extent than the value fixed by the stat- | tiff retained the respondent's railroad ties in ute for catching and preserving the ties; that said Hughes river; and charging that no boom he had preserved said ties in his boom at could be maintained in said Hughes river durhis own cost and expense; that the said ties ing the year 1892 and 1893, at any point in filled plaintiff's boom, and, by reason of the said Hughes river, or in said Little Kanawha plaintiff's preserving the ties of defendant, he river, because the same was not allowed by the was totally unable to take care of his own ties, laws of the state of West Virginia; and denywhich were too numerous to preserve after ing that the plaintiff was or could be the owner said boom was filled with the ties of said de- of any boom near the mouth of Hughes river, fendant, and plaintiff was put to great cost and in Wirt county, West Virginia, for catching expense in securing his own ties, which drifted timber and railroad ties which might be driftout into the Little Kanawha and Ohio rivers, ing in said Hughes river; and denying that which would not have been the case had plain- plaintiff caught in any boom any railroad crosstiff not caught and preserved the ties of said ties belonging to respondent and drifting in defendant, all of which the said defendant said Hughes river near the mouth of the Little well knew at the time he took possession of the Kanawha or elsewhere; and denying that ties from plaintiff's boom, and refused to pay the plaintiff had any right to catch, in any plaintiff the compensation fixed by statute; boom in said Hughes river, any cross-ties or that he filed an affidavit, and caused an order timber or property, belonging to respondent, of attachment to be issued from the clerk's drifting in said Hughes river, at any point, office of the said court of Wood county, and in any boom; and denying that plaintiff was by virtue of said attachment the sheriff of entitled to receive from him anything for Wood county had levied upon and attached a illegally obstructing the floating and passage barge of ties, containing about 200, as the of any of his railroad cross-ties or timber down property of said Hare, which was then in said Hughes river; and especially denying possession of the sheriff; and that a copy of that the plaintiff was entitled to receive or said order of attachment was also sent to the recover from respondent 6 cents for each and sheriff or any constable of Wirt county, which every tie caught and preserved by him in was levied also upon a lot of ties in Wirt any such boom that may have been so atcounty, and the same were in the possession tempted to have been maintained by plaintiff of the officer levying it; and he filed as ex-in Hughes river illegally; and charging that hibits the affidavit and order for the attach- plaintiff did not preserve respondent's ties, but ment. And further charging that the defend-threw the same out of the boom when found ant was indebted to him in the sum of $230 for a lot of rope which plaintiff furnished to said defendant to be used by him in securing the timber, ties, and logs, in Hughes river, one coil of which rope said defendant used, and one coil was delivered by plaintiff at the barn of Col. Enoch, near Greenville, and defendant notified that said rope was there subject to his orders upon payment of the cost thereof, and that said defendant had failed to pay for said rope, and that the plaintiff was justly entitled to recover the value thereof; and charging that he was justly entitled to recover from the defendant, for catching and securing the railroad ties, the sum of $570, and for the rope furnished to the said defendant the sum of $230, making in all the sum of $800; that he was remediless in the premises, save in a court of equity, where matters of the kind are properly cognizable; and prayed that he might have a decree against the defendant for the sum of $800, and for the sale of said cross-ties attached in the counties of Wood and Wirt, and out of the proceeds that the costs might be paid, and expenses of levying upon and attaching said cross-ties, and preserving the same in the hands of the sheriff, and for the payment of his claim and interest, and for general relief. Defendant filed a general demurrer to the bill, and, without waiving his demurrer, filed his answer, denying that the Hughes river is any part of the Little Kanawha river, and averring that it is a separate and distinct river, and so recognized in the history and geographical surveys and delineations on the maps of the state of West Virginia, etc.; and admitting the truth of the allegation that in the fall of 1892 and spring of 1893 there was no boom in use for the catching of timber drifting in said Hughes river below the point where the plain by the plaintiff, and denying that he was indebted to the plaintiff in any such sum as $230 for rope furnished to respondent by plaintiff, but that it is true that respondent did receive and use one coil of rope, worth, including freight, $77; and denying that there was any coil, delivered by plaintiff at the barn of Col. Enoch, near Greenville," or, at least, if it was placed there, it was not delivered to respondent; and denying that respondent was notified that said rope was there subject to his order, upon payment of the costs thereof, and denying any liability to pay for any rope so delivered at Col. Enoch's, or that plaintiff was entitled to recover anything on account of same against him; alleging that, in the spring of 1893, respondent and Miller were running and drifting cross-ties in said Hughes river, and plaintiff proposed to respondent that he (plaintiff) would get a lot of rope, and put some rafts across the Little Kanawha below the mouth of Hughes river, to catch plaintiff's and respondent's property jointly, as it should come out of Hughes river; that at the time said river had been lately frozen over and the ice had broken up, and the object was to hold the ice and the stuff that was in it; that in addition to plaintiff and respondent, the Parkersburg Mill Company and William Richardson, all of whom had property, or were interested in property, that floated in said Hughes river, or bound up in said ice, were to bear their share of the expense of putting in three rafts; that to such proposition respondent acceded, but that plaintiff failed to and did not put in such rafts, and did not stop any such property of respondent, and then afterwards set up a claim that respondent should pay for the coil of rope which plaintiff had gotten, but not used, but respondent had nothing to do with getting such rope, and denying that he was in any | tained the cross-ties and property of this reway liable to pay anything therefor; and aver-spondent to a large amount; that respondent, ring that, by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to place and secure such rafts across said Little Kanawha river, respondent lost railroad ties that floated out with the ice into the Little Kanawha and Ohio rivers to a large amount, at least the sum of $5,000, which sum of $5,000 respondent had a right to and claims, and also seeks and asks to recoup and have set off against the plaintiff's claim set up in said bill for said rope as well as for catching said cross-ties; and averring that the $77 had been settled and adjusted and by accord satisfied prior to the institution of this suit; denying that plaintiff was justly entitled to recover from defendant for catching and securing said railroad ties the sum of $570, and for the rope furnished the sum of $230, making in all the sum of $800, as charged in said bill, or that he was indebted to the plaintiff in any sum whatever, but charging that, upon a just and fair settlement, plaintiff was indebted to respond ent, because that about the 29th of April, 1893, respondent caught 2,500 railroad cross-ties drifting in Hughes river belonging to plaintiff, and secured same, and cared for and preserved them, and delivered them to plain tiff, for which respondent was entitled to recover a fair and reasonable compensation, as provided by law; that he preserved and cared for same from about April 29 to about July 1, 1893, and that a reasonable compensation therefor should be fixed and ascertained by the court; and further charging that, during the fall of 1892 and spring of 1893, the plaintiff undertook to establish a boom in said Hughes river, as he calls it, and went on and placed obstructions in said river, and kept the same there during the fall of 1892, and up to the time of the bringing of this suit and the filing of the answer; that said Hughes river, at the point where the plaintiff was attempting to maintain said boom and obstruction, was and is a navigable river and was and is used a great deal then and now by the citizens of West Virginia, and people and public doing timber business thereon, for the transportation, floating, driving, drifting of timber, cross-ties, etc., along and upon the waters of said Hughes river, as they had a right then and now to do without hindrance: that at the point where said boom was so established, and for at least a distance of about a mile above that in said Hughes river, the said river is and was then navigable for steamboats and other crafts, rafts, etc., at all times when said Little Kanawha is and was navigable for such crafts, rafts, boats, etc., and at all times except during ordinary low water; that said obstruction so called a "boom" by said plaintiff was then and is now without any legal authority or right whatsoever, and is in violation of law and the rights of this respondent, and of the citizens of the United States, of the public in general, and especially of the citizens of the state of West Virginia, and then and now constituted a nuisance under the law; and said boom was by plaintiff so constructed that there was no provision for timber, cross-ties, or property of respondent or anybody else to pass through or beyond said obstruction or boom so placed there by plaintiff, and in consequence it de through his agents and employees, went and took possession of his cross-ties so wrongfully detained by plaintiff, and loaded them into barges, and about the month of June, and just prior to the institution of this suit, moved the barges into which respondent's said cross-ties were so loaded; that plaintiff took out an attachment against respondent before H. J. Fought, justice of the peace of Wirt county, claiming and swearing that he was entitled to. recover from respondent $300, but, before the same could be tried, plaintiff dismissed that action, and then brought this suit, and swore he was entitled to recover $800, and denying the plaintiff's right to recover anything, or his right to issue any writ of attachment; that respondent has given bond and taken possession of his property, and is entitled to recover from the plaintiff a reasonable compensation for catching, securing, preserving, and delivering to plaintiff said 2,500 ties, and to decree therefor, together with his costs in this suit, and praying for affirmative and for general relief; to which answer plaintiff replied generally. On the 29th of August, 1895, the cause was heard upon process executed, affidavit and attachment issued and levied upon the bill filed, and proceedings had at rules, the demurrer and answer of defendant, general replication to the answer, the issue on demurrer, and the depositions of all the witnesses, taken both for plaintiff and defendant; whereupon the court overruled the demurrer, and found that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable compensation for catching and preserving defendant's ties, and sustained the attachment issued in the cause, but held that, before a final decree could be executed in the cause, it should be referred to one of the commissioners of the court to take, state, and report an account between the plaintiff and defendant. The cause was accordingly referred to W. W. Jackson, commissioner, with directions, after first giv ing reasonable notice to the parties, to make, state, and report an account between plaintiff and defendant, as follows: "First, as to the amount the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff on account of the lines or ropes mentioned in the bill, alleged to have been purchased by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the Parkersburg Mill Company, if any, the costs of said ropes, and the amount to be charged to the defendant; second, the number of railroad ties, belonging to the defendant, collected in plaintiff's boom, and received by the defendant, and what would be a just compensation for catching and preserv ing said railroad ties, and the amount to which the plaintiff would be entitled for such service; third, the amount of payments or offsets to which the defendant may be entitled, under the pleadings in this cause, if any." On the 19th of November, 1895, Commissioner Jackson filed his report in the cause, in substance as follows: "Your commissioner reports that the evidence submitted to him by plaintiff and defendant was very conflicting, and that a large amount of such evidence was irrelevant, and totally foreign to the matters under consideration. Your commissioner reports that no evidence was produced before The defendant, John A. Hare, excepted to the report: "First, because the same is not supported by the evidence before the commissioner and before the court; second, because said report is contrary to the evidence in the cause before said commissioner; third, because the commissioner has erred in allowing the plaintiff, D. M. Miller, $230 for rope, when the evidence shows that no rope was ever delivered to the defendant, nor was any ever delivered at any place agreed upon between the plaintiff and defendant for delivery; fourth, because the commissioner erred in allowing the plaintiff two and a half cents (24) per tie as just compensation for catching and preserving railroad ties in controversy, making a total of $270.50 due from the defendant to the plaintiff on account of catching and preserving such railroad ties, and because plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything, as set up in the answer filed in this cause, and said finding is contrary to the weight of evidence; and, fifth, because of errors and insufficiencies appearing upon the face of said report." And on the 2d of December, 1895, the cause was heard upon the papers formerly read, and the orders made therein, upon the order of reference and report of Commissioner Jackson made thereunder, and the exceptions taken by defendant to said report, and the exceptions set down for argument, and was argued by counsel; whereupon the court overruled the several exceptions of the said defendant to said report, and confirmed the report of Commissioner Jackson, and decreed that plaintiff recover from defendant, John A. Hare, $472.27, the amount ascertained by the commissioner to be due from defendant to plaintiff, with interest from September 13, 1895, until paid, and the costs of suit, from which decree this appeal is taken. him except the depositions already filed in the case." In response to the first inquiry, he says: "Your commissioner finds that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff on account of the lines or ropes mentioned in the bill, alleged to have been purchased by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant, in the sum of $230. Your commissioner has been unable to report exactly the cost of the ropes purchased for the use of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the Parkersburg Mill Company, but, on the testimony of S. L. Gould, fixes the cost price of said ropes at $797.80. Of this rope the mill company took two fifths, leaving the remaining three fifths to be divided equally, as ascertained by the commissioner, between the plaintiff and the defendant, both plaintiff and defendant being liable for the payment of one half of said three-fifths part set aside to them. While this would exceed the amount claimed in the plaintiff's bill, owing to the uncertainty of the evidence, your commissioner has taken the amount as set out in the plaintiff's bill, and fixed the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff on account of said ropes as $230." And to the second inquiry: "As to the number of railroad ties belonging to the defendant collected in plaintiff's boom and received by the defendant, the testimony is extremely conflicting, and the witnesses, all with the exception of the defendant, give estimates in guesses as to the amount, no person seeming to have actually counted the number of ties so collected. The defendant testifies that there were 6,700 ties in the boom, and that prior to that rise he had loaded 3,000 ties out of Miller's boom, making 9,700 in all. Your commissioner finds that the amount of ties claimed in the plaintiff's bill to have been caught for the defendant was 9,500. Your commissioner, therefore, fixes the number of ties collected in the plaintiff's boom, and received by the defendant, at 9,500. Upon the question of a just compensation for catching and preserving said railroad ties, and the amount to which the plaintiff would be entitled for such services, your commissioner reports that the evidence varies from one half a cent to six cents a tie, but that the amount of six cents per tie seems, from the evidence, to have been paid almost if not exclusively upon the Little Kanawha river, the evidence show-preserving certain ties of and for the defending that the amount paid upon the Hughes river, when caught in booms, ranged from one half a cent to three cents. Your commissioner, after carefully considering the evidence has reached the conclusion that a just compensation for catching and preserving said railroad ties would be two and a half cents for each tie, making a total of $237 due from the defendant to the plaintiff on account of catching and preserving said railroad ties." And to the third inquiry he says: "Under this head your commissioner reports that, after a careful consideration of the evidence, he is of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to no setoff or payment against the plaintiff's claim. ... Second, that the court erred in overruling the Your commissioner further reports that there exceptions to the report of Commissioner W. is due, as ascertained by him, from the defend- W. Jackson in the cause, certified as of Septemant, John A. Hare, to the plaintiff, D. M. Mil-ber 28, 1895, because the same is not supported ler, on account of rope, $230; on account of compensation for catching and preserving ties, $237.50,-making a total of $467.50 due from the defendant to the plaintiff." The first assignment of error is the overruling of the demurrer to plaintiff's bill. The demurrer filed is a general demurrer to the whole bill, and sets out no grounds other than that "the same is not sufficient in law." The bill alleges indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff in the sum of $230 for rope sold by plaintiff to defendant and furnished to him, and also in the sum of $570 for catching and ant. In his brief the counsel for defendant argues that the demurrer should have been sustained by reason of the plain and wilful violation of the statute law of the state of West Virginia in maintaining a boom on a navigable stream by the plaintiff, where no such boom was permitted under the law, in which boom defendant's ties were unlawfully caught, and for which plaintiff has charged defendant, and seeks to recover from him such charges in this suit. The reasons assigned for sustaining the demurrer do not apply to the whole bill. The demurrer is too extensive and was properly overruled. by the evidence before the commissioner and before the court, and for other reasons set forth in the exceptions to said report filed by John A. Hare, by his attorney, L. N. Tavenner. A care ful examination of the evidence shows that the third exception to Commissioner Jackson's report is well taken, as to the allowance to plaintiff, Miller, of $230 for rope. This allow ance should have been $77, and not $230. Defendant admits getting the half coil of rope at $77, and the fact is proved also by other wit-prevent free passage of any ties, timber, etc., nesses. It is true, it is shown by the testimony of B. S. Pope that the $77 was credited to plaintiff, Miller, in his account with Pope & Sons, and charged to defendant, Hare; but it is also shown by the testimony of B. S. Pope that it was again credited back to Hare, and charged back to Miller, so that Hare has never paid it. The evidence fails to prove that defendant, Hare, ever purchased, or contracted to purchase, or received, or agreed to receive, any more of the rope than the half coil, for which he says himself he should pay to Miller $77. There was considerable testimony taken concerning the purchase of the rope, and of interviews between plaintiff, Miller, and Hare, and between Miller and Pope, and representatives of the Parkersburg Mill Company, about its purchase. Miller says he and Hare were consulting about the matter of getting the line to hold the gorge, ice, timber, and ties, and save the stuff, when Hare says, "Let's go up and see Pope, and see what he thinks of it, and, if he is in favor of it, we will do so;" that they went to Pope's office, in the city of Parkersburg, "and there consulted about the matter between us three, and the agreement was made there to order ten coils-half coils-of two-inch line, and take them there, and if it was a favorable thaw, and we thought it could be held by erecting a boom below it, and putting them out, why we were to do it, each one paying for one third of the line, the Parkersburg Mill Co., one third; myself, one third; and John A. Hare, one third." Hare in his testimony says emphatically there was no such contract, and he is corroborated by the testimony of Pope, who was the third party present when the contract was alleged to have been made. Third assignment: "The court erred in confirming the said commissioner's report, and decreeing against the appellant, John A. Hare, the sum of $472.27, with interest and costs of suit." This is correct to the extent of the difference between $230 allowed in the report for rope, and $77, the amount which should have been allowed. Fourth assignment: "The court erred in not dismissing the plaintiff's bill after the proofs were in, showing that the plaintiff, D. M. Miller, had in his own wrong erected a boom across Hughes river, which was a navigable stream, and then being navigated by steamboats plying the waters of the Little Kanawha river; thereby not only obstructing navigation, but preventing, by his wrongful and illegal act, the ties and timber of the appellant from passing out of said stream into the Little Kanawha river, and at the same time obstructing and hindering navigation of said river, and preventing its free use by the pubA careful review of all the testimony shows that plaintiff, Miller, maintained a boom in Hughes river from 100 to 200 yards from its mouth, and that defendant, Hare, had a boom about a mile to a mile and a half above Mil lic." ler's, on the same river. These booms were both constructed and maintained for the purpose of catching ties, timber, etc., to keep it from passing out into the Little Kanawha river, and thence into the Ohio; that there was no boom below that of plaintiff, Miller, to which passed his boom, into the Little Kanawha river; that ties, etc., passing into the Little Kanawha were liable to be lost entirely to the owners, and, if caught on the Little Kanawha or Ohio river, the expense of recovering the same was much greater than if caught in the said booms. Defendant, Hare, in his testimony, says that "in January, 1893, the river broke up, and the ice destroyed Mr. Miller's sheer boom, and a portion of my side boom, and I took my sheer boom and what side boom I had and coupled it onto his [Miller's], and we used the boom jointly for a short time for catching our ties;" that Mr. Miller rebuilt his sheer boom, and witness Hare then moved his back to the place where he formerly had it; as he expressed it, "That is, what I had left of it." "about a mile, or a mile and a half, or something like that, above Mr. Miller's." The "wild rise,' as witness Hare designated it, came in April, 1893, when plaintiff caught most of the ties of defendaut, Hare, for which he has charged him in this suit. From Hare's testimony it appears that several thousand ties on this rise passed out into the Little Kanawha river, and Hare himself says that his recollection is that it cost 11 cents per tie to have such ties gathered up and delivered in boat. Several witnesses were examined as to the cost and proper amount to be paid for catching the ties, and it ranges all the way from one half cent per tie to six cents. William Richardson testifies very intelligently, and from large experience in the business, and he fixes a reasonable compensation at 3 cents per tie for catching and preserving defendant's ties as was done by plaintiff. So I conclude that the amount arrived at by the commissioner, to wit, 2 cents per tie, was not unreasonable. And Hare admits that plaintiff caught and saved to him about 9,700 ties. The evidence further shows that the catching of plaintiff's ties by defendant in his boom above plaintiff's boom was of no advantage to plaintiff, but a disadvantage, and that defendant, as well as his agents and employees, was notified by plaintiff not to catch his ties. After acquiescing, and even assisting, as defendant did, in the maintenance of plaintiff's boom, and receiving the benefits thereof in the saving of large numbers of his ties, at an expense far less than it must have cost to save them if they had been permitted to pass out of Hughes river into the Little Kanawha, he cannot, in a court of equity, be heard to say that the boom was constructed and maintained in violation of law, and that the same was a public nuisance, interfering with steamboat navigation, and therefore he should not be required to pay a just and reasonable compensation for a valuable service rendered him. It is shown by the evidence that the boom of plaintiff was not a private nuisance, but of great value and benefit to individuals engaged in driving and running ties, timber, etc., in Hughes river, and that it was especially so to defendant, Hare. In Page v. Mille Lacs Lumber Co. 53 Minn. 499, 501, cited by appellant, the court says "that a nuisance, such as an unreasonable or wanton obstruction of a navigable stream, a public highway, may be public in its general effect upon the public, and at the same time private as to those individuals who suffer a special and particular damage therefrom, distinct and apart from the common injury. . . . The public wrong inflicted upon all persons must be redressed by a public prosecution." If appellee's boom was erected and maintained, as claimed by appellant, in violation of law, and was therefore a public nuisance, the way to get rid of it was by a public prosecution, and appellant, Hare, had no cause of complaint as an individual, aside from that of the common public, unless he "suffered a special and peculiar damage therefrom distinct and apart from the cate or basis of evidence of all such incidental facts and circumstances of omission and commission as fairly tend to establish the negligence of the primary act; and to plead them specially would be to plead mere evidence instead of facts. 2. Where a declaration based on negligence states a particular act as the cause of the damage, no evidence of other acts causing it can be given. 3. There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where a thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. common injury." Aldrich v. Wetmore, 52 ERE Minn. 164; Williams's Case, 5 Coke, 72a; Brakken v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 29 Minn. 41. Not only is this not appellant's case, but it is shown that the boom was of peculiar benefit to him, not only saving him large expense, but from considerable probable loss. The appellant's ties were drifting on the Hughes river, and were secured by appellee, and taken from his possession by appellant without having paid the just compensation for catching and preserving the same, as provided in 7, chap. 61, Code, to the person taking them up. Appellee is entitled to recover the same in this suit. The decree is affirmed as to the amount allowed for catching and preserving the ties, and is reversed as to amount found for rope, which should be $77; and, this court proceeding to render such decree as the circuit court should have rendered, it is adjudged, ordered, and decreed that plaintiff recover against the defendant the sum of $317.30, with legal interest thereon from December 2, 1895, until paid, and his costs by him expended about his suit in the circuit court, including $15, as allowed by law, and that he have execution therefor. (November 10, 1897.) RROR to the Circuit Court for Ohio County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for alleged negligent killing of plaintiff's intestate. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. W. P. Hubbard, for plaintiff in error: The declaration seems insufficient. It must set forth the duty which has been neglected, and aver the neglect. Poling v. Ohio River R. Co. 38 W. Va. 645, 24 L. R. A. 215; Clarke v. Ohio River R. Co. 39 W. Va. 732. It was error to permit the plaintiff to give in evidence a supposed act of negligence which had not been averred in the declaration, to permit the jury to consider it, and, worst of all, to tell the jury that a recovery might be had on such a matter. Hawker v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 15 W. Va. 628, 36 Am. Rep. 825. In this case, as in Fisher v. West Virginia & P.R. Co. 39 W. Va. 367, 23 L. R. A. 758, and (on second writ of error) 42 W. Va. 183, 33 L. R. A. 69, the proximate cause of the injury was plaintiff's "own obstinate and perverse conduct in refusing to obey the reasonable" warnings of bystanders; "in voluntarily subjecting himself to the influence of liquor, and Florence SNYDER, Admrx., etc., of Andrew in needlessly and negligently assuming the C. Snyder, Deceased, v. WHEELING ELECTRICAL COMPANY, *1. A declaration for tort arising from negligence may allege the mere negligence generally, without stating the particular facts going to prove negligence, but must specify with reasonable certainty the main or primary act of omission or commission doing the damage; and the allegation that the defendant did the particular act causing the damage furnishes the predi*Headnotes by BRANNON, J. dangerous position.' Harris v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 37 Minn. 47; Gerity v. Haley, 29 W. Va. 98; Butcher v. West Virginia & P. R. Co. 37 W. Va. 180, 18 L. R. A. 519. The fact that the defendant has been guilty of negligence followed by an accident does not make him liable for the resulting injury, unless that was occasioned by the negligence. The connection of cause and effect must be established. And the defendant's breach of duty, and not merely his act, must be the cause of the plaintiff's damage. 1 Shearm. & Redf. Neg. § 25; Butcher v. West Virginia & P. R. Co. 37 W. Va 190, 18 L. R. A. 519; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. NOTE. AS to the presumption of negligence | R. Co. v. Owings (Ga.) 33 L. R. A. 798; Willey v. from the occurrence of accidents, see note to Barnowski v. Helson (Mich.) 15 L. R. A. 33. As to liability for electric wires in highways, see note to Denver Consol. Electric Co. v. Simpson (Colo.) 31 L. R. A. 566; also Atlantic Consol. Street Boston Electric Light Co. (Mass.) 37 L. R. A. 723; |