as is known to every one, at first determined from the most trifling event possible. And thus, in optics, from a few observations on some of the phenomena of light are inferred the general laws of refraction and reflexion: which, when in this manner once obtained, are applied to the solution of a variety of other phenomena, which would, otherwise, remain inexplicable paradoxes. "But suppose we make a farther concession still; and allow-what, indeed, we find every hour in every day continually contradicting--that the same proportion and adjustment between cause and effect obtains among rational and intelligent beings, as among brute, unconscious matter; and that the power or capacity of exertion, which is the cause, is never superior to the operation, which is the effect: even by this concession, the argument urged against us, so far from obtaining the least additional force, would, on the very principles of Mr. HUME himself, prove the means of its own refutation. "All our knowledge, even according to his own system, with respect to matters of fact and existence, we derive from experience; and every event, that takes place in opposition to this grand criterion of our judgment, must bring with it proofs that will more than counterbalance the observations of every day, before a philosopher can assent to its truth. It is this constant and unremitted experience which shews us the continual coherence subsisting between cause and effect. Not that the first bears any analogy to the second, or exerts any sensible influence over it; but only, by long habitude, we have accustomed ourselves to expect the second as the necessary result of the first. For had causes any analogy to their effects, or exerted any known energy over them; immediately on the appearance of a cause, however singular, and however impossible to be classed under any determined species, we should be able, very nearly, to decide at once what effect it might produce, or to invert the whole were an effect equally singular and unparalleled, to be presented to our view, we should, with the same facility, be enabled to interpret its cause. Yet in all such cases, on the present constitution of things, we should certainly find ourselves at a loss for an answer. "It is owing, therefore, entirely to the constant conjunction of occurrences, as established by the laws of nature, that we are capable of inferring one object from another, or of predicting one event from a preceding.-If we examine the universe at large, we shall find it an effect absolutely unparalleled; and which cannot be comprehended under any species with which we are acquainted. And as we cannot, prima facie, infer any effect from a presented cause, or any cause from a given effect, we find ourselves obliged to hesitate about what the cause of such an extraordinary effect may be; or whether, in reality, we are capable of conceiving any cause at all. Yet, taken collectively, the arguments for the existence of a cause are so potent and convincing, that even in the present age of speculation and refinement, and amongst those who have indulged themselves in the largest latitude of conjecture, there is no philosopher whatever who has been bold enough to controvert them or rather who has not stood forward as the champion and espouser of a truth so obvious and incontestable: a truth to which Mr. HUME himself submits with the most cordial acquiescence, which is completely assented to by Lord BOLINGBROKE,† and imagined to be self-evident by the late royal philosopher of SANS SOUCI. This mode of arguing, therefore, is obviously fallacious; is destructive of principles acknowledged to be in "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion." Hume on the Natural History of Religion. "I know, for I can demonstrate, by connecting the clearest and most distinct of my real ideas, that there is a God; a first, intelligent cause of all things, whose infinite wisdom and power appears evidently in all his works, and to whom therefore I ascribe, most rationally, every other perfection, whether conceivable or not conceivable by me." Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. ↑ Le monde entier prouve cette intelligence. Il ne faut qu'ouvrir les yeux pour s'eu convaincre. Les fins que la nature l'est proposées dans ses controvertible; and if pursued, would lead us into endless mazes of error and perplexity.-HUME himself was sensible of the consequences which must necessarily result from the continuation of such an argument, and drops it, therefore, abruptly, without pressing it forward to its extreme; lest it should lead us, as he observes, into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature.' "But the Deity being allowed to possess a capability of exerting a providential care over his creatures, it has at times been contended that such an exertion would be derogatory to his infinite greatness and majesty. A mean and contracted idea! and unworthy of a philosopher to entertain for a moment. However it may be respecting ourselves, in the view of the Deity nothing can, properly speaking, be either great or small; and nothing unworthy the notice of him who created it. If the Deity did not degrade himself by the formation of his creatures, much less can he do so by superintending them after they are formed: for an existing being must at all times be superior to non-existence; and though they may have claims upon his bounty and his protection at present, it is certain they could have no claim at all anterior to their actual creation. "I have, moreover, observed already, that the Creator is a being of infinite benevolence; and that the principal motive he could possibly be actuated by in the formation of any order of beings, must be their own essential felicity. If it did not degrade him, then, to exert himself in providing for this felicity at first, it cannot degrade him in the superintendence and direction of it afterwards; and as a being all active, and all powerful, he cannot possibly resist such a conduct. "In effect, such a superintendence and unremitted exertion seems fully proved both from the continued operation of the ouvrages, se manifestent si evidemment, qu' on est forcé de reconnaitre une cause souveraigne et superieurement intelligente qui y preside necessairePour pen qu'on soit de bonne foi, il est impossible de se refuser à ment. Reflexions du Roi de la Prusse sur la Religion. laws of nature; the powers entrusted to mankind; and the various and unexpected events which often arise to confound the policy of the most artful, and baffle the strength of the mighty. Were it not so, material bodies must be possessed of an innate and essential power of mutual gravitation: a doctrine, as Sir ISAAC NEWTON observes, too absurd to be credited by any man in his senses;* and few events in nature would take place contrary to our expectations, or at any time excite our surprise. "It appears singular and unaccountable, that after acknowledging his belief in the existence of such a general providence, and, indeed contending for its truth, Lord Bolingbroke should, nevertheless, deny the extension of this providence to individuals. That the same volume which declares that when the immorality of individuals becomes that of a whole society, then the judg ments of God follow, and men are punished collectively in the course of a general providence,'t that this same volume should almost in the same page inform us that it is plain from the whole course of this providence, God regards his human creatures collectively, and not individually; how worthy soever every one of them may deem himself to be a particular object of the divine care; and that there is no foundation in nature for the belief of such a scheme as a providence thus particular.'t Is not then every collection and society of beings composed of individuals? or is it possible for such a society or collection to be interested in providential interpositions, and yet for the individuals that compose it to remain uninterested and unaffected thereby? Is it from a view of the derogation we have before remarked upon, or of fatigue, or of incapacity, that the Deity should. thus restrain himself? or what precise number of individuals. can constitute a society capable of demanding the full attention of Providence, the abstraction of a single member from which would immediately render it unworthy of any further notice or regard? Letters to Dr. Bentley. † Vol. 5. Quarto edit. E "Miserable indeed must have been the situation of CADMUS or IDOMENEUS, wandering, as they were, from climate to climate, in pursuit of an unknown region; and attended, perhaps, by too few associates to induce the interference and benediction of Providence upon their attempts. And still more miserable the fate of a PHILOCTETES, or a ROBINSON CRUSOE, cut off, by the most desert solitude, from the pleasures of social communication, and, by the same solitude, deprived of the assistance of the Deity. And SOPHOCLES had more reason than has generally been imagined, when he makes the former exclaim, Ο θάνατε, θάνατε πῶς ἀεὶ καλεμενος * Ουτω κατ ἦμαρ, ου δύνη μολεῖν ποτές.* "In fact, every order of created beings whatsoever, and every station in every various order, must be equally the object of the attention and care of the Supreme Being. While SOLOMON was noticed by him, in all his glory, he did not forget the 'lily of the field,' in its humbler and more modest array. And whatever difference there might have appeared to the dazzled eyes of mortals, between the situation of DAVID or CINCINNATUS, when engaged in the lowlier employments of agriculture and rural economy, and when advanced to the first dignities of their different nations, and leading forward their exulting armies to victory and renown-in the grand survey of the great Creator of all things, such differences and distinctions must shrink into nothing, and every gradation of life alike enjoy his common protection. "If the race of man did actually proceed, according to either the Mosaic history or the fabulous accounts of the Greeks, from one single pair, or family-it is plain, according to this doctrine, that Providence could have little to do with the world, either at its first creation, or immediately after the deluge: and it would form a curious inquiry, and one, I fear, not easily resolved, at * O Death, where art thou, Death ?-so often called, Francklin. |