in this country. Lord Eldon, in Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. Jr. 329, himself said, "It has always struck me, considering this subject, that it would have been better at once to have held that the lien should exist in no case, and the vendor should suffer the consequences of his want of caution, or to have laid down the rule the other way so distinctly that a purchaser might be able to know without the judgment of a court, in what cases it would and in what it would not exist," but felt himself obliged to declare, as the result of all the authorities, that it was clear that different judges would have determined the same case differently. The most plausible foundation of the English doctrine would seem to be that justice required that the vendor should be enabled, by some form of judicial process, to charge the land, in the hands of the vendee, as security for the upaid purchase money. The doctrine of vendor's lien has never been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, except where established by the local law. In Bayley v. Greenleaf, 20 U. S. 7 Wheat. 46, 5 L. ed. 393, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observes: "It is a secret invisible trust, known only to the vendor and vendee and to those to whom it may be communicated in fact. To the world, the vendee appears to hold the estate, devested of any trust whatever; and credit is given to him in the confidence that the property is his own in equity, as well as law. A vendor relying upon this lien ought to reduce it to a mortgage, so as to give notice of it to the world. If he does not, he is, in some degree, accessory to the fraud committed on the public, by an act which exhibits the vendee as the complete owner of an estate on which he claims a secret lien." Says Mr. | Justice Gray in Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 19 Am. Rep. 449: "The decisions in the courts in favor of the doctrine, which are collected in the notes to 2 Sugden on Vendors, 8th Am. ed. chap. 19, suggest no reasons and afford no grounds why we should now for the first time adopt in this commonwealth a doctrine which has never been supposed by the profession to be in force here; which would introduce a new exception to the statute of frauds; which, as experience elsewhere has shown, tends to promote uncertainty and litigation; and which appears to us to be unfounded in principle, unsuitable to our condition and usages, and unnecessary to secure the just rights of the parties. If no third person has acquired any rights in the land by bona fide attachment or conveyance, the original vendor may secure payment of the debt due him for the purchase money by the usual attachment on mesne process. If any third person has acquired rights in the property, there is no reason why equity, any more than the common law, should interpose to defeat them." Under our statutes the vendor may obtain his judgment for the purchase money, or any part thereof, which immediately becomes a lien of record upon the land sold, and under execution he may have the land sold in satisfaction of his judgment; and that, too, freed from any homestead or other claim of exemption. Thus, the reason for the maintenance of the lien of the vendor is gone, and the rule has never been applicable to our condition. The adoption of the common law of England by legis lative enactment in this state adopts so much of that law as is applicable to our condition, and the lien devised in favor of the vendor by the English chancellors was inapplicable to the legislation and existing conditions in this state. Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 19 Am. Rep. 449; Simpson v. Mundee, 3 Kan. 172; Brown v. Simpson, 4 Kan. 76; Greeno v. Barnard, 18 Kan. 518; Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 Serg. & R. 64; Heister v. Green, 48 Pa. 96, 86 Am. Dec. 569; Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265; Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410; Peck v. Culberson, 104 N. C. 425; Richards v. Arms Shingle & Lumber Co. 74 Mich. 57; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285; Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102; Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334; Wragg v. Comptroller General, 2 Desauss. Eq. 509; Frame v. Sliter, 29 Or 121, 34 L. R. A. 690; 2 Jones, Liens, § 1061. The change of venue from Clallam to King county should have been granted the defendants. The cause is reversed, with directions to the superior court to proceed in conformity to this decision. Scott, Ch. J., and Dunbar, Anders, and Gordon, JJ., concur. MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS. Marion DUCKETT et al., Appts., 0. prevent a bank in which he deposits it from crediting the check to his individual account. NATIONAL MECHANICS' BANK of Bal- 2. A check stating that it is for “deposit timore et al. Md.........) 1. A check stating that it is "for deposit to credit of" a person named, without adding the word "Trustee" to his name, although it contains a further clause stating that it is "the balance of purchase money due him as (trustee," does not impress the funds with a trust so as to NOTE.-As to the effect of depositing money in a bank in trust for third persons, see Cunningham v. Davenport (N. Y.) 32 L. R. A. 373, and note; and Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn (Me.) 32 L. R. A. 377. to the credit of" a person named, with the word “Trustee” added to his name, is an explicit notification to the bank in which he deposits it that he is not the actual owner of the money, and if the bank credits it to his individual account, and loss ensues to the trust estate by reason of his drawing out the fund by checks on his personal account, the bank is liable for participation in the breach of trust. 3. A bank is not responsible for the use of trust funds made by a trustee unless it knowingly participates in the breach of trust, or profits by the fraud. 4. A ratification by a trustee of the act of a bank in placing to his individual credit a | Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693; Shaw v. check which showed on its face that it was due Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 1 Am. Rep. 115, 97 to him as trustee cannot relieve the bank from Am. Dec. 107; 2 Perry, Tr. 1882, p. 463, 814, liability to the trust estate if the funds are lost note 2; Stewart v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 53 Md. by his checking them out on his personal ac- 578: Lowry v. Commercial & F. Bank, Taney, 5. A defense of the statute of limita-v. Ehlen.72 Md. 216; Jaudon v. National City 330; Morse, Banks & Banking, § 604; Marbury tions cannot be invoked by a participant in a count. breach of trust any more than by the trustee himself. 6. The statute of limitations must be in voked by plea or answer in order to be available as a defense. (December 1, 1897.) APPEAL by plaintiffs from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City in favor of the defendant bank in a suit to hold it lia ble for participation in a misappropriation of trust funds. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Marion Duckett, Charles H. Stanley, and David S. Briscoe, for appellants: Equity has a natural and primary jurisdiction superadded to any legal rights that the suitors may have, and concurrent with them, and it is no bar that an action at law may have| been sustained on the same state of facts. 2 Perry, Tr. 843; Swift v. Williams, 68 Md. 237; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54-63, 26 L. ed. 693-698; Stewart v. Baltimore Firemen's Ins. Co. 53 Md. 564. The trustees must sue and not join the cestui que trust if the trust is alive. Abell v. Brown, 55 Md. 217; Swift v. Williams, 68 Md. 237. A participant in a breach of trust, or an exmaleficio trustee, cannot plead limitations against the rights of the rightful owner to recover trust property or trust funds, because he who is thus placed becomes a trustee, and not until fraud is discovered or the breach made known, if then, does the act of limitations begin to run. 2 Perry, Tr. §§ 828, 832, 840, 859, 861; Code, art. 57, § 13. The true owner of a fund traced to the possession of another has a right to have it restored. not as a debt due and owing, but because it is his property wrongfully withheld from him. Bank, 8 Blatchf. 430, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 165, 21 L. ed. 142. A trustee cannot dispose of trust funds in his hands without an express and previous order of the court having jurisdiction over the trust estate. Tilly v. Tilly, 2 Bland, Ch. 425; Third Nat. Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 144, 34 Am. Rep. 304; Abell v. Brown, 55 Md. 223. Messrs. Barton & Wilmer, James M. Ambler, and Randolph Barton, Jr., for appellees: The rule that limitations cannot be pleaded by a trustee has a qualification that limits it to the case of an express or acknowledged trust, or a fraudulent collusion with a trustee. Lewin, Tr. 9th ed. p. 983. Limitations will bar as to trusts created by operation of law, though it may not as to express trusts. Mc Dowell v. Goldsmith, 6 Md. 319, 61 Am. Dec. 305: Re Leiman, 32 Md. 225, 3 Am. Rep. 132; Wearer v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708; Walker v. Manhattan Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 255. The mere fact that a trustee deposits and disburses a fund under his absolute control, as an individual, instead of as trustee, raises no presumption that his conduct is fraudulent or improper. Kirby v. State, 51 Md. 383; Munnerlyn v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 88 Ga. 337; Bolles, Banks and Their Depositors, § 107, p. 111; Morse, Banks & Banking, 3d ed. $317, p. 541; Goodwin v. American Nat. Bank, 48 Conn. 567. Clagett had the power to place the fund to his individual account without any right or duty on the bank's part to protest; and his ratification of the bank's act is equivalent to a previous authority to the bank to so deposit the fund. State Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 124 U. S. 346, 31 L. ed. 463. and a guarantor of his fidelity. Money is deposited in a bank by a trustee, or subject to his order, just as in the case of an individual, for safe-keeping and for convenience in handling, and not with the object of Englar v. Offutt, 70 Md. 78; Swift v. Will-making the bank an overseer over the trustee iams, 68 Md. 237; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693; Union Nat. Bank v. Goetz, 138 Ill. 127, 32 Am. St. Rep. 125, note: Englar v. Offutt, 70 Md. 78; Ferchen v. Arndt, 46 Am. St. Rep. 603, see note, p. 608, 26 Or. 121, 29 L. R. A. 664. Mingling the trust funds with his own is a breach of trust. 1 Perry, Tr. § 447 (1882). A trustee has no power to sell and dispose of trust property for his own use and at his own mere will. Third Nat. Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 144, 34 Am. Rep. 304. The insertion of the word 'trustee' after the name of a stockholder indicates and gives notice of a trust. Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Walker v. Manhattan Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 255; Bolles. Banks and their Depositors, § 40c. p. 57; 1 Morse, Banks & Banking, 3d ed. 317, p. 540; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 63, 26 L. ed. 698; Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. 431; Essex County Chosen Freeholders v. Newark City Nat. Bank, 48 N. J. Eq. 53; State Nat. Bank v. Reilly, 124 I. 469; Swartwout v. Mechanics' Bank, 5 Denio, 555; Goodwin v. American Nat. Bank, 48 Conn. 567; Swift v. Williams, 68 Md. 252; 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. § 1612a; 2 Morse, Banks & Banking, § 432, p. 711: Munnerlyn v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 88 Ga. 336. The simple case of a bank dealing with a trustee depositor and treating his rights over a trust deposit in his name just as those of an in dividual having an individual deposit, is, of | 31 L. ed. 458, 462; Neff v. Greene County Nat. course, to be distinguished from that of a bank Bank, 89 Mo. 581; Risley v. Phenix Bank, 83 attempting to assert a lien for a private debt N. Y. 328, 38 Am. Rep. 421. due to itself from the trustee, against a fund known to be held by the trustee in a fiduciary capacity. For in such case the bank would be presumed to be a knowing participant in the profits of a fraud. See Walker v. Manhattan Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 255; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 64, 26 L. ed. 698; Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 421, 34 L. ed. 728; Bank of Greens boro v. Clapp, 76 N. C. 482. If the trustee pays a private debt due the bank by a check upon a trust fund on deposit with it, the bank is not necessarily bound to presume that the payment is unlawful. Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 63, 26 L. ed. 698; Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453. The present case, moreover, is very different from that of a trustee offering for sale a note payable to him as trustee. Such a note is not negotiable and one buys it at his peril. Third Nat. Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 138, 34 Am. Rep. 304. Or from the case of a trustee attempting to pledge trust property. Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 1 Am. Rep. 115, 97 Am. Dec. 107; Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 470. Or from an attempted sale of stock standing in the name of a trustee. Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206; Stewart v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 53 Md. 564; Lowry v. Commercial & F. Bank, Taney, 310. In the case of stock there is no presumption of the trustee's right to sell. Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 217. Ratification is equivalent to a previous authority. 1 Dan. Neg. Inst. § 318, p. 237. McSherry, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: These proceedings had their origin in a bill filed by the appellants against the appellees in the circuit court of Baltimore city. The appellants are trustees, who were appointed by an order of the circuit court for Prince George's county in the place and stead of Henry W. Clagett, the survivor of three trustees named in the will of John D. Bowling. To these latter-the testamentary trusteescertain funds were bequeathed by Mr. Bowling, to be held in trust for the purposes designated in the will; but as those purposes have no relation whatever to the questions presented on the record they need not be alluded to here. It is only necessary to state that the funds now in controversy formed part of the corpus of that trust estate. Upon the death of his associates Clagett became, under a decree of the circuit court for Prince George's county, sole trustee, and thereafter, having made default to the trust estate, was in due course removed, and the appellants were immediately appointed to discharge the trust created by the will of Mr. Bowling. Amongst the investments belonging to the trust estate in the hands of Clagett were two mortgages, each for $2,000, one due by Thomas S. Duckett and the other by Washington J. Beall. The mortgage given by Beall was foreclosed by Clagett after he became sole trustee, and the money realized from the sale was paid to him through Mr. Charles A bank account is meant to be checked H. Stanley. The payment was made by Mr. against. Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 64, 26 L. ed. 698. Even in the case of stock, where the stock merely stands in the name of the holder as "trustee," with nothing else to indicate the name or nature of the trust, and no means of discovery, by any reasonable or ordinary inquiry, the purchaser will not be put upon inquiry. Graffin v. Robb, 84 Md. 455; Albert v. Baltimore, 2 Md. 159. The cases where the word "trustee" has been held to put purchasers of stock upon inquiry, have been those in which the name and object of the trust were easily ascertainable without inquiry from the trustee. Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206; Stewart v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 53 Md. 564. Clagett knew of and approved the action of the bank in thus entering the deposits, and if he had complete power to direct the bank so to credit them, or so to transfer them when deposited, it can make no difference that he ap proved and adopted an act, which affected merely the form, and not the extent, of his control over the fund, instead of previously directing it. 2 Morse, Banks & Banking, SS 4406, 471; Bolles, Banks and Their Depositors, § 36, § 41a, p. 54; McEwen v. Davis, 39 Ind. 112; State Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 124 U. S. 333, 334, Stanley's check which reads as follows: after his removal as trustee it was discovered that these funds had been dissipated and spent. Clagett was and still is insolvent. The new trustees the present appellants-made demand upon the National Mechanics' Bank for a restitution of the amount of the two checks, claiming that the bank was accountable therefor because it had wrongfully placed the proceeds thereof to Clagett's individual account instead of to his account as trustee, and had thereby aided and participated in his breach of trust; and to enforce that demand they filed the pending bill against the bank and Clagett. Upon final hearing the circuit court of Baltimore city decreed that the bank was not liable and dismissed the bill; whereupon this appeal was taken. The ultimate inquiry is, whether under the circumstances stated the bank is liable to make good to the new trustees the amounts of these two checks. In addition, there are subordinate questions arising by way of defense, that will be disposed of after the main one has been dealt with. merely the innocent agency through which, without fault or negligence on its part, Clagett depleted the trust estate, then it was not guilty of aiding him in misappropriating the trust fund, and is not liable to restore it. In seeking, then, to solve the principal inquiry, we must look to the record for the evidence which will fasten on the bank this knowledge or notice, if in fact it possessed such knowledge or notice. At the outset it ought to be noted that there is a marked difference between the phraseology and the legal effect of the two checks already set forth. The one is payable to Scott, cashier, for deposit to the credit of Clagett personally that is, not in his capacity as trustee-though there is a memorandum added of which we will speak in a moment. The other check is payable to Scott, cashier, "to deposit to the credit of Henry W. Clagett, trustee." Apart from these two checks and the information which they themselves by their terms imparted, there is no pretense that the bank had any notice or knowledge that the funds collected on them belonged to or formed part of any trust estate, or were other than Clagett's own indi stricted to the checks alone in determining whether the bank is liable. There can be no dispute that as a general principle all persons who knowingly partici-vidual property. As a consequence we are repate or aid in committing a breach of trust are responsible for the wrong, and may be compelled to replace the fund which they have It is true, undoubtedly, that a bank is bound been instrumental in diverting. Every viola- to honor the checks of its customer, so long as tion by a trustee of a duty which equity lays he has funds on deposit to his credit, unless upon him, whether wilful or fraudulent, or done such funds are intercepted by a garnishment through negligence, or arising through mere or other like process, or are held under the oversight or forgetfulness, is a breach of trust; bank's right of set-off. It is equally true that 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1079. There is in such in- whenever money is placed in bank on deposit stances no primary or secondary liability as and the bank's officers are unaware that the respects the parties guilty of, or participating fund does not belong to the person depositing in, the breach of trust; because all are equally it, the bank, upon paying the fund out on the amenable. That a breach of trust was com- depositor's check, will be free from liability mitted by Clagett does not admit of a doubt. even though it should afterwards turn out The defaulting trustee was removed because he that the fund in reality belonged to someone was a defaulter. He unquestionably received else than the individual who deposited it. It the proceeds of these two checks, and those is immaterial, so far as respects the duty of the proceeds formed part of the corpus of the trust bank to the depositor, in what capacity the estate which it was his imperative duty to pre-depositor holds or possesses the fund which he serve intact. Instead of performing that duty, places on deposit. The obligation of the bank he spent the funds-they have disappeared, is simply to keep the fund safely and to reand he has not explained what he did with turn it to the proper person, or to pay it to them-and it can make no difference for what his order. If it be deposited by one as truspurpose he did spend them, if by spending tee, the depositor, as trustee, has the right to them he impaired the corpus of the trust es- withdraw it, and the bank, in the absence of tate; and that he did impair the corpus of the knowledge or notice to the contrary, would trust estate no one pretends to deny. Whoever be bound to assume that the trustee would knowingly aided him, or knowingly partici-appropriate the money, when drawn, to a pated with him in misapplying that fund, is, by reason of so aiding and so participating, equally liable with him to make the fund good by restoring it to the trust estate; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1079. If the bank knowingly aided and participated in Clagett's breach of trust, then the bank is, beyond dispute, as responsible to the new trustees as is the defaulting trustee himself. This liability of the bank depends, however, altogether upon the contingency that it knowingly aided the trustee, Clagett, to commit the default of which he was undeniably guilty. If without knowledge of Clagett's misconduct, or if without sufficient notice to put it on inquiry that would have enabled it to ascertain that Clagett was mingling with his individual deposits, and using as his own, money that the bank knew or had the means of knowing was trust money; or if it was proper use. Any other rule would throw upon a bank the duty of inquiring as to the appropriation made of every fund deposited by a trustee or other like fiduciary; and the imposition of such a duty would practically put an end to the banking business, because no bank could possibly conduct business if, without fault on its part, it were held accountable for the misconduct or malversations of its depositors who occupy some fiduciary relation to the fund placed by them with the bank. In the absence of notice or knowledge a bank cannot question the right of its customer to withdraw funds, nor refuse (except in the instances already noted) to honor his demands by check; and, therefore, even though the deposit be to the customer's credit in trust, the bank is under no obligation to look after the appropriation of the trust funds when with drawn, or to protect the trust by setting up a case to which the fund belonged, and a corjus tertii against a demand. But if the bank responding entry was made upon the books has notice or knowledge that a breach of trust of the bank indicating that a particular deis being committed by an improper withdrawal posit belonged to a particular case designated of funds, or if it participates in the profits or by its number. All this was fully understood fruits of the fraud, then it will be undoubtedly by the officers of the bank. When checks liable. In support of these general principles, signed by the clerk and countersigned by the if support they need at all, we may refer to judge were drawn upon this account, the numMunnerlyn v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 88 Ga. 333; | ber of the case to which the fund to be paid State Nat. Bank v. Reilly, 124 Ill. 464; Essex on the check belonged was written on the upCounty Chosen Freeholders v. Newark City Nat. per right-hand corner of the check, following Bank, 48 N. J. Eq. 51, all cited in 3 Am. & the words "Case No." Numerous deposits Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. pp. 833, 834; Walker were made in many cases, but each and every v. Manhattan Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 255; 1 deposit showed the number of the case, and Morse, Banks & Banking, § 317; Swift v. consequently identified the case to which each Williams, 68 Md. 237. deposit actually belonged. Many checks were As the bank, then, would not be responsible drawn upon and paid by the bank in cases for the use made of the trust funds by the in which no deposits had been made by the trustee unless it knowingly participated in a clerk at all and the checks themselves showed breach of trust or profited by the fraud, do by the case numbers written on the top rightthe checks, as we have said, the only evidence hand corners that no deposit belonging to in the record on this branch of the case, show those cases had ever been received, because that the bank is liable? As respects the first there were no deposits credited to the cases check representing the proceeds of the fore- bearing those numbers. In consequence of closure of the Beall mortgage, we are of opin- the bank having paid various checks bearing ion that there is no liability on the part of the case numbers to the credit of which cases no bank. It will be remembered that this particu- deposits had ever been made, the entire sum lar check was not made payable to Clagett, of the credit of the whole account was checked as trustee, nor, being payable to Scott, cashier, out before Dodge, to whom several checks were the proceeds directed to be placed to the were given in the distribution of the assets of credit of Clagett, trustee. In placing the a particular estate, received his checks and preproceeds to the individual credit of Clagett, sented them to the bank for payment. In the the bank did just precisely the thing it was case in which Dodge was interested as a creddirected on the face of the check to do. In itor of a bankrupt, there had been deposited, doing this, it violated no duty to anyone, un- as shown by the deposit tickets and by the less the addition of the words "being the entry of the case number on the bank's books, balance of purchase money due him as trustee more than sufficient to pay the checks held by from John R. Coale," controlled the explicit Dodge, as well as all other checks delivered direction in the body of the check to deposit to other creditors of the same bankrupt; but the fund to the credit of Clagett individually, because the bank had paid out the funds beand gave the bank notice that instead of do-longing to this case, on checks bearing the ing what the check required should be done, it must do something it was not instructed; to do at all, viz.: place the funds to the credit of Clagett, as trustee. Mr. Stanley's check was drawn, not on the National Mechanics' Bank, but upon the Citizens' National Bank of Laurel; and the memorandum descriptive of what the funds were or the source from whence they came was neither an instruction to the Mechanics' Bank, through which the check passed, as to the account in which these funds, when collected from the Citizens' Bank should be credited in the Mechanics' Bank, to Clagett; nor was it a notification to the Mechanics' Bank that the funds were impressed with a trust that would be invaded by their being carried to Clagett's individual credit. On the contrary, the specific instruction on the face of the check was to credit Clagett individually with the proceeds, whatever the origin or ultimate use of these proceeds might be. This memorandum imposed no duty on the Mechanics' Bank, and operated only to subserve the convenience of the drawer of the check. In the case of State Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 124 U.sitor places there merely for his own conS. 333, 31 L. ed. 458, it appeared that the clerk of the United States district court for the southern district of Illinois deposited with the State National Bank the funds belonging to the registry of the court. Whenever a deposit was made it was accompanied by a deposit ticket, giving the number of the bankruptcy numbers of other and different cases, as to which latter cases there had been no deposits made at all, there were no funds in bank to the credit of the registry with which to pay the checks held by Dodge, and the bank refused to pay them. Dodge brought suit against the bank, and bases his claim to recover on the distinct ground that the bank had actual notice from its own books as to what estates had funds on deposit, and had actual notice on the face of every check drawn in a case from which no funds had been received, that there were no funds on deposit applicable to the payment of such checks, and that, consequently, when it paid those checks it paid them knowingly out of the funds belonging to other and different cases or estates, and was bound to honor the checks held by Dodge, as they were drawn against funds which had been actually deposited as part of the assets of the bankrupt estate of which he was creditor. But the supreme court held that, "no bank is bound to take notice of memoranda and figures upon the margin of a check, which a depo venience, to preserve information for his own benefit; and in such case, the memoranda and figures are not a notice to the bank that the particular check is to be paid only from a particular fund. So, too, a mark on a deposit ticket, if intended to require a particular deposit to be kept separate from all other depos |