CHAPTER XIX. THE FORGOTTEN ISSUE. A FALLACY of the Forgotten Issue is committed when we forget what it was that an argument was intended to prove, and either take that very thing or something equivalent to it and quite as doubtful for granted, or else prove something which is not equivalent to the point at issue and then assume that we have proved the point itself. In the first case the fallacy is called Petitio Principii or Begging the Question. In the second it is called Ignoratio Elenchi or a fallacy of Irrelevance. Each of these two fallacies of the forgotten issue takes several forms. Petitio The fallacy of Petitio Principii is not committed unless there is a show of proof. Nobody commits it who merely says I assume these conclusions to be true, and Principii. I do not try to prove them'. But a person does commit it if he thinks he is proving his conclusions when he is really assuming them, or is assuming a premise that is not admitted or would not be admitted if its real significance were understood. Often the premise is actually proved from the conclusion, or is such as would naturally and properly be so proved'. But in any case in which the fallacy is present the conclusion seems to be more fully proved by the argument than it really is, because it is not clearly understood how nearly equivalent is that which is taken for granted to that which is to be proved; e.g., Whoever refuses to believe in the inspiration of the Bible makes the Most High 66 a deceiver; for has he not told us that All scripture is given by inspiration of God'?" Of course we have no reason to believe that it was really God who said that all scripture is given by his inspiration unless we already assume that the Bible or some part of it is inspired. Whately directs attention to the fact that the English language is peculiarly "suitable for the fallacy of Petitio Principii, from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions which have no resemblance in sound, and no connection in etymology; so that a Sophist may bring forth a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin; e.g., 'To allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited of expressing his sentiments A blunder of this same sort is committed when a student says that two chemicals are sure to unite since they have an affinity for each other; or that he knows unsupported objects will fall to the earth from the fact that they are attracted towards it. Connected with this fallacy is the rhetorical device [already discussed] of Question-begging Epithets. Thus, though the matter we are discussing is open to dispute, we may speak of a nefarious project, a laudable am- Includes bition, an astute act, a far-sighted policy, and epithets. so on, attempting, by means of a carefully selected epithet, to assume the point at issue, or at least to create an unfair prejudice in the mind of the hearer or reader whom we address."'* When a conclusion is based upon a premise which in an earlier stage of the argument was itself based upon this very conclusion, the reasoning is said *Fowler's "Deductive Logic" (Clarendon Press). And circle. to be in a Circle (Circulus in Probando). Here are some "Some mechanicians attempt to prove (what they ought to lay down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis) that every particle of matter gravitates equally; 'why?' because those bodies which contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, i.e., are heavier: but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky;' 'no, but still they contain more particles, though more closely condensed;' 'how do you know that?' 'because they are heavier; how does that prove it?' because all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must needs have the more of them in the same space'" (Whately). Any man who would marry such a woman must have something wrong with him.' 'Why, what is the matter with his wife?' 'It is matter enough to be willing to marry such a man as he is.' If there are a large number of intermediate steps and the argument is a long one it may be very difficult to detect the circle. This fallacy, like a good many others, can be best guarded against by making the shortest and simplest possible summary of any argument that claims our interest. Ignoratio Elenchi or Irrelevance, the other fallacy of the forgotten issue, consists merely in arguing beside the point. “I am required by the circumstances of the case (no matter why) to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, Ignoratio not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in this lies the fallacy. . . . For instance, instead of proving that this prisoner has committed an atrocious fraud', you prove that 'the fraud he is accused of is atrocious'; instead of proving, as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats, that the taller boy had a right to force the other boy to exchange coats with him', you prove that 'the exchange would have been advantageous to both '; instead of proving that a man has not a right to educate his children or dispose of his property in the way he thinks best', you show that the way in which he educates his children or disposes of his property is not really the best'; instead of proving that the poor ought to be relieved in this way', you prove that they ought to be relieved'. . . . A good instance of the employment and exposure of this fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mitylenæans: the former (over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters to death; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in judgment, but in deliberation, of which the proper end is expediency."* It is interesting to find counterparts of this story in the history of our own times. The following sentences from Bismarck's Autobiography (Chapter XX) refer to the Austrian proposals for peace after the Prussian victories in the war of 1866: "I unfolded to the King [of Prussia] the political and military reasons which opposed the continuation of the war. We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chess-board and the renewal of friendly relations with her as a move open to us. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia.. * Whately, "Elements of Logic", third edition, London, 1829. To all this the King raised no objection, but declared the actual terms as inadequate, without, however, definitely formulating his own demands. Only so much was clear, that his claims had grown considerably since July 4. He said that the chief culprit [Austria] should not be allowed to escape unpunished, and that justice once satisfied, we could let the misled backsliders [the smaller German states that had sided with Austria] off more easily, and he insisted on the sessions of territory from Austria which I have already mentioned. I replied that we were not there to sit in judgment, but to pursue the German policy. Austria's conflict in rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her; our task was the establishment or initiation of a German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia. 66 Passing on to German states, he spoke of various acquisitions by cutting down the territories of our opponents. I repeated that we were not there to administer retributive justice, but to pursue a policy; that I wished to avoid in the German federation of the future the sight of mutilated territories, whose princes and peoples might very easily (such is human weakness) retain a lively wish to recover their former possessions by means of foreign help; such allies would be very unreliable."'* 6 "So Canning, in a speech in the House of Commons in reply to Mr. Percival, says: The question is not, as assumed by my opponent, whether we shall continue the war in the Peninsula, but whether it is essential to our success in the war that our present system of currency remain unchanged.' Thus it is not unusual, after a protracted debate, for the cooler thinkers to preface their remarks with reminding the audience of the real nature of the point on which issue is joined; and the longer and more heated the discussion, the greater the need for these monitory exordiums. For, especially when the field of debate is large, the combatants *Bismarck the Man and the Statesman". (Harper & Bros., 1899.) |