Department, granting a new trial after verdict The facts are stated in the opinion. At the time of the accident in question, the statutes of this state prescribed that each county might sue and be sued in the manner prescribed by law. 1 Birdseye's Rev. Stat. p. 730, § 1. not able to do it by its road work and tax. This case follows the late Indiana cases overruling the former cases, which held there was an implied liability on counties for injuries caused from defective bridges. This decision is in accord with the weight of authority. In the absence of a statute it is generally held that counties are not liable in an action for damages for injuries caused by bridges being out of repair, although in Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania a contrary rule prevails, as formerly in Indiana, and in some states a provision is made therefor by statute. The cases holding there is no implied liability are as follows: The leading case on liability of counties for negligence and tort held that the inhabitants of a county were not liable for an injury done to a wagon in consequence of a bridge being out of repair, which ought to have been repaired by the county. It held that no recovery could be had in the absence of a statute imposing liability, distinguishing the cases where a recovery was had under the statute of hue and cry, because in those cases there was a statutory remedy. It was further held that there could be no liability because there was no corporation fund out of which satisfaction could be made; also that the principle of law that where an individual sustains injury by neglect or default of another the law gives him remedy, must give way to the principle that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should sustain an inconvenience. Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 667. Police duties are always held to be public duties, performed for the benefit of the whole state, and neither counties nor municipalities, existing under special charters, are liable for acts of omission or commission in the matter of preserving order or confining offenders against the law. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 974, (772); Shearm. & Redf. Neg. § 260; Beach, Pub. Corp. § 745. Counties, and cities in states which recognize no distinction between the two are liable to action for private nuisance. Michel v. Monroe County Supers. 39 Hun, 47; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 31 Am. Dec. 157; Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio, 229, 51 Am. Dec. 453; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, though in truth "we believe there are none." It was also said: "It was much pressed that unless the words in question were allowed to have the operation contended for by the plaintiff, it was impossible to give them any at all. The court below felt the pressure of this argument, and attempted to meet it by one or two suppositions which do not entirely satisfy us. But this difficulty, even if it were greater than it appears to us, would not warrant us in giving such effect to these words as the plaintiff requires, creating a new liability clearly without the intention of the legislature, and working injustice at the same time. The judgment of the court below, therefore, will be affirmed.” Makinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457, affirming 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 509. In Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 340, it was said that "if a man have particular damage by a foundrous way, he is generally without remedy though the nuisance is to be punished by the King. The reason is, because a foundrous way, a decayed bridge, or the like, are commonly to be repaired by some township, vill, hamlet, or a county who are not corporate, and therefore no action lies against them for a particular damage, but their neglects are to be presented, and they punished by fine to the King. But if a particular person or body corporate be to repair a certain highway, or portion of it, or a bridge, and a man is endamaged particularly by the foundrousness of the way, or decay of the bridge, he may have his action against the person or body corporate, who ought to repair for his damage, because he can bring his action against them; but where there is no person against whom to bring his action, it is as if a man be damaged by one that cannot be known." So, a county was held not liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge on a public highway where there was no statute imposing liability, in Granger v. Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Barnett v. Contra Costa County, 67 Cal. 77; White v. Bond County, 58 Ill. 297, 11 Am. Rep. 65; Hedges v. Madi 704: Carter v. Wilds, 8 Houst. (Del.) 14: Brabham v, In an action against the inhabitants of a county for injuries caused by a defective bridge, naming the county surveyor as defendant, under 43 Geo. III., chap. 59, § 4, providing that the inhabitants of counties shall and may sue for any damages done to bridges and other works, and repair at the expense of such counties respectively, and for the "recovering" of any property belonging to such counties in the name of their surveyor, "and also shall and may be sued in the name of such survey-son County, 6 Ill. 567; Wheatly v. Mercer, 9 Bush, or,... but the surveyor for the time being shall be deemed the plaintiff or defendant in such action provided always, that every such surveyor shall always be reimbursed and paid out of the moneys in the hands of the treasurer of the public stock of such county. . . all such costs and charges as he shall be put unto," which statute was passed fifteen years after the decision of Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 667,-it was held at first that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, but the judg- | ment was arrested on the ground that the words "costs and charges” did not give a liability against the county by an action against the surveyor. It was said that it may be reasonably considered that the legislature supposed there were some cases where the county was liable at common law, and might have execution against it for the damages, In Clark v. Adair County, 79 Mo. 536, Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313, was distinguished, as in that case the county was the owner and proprietor of the property it was improving. And in Wood v. Tipton County, 7 Baxt. 112, 32 Am. Rep. 561, it was held that a county was not liable for failure to keep a county bridge in repair where there was no statute imposing such liability. It was said that a county was declared by statute to be a corporation, but this only meant in regard to contracts and the power to sue and be sued. And a county was not liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge. It was said that counties. 159, 36 Am. Dec. 82; Proprietors of Locks &| Canals v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 223; Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208. Counties, while they may be exempt for omission to perform public duties imposed upon them as such by the state, are liable for the private wrongs they commit against others to the same extent as private corporations. It is a ridiculous condition of the law if counties are properly liable for committing nuisances, for infringing patents, and for converting funds, and yet owe no duty to employees for which they can be held responsible. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 358, 23 Am. Rep. 332. are only quasi corporations created for the purpose of government, and their functions are political and adminstrative, and their powers are rather duties imposed than privileges granted, while cities are chartered for the private advantage of their citizens, and that some courts hold that counties are but political subdivisions of a state, and a suit would be in effect a suit against the state, but, whatever the distinction may be, cities are liable, but counties are not. Heigel v. Wichita County, 84 Tex. 392. And a county was not liable for injuries caused by defects in a bridge in the absence of any statute imposing such liability, as counties are only quasi corporations. Heigel v. Wichita County, 84 Tex. 392. So a county was not liable for injuries caused by a county bridge being out of repair. It was held that counties were not liable at common law for injuries caused in this manner, and the statute in force at the time of the alleged injury (1876) did not change the common-law rule. It was said that a county is not, in the proper sense of the word, a municipal corporation. Woods v. Colfax County Comrs. 10 Neb. 552. And a parish is not liable for private injuries caused by the ruinous condition of one of the parish bridges on a highway where there is no remedy given by statute. King v. Police Jury, 12 La. Ann. 858. In King v. Police Jury, 12 La. Ann. 858, the case of Houston v. Police Jury, 3 La. Ann. 566, was distinguished, as in the absence of a statute requiring a bridge to be built or to be kept in repair the liability is different from the liability of municipal corporations for the injurious acts of their agents done in the proper scope of their employment, which was the case in 3 La. Ann. 566. And a county is not liable for injuries occasioned through the negligence of county officers in the construction and repair of county bridges, there being a distinction between cities and counties, as the first are compact and have officers empowered to act promptly, while it is almost impossible for counties covering a large area to provide against defects in highways and bridges. El Paso County Comrs. v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474. In El Paso County Comrs. v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, it was said that an implied liability is recognized in Iowa, Maryland, Indiana, and Pennsylvania from the failure of county officers to perform a statutory duty, but the weight of authority is contra. And where a bridge was out of repair, but the delay in repairing was unavoidable, and the plaintiffs attempted to ford a creek, and lost his horse by drowning, the county was not liable. It was further held that if plaintiff attempted to cross a ford when it was apparent that it was dangerous, the defendants would not be liable for failure to give notice. The court said that it has not been usual, Where a county undertakes other matters than these public functions of government, for its own advantage or emolument, it loses its character as a public corporation, and it becomes liable in regard to those matters, to the same extent and in the same way as a private corporation. 1 Thomp. Neg. p. 618; 1 Shearm. & Redf. Neg. S$ 255-259; Wood, Mast. & S. §§ 462 et seq.; Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 543; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Perkins v. Lawrence, 136 Mass. 305; Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313; Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669; Oliver v. Worces ter, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 29, 17 Am. Rep. 178. nor is it necessary, to give notice when the streams are "up," and "besides, it would have been contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to venture to cross a stream so swollen." Jackson v. Greene County Comrs. 76 N. C. 282. So, the justices of a county were not liable for injuries caused by the breaking of a bridge which was admitted to be dangerous, and known to be so by the magistrates, who made a contract to have the same repaired as soon as they were aware of its condition, but the contractor had neglected to repair the same. It was said that the remedy for a bridge being out of repair is by mandamus, and that there was no liability created by any statute. Kinsey v. Jones County Magistrates, 8 Jones, L. 186. And a county was not liable for injuries caused by neglect in keeping a bridge in repair where there was no statutory liability, although the statute imposed on the boards of county commissioners the duty of keeping in repair the bridges. Bailey v. Laurence County, 5 S. D. 393. In Bailey v. Laurence County, 5 S. D. 393, it was said that counties are made corporations for civil and' political purposes, but with limited powers: and while it is true that the legislature has imposed upon them the duty of keeping in repair all bridges on public highways, and provided the method, yet to hold that counties are thereby liable for injuries caused by defects in bridges in the absence of legislation would be a species of judicial legislation. And where an action was brought against the supervisors of a county on a warrant issued for damages caused by the breaking of a bridge on a county road, which warrant had been refused payment, it was held that there was no liability under Cal. Code 1883, § 7, providing that all supervisors, or any officer, authorizing, auditing, or allowing any claim in violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be liable in person to the person damaged to the extent of his loss. It was held that neither the original holder of the warrant nor his assignee had any claim, as the warrant was invalid. Bank of Santa Cruz County v. Bartlett, 78 Cal. 301. And for injuries caused by failure to repair a bridge the county was not liable under Cal. act March 28, 1855, creating a board of supervisors and giving them the management and control of bridges, and act April 28, 1855, concerning roads and highways, and imposing upon the overseers of the county the duty of keeping bridges on public highways in repair. The remedy, if any, for injuries resulting from neglect to keep such bridges in repair is against the road overseers or supervisors personally. Huffman v. San Joaquin County, 21 Cal. 426. So, a county was not liable for injuries from a defective bridge in the absence of a statute, and it was held that Cal. Stat. 1875-76, p. 237, § 50, providing that a county is responsible for providing and keeping in good repair bridges, did not create any The defendant was conducting a private busi- | The factory law in force at the time of this ness in connection with the care of its own accident required manufacturing establishpauper insane. Under the authorities this ments to provide safe mechanical contrivances renders it liable to the same extent as a private for the purpose of throwing on and off belts or individual. pulleys. It also provided that machinery of every description in such manufactories shall be properly guarded. Neff v. Wellesley, 148 Mass. 493, 2 L. R. A. 500; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485; Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23; Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 172; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 285. There is no ground for claiming that the warden of this asylum was an independent officer, over whom the defendant had no control. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 974 (772); New York & B. Sawmill Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 584; Appleton v. New York Water Comrs. 2 Hill, 433; Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669. liability, as the act did not say the county shall be responsible in damages for the failure to keep the bridges in repair. Barnett v. Contra Costa County, 67 Cal. 77. And a county was not liable for injuries caused from a defective bridge on a highway, under Miss. Rev. Code, arts. 12-14, 17, 18, 21, providing that boards of county police are charged with the duty of making provisions for the building of bridges, making roads and keeping them in repair in their respective counties, and of dividing the public roads into convenient districts, and of appointing one overseer for each district. Sutton v. Carroll County Bd. of Police, 41 Miss. 236. In this case it was said that under Rev. Code, 600, art. 162, making it the duty of the overseer to keep the roads in his district in good repair, and Rev. Code, 178, art. 38, providing that the board of police shall contract for building and keeping in repair any bridge which the overseer of the road cannot conveniently make with the labor of the hands under his charge, the action would lie against the overseer or contractor. And the county of St. Louis was not liable for negligence in not keeping a bridge in repair upon a public road. Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555. This case was distinguished in Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313. So, where injuries were caused by the failure to keep a bridge in safe condition upon a public highway the county was not liable. It was also held that Mo. Const. art. 2, § 21, providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, did not apply. Pund. man v. St. Charles County, 110 Mo. 594. In Pundman v. St. Charles County, 110 Mo. 594, it was said that Chester County v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647, which held that a county was liable where the plaintiff's property was damaged by the erection of the abutments of a bridge some 14 feet above the grade of the street in front of his house, and which held that municipal corporations shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed by the construction of their highways or improvements, did not furnish any support to this action. And a county was not liable in damages for injuries caused by defects in a bridge arising from the neglect of the county to maintain it, under N. Y. Laws 1837, chap. 388, § 9, providing that in case a bridge of a certain chartered company shall be impassable for the term of fifteen days, or taken down for the purpose of being rebuilt, or if the same shall not be rebuilt within eighteen months, the bridge shall thereupon become a public bridge, and may be maintained at the expense of the county of L. Ensign v. Livingston County Supers. 25 Hun, 20. Laws 1890, chap. 398, § 12; Knisley v. Pratt, 75 Hun, 323; Cobb v. Welcher, 75 Hun, 283. Messrs. Parker, Drake, & Parker, for respondent: Counties are under no liability in respect of torts, except as imposed (expressly or by necessary implication) by statute. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 963; Addison, Torts, Banks & Bros.'s ed. p. 1298, § 1526; Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468; Ensign v. Livingston County Supers. Under N. Y. Laws 1892, chap. 686, declaring counties to be municipal corporations, an action could not be maintained for injuries caused by a defective bridge between two counties, as this statute did not change the liability of counties. Albrecht v. Queens County, 84 Hun, 399; Ahern v. Kings County, 89 Hun, 148. IN MARKEY V. QUEENS COUNTY, where plaintiff's intestate lost his life by a temporary bridge being out of repair while the bridge was being reconstructed between the counties of Queens and Kings, it was held that the board of supervisors were executing a certain public duty imposed upon them as the proper public agents in that particular civil division of the state, and that a county could not be subjected to a private action for injuries occurring in or by reason of the performance of the work. It was further held that N. Y. Laws 1892, chap. 686, providing that a county is a municipal corporation, and that an action to enforce any liability created or duty enjoined upon it or upon any of its officers or agents for which it is liable, or recover damages for any injuries to any property or rights for which it is liable, shall be in the name of the county, did not import any greater liability than that which already existed before the passage of the law. In Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, counties have been held liable for injuries caused to travelers by bridges being out of repair, under an implied liability, but in Indiana a long line of such cases has been now overruled. Indiana. In JASPER COUNTY COMRS. V. ALLMAN it was held that a county was not liable for damages caused by negligence of its officers in respect to keeping bridges in repair, in the absence of any statute imposing a liability. In this case all the previous cases in Indiana holding a county liable in such case were overruled, and it was held that counties are instrumentalities of the government, and exercise authority given by the state, and are no more liable for the acts or omissions of their officers than the state. So, following that case, it is held in Johnson County Comrs. v. Hemphill, 14 Ind. App. 219, Cowan v. Adams County Comrs. 142 Ind. 699, that a county is not liable for injuries caused by the defective condition of an approach to a bridge. Nor for negligence in permitting the county bridge to become out of repair. Montgomery County Comrs. v. Coffenberry, 14 Ind. App. 701. But in Park v. Adams County Comrs. 3 Ind. App. 536, under the previous holding of the courts in this state a county was liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of the contractor employed by the county to repair bridges, who failed to place 25 Hun, 20: Alamango v. Albany County, the negligence of its officers and agents, except Supers. 25 Hun, 551; Symonds v. Clay County in relation to a certain class of matters. Supers. 71 Ill. 355; Hollenbeck v. Winnebago County, 95 Ill. 155, 35 Am. Rep. 151; Hamilton County Comrs. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Summers v. Daviess County Comrs. 103 Ind. 262, 53 Am. Rep. 512; Downing v. Mason County, 87 Ky. 208; Dosdall v. Olmsted County, 30 Minn. 96, 44 Am. Rep. 185; Brubham v. Hinds County Supers. 54 Miss. 363, 28 Am. Rep. 352; Kincaid v. Hardin County, 53 Iowa, 430, 36 Am. Rep. 236; Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113, 81 Am. Dec. 151; Barnett v. Contra Costa County, 67 Cal. 77; Crowell v. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 313; Rear don v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555; Pundman v. St. Charles County, 110 Mo. 594. Even a municipal corporation proper, as a city created by special charter, is not liable for lights or barricades to warn travelers of the dan- | ger. And a county was held liable for negligent"omission to keep in a reasonably safe condition the bridges on the public highways. Morgan County Comrs. v. Pritchett, 85 Ind. 68; Pritchett v. Morgan County Comrs. 62 Ind. 210. And a county was held liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge, in the absence of express statutory liability, under 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1876, p. 239, providing that the board of county commissioners shall cause all bridges therein to be kept in repair. House v. Montgomery County Comrs. 60 Ind. 580, 28 Am. Rep. 657. In House v. Montgomery County Comrs. 60 Ind. 580, 28 Am. Rep. 657, Russell v. Devon County, 2 T. R. 667, was not followed; and it was said that Hamilton County Comrs. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, overruled Brown County Comrs. v. Butt, 2 Ohio, 348. In an action for injuries caused by the breaking down of a bridge from hauling a heavy load over it, evidence that if the bridge had been kept in good repair, as originally built, it would have sustained a much larger load, should have been admitted. Bonebrake v. Huntington County Comrs. 141 Ind. 62. In Fulton County Comrs. v. Rickel, 106 Ind. 501, it was said that counties are liable for negligence respecting county bridges. In State, Roundtree, v. Gibson County Comrs. 80 Ind. 478, 41 Am. Rep. 821, it was said that counties are liable for injuries received because of negligence in not making bridges safe for travel. Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; Ülrich v. St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138; Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468; Ham v. New York, 70 N. Y. 459; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495, 14 Am. Rep. 499; Calwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687, 33 Am. Rep. 154; Blake v. Pontiac, 49 Ill. App. 543; Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19, 2 Am. Rep. 368; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Toomey v. Albany, 38 N. Y. S. R. 91; Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87, 6 Am. Rep. 196; Pettingell v. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368, 24 L. R. A. 426; Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 12 L. R. A. 160; Finch v. Toledo Bd. of Edu. caused by negligently suffering a bridge to remain out of repair, although such action was not authorized expressly by statute; and the county could not escape liability by showing that the bridge had been built, repaired, and maintained by township officials alone, and had never been recognized as a county bridge by the commissioners, where it was erected upon and part of a public highway over which the board of commissioners had exclusive dominion. Vaught v. Johnson County Comrs. 101 Ind. 123. And a county was held liable in Gibson County Comrs. v. Emmerson, 95 Ind. 579, for negligence in not keeping a bridge in proper repair whereby a party was injured. It was held that 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1876, p. 239 (act. March 3, 1855, § 11), providing that the boards of commissioners of the respective counties shall cause all bridges to be kept in repair, continuing in force as Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2892, was not affected by act March 2, 1883, p. 62, providing that the supervisors of roads shall carry into effect all orders of the trustee of the township touching highways and bridges therein, and keep the same in good repair. And a county was liable for injuries caused through negligence of the county board in suffering a bridge to get out of repair, and this liability was not changed by the act of 1881, providing for the superintendent of roads, or by the act of 1883 in regard to counties. Patton v. Montgomery County Comrs. 96 Ind. 131. So, evidence of repairs made by the county on a bridge shortly after an accident was competent to show that the bridge was a county bridge, but not for the purpose of showing negligence. Shelby County Comrs. v. Blair, 8 Ind. App. 574. And a county was held liable, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2892, for injuries caused to plaintiff from defects in a bridge, where she and her hus- And where injuries were caused by negligence in band, a good and careful teamster, were driving. failing to keep a bridge on a public highway in reIt was further held that an allegation that the pair a county was held liable without regard to the bridge was on a public highway leading into a city, cost of the repairs. It was held that this liability at or near the city limits on the south side of the was not relieved by Ind. acts 1883, p. 68, amended city, showed that the bridge was not within the city, by acts 1885. p. 202, § 3, providing that if the proband that it was the duty of the county to keep it in able cost of constructing and repairing any bridge repairs. So it was held that Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, shall exceed $75, the township trustees of the § 2892, Rev. Stat. 1894, § 3282, providing that the town- township shall notify the board of commissioners ship superintendent shall place a warning against of the necessity of such bridge or culvert; and if, fast driving at the end of any bridge in his district in the opinion of the county commissioners, the whose chord is less than 25 feet, does not relieve the public convenience shall require the building or county from repairing a bridge which was less repairing of the same, they shall cause the same to than 25 feet. It was also held that the allegation be erected, and the township shall pay $75 of the that the bridge was constructed by the county cost. Sullivan County Comrs. v. Arnett, 116 Ind. avoided the presumption that it was a township | 438. bridge. Jackson County Comrs. v. Nichols, 139 Ind. 611. And where injuries were caused by negligence in constructing or maintaining a public bridge a And under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881 (Acts 1855, p. 18, county was liable, and it was not a defense to show § 11), providing that the board of commissioners of irregularities in the proceedings establishing the such county shall cause all bridges therein to be highway of which the bridge was a part. Knox kept in repair, a county was held liable for injuries | County Comrs. v. Montgomery, 109 Ind. 69. Ham v. New York, 70 N. Y. 459; Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506; Bamber v. Rochester, 26 Hun, 587; Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505, 8 L. R. A. 243. 30 Ohio St. 37, 27 Am. Rep. 414; Hill v. Bos- | a private person for negligence or not, the ton, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332; McKay county certainly cannot be liable therefor. v. Buffalo, 9 Hun, 401, Affirmed 74 N. Y. 619; Givens v. Faris, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 705; Whitfield v. Paris, 84 Tex. 432, 15 L. R. A. 783; Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505, 8 L. R. A. 243; Benton v. Boston City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13, 54 Am. Rep. 436. While municipal corporations proper may be liable in cases where counties would not be, still, neither can be held liable for negligence of its officers or agents in the execution of powers conferred for the public good. The officers are created by the statute, and the officers' powers and duties defined by the statute, and they are public officers, perform ing public duties by virtue of the statute, and in the performance of those duties are absolutely independent of the board of supervisors. Whether individually they would be liable to But a county was not liable for injuries caused from a defective bridge or culvert, where it was not shown over what the bridge spanned, or over what it constituted a passageway; and this was not cured by the averment that "the defendant in its corporate capacity had supervision over, and had control of, the structure." It was further held that the allegation that the plaintiff was without fault was not overcome by an averment that the plaintiff attempted to pass over the bridge with a steam threshing engine. Clark County Comrs. v. Brod, 3 Ind. App. 585. And where the bridge was within a city, formed one of its streets, and it was not shown that it belonged to the county, or that it was its duty to keep it in repair. Spicer v. Elkhart County Comrs. 126 Ind. 369. In Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196, it was said: "It bas often been held by this court that it is the duty of the counties in this state to keep their bridges in repair, and that they are liable in damages to those injured, without their fault, for a neglect of that duty. But the county is not liable for a failure to keep in repair bridges over which the board of commissioners has no control." In Shelby County Comrs. v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 509, it was said that a county was liable for injuries caused by defective approaches to bridges; but in this case the petition failed to show that the bridge was a part of a public highway. As to whether a county could be held liable for a bridge in a city was not decided. Where the question was as to notice of defects, a county was held liable for injuries caused by the negligent construction of a bridge, and it was no defense that the bridge had been safely used for thirteen years. Where it was shown that the bridge was negligently constructed so as to be unsafe, it was not necessary to allege that the county had notice of its condition. Wabash County Comrs. v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426. And in an action against a county for negligence in not keeping a county bridge in repair, it is not necessary to allege that the board of supervisors had notice of the condition of the bridge, and it is no defense that the bridge had been built and maintained by the township, and that they have sufficient means to keep it in repair, as it is the duty of the board of commissioners under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2892, and the act of March 2, 1883, did not relieve the county. Allen County Comrs. v. Bacon, 96 Ind. 31. So, a county was liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge where its proper officers did not exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the condition, and repairing the same. It was held that no The fact that the asylum received a small sum from the sale of surplus produce, etc., of its farm, is unimportant. Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505, 8 L. R. A. 243; Alamango v. Albany County Supers. 25 Hun, 551; People, Society of New York Hospital, v. Purdy, 126 N. Y. 679. The fact that the plaintiff was an employee at the asylum when she was injured does not affect the question of the county's liability. Pettingell v. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368, 24 L. R. A. 426. It is of no materiality whether in fact the asylum derived some slight revenue from paytice might be inferred where defects existed for such length of time that the county by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the same. Howard County Comrs. v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479. So, a county was liable for the breaking down of a bridge, where it had been built for seven or eight years, and the county had been petitioned to erect a new bridge, the present one being unsafe, the timbers having been placed upon the ground and rotted. The duration of time and manner of structure was held to be notice to the county of its dangerous character. Bonebrake v. Huntington County Comrs. 141 Ind. 62. And where the county not only negligently used unfit and unsafe material, but during eight years of use and exposure to the elements made no inspection of it, and the defects were of such a character as to be easily discernible on inspection it was held liable. Allen County Comrs. v. Creviston, 133 Ind. 39. So, a county was liable for injuries caused by negligence in not keeping a county bridge in repair. It was held that notice, express or implied, on the part of the county should be shown in order to recover for failure to repair. It was said that a county adopting a bridge erected by others would be bound to the same extent as though it originally constructed it; but that if it was a township bridge the county would not be liable. Howard County Comrs. v. Legg, 93 Ind. 523, 47 Am. Rep. 390. And a county was liable for injuries caused by failure to keep a bridge in repair, where a horse was frightened by a crooked log placed at the corner of the bridge to keep the earth from washing away, and there was no railing, and it was shown that two members of the county board had crossed the bridge some months before, but had not noticed that there was no railing. It was further held that Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2892, requiring county boards to keep bridges on public highways in repair, was not repealed by act of 1885, and that the duty resting on the county board to repair bridges applied to approaches and railings where the same were needed to make a bridge reasonably safe for travel by those who exercised ordinary care. Sullivan County Comrs. v. Sisson, 2 Ind. App. 311. Where a county was held liable for injuries from a defective bridge it was further held that it was no defense to show that the plaintiff was driving in the dark. Jackson County Comrs. v. Nichols, 139 Ind. 611. And where a recovery was had for injuries caused by a bridge being out of repair, and the verdict was that "had the timber in said bridge been sound the same would have carried said load over safely," and the verdict did not show that the |