exempting vessels which had previously been more to points along the coast and also to for- If it had been the intention of the legislature to require the vessel which was to have the benefit of this exemption to carry any definite quantity of coal or any fixed proportionate part of her cargo of coal, it would have so pro fully satisfied that the vessel refused or neglected, chusetts exempt American vessels engaged in the to take a pilot as provided by the statute. The plaster trade, and British and American vesels are Talisman, 23 Fed. Rep. 111. And the fact that a pilot left the vessel he was piloting without written permission from the master, as required by the rules and regulations of the master and wardens of the port of New York, does not destroy his right to compensation provided he left a competent substitute on board who was able to perform his duties; but the substitute must be a person who is himself a branch or deputy pilot. Shepherd v. Mitchill, 10 Johns. 112, And that a pilot did not immediately upon going on board a vessel ascertain the situation of the ship and cause an entry thereof to be made in the log book, according to the rules and regulations of the master and wardens of the port of New York, cannot take away the right of the pilot against the ship owner to compensation, and the situation of the ship, being a matter of fact, may be proved in an action for such compensation by parol. Shepherd v. Mitchill, 10 Johns. 112. b. Exemptions. The exemption of American vessels engaged in the Pensylvania coal trade from the necessity of paying half pilotage for refusal to accept the services of a pilot, provided for by Pa. laws March 3, 1803, is a fair exercise of legislative discretion acting upon the subject of the regulation of the pilotage of the port of Philadelphia. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 314, 13 L. ed. 1002. So, a registered vessel bound from the port of Boston to Alexandria, from whence she was destined to and actually went upon a foreign voyage, should be considered as a coasting vessel within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute exempting coasting vessels from compulsory pilotage. Tilley v. Farrow, 14 Mass. 17. And a vessel properly documented, sailing from Philadelphia to Boston with a cargo of coal duly cleared with bills of lading signed and delivered, is regularly employed in the coasting trade within the meaning of Mass. Stat. 1873, chap. 281, § 1, authorizing vessels engaged in such trade to decline the services of a pilot, and exempting them from compulsory pilotage, though she sailed under a register and not under a coasting license, and though she had not been continuously or generally so employed. Wilson v. Gray, 127 Mass. 98. And a vessel regularly and properly documented, which had been continuously employed for about seven years in carrying coal for various persons from Philadelphia to New York and other ports along the coast of the United States, and chiefly employed by the charterer in carrying its coal from its depot in Philadelphia to various depots of that company at other ports, transporting a cargo of coal from such depot to the charterer in Newburyport for sale there in the regular course of its business, is engaged in the coasting trade within the meaning of Mass. Pub. Stat. chap. 70, § 32, exempting vessels regularly employed in the coasting trade from compulsory pilotage. Chase v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 135 Mass. 347. So, a British vessel engaged in the plaster trade between Nova Scotia and Boston is not obliged to take a pilot into the harbor of Boston, and is not liable for refusal to do so, as the statutes of Massa by treaty and commercial arrangement between Great Britain and the United States placed upon the same footing with each other. Hunt v. Card, 14 Pick. 135. But an Irish vessel with a general cargo, trading between Belfast and London and not laden with corn or grain as specified in 46 Geo. III. chap. 97, § 2, cannot be considered as a coasting vessel or an Irish trader using the navigation of the river Thames, as a coaster, within the meaning of 52 Geo. III. chap. 39, § 2, and is not exempted from the duty of taking a pilot on board. Davison v. Mckibben, 6 J. B. Moore, 387, 3 Brod. & B. 112. For construction of exemption of vessels laden with lumber, see CLAYTON V. HEBB. Coasting vessels, however, are not bound to take pilots on board on entering rivers within the limits of a jurisdiction having authority to appoint and license pilots, and the exemption in 52 Geo. III. chap. 39, is not confined to coasters navigating the Thames alone. Usher v. Lyon, 2 Price, 118. And the merchant's shipping act of 1854, § 379, exempting ships not carrying passengers employed in the coasting trade from compulsory pilotage in Trinity House export districts, which by § 370 thereof includes any pilotage district for the appointment of pilots within which no particular provision is made by law, is not repealed or overridden by the Ipswich dock act of 1852 (15 Vict. chap. 116, § 91), requiring the corporation of Trinity House to appoint commissioners resident within the port of Ipswich to examine and certify pilots; and the master of a ship not carrying passengers employed in the coasting trade within the district is not liable for compulsory pilotage upon refusing to take a pilot. Hadgraft v. Hewith, L. R. 10 Q. B. 350, 44 L. J. M. C. N. S. 140, 32 L. T. N. S. 720, 23 Week. Rep. 911. But a steam tug carrying passengers between two places, both of which are within the provisions of the Dublin port and dock act of 1869, is within the merchant's shipping act (17 & 18 Vict. chap. 104), providing that certain vessels in such case must take a pilot, imposing a penalty upon the master for failure to do so. Dublin Port & Docks Board V. Shannon, Ir. Rep. 7 C. L. 116. All exemptions from compulsory pilotage existing immediately before the time that act went into operation are continued by the merchant's shipping act of 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. chap. 104, § 353), and a vessel carrying passengers proceeding on her outward voyage to the Baltic is not liable for coinpulsory pilotage for refusal to allow a duly qualified pilot to take charge at Graves End. Stanton v. Banks, 4 Jur. N. S. 10, 332, 8 El. & Bl. 445, 27 L. J. M. C. N. S. 105. As to constitutionality of exemption of certain vessels, see Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 314, 13 L. ed. 1002, infra, III. As to exemptions within the Federal prohibition against discrimination, see supra, IV. III. Effect of constitutional restrictions. A law requiring ships to pay half pilotage in case of refusal of offered services of a pilot is not unconstitutional. Collins v. Society for Relief of Distressed & Decayed Pilots, 73 Pa. 194. A state statute regulating the modes and times Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 485; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 236. If the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instru ment, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 237; Wilson v. Stewart Gray, 127 Mass. 98: Tilley v. Farrow, 14 Mass. 18; Chase v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 135 Mass. 347. Messrs. Brown, Arthur George Brown, F. W. Brune, and George Stewart Brown, for appellee: In all known systems of pilotage, provisions for what is called "compulsory pilotage" are of offering and rendering their services by pilots | regulation of commerce, is not in conflict with the and the compensation they may demand constitutes provision of the United States Constitution confera regulation of commerce within the grant to Con-ring power to regulate commerce upon Congress, gress of the commercial power contained in the 3d as the power to regulate pilotage is one which may clause of the 8th section of the 1st article of the Con- be exercised concurrently and independently by stitution of the United States, but such power is not both state and nation, and may be exercised by the in its nature national, admitting only of one uni- states until Congress shall see fit to act upon the form system or plan of regulation, and such state subject. Ex parte McNiel, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 236, 20 regulation is not therefore repugnant to such con- L. ed. 624. stitutional provision where Congress has not found it necessary to exert its power upon the subject. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 300, 13 L. ed. 996. Power to regulate pilots and pilotage is concurrent in the state and national governments until exercised by the latter, and is not therefore granted by Congress to the states, but may be exercised by the later until appropriated by the former. The Panama, Deady, 27. And state pilotage laws regulating pilots and providing for their compensation, and entitling them to half fees when their services are refused, though subject to the power of Congress over the matter, are valid, and not in conflict with the provisions of the United States Constitution conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce. Ex parte McNiel, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 236, 20 L. ed. 624. So, state statute regulating the modes and times of offering and rendering their services by pilots and the compensation they may demand, passed previous to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, providing that all pilots, in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States snall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the state respectively, wherein such pilots may be, might be held to have been adopted by Congress and thus made a law of the United States. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 312, 13 L. ed. 1001, dictum. Ane see similar doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 207, 6 L. ed. 72. And the fact that Congress has legislated on the subject of pilotage by act of March 2, 1837, with relation to waters which are the boundaries between two states, considered in connection with the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, providing that all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, and harbors of the United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the states respectively, wherein such pilots may be, manifests an intent upon the part of Congress, with the single exception named, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the states, so that a state statute providing for the modes and times of offering and rendering their services by pilots and the compensation they may demand would not be thereby rendered invalid. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 300, 13 L. ed. 996. Thus, the pilot laws of the state of New York are valid, and not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States conferring power upon Congress to regulate commerce. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 26 L. ed. 234. And the New York act of April 15, 1847, and amendments thereto, providing that a pilot who shall first tender his services may demand from the master of any vessel of designated capacity navigating Hell Gate, to whom the tender was made and by whom it was refused, half pilotage though a So, the act of California of May 20, 1861, providing that when the services of a pilot are refused he shall be entitled to one half pilotage fees, is not in conflict with the provision of the United States Constitution conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce, as such power does not exclude the exercise of authority by the states to regulate pilots. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 450, 17 L. ed. 805. And Louisiana act of 1855, with relation to the board of master and port wardens, providing for the payment for services actually rendered or the tender of such services by pilots, is not a violation of the commercial clause of the United States Constitution. New Orleans Port Wardens v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289. And in New Orleans Port Wardens v. Prats, 10 Rob. (La.) 460, it was said that the constitutionality of the Louisiana act of 1805, which first allowed fees to the master and warden, has never been questioned, although they have been claimed for forty years. So, the fees allowed to the master and warden of a port for piloting vessels, or for offer of services which is refused, are not impost or duties on imports or exports within the meaning of the prohibition against the levying thereof by the states contained in the Constitution of the United States. New Orleans Port Wardens v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289; State v. Penny, 19 S. C. 218. And the Pennsylvania law of March 2, 1803, providing that a vessel which neglects or refuses to take a pilot shall forfeit one half the regular amount of pilotage, exempting American vessels engaged in the Pennsylvania coal trade, is not repugnant to the 5th clause of the 9th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States, providing that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another, and that vessels to or from one state shall not be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties to another, as pilotage fees are not duties, and the requirement of the payment of pilotage fees does not constitute a preference. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 314, 13 L. ed. 1002. And half pilotage under the California act of 1856, providing that all vessels arriving at or leaving a designated port shall receive only half of the rates provided for by full pilotage when a vessel is spoken and the services of the pilot are refused, which shall go to the pilot first offering his services, is not a toll in the sense of the Constitution, but merely a compensation dependent upon the rendering of certain services and the discharge of certain duties incident to the office of pilot. Harrison v. Green, 18 Cal. 94. And the Pennsylvania act of March 2, 1803, providing that a vessel which neglects or refuses to take a pilot shall forfeit one half of the regular amount of pilotage, is not in conflict with the 2d to be found, and as such requirements are upheld by the courts as "necessary and usual parts of every such system." Ex parte McNiel, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 236, 20 L. ed. 624. They do not constitute "a burden on commerce, but are for its benefit and safety." Smith v. The Creole, 2 Wall. Jr. 485. and 3d clauses of the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the state without the assent of Congress from laying any imposts or duties on exports or imports or tonage, as this provision of the Constitution was intended to operate upon subjects actu ally existing. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port War dens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 314, 13 L. ed. 1002. So, Pa. act March 2, 1803, providing that a vessel which neglects or refuses to take a pilot shall forfeit one half the regular amount of pilotage, exempting American vessels engaged in the Pennsylvania coal trade, is not repugnant to the 1st clause of the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States declaring that all duties and imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, as pilotage is not a duty, impost, or excise requiring uniformity. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 300, 13 L. ed. 996. It is provided by act of Congress (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4237), that no regulations or provisions shall be adopted by any state which shall make any discrimination in the rates of pilotage or half pilotage between vessels sailing between the ports of one state and vessels sailing between ports of different states, or against national vessels of the United States. This statute is constitutional and valid under the clause of the National Constitution authorizing Congress to regulate commerce between the states. Freeman v. The Undaunted, 37 Fed. Rep. 662. And Cal. Pol. Code, § 2468, exempting from all charges for pilotage unless a pilot be actually employed all vessels coasting between San Francisco and any port in Oregon or Washington or Alaska territories, and by vessels coasting between ports of the state, is invalid for discrimination within the meaning of that statute. Freeman v. The Un And Ga. Code, § 1512, providing for compulsory pilotage, but exempting from its operation coasters of that state, and between the ports thereof, and those of South Carolina and Florida, is not repugnant to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, providing that all citizens of the several states shall be citizens of the United States, and that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall in-daunted, 37 Fed. Rep. 662. fringe the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Thompson v. Spraigue, 69 Ga. 409, 47 Am. Rep. 760. And Ga. Code, § 1512, providing for compulsory pilotage, but excepting from the operation thereof coasters in that state, and between the ports thereof and those of South Carolina and Florida, is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 1, declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, as it cannot be said by this exception citizens of any state are excluded from owning and employing coasters within the exemption. Thompson v. Spraigue, 59 Ga. 409, 47 Am. Rep. 760. But see Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 30 L. ed. 115, infra, IV. So, La. act 1855, organizing a board of port wardens for the port of New Orleans, which permits them to demand from each vessel arriving from sea the sum of $5 whether they are called upon to perform any services or not, is not unconstitutional as a charge or duty imposed without regard to a corresponding and equivalent benefit. New Orleans Port Wardens v. The Charles Morgan, 14 La. Ann. 602. And Fla. act March 7, 1879, authorizing the pilot commissioners to determine rates of pilotage which shall be paid by any vessel at their ports, such rate not to be greater than those provided, is not a local law within the meaning of Fla. Const. art. 4, § 18, providing that in designated cases, and in others where a general law can be made applicable, the law shall be general and uniform throughout the state. The Chase, 14 Fed. Rep. 854. So, the right of a pilot who offered his services to a vessel of 100-tons burden passing through Hurlgate near the city of New York, which were refused, under N. Y. act Feb. 19, 1819, providing therefor, will not be defeated by the claim that the And a vessel sailing from San Francisco to New York around Cape Horn is a coasting vessel sailing between the ports of different states within the meaning thereof. Freeman v. The Undaunted, 37 Fed. Rep. 662. And Cal. Pol. Code, tit. 6, chap. 1, art. 6, §§ 2466, 2468, providing a system of pilotage and half pilotage, but exempting vessels engaged in the whaling or fishing trade and all vessels coasting between San Francisco and any port in Oregon or Washington or Alaska territories, and all vessels coasting between the ports of the state, conflicts with the provisions of that statute, and are invalid so far as they relate to coasting vessels, but may be enforced so far as they relate to vessels engaged in foreign trade. The Alameda, 31 Fed. Rep. 366. But the exemption under Cal. Pol. Code, § 2468, of certain coasting vessels from the charge of half pilotage does not have the effect of bringing the whole system of regulations for half pilotage prescribed by Cal. Pol. Code, § 2466, providing for a system of pilotage and half pilotage, and exempting vessels engaged in the whaling or fishing trade, within the inhibition of that statute; § 2466 being left intact, while § 2468 is invalid so far as it conflicts with the Federal prohibition. The Alameda v. Neal, 32 Fed. Rep. 331. In that case Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 30 L. ed. 115, was distinguished upon the ground that in that case it was sought to charge a coasting vessel which was excepted from pilot charges by the Code of Georgia, while here it is sought to except from such charges a vessel engaged in foreign commerce, because of an exemption in favor of certain coasting vessels contained in an independent section. So, Georgia Code, § 1512, providing that any person, master, or commander of a ship or vessel bearing toward any of the harbors of that state who refuses to receive a pilot on board shall be liable to the first pilot offering his services outside of the bar for the full rate of pilotage, excepting from Smith v. Swift, 8 Met. 332. Looking to the general purpose and policy of the pilot act, it should receive every reason its operation coasters in that state and between the ports of that state and other designated states, is invalid because of such discrimination, as in conflict with the Federal prohibition. Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 30 L. ed. 115, reversing Thompson v. Spraigue, 69 Ga. 409, 47 Am. Rep. 760. But South Carolina act 1878, prescribing a system of pilotage for the ports of that state, requiring the employment of licensed pilots and establishing the fees to be paid them by incoming and outgoing vessels, is not invalid as conflicting with U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4237, prohibiting discrimination. State v. Penny, 19 S. C. 218. | able intendment in its favor, and provisions for exemption from its operation, and not the general law itself should be strictly construed. Ross v. Duval, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 61, 10 L. ed. 59. All statutes must be construed by reference to their effect upon the particular subject-matter to which they relate. The Columbia river is the boundary between two states, Oregon and Washington, within the purpose and spirit of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4236, prohibiting discrimination by state laws with relation to pilotage on such waters, and the state of Oregon cannot require a vessel bound in or out of said river to take an Oregon pilot or pay half or any pilotage if the master thereof prefers and does take a Washington pilot. The Abercorn, 28 Fed. Rep. 384; Neil v. Wilson, 14 Or. 410. And a duly licensed Oregon pilot who piloted a vessel over the bar of the Columbia river into Astoria, and tendered his services to pilot her out again to the open sea, which were refused and an V. Effect of national provision for waters between other pilot licensed for Washington territory en states. By act March 2, 1837, Congress provided that it shall be lawful for the master or commander of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters which are the boundary between two states to employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of either. Within this provision a state may license pilots and provide regulations for their government and employment, but she cannot exclude others duly licensed elsewhere from employment on the public waters of the nation because these waters happen to be within her territorial limits, and a law designed for that purpose, or which contemplates an exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of water within the limits of the state by requiring any person exercising the profession of a pilot thereon to apply to a board of commissioners of that state for a license to entitle him to do so, is inoperative and void. The Clymene, 9 Fed. Rep. 164. gaged, is not entitled to half pilotage because of such refusal under Oregon act of 1882, providing that a pilot who brings a vessel in is entitled to pilot her out when she leaves, and if his offer of services is refused by the master he shall pay half pilotage. Neil v. Wilson, 14 Or. 410. So, Fla. act 1859, § 3, providing that no person shall be authorized or permitted to conduct any vessel into or out of the barbor of Fernandına, unless such person shall have a license from the commissioner of pilotage for that port imposing a penalty for violation thereof, is unconstitutional as contravening that act. Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 409. And though the waters of Delaware bay and river are not the boundary between Delaware and Pennsylvania, as both states border on them, they come within the purview of the act. The South Cambria, 27 Fed. Rep. 525. So, a vessel refusing to take a New York pilot upon entering New York harbor by way of Sandy And a pilot duly licensed under a statute of the Hook is not liable for pilotage as if one had been state of Delaware, who pilots a vessel from the en-employed under N. Y. Laws 1853, chap. 469, as trance of Delaware bay into the port of Philadel- | amended by N. Y. Laws 1857, chap. 243, where there phia, is not deprived of his right to compensation for his services by the fact that a statute exists in Pennsylvania prohibiting anyone from acting as pilot in Delaware river or bay without a license from a Pennsylvania board. The Clymene, 9 Fed. Rep. 164, 12 Fed. Rep. 346. And a claim for half pilotage by a duly licensed pilot, against a vessel to which he tenders his services to bring her into the port of Philadelphia, under the Delaware statute providing therefor, is not affected by the fact that the laws of Pennsylvania exempt all vessels from the obligation to take a pilot after they have crossed a designated line. The Alzena, 14 Fed. Rep. 174. was a New Jersey pilot on board, as the water constituted the boundary between two states within the meaning of the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, authorizing the employment of pilots licensed by the laws of either state. Brown v. Elwell, 60 N. Y. 249. And a New Jersey pilot piloting in New York waters is authorized to maintain an action for compensation allowed by the statutes of New York by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4235, authorizing bis employment in such waters, and declaring that pilotage shall be regulated by the law of the state where the pilot may be, as such statute adopts the local law and makes it applicable to the New Jersey pilot so employed. Reardon v. Arkell, 59 Fed. Rep. 624. In Hopkins v. Wyckoff, 1 Daly, 176, however, it was held that a pilot licensed under the statutes of the state of New Jersey and authorized by Con So, a vessel at Astoria bound up the Columbia river is on pilotage ground subject to the laws of both Oregon and Washington, and may under the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, take a pilot from either state after declining the services of one from the other without being liable for half pilot-gress to pilot vessels coming in or going out of the age under a state law of the latter. The Glenearne, 7 Sawy. 200, 7 Fed. Rep. 604. The state of Oregon and the territory of Washington bave equal powers over the subject of pilots and pilotage on Columbia river, and either may appoint pilots for the river and prescribe their duties and compensation without reference to whether the business or commerce in which they are engaged pertains to Oregon or Washington, and neither can require that the legislation of the other shall conform to its own. The Alcalde, 30 Fed. Rep. 133. port of New York cannot sue for the pilotage fees under the New York pilot act of 1853, as amended by Laws 1854, chap. 196, and 1857, chap. 243, for retusal of the master of a vessel to accept the service of the pilot first offering, the right to recover thereunder being contined to pilots who have been duly licensed under that act. And the words "licensed pilots" in N. Y. Laws 1853, chap. 469, as amended by Laws 1857, chap. 243, regulating the pilotage of the port of New York, providing that certain designated vessels bound to or from the port of New York shall take a licensed Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 2d ed. chap. 2, p. 75: The Cybele, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 224, L. R. 3 Prob. Div. 8; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 226; United States v. Kirby, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 482, 19 L. ed. 278; The Winestead [1895] P. 170. that the legislature intended to exempt a vessel carrying a quantity of little value and small compared with her full tonnage. Goff, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: John S. Hebb, the appellee, filed a libel in It is an unreasonable construction to hold the district court of the United States for the pilot, or, in case of refusal pay pilotage as if one had been employed, to the pilot first offering his services, has been held to refer to pilots who derive their authority from the appointment of the commissioners established by that act, and not to include a New Jersey pilot whose services were offered and refused. Brown v. Elwell, 60 N. Y. 249. But while a state cannot pass laws excluding the duly qualified pilot of adjacent states on the same waters, she may impose such regulation as she deems conducive to the public welfare upon pilots licensed under her own laws. The William Law, 14 Fed. Rep. 792. And a state being sovereign and independent possesses inherent power over every resident citizen to declare what shall be considered a public grievance, provided such declaration does not conflict with the Constitution or any act of Congress passed within the scope of the constitutional power of Congress; and it may legally prohibit one of its citizens residing within its jurisdiction from holding and exercising a license as pilot granted by a sister state or any foreign power, so that fees for pilotage under such a license could not be recovered. Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 409. And a vessel refusing to take a pilot on waters which constitute a boundary between Delaware and Pennsylvania is liable under the Delaware statute for pilotage where he did not take a Pennsylvania pilot as authorized by the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, but went without a pilot. The Belle Hooper, 28 Fed. Rep. 928. and the laws of the United States, within the meaning of the organization act conferring legislative power upon the territory of Washington. The Alcalde, 30 Fed. Rep. 133; The Panama, Deady, 27. A vessel going out of a port situated on water constituting the boundary between Washington territory and Oregon, which refuses the services of the pilot which had brought her in, is not liable for half pilotage for such refusal under Oregon act of 1882, on the ground that the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, authorizing the employment of any pilot duly licensed by either state by a vessel coming in or going out of any port situated upon waters which are the boundary between two states does not apply as between a state and territory. Neil v. Wilson, 14 Or. 410. In that case, supra, The William Law, 14 Fed. Rep. 793, was distinguished upon the ground that in that case the vessel passed over no other territory than that within the jurisdiction of the state of Delaware; and The Glenearne, 7 Fed. Rep. 606, was distinguished upon the ground that the vessel in that case was on a voyage which involved the navigation of a river for a distance of 12 miles, which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state of Oregon. VII. Effect of Federal licenses and license laws. The act of Congress of 1852, with reference to pilots licensed by the United States, is applicable only to the class of pilots attached to particular vessels and charged with the duty of navigating them on the voyage, and does not supersede the authority of the states to regulate pilotage at their own ports for the protection of general commerce, and to require a vessel to take the first pilot offering his services. Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292. And the act of Congress of July 25, 1866, providing that every seagoing vessel subject to the navigation laws of the United States shall when under way, except upon the high seas, be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the inspect So, the provision of the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, that a vessel upon waters that are the bound. ary between two states may take a pilot from either, do not apply to a vessel bound on a voyage to Portland after passing the mouth of the Wallamet river involving the navigation of that river for a distance of 12 miles within the exclusive jurisdiction of Oregon; and an Oregon pilot offering his services to the vessel to conductor. of steam vessels, and the act of February 25, her from Astoria to Portland is entitled to half pilotage under the laws of Oregon, in case of a refusal of his services. The Glenearne, 7 Sawy. 200, 7 Fed. Rep. 604. 1867, amendatory thereof, providing that nothing in such acts shall be construed to annul or affect any regulations established by existing state laws, does not annul or abrogate state laws concerning pilots and pilotage in ports and harbors except so far as the latter may conflict or be incon And the rule that under the act of Congress of 1837 a state has no right to compel vessels passing up Delaware bay and bound to the port of Phila-sistent with the former, or prohibit a mere state delphia to accept any other pilot than those they see fit to elect does not apply so as to relieve a vessel from payment of compulsory pilotage to a pilot offering his services, where she was not bound to Philadelphia but to a breakwater for orders, so that the whole scope of her action was confined to Delaware waters. The William Law, 14 Fed. Rep. 792. The act of Congress of August 7, 1789, granting the power to states to pass pilot laws, includes territories, so as to authorize services on such waters by a pilot licensed by territorial legislation, and prevent a recovery for services tendered and re. fused by a pilot authorized under state legislation. The Panama, Deady, 27. And the territory of Washington is a state, and the Columbia river is the boundary between two states, within the meaning of the act of Congress of March 2, 1837. The Abercorn, 26 Fed. Rep. 877. And pilots and pilotage are rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution pilot from piloting a seagoing steamer in the port or elsewhere upon the navigable waters of the United States; if the pilot be licensed by the United States inspectors the act of Congress is satisfied and does not exclude the operation of state laws providing additional regulations upon the subject, and the master of such a vessel may, if he chooses, pilot her in or out, but he is bound notwithstanding to pay a pilot who first offers his services outside of the bar full pilotage, and, if bound out, half pilotage, under a state statute providing therefor. The George S. Wright, Deady, 591. And a duly licensed pilot who offered his services to a seagoing vessel, which were refused, cannot be deprived of his right to fees for pilotage on the ground that N. Y. act of 1853, chap. 467, p. 921, with the subsequent act amendatory thereof, was repealed by the act of Congress of July 25, 1866. Henderson v. Spofford, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 140. So, a pilot licensed by the United States inspectors under act of Congress July 25, 1866, is not a |