not to keep bridges in repair. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2888 (Rev. Stat. § 1894, § 3278). When the board is not in session, no one is or can be authorized, as the law now stands, to represent or act for or bind the county in keeping bridges in repair, or in contracting for the repair of the same. Driftwood Valley Turnp. Co. v. Bartholomew County Comrs. 72 Ind., on pages 239, 240; Potts v. Henderson, 2 Ind. 327; People v. St. Clair County Officers, 15 Mich. 85. So that, if the board of commissioners had the power to appropriate the county funds to pay for the expense of repairing bridges in all cases, without any limitations or conditions whatever, they could not exercise that power when not in session; and, as neither they nor anyone representing or acting for the county can call them in special session, most certainly it could not be said, even in that case, with all the powers named, that they had been given the power or provided with the means and instrumentalities necessary to keep the bridges of the county in repair, unless they also, at least, had the power to meet as a board at any time of their own volition. The authority of the board of commission ers, acting as a board of turnpike directors, in respect to free gravel roads, is much more like officers. Hutchison v. Pulaski County, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 117. the power cities have in regard to streets than is that of the board of commissioners in regard to bridges; and there is therefore much greater reason for holding that the doctrine of implied liability applies to counties with reference to free gravel roads than with respect to bridges. The board of commissioners is by statute constituted a board of turnpike directors, having exclusive management and control of the free gravel roads of the county. The board is required to divide the county into three districts, as nearly equal in number of miles of free gravel road as practicable; and each member is given personal control and supervision over one of such districts, and has the power to keep the same in repair, subject to the rules and regulations of the board. The board fixes the time of its meetings, and is empowered to appoint persons to superintend the work of repairs, and let contracts therefor,-contract for, or condemn and take material for, the repair of such roads, and issue certificates therefor; to cause to be levied and collected taxes to pay for the expense of keeping such roads in repair. These powers have been changed to some extent by the amendment of 1895. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 6868-6875, 6912, 6933, 6935, 6950, 6958; Acts 1895, p. 363. Yet, as we have seen, thoroughfare through plaintiff's property without making any compensation, which was an action for damages, and for injunction, it was held that under Cal. act March 20, 1855, providing that no An action would not lie against a county for damages sustained by a turnpike company in laying off a shun-pike public road, a nuisance to plain-person shall sue a county in any case unless his tiff's rights, the use of which was enjoined. Tenn. Code, § 403, providing that suits may be maintained against a county for any just claim, as against other corporations, did not create any liability, but simply provided the remedy if a liability existed. White's Creek Turnp. Co. v. Davidson County, 14 Lea, 73. In White's Creek Turnp. Co. v. Davidson County, 14 Lea, 73, it was said that the intimation in Franklin & C. Turnp. Co. v. Maury County Ct. 8 Humph. 355, that an action would lie against a county court in case of a shun-pike, was only a dictum. In Franklin C. Turnp. Co. v. Maury County 8 Humph. 342, which was an action for an injunction against a shun-pike, it was said that the county would be liable in damages for an action on the case on the part of the corporation. claim has been first presented to the board of supervisors, an action did not lie. It was further held that the claim for damages could not be joined to a bill for injunction. It was said that under the Constitution of California providing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, an injunction might be granted. McCann v. Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121. d. By ditches, canals, and dams. In SCHUSSLER V. HENNEPIN COUNTY COMRS. where the county, by erecting a dam in a lake, deCt.stroyed the use of a mill, and pleaded that its acts were lawful under a power given by a special statute, and the attorney for the county claimed the act was unconstitutional, and that the acts complained of were ultra vires, but the board of commissioners upheld and ratified the acts from which the injury arose, the court declined to pass upon the unconstitutionality of the act, but based the opinion upon the concession of the defendant's counsel, and the county was held liable. The court says: "If valuable property rights can thus be taken, destroyed, diverted, and injured without compensation, there will be but little safety in the private ownership of property," and held that the county was liable where it had adopted, assumed, and ratified the act complained of, and granted a mandatory injunction lowering the dam, and a judgment for damages already accrued. This case can be sustained on the theory of liability for taking property without due compensation. But where a county claimed that a road had been opened through private property by prescription and use for forty years, and endeavored by the county records to make it of record a public road, and one of the board of supervisors committed trespass in tearing down plaintiff's gate and endeavoring to maintain a road, and the board of supervisors impliedly recognized his actions and approved them by afterwards at his instance declaring such road to be public, an injunction was granted against further trespass, and the county was held liable for damages. Coburn v. San Mateo County, 75 Fed. Rep. 520. In this case the defendant denied that it had ever ratified the trespass, and the court held that it had, and in its opinion quotes the doctrine from another case that property cannot be taken without compensation, but the judgment is really for enjoining further trespass and for damages. An injunction was granted against the opening of a road through plaintiff's property by the county, where no proceedings were taken to condemn the same. Cummings v. Kendall County, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 164. In an action against a county for injury caused by the board of supervisors running a street or It is generally held that counties are not liable for damages to real property caused by ditches affecting adjoining property. A county was not liable for damages from a ditch which had been abandoned and become a nuisance and caused overflow of plaintiff's land, which ditch was constructed under Iowa Code, § 1207, authorizing the construction of ditches whenever the same will be conducive to the public health and convenience or welfare. It was said that a county was not liable for negligently constructing or failing he was supervisor. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 6838. this court held in Cones v. Benton County | are for the benefit of the road district for which Comrs. 137 Ind. 404, and we think correctly,— that there is no implied liability against the county in favor of one injured by reason of a failure to keep a free gravel road in repair. It is the duty of township trustees and road supervisors at all times to keep the bridges in repair, and protect them from injury, Rev. Stat. 1894, 6818, 6832-6838; Carroll County Comrs. v. Baily, 122 Ind., on pages 49, 50. They also have the power to construct bridges. Rev. Stat. 1894, E 3276, 3277, 6833 (Rev. Stat. 1881. § 2886, 2887); Acts 1885, p. 202, § 3. And the township trustee has the power to levy an additional road tax, and expend the same, as well as the ordinary road tax, in the construction and repair of bridges. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 6834; Acts 1885, p. 202, § 4. The township trustee had no power to levy an additional road tax to be used for the construction and repair of bridges until the act of 1885 was passed. Prior to that date, only the ordinary road tax was used for that purpose. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 3276, 3277 (Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2886, 2887). For each failure of the road supervisor to perform his duty as required by law, he is liable to a penalty of $10, to be recovered by the township trustee, and all sums to keep open a ditch constructed under that section, as the cost of the ditch was to be apportioned from adjoining owners and was not payable out of the general fund of the county. It was further heid that the rule that has been held to apply to bridges would not be applied to ditches, as there was a clear distinction between the two. It was said that inasmuch as the ditch had been adjudged to be a nuisance, and the county ordered to abate the same by repairing or reconstructing, the plaintiff had the remedy to compel the levy of a tax for the purpose of having the ditch put in proper condition. Dashner v. Mills County, 88 Iowa, 401. And where overflow of a public ditch injured an adjoining crop a county was not liable. The distinction was made as to the liability for negligence in the maintenance of county bridges, holding that the ditch was made for the benefit of abutting owners. Green v. Harrison County, 61 Iowa, 311; and in Nutt v. Mills County, 61 Iowa, 754, the opinion in Green v. Harrison County was adopted as the law in a similar case. In Fenton v. Salt Lake County, 3 Utab, 423, a right of action for injuries to land caused by the construction of canals and diverting a natural watercourse was denied, where the claim had not been presented and audited under the statute. A county was not liable for taking out a small culvert in the highway and substituting an insufficient drain, thereby causing a nuisance and overflow on plaintiff's land. Packard v. Voltz, 94 Iowa, 277. So, a county was not liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of the county in failing to keep in repair a privy owned and kept by the county for public use. Mobley v. Carter County, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 694. And for injuries to a resident caused by reason of the erection of a county jail in that vicinity, by reason of the jail being kept in such a condition as to become a nuisance, under Neb. act February 27, 1873, making it the duty of the board of county commissioners of each county to erect a suitable jail and to keep the same in repair, the county was not liable, as in building the jail the county simply obeyed the command of the law-making power of the state in a matter of public concern, and for which it could not be held liable. The court held that the liability was a personal one of the jailor if the jail was a nuisance. Wehn v. Gage County Comrs. 5 Neb. 494, 25 Am. Rep. 497. And a county was not liable for injuries caused to adjacent property by the filthy condition of the jail, under N. C. Code, § 707, subs. 5, authorizing the county board to make such orders respecting the corporate property of the county as may be deemed expedient, and the complaint nowhere alleged that the board failed to use the means at their disposal to prevent the accumulation of filth. Threadgill v. Anson County Comrs. 99 N. C. 352. And for injuries caused to property in unlawfully, carelessly, and negligently changing and obIn that case it was said that the rule announced structing a stream so as to flood plaintiff's premin Wilson v. Jefferson County, 13 Iowa, 181, in re-ises, while the county was building a jail, a recovery gard to liability for bridges, has been doubted, was denied. Downing v. Mason County, 87 Ky. and it was held not applicable to a defective 208. drain causing overflow. The reporter's syllabus An injunction was refused against the erection of says that the Wilson Case was overruled, but a county jail in the proximity of plaintiff's propthe opinion simply refuses to apply the doc-erty, although it was alleged that its erection trine of liability for defective bridges, which is would injure the property by reason of the emiswell recognized in Iowa, although the principle in sion of noxious vapors and gases. Burwell v. that case is doubted. Vance County Comrs. 93 N. C. 73, 53 Am. Rep. 454. But in Lefrois v. Monroe County, 48 N. Y. Supp. 519, it was held that where the sewage from a farm Counties are not liable for injuries caused to real used in connection with county buildings flowed property on account of the condition of its build-into a stream injuring a dairy farm belonging to ings. But a county was held hable for nuisances plaintiff, an injunction was granted, and damages on a farm connected with its buildings, where the were awarded as compensation. The distinction e. By buildings. gard to bridges, that the same did not then, and do not now, give any support to the assumption in those cases that the board of commissioners had been given either the unconditional power to contract for the construction or repair of bridges, and appropriate the county funds to pay therefor, or provided with the means and instrumentalities necessary to cause or compel the same to be done. There is no provision in the statute which confers a right of action against the county for the negligent acts of the county or its board of commission ers in the management of the affairs of the county. No authority has ever been given the board of county commissioners to appropriate the county funds to pay damages in such cases, nor to levy and collect taxes for any such purposes. No fund has ever been provided, nor has any provision been made, for raising money, by taxation or otherwise, to pay such damages. Cones v. Benton County Comrs. 137 Ind., on page 408. The power to allow claims against the county, and pay judgments against the county, creates no liability, and gives no right of action to anyone. Such powers were given that the board of commissioners might pay just claims against the county, and not to create a liability in favor of anyone. was made between the obligations incurred in the management of an alms house or other public institutions and those which are involved in the ownership of a farm, although the latter may be an adjunct or accessory to the former. It was held that for a tort committed upon premises which the county had acquired for its mere convenience, advantage, or profit, and not because their possession was absolutely essential to the proper discharge of a public duty, it was liable to an adjoining owner of land whose premises were injured thereby. In this case it was said that a county in the management and care of its paupers and criminals was engaged in the performance of a public duty delegated to officers, and consequently for an injury which resulted from their lack of skill, or even from their negligence while actually engaged in the performance of their duty, no action will lie against the county which they represented. (The cases cited by the court to sustain the liability in this case were those of torts on premises controlled by cities. This case is now in the court of appeals.) IV. Other wrongful and negligent acts affecting persons or property. a. Generally. Generally a county is not liable for injuries caused by torts or negligence of its officers, and a recovery was refused for wrongful attachment. But it was held liable for damages on an injunction bond, and was liable for extorting money by sale of a ferry license; but this latter case may be sustamed upon the principle of money wrongfully received for plaintiff's use. The principle asserted in House v. Montgomery County Comrs. 60 Ind. 580, 28 Am. Rep. 657, and the cases following it, in regard to the implied liability of counties, cannot be reconciled with those cases, in this and other states, which affirm the rule that a county is a subdivision of the state for governmental purposes, and is not liable for the negligence of its officers, unless a right of action is expressly granted by the statute. But it is earnestly contended by appellee that, if the rule of implied liability declared in the bridge cases was erroneous, the doctrine of stare decisis should be invoked to protect it, and the same should only be changed by legislation. While the rule of stare decisis is a salutary one, yet it is not to be applied in all cases. If a decision or series of decisions are clearly incorrect, either through a mistaken conception of the law, or though a misapplication of the law to the facts, and no injurious results would follow from their overthrow, and especially if they were injurious or unjust in their operation, it is the duty of the court to overrule such cases. 6 Alb. L. J. 329; Church v. Brown, 21 N. Y. 335. But if a principle of law, doubtful in its character or uncertain in the subject-matter of its application, has been setliable for the tortious acts of its officers in levying an illegal tax and selling plaintiff's property, causing a cloud on his title. Pitkin County Comrs. v. Ball, 22 Colo. 125. And a county was not liable for negligence of the board of supervisors in failing to issue railroad bonds. It was said that for the neglect or refusal to perform a duty imposed on him by law a supervisor was made personally liable under Cal. Pol. Code, § 4086. Santa Cruz R. Co. v. Santa Clara County, 62 Cal. 180. So, where a county failed to sell bonds, or to issue warrants, as required by law, it was held that it was not liable on account of such neglect, although it was a case of money "withheld by a reasonable and vexatious delay," and Mont. Comp. Stat. § 1237, provides in such a case for paying 10 per cent, but it was held that a county could not be held liable for a violation or neglect of duties by its officers, and it would not be responsible for a breach of duty imposed upon commissioners, or for their nonfeasance or misfeasance in relation to such duty. Territory v. Cascade County Comrs. 8 Mont. 396. In Montgomery County Comrs. v. Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, where the question was as to the right of a county to make a further assessment for a gravel road after the original assessment proved to be insufficient, and the board had failed to ascertain the cost in advance, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, $5095, providing that no bid shall be accepted which exceeds the estimated cost, it was said that the commissioners were not acting as agents of the county while exercising their powers, and it was impossible to conceive any valid reason why the county should sustain any loss because of their errors, negligence, or wrongs, and the county would not be liable for the failure of the commissioners to do their duty in the first instance, but the cost should be paid from the property. And a county was not liable to a party furnish So, a county was not liable where it sold by mistake or wrongfully a tract of land for taxes to the plaintiff, and be brought suit to recover 30 per cent penalty, which money he would have been entitled to if the sale had been valid and the land had been redeemed, as Iowa Rev. Stat. §785, providing that where by mistake or wrongful act of the treasurering material for a bridge where the county failed land has been sold on which no taxes are due, the county is to hold the purchaser harmless, by paying him the amount of the principal, interest, and cost, did not authorize a judgment for the penalty. Coulter v. Mahaska County, 17 Iowa, 92. by reason of negligence to require a bond from the contractor, under Ind. act March 14, 1877, providing that no bid for building or repairing a bridge or building shall be received unless such bid shall be accompanied by a good and sufficient In the absence of any statute a county was not | bond, which shall guarantee that the contractor In another case it was said: 'I hope we shall consider what a decision really is, and treat it accordingly; not as the law, nor as giving the law, but simply as evidence of the law; and not conclusive evidence, but only prima facie evidence of what the law is.' Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill, 535. Chancellor Kent says: Even a series of decisions are not always conclusive evidence of what is law; and the revision of a decision very often resolves itself tled by a series of decisions, until it has become an established rule of property or the basis of contracts, it should not be overthrown except from the most urgent considerations of public policy. Hines v. Driver, 89 Ind. 339; Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295; Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469; Rockhill v. Nelson, 24 Ind. 422, 424. To that extent only are courts ordinarily restrained from correcting mistakes which they may have made. It must not be understood, however, that a previous line of decis-into a mere question of expediency, depending ions affecting even property rights can in no case be overthrown. If the evil resulting from the principle so established is greater than the mischief to the community could possibly be from a disregard of former adjudications, they should be overruled, and a new rule declared. Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246, 64 Am. Dec. 159. What was declared by this court on this question in Paul v. Davis, 100 Ind. 422, is applicable here. Elliott, J., speaking for the court, said: "A judicial decision does not make unalterable law, nor is it law in the sense that statutes are law. It was justly said by Senator Platt in Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 415, 6 Am. Dec. 290, that 'the decisions of courts are not the law; they are only evidence of the law.' shall promptly pay all debts incurred by him for labor and materials. Pike County Comrs. v. Norrington, 82 Ind. 190. In Ilsley v. Essex County, 7 Gray, 465, which was an action for tort under Mass. Stat. 1855, chap. 95, providing a penalty against a county in case the county commissioners shall neglect to erect bounds at the termination or angles of a county road for the space of one month after being notified so to do, a notice to the chairman of the board was held not sufficient. The surety of a school-land mortgage was not released by reason of injury caused by the county court in bidding in the property without authority and then putting it up after it had decreased in value and selling it 'at a second sale. It was held that a county would not be liable for the negligence or omission of those to whom she was compelled to confide the management of her pecuniary concerns. Ray County v. Bentley Common School Fund, 49 Mo. 236. And a county was not liable for damages arising from wrongful attachment to property in an action brought by the county, as the officers in the suit were engaged in the performance of those public duties which were enjoined on them by the direct authority of the state, and not undertaken for the private benefit or emolument of the county. Reed v. Howell County, 125 Mo. 58. But where the plaintiff had a ferry license, and the county unlawfully gave notice that it would grant the ferry franchise to anyone donating the largest amount of money, and the plaintiff was required to advance $500 to retain his privileges under his license and the commissioners had no discretion except an annual tax on the ferry not exceeding $100, the amount thus illegally extorted could be recovered with interest. It was also held that plaintiff was not particeps criminis. La Salle County v. Simmons, 10 Ill. 520. And where a county was entitled, under Miss. Code, § 897, to all actions and remedies to which individuals are entitled, it was held that it could not escape liability for costs and damages which it had caused by the wrongful suing out of an injunction. Freeman v. Lee County Supers. 86 Miss. 1. And in People, Burrows, v. Orange County Supers. 17 N. Y. 235, the supervisors of a county upon the consideration of the importance of certainty in the rule, and the extent of property to be affected by a change of it.' Again he says: 'It is probable that the records of many of the courts in this country are replete with hasty and crude decisions; and such cases ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error.' 1 Kent, Com. 477. The lord chancellor of England said to the House of Lords: 'You are not bound by any rule of law which you could lay down, if, upon a subsequent occasion, you should find reason to differ from that rule; that is, like every court of justice, and I regard this as a court of were compelled to levy a state tax where they had neglected and refused to levy the same, and claimed that N. Y. Laws, 1855, chap. 335, providing for such tax, was unconstitutional, under N. Y. Const. art. 7, 13, providing that every law which imposes, continues, or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax. It was also held that the act was constitutional. f. Affecting property. Generally a county is not liable for injuries to property caused by wrongful acts of its agents, but there is a Michigan case which implies that a county would be liable where a county official returned to plaintiff a hog in a diseased condition, causing loss to his other stock. So a county was not liable for damages for a horse killed from being overdriven while in the service of the county, as the judge of the superior court, or the sheriff, had no power to make the county responsible for the loss of a horse used by an officer. Dougherty County v. Kemp, 55 Ga. 252. So, where injuries were caused to a horse by being overdriven by a sheriff who used the same in making an arrest, the county was not liable. Randles v. Waukesha County (Wis.) 71 N. W. 1034. And where an employee of the county, who was working in repairing a road, occupied a barn of plaintiffs, and negligently destroyed the same by fire, no recovery could be had against the county. Field v. Albemarle County (Va.) 20 S. E. 954. So, a county was not liable for damages where the agent of the poor farm in attempting to clear a portion of land, and in burning the brush, started a fire which ran onto other land, iujuring other parties. It was held there was no liability in the absence of a statute imposing one. Symonds v. Clay County Supers. 71 Ill. 355. A county was not liable generally for damages done to sheep by dogs, nor for neglect to levy a tax on dogs for the year 1893, where no such tax could be levied until an assessment of dogs should be made, as no special provision was made for assessments as a basis for levying taxes in and for the year 1893, under Pa. act May 25, 1893 (Pub. Laws, 136), providing for the taxation of dogs and protection of sheep. It was not shown that any money had been justice; it is inherent in the nature of every, court of justice that it should have liberty to correct any error into which it may have fallen.' Bright v. Hutton, 12 Eng. L. & Eq. (vide p. 15). In the case cited the earlier case of Hutton v. Upfill, 2 H. L. Cas. 674, was overruled, although it was a case growing out of the same subject-matter, and involving the same principle and substantially the same in terests. The law is a science of principles, and this cannot be true if a departure from principle can be perpetuated by a persistence in error. If it be correct to affirm that there can be no departure from former decisions, then it would be true, as it has been well said, that in such cases summum jus might be summa injuria.' Ram, Legal Judgm. 201. The supreme court of California, in discussing this general subject, said: 'But it is a solecism to say that causes should be tried upon wrong principles, be decided against the law whether it be for the purpose of justice or not, so to decide them. The law is not so false to itself as to require its own permanent overthrow, unless the subversion be necessary to the public interests; and whether it be so necessary in a given case or not is for the court to decide, as a matter of legal discretion, whenever the paid into the county treasury as a part of the county stock under said act. But the county was liable for injury done to sheep in 1893, where it was shown that a fund was raised and collected in 1894, although the 2d section of the act implies that the damages are to be paid only out of the taxes of the current year, where the act provides that it "shall annually levy a tax upon each dog so returned, and within the discretion so given to such commissioners, etc., to such an amount as will in their judgment create a sufficient fund from which all loss or damage caused to sheep within the respective counties or cities, by a dog or dogs, during each current year, may be paid, together with all necessary expenses incurred in the adjustment of claims as hereinafter provided." Section 5 provides for the payment of damages out of the fund raised or to be raised, and this does not limit the right of payment for such damage only out of the fund of any current year. Morgan v. Tioga County, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 246.. But where the plaintiff sued the superintendents of the poor of the county, and charged that by reason of their negligence a boar of the plaintiff became diseased and was returned to plaintiff in that condition, whereby other stock was injured, and the defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence, first, because an action against the superintendents of the poor in their name of office was in reality against the county, which was a quasi corporation; second, because the superintendents of the poor were in no sense agents of the county; and, third, because the superintendents of the poor were a quasi corporation for the benefit of the general public, and could not be liable because the declaration did not allege that the defendants were operating a county poorhouse in pursuance of their corporate duties, and did not state any facts which showed them liable in a corporate capacity or made the county liable for their acts or negli gence, it was held that the court erred in excluding the evidence offered, and the case was reversed for a new trial. Rowland v. Kalamazoo County Supers. of Poor, 49 Mich. 553. A complaint alleging a trespass by the county in tearing down a wall and removing a vault was held defective in failing to show that plaintiff had complied with the statute in regard to presenting rule is invoked.' Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (vide opinion, 607). Consistency purchased by adherence to decisions at the sacrifice of sound principle is dearly bought. But we deem it unnecessary to further pursue this discussion, for we know quite well that there is not a court in England or America that has not corrected erroneous departures from the principles of justice by overthrowing previous decisions. Much as we respect the principle of stare decisis, we cannot yield to it when to yield is to overthrow principle and do injustice. Reluctant as we are to depart from former decisions we cannot yield to them, if, in yielding, we perpetuate error and sacrifice principle. We have thought it wisest to overrule outright rather than to evade, as is often done, by an attempt to distinguish where distinction there is none. We have preferred the censure that sometimes falls upon us rather than undertake to distinguish, and thus make 'confusion worse confounded,' where there is no room to limit or distinguish.' The case of House v. Montgomery County Comrs. 60 Ind. 580, 28 Am. Rep. 657, and cases following, do not involve property rights, nor has the rule which they declare in any sense become a rule of property or a basis for conclaims to the county board. Rhoda v. Alameda County, 52 Cal. 350. But in Rhoda v. Alameda County, 69 Cal. 523,'an amended complaint showing a compliance with the statute by the proper presentation of the claim to the commissioners of the county board stated a cause of action. V. Infringement of patents. The weight of authority is that a county is liable for infringement of a patent, but there are two cases to the contrary whose authority has been denied. Some cases require the claim to be presented to the county board for auditing before suit could be brought. A county in Kentucky was held liable for an infringement of a prison device, as counties in that state are corporations and can contract and sue and be sued, and Ky. Gen. Stat. chap. 28, art. 16, provides that county courts may erect and keep in repair county buildings, while art. 17 provides that the county court shall cause to be erected and keep in repair a good and sufficient jail. May v. Mercer County, 30 Fed. Rep. 246. In May v. Mercer County, 30 Fed. Rep. 246, for the infringement of a patent in the use of an improvement in the construction of a county jail, a recovery was allowed under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4919, by an action on the case, and the complaint, whether called a declaration or a petition under the Code, containing all the allegations material to make an action on the case, would be sufficient. In that case it was said that the reasoning in the case of Lawrence County v. Chattaroi R. Co. 81. Ky. 225, to the extent that public buildings belong to the county as a corporation, and the county may sue for an injury done to them in an action on the case, implied that counties were liable for property taken and used in the erection of public buildings, even though the property was wrongfully taken. So, a county was. liable for an infringement of a patent under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4919, providing that damages for the infringement of any patent may be recovered by an action on the case in the name of the party interested, and a county is liable although it is only a quasi-municipal corporation and cannot be exempted by the state |