctrine is recognized. Kinney, Irrigation, § 467. Anders, J., delivered the opinion of the court: An action was instituted in the superior court of Yakima county by the plaintiff Benton, a riparian proprietor on the Ahtanum river, in said county, to restrain certain of the appellants from diverting the waters of said stream, and conducting the same to and upon their land, situated at a distance therefrom, for the purposes of irrigation. Three separate actions were also commenced by other parties, seeking similar relief, and by stipulation of all the parties, and an order of the court, all of those causes were consolidated and tried in this action. Many riparian owners became parties by intervention, and joined the plaintiffs in claiming the relief sought by them, and the defendants in the several causes were all made defendants in the consolidated case. The complaint in each case, briefly stated, alleges riparian ownership on the part of the plaintiff, and appropriation of the water, and the date thereof, and the use of the water for irrigation, and its diversion by the defendants. Each of the nonriparian landowners alleges ownership of lands, and appropriation and use of the water for irrigation, and date of such appropriation, and the making of valuable improvements on the land. And each party to the action avers that his land, without artificial irrigation, is arid and unproductive, and prays that he may be decreed entitled to a certain specified quantity of water for the purpose of irrigating his premises. The action involves the rights of a multitude of farmers located on the banks of the river, as well as those of a great number of nonriparian landowners. The evidence preserved in the record is exceedingly voluminous, but the facts deduced therefrom and stated by the court are so satisfactory to counsel that we have been relieved of the labor of examining it in detail. Of the ninety-one |