W. W. Barron, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Fred H. Caplan and George H. Mitchell, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

Syllabus.

UNITED GAS PIPE LINE CO. v. MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS AND WATER DIVISION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 23. Argued October 20-21, 1958.-Decided December 8, 1958.* A natural gas pipeline company regulated under the Natural Gas Act supplies gas to a number of distributing companies under longterm service agreements filed with the Federal Power Commission which were construed by the Commission as obligating the purchasers to pay for the gas during the terms of the agreements not at a single specified rate but at the pipeline company's "going" rates as established from time to time in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Act. Held: Under agreements so providing, nothing in the Natural Gas Act prevents the pipeline company, without further agreement with the purchasers, from changing its rates by filing new schedules under § 4 (d) of the Act, subject to review by the Commission under § 4 (e). Pp. 104-116.

(a) United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, distinguished. Pp. 109-111.

(b) The procedures prescribed by § 4 (d) and § 4 (e) are not limited to instances where the parties have mutually agreed upon specific new rates. Pp. 111-114.

(c) The Commission correctly determined the meaning of the service agreements here involved. Pp. 114-115.

(d) Nothing in the agreements here involved, as interpreted to permit the pipeline company to change its rates under § 4 (d) and § 4 (e) procedures, is hostile to any of the provisions or purposes of the Act. P. 115.

102 U. S. App. D. C. 77, 250 F. 2d 402, reversed.

Ralph M. Carson argued the causes for petitioners in Nos. 23 and 26. With him on the brief for petitioner in No. 23 were Thomas Fletcher, C. Huffman Lewis, Morton

*Together with No. 25, Federal Power Commission v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., and No. 26, Texas Gas Transmission Corp. et al. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., also on certiorari to the same Court.

Opinion of the Court.

358 U.S.

E. Yohalem and James J. Higginson. On the brief for petitioners in No. 26 were John T. Cahill for the Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, William S. Tarver for the Southern Natural Gas Co., and Richard J. Connor and Daniel James, of counsel.

Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Willard W. Gatchell and William W. Ross.

George E. Morrow and Reuben Goldberg argued the causes and filed a brief for the Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., respondents.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in Nos. 23, 25 and 26 were filed by Everett C. McKeage for the State of California et al., Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General, and Wade H. Creekmore, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Mississippi, George F. McCanless, Attorney General, and Allison B. Humphreys, Solicitor General, for the State of Tennessee, Stewart G. Honeck, Attorney General, and Roy G. Tulane, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wisconsin, John J. O'Connell, Attorney General, and Frank P. Hayes, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington, Garner W. Green for the City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and Roger Arnebergh, John C. Banks, Peter Campbell Brown, J. Elliott Drinard, Marshall F. Hurley, J. Frank McKenna, John C. Melaniphy, Charles S. Rhyne and J. Parker Connor for the Member Municipalities of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which directed the Federal Power Commission to reject certain rate schedules for

103

Opinion of the Court.

natural gas filed with it by petitioner United Gas Pipe Line Company (United) under § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq.

United, a regulated natural gas pipeline company, supplies gas to Texas Gas Transmission Corporation (Texas Gas), Southern Natural Gas Company (Southern Gas), and Mississippi Valley Gas Company (Mississippi),1 under a number of long-term service agreements made and filed with the Commission prior to September 30, 1955, each of which contains the following pricing provision: 2

"All gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's Rate Schedule [the appropriate rate schedule designation is inserted here], or any effective superseding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission. This agreement in all respects shall be subject to the applicable provisions of such rate schedules and to the General Terms and Conditions attached thereto and filed with the Federal Power Commission which are by reference made a part hereof." (Italics supplied.)

1 Mississippi, a natural gas distributing company, also purchases gas from Texas Gas and Southern Gas. Respondent Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, an agency of the City of Memphis engaged in the distribution of natural gas, purchases gas from Texas Gas, and has no direct contract relations with United. However, it is obligated to reimburse Texas Gas for any increase in the latter's cost of gas acquired from United.

2 Originally there were seven such agreements, of which five contained the provision quoted in the text. However, the other two were found by the Commission, and assumed by the Court of Appeals, to contain the equivalent of that provision, and one of the two was replaced by a superseding agreement explicitly containing the provision very shortly after the filing here at issue.

Opinion of the Court.

358 U.S.

On September 30, 1955, United, proceeding under § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act, filed with the Commission new rate schedules, together with supporting data, increasing its prices for gas as of November 1, 1955, by amounts estimated to yield total additional annual revenues of $9,978,000 from sales under the agreements here involved and from other sales also subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Exercising its powers under § 4 (e) of the Act, the Commission ordered a hearing as to the propriety of the new rates, and, except as to those relating to sales of gas for resale for industrial use only, suspended their effectiveness from November 1, 1955, to April 1, 1956, the maximum period of suspension authorized by the statute. Thereafter Texas Gas, Southern Gas, Mis

3 Sections 4 (d) and 4 (e) of the National Gas Act read as follows: § 4 (d): "Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such [filed] rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days' notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published."

§ 4 (e): "Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, or State commission, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or