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In Miller v. Oelwein, 155 Iowa, 706, 136 N. W. 1045, it was declared that "the enrolled bills duly signed and deposited with the secretary of state constitute the ultimate proof of their regular enactment, and behind them it is impossible for any court to go for the purpose of ascertaining what the law is."

take from the act as published, but ap-state without objection thereto within peared in the original bill. The court, upon thirty days, and the court held that it did examination of the enrolled bill, found this not become a law. not to be so, and added: "This enrolled bill, thus filed and preserved in the secretary's office, is the authenticated copy of the real bill which the general assembly passed, and is the ultimate proof of the true expression of the legislative will, as this court have before held. Clare v. State, 5 Iowa, 510. And that for the obvious reason that it is the bill which received the Duncombe v. Prindle, supra, and Collins signatures of the officers of both branches of v. Laucier, 45 Iowa, 702, were cited, and althe legislature, after a committee appointed so Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Taggart, 141 for that purpose had compared it with the Ind. 281, 60 L.R.A. 671, 40 N. E. 1051. law as passed, and reported it a correct But later on this was added: The "mere copy of the same. Behind this it is im- failure of the journals to show compliance possible for any court to go for the purpose with the requirements as to the method of ascertaining what the law is. There is of enacting a law will not be conclusive that no other bill, original or a copy, to which such requirements were not complied with" the signatures of the president of the senate-citing Leavenworth County v. Higginand speaker of the house of representatives botham, 17 Kan. 62. are affixed, or to which is appended the approval by the governor. And when counsel speak of some other original bill than this, in which the township 90 was embraced, we confess we are at a loss to conceive what they mean. Are we to suppose that the enrolling clerk, and the committee appointed to examine and report upon the accuracy of his work, have all been guilty of laches or corruption, especially in the absence of any competent proof to that effect?"

In the recent case of Conly v. Dilley, 153 Iowa, 677, 133 N. W. 730, the contention was that the two houses did not adopt the same bill, in that in passing the house it included two amendments omitted by the senate, and, among other things, the court observed that "in the first place, it is extremely doubtful if the courts can properly go behind the enrolled bill to scrutinize the details of its legislative history for grounds upon which to hold it invalid. Clare v. State and Duncombe v. Prindle, supra; 36 Cyc. 971. It may be held that if the record

Though not involved in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N. W. 738, the court in the course of its opinion observed that “in-affirmatively disclosed the adoption of an asmuch as a bill, before it becomes a law, must be signed by the presiding officers of the two houses and by the governor, as will be assumed, we may, for the purposes of this case, concede, when it has been enrolled and so signed and deposited in the office of the secretary of state, it is the ultimate and conclusive evidence of the contents of the bill which passed the general assembly, and that it cannot be contradicted by the journals, because there is no constitutional provisions requiring that it shall be entered on the journals."

And further on at page 563, of 60 Iowa, it was said: "For fear we may be misunderstood, we will repeat that, when a bill or joint resolution is required to be signed by the presiding officers and the governor, and it is so signed, it will be conceded that such bill or resolution constitutes the ultimate and conclusive evidence of the contents thereof."

In Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa, 702, 25 N. W. 887, the bill was presented to the governor for his approval during the last three days of the session of the general assembly, and he did not sign it and merely deposited it in the office of the secretary of

amendment which does not appear in the enrolled bill, or that such bill did not receive a constitutional majority of either house, or other vital defect of that nature, the court would not be bound to accept the enrolment and publication of an alleged statute as a finality; but we are here asked to go very much farther than the suggested case, and to presume that the house did adopt certain amendments of which there is not the slightest record, except of the fact that they were recommended by a committee. The fact that the journal does not show what was done with these amendments may afford good ground to criticize the manner of keeping the record; but we know of no rule of law or reason by which we can presume they were adopted by the house."

It will be noted that the point under consideration was not involved in any of those cases, but it was covered by what was said in Duncombe v. Prindle, supra, and that decision is generally cited in opinions holding that the enrolled bill in office of the secretary of state, when properly attested. is conclusive evidence of its enactment, and, even though what was said in other deci

the journal on final passage, no record except the enrolled bill duly authenticated is exacted by the fundamental law, and as the legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the government, in no sense inferior to the other branches, and equally bound by oath of obedience to the Constitution, we perceive no reason for not regarding its final record as embodied in such enrolled bill, authenticated as required by § 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, as absolute a verity as the judgment of a court. Of course, a judgment may be attacked, but not collaterally, and that is the only way an enrolled bill may be assailed.

sions be dicta, these indicate the trend of exacted in the passage of a bill also required thought of those concurring therein. More- to be preserved? The Constitution noover, upon an examination of the conflicting where requires the bill to be made of record. authorities, we are inclined to the opinion | Aside from entering the yeas and nays on that this construction has the better reason for its support. There is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between other parties. Regardless of the good faith of a person or officer relying on the enrolled bill in the office of the secretary of state, this would afford no protection from the consequence of his acts if it should turn out that the journals or other evidence disclosed fatal defects in its passage. One believing that he were complying with the Each of the three departments of our law might be unwittingly committing a government is equal, and each should be crime, or an officer paying out money in responsible to the people whom it represupposed obedience to a statute might dis- sents. The legislature enacts laws, and is cover too late that the enactment he under- commanded by the Constitution to enact took to obey had not been adopted in the them in a certain way. The executive manner prescribed by the Constitution, ac- enforces the laws, and by the Constitution cording to record of clerks, though the it is made his duty to take certain steps legislators were proceeding under solemn looking toward such enforcement in the oath of obedience to the fundamental law. manner prescribed therein upon the hapIt seems quite enough that the average citi-pening of certain contingencies. The judizen must take notice of the contents of the enrolled bill when duly authorized, subsequent to July 4th after passage, without also putting upon him the burden of ascertaining the condition of the journal of the respective houses bearing thereon, and determining for himself the effect of any irregularity therein tending to invalidate the bill. Courts could not rely upon the pub-more impropriety in the legislature seeking lished session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the house and senate, and often to any printed bills or amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the general as sembly. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never become a law. The inconvenience of such a rule and the consequent confusion are a strong argument against its adoption. What is the design of exacting the signing of the enrolled bills by the presiding officers of the two houses and the approval of the governor, and that they be deposited with the secretary of state? Is it not that these are the final records of the acts of the legislature for the information and guidance of other departments of government? If so, why should they not be accorded the respect usually accorded solemn records? If merely steps in the enactment of laws, why are not other matters

cial department is charged with the duty of interpreting the laws, adjudging rights and obligations thereunder. Such being the respective duties of the several departments, it would seem that, when certified to have been performed as required by the Constitution, this should be conclusive on the other departments, and there would seem no

to go behind the final record of a court to determine whether it had obeyed some provision of the Constitution in making such record, than there would be in the courts seeking to go behind the final record made by the legislative department. Where the executive is charged with taking certain things upon contingencies happening, and is given no power to act except upon such contingency, if he determined that the contingency exists and acts in pursuance thereof, the courts will not inquire into the fact as to whether he decided correctly in de termining the existence of the contingency. Indeed, to preserve the harmony of our form of government, these mandatory provisions must be considered as addressed to the department which is called upon to perform them, and neither of the other departments will be permitted in any manner to coerce that department into obedience thereto. Those courts which uphold the inquiry as to whether the legislature has observed the mandatory provisions of the Constitution necessarily assume that it is safer

to intrust the enforcement of these to the Constitution itself. If it may, then, for the judicial department than the legislature, same reason it may go beyond the journal, and that the judicial department is the when that is impeached; and so the validity only one in which sufficient integrity ex- of legislation may be made to depend upon ists to insure observance of the provisions the memory of witnesses, and no man can, of the Constitution. Such an attitude in fact, know the law, which he is bound seems intolerable, and not to be endured. to obey. Such consequences would be a It is sometimes said that the courts assume superiority over the legislature in determining that an act violates a provision of the Constitution. This is not so, however, for they merely undertake to determine whether an act of the general assembly is in conflict with the Constitution, and, if it is, the statute necessarily must yield, for that the Constitution has a sanction greater than can be given by the action of any department of state.

large price to pay for immunity from the possible abuse of authority by the high efficers who are, as we think, charged with the duty of certifying to the public the fact that a statute has been enacted by competent houses. Human governments must repose confidence in officers. It may be abused, and there may be no remedy. Nor is there any great force in the argument which seems to be regarded as of weight by some American courts, that some important "Upon principle then, in view of the divi- provisions of the Constitution would be a sion into departments under our form of dead letter if inquiry may not be made by government, each of equal authority, one de- the court beyond the rolls. This argument partment cannot rightfully go behind the overlooks the fact that legislators are sworn final record certified to it or to the public to support the Constitution, or else it asfrom either of the other departments. And sumes that they will wilfully violate that the judicial department is no more justi- oath. It is neither modest nor just for fied in going behind the final act of the leg-judges thus to impeach the integrity of anislature to see if it has obeyed every man- other department of government, and to datory provision of the Constitution than claim that the judiciary only will be faithis the legislature to go back of the final ful to its obligations." record made by the courts to see whether or not they have complied with all the constitutional requirements." State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 23 L.R.A. 340, tution. Nor does it require that the acts 34 Pac. 201.

What was said in Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 95 Am. Dec. 710, is especially pertinent: "It is argued that, if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each house may, by the aid of corrupt presiding officers, impose laws upon the state in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must, of necessity, be confided to officers, who, being human, may violate the trusts reposed in them. This, perhaps, cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond others, nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments, and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep the legislative journal. It ascertains the statute law by looking at its authentication, and then its function is merely to expound and administer it. It cannot, we think, look beyond that authentication, because of the

It is also to be observed that the manner of keeping the journal, by either the house or senate, is not prescribed in the Consti

finally passed shall be preserved in any form or place other than as enrolled bills authenticated as exacted therein and deposited with the secretary of state. In State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, supra, the court, in reverting to this matter, said: "The enrolled acts are prepared with some care, and, under the rules of our legislature, and of every legislative body of which we have any knowledge, some committee is charged with the responsibility of seeing that such enrolled bills are compared with the one which actualy passed the legislature before they are presented to the presiding officer for signature. There is therefore some protection thrown around these enrolled acts, and it would be a difficult matter for anyone through carelessness or fraud to prevent the will of the legislature, as expressed in the bill actually passed, being embodied in the enrolment thereof. But, if the doctrine be once established that the fact that such bill had passed can be negatived by the journal, there would be very little to prevent a bill which had been properly passed being defeated by the carelessness or fraud of the journal clerk or some employee under him. Under the practice prevailing in the legislature of this state, and in most of the other states, there is very little assurance that the journal will fully and ac

ernment which has as its basis the equal authority of the three departments into which it is divided."

In Pacific R. Co. v. The Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 66 Am. Dec. 673, in considering this subject, the court, speaking through Scott, J., said: "If the legislature exceed its powers in the enactment of a law, the courts, being sworn to support the Constitution, must judge that law by the standard of the Constitution, and declare its validity. But the question whether a law on its face violates the Constitution is very different from that growing out of the noncompliance with the forms required to be observed in its enactment. In the one case, a power is exercised, not delegated, or which is prohibited, and the question of the validity of the law is determined from the language of it. In the other, the law is not, in its terms, contrary to the Constitution; on its face it is regular, but resort is had to

curately show the proceedings of the body for which it is kept. The practice in nearly all such bodies is to have the journal read, if read at all, from loose slips of paper, made up partly in writing and partly by pasted slips, and, after being thus read, ordered approved. It is also a fact of which everyone has knowledge that often upon such reading there is such inattention on the part of the members of the legislature that gross errors might pass unnoticed. The journal as thus read and approved from loose slips of paper is then passed to the journal clerk, and by him, or under his direction, transcribed into a book, and the slips then carelessly preserved or entirely destroyed. The transcription of these minutes, without any further action on the part of the legislature, or of any person but the one who makes it, except superficial examination by the journal clerk, and possibly by the presiding officer, becomes the formal journal. It follows that the chances of mis-something behind the law itself in order to take are very great, and for fraud upon the part of the copyist even greater. The Constitution requires that there should be a majority of the body recorded as voting in favor of a bill upon its final passage. Upon such passage the bill in fact receives one or two more than such constitutional majority, and is duly passed; but if by carelessness or fraud the copyist should change one or two of the names of those voting, from the affirmative to the negative, the will of the legislature, regularly expressed, would be defeated. And the same result might follow if in copying he should omit a name. Not only would such results follow in the cases specified, but in many other ways the least error in making up or transcribing the journal might result in the defeat of the will of the legislature. Unless the method of keeping journals should at once be revolutionized, and so much attention be paid to them that they will be made to absolutely represent all the doings of the body to such an extent as to very much prolong the sessions of the legislature, the sanctity of legislative enactments will be entirely dependent upon the carefulness and good faith of some copyist employed by the legislature at a few dollars a day. Much less evil will grow out of a course of decision which will give the people to understand that the legislative is a department of the government of as high authority as the judicial, and that with the mandatory provisions directed to it, the other depart ments of the government have no concern. When this is once well understood, the people will see to it that such mandatory provisions are complied with by the legis lature, or, if they do not, the blame must rest upon themselves or the system of gov

ascertain whether the general assembly, in making the law, was governed by the rules prescribed for its action by the Constitution. This would seem like an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the general assembly, and it must be seen at once that it is a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. This inquiry may be extended to good as well as to bad laws,-to those passed as well with the approval of the governor, as to those which are passed his objections to the contrary notwithstanding; for it is clear that, if a law passed over the objections of the governor may be impeached by inquiring whether the forms of the Constitution were observed in its enactment, the same inquiry may be instituted in relation to laws passed with his sanction, and thus statutes, constitutional on their face, regular in their terms, which may have been the rules of action for years, and under which large amounts of property have been vested, and numerous titles taken, may be abrogated and declared void. A principle with such a consequence should be supported by a weight of authority which no court can resist. When we reflect on the manner in which the journals are made up, and the rank of the officers to which that duty is intrusted, how startling must the proposition be that all our statute laws depend for their validity on the journals of the two houses of the general assembly showing that all the forms required by the Constitution to be observed in their enactment have been complied with. The required forms may be observed, and the clerks may fail to make the necessary or correct entry. If the journals had been designed as the

When we once depart from principle, from a sound rule of law,-where shall we stop? Do not the circumstances of this case open to our vision a vista of absurdities into which we shall stumble if we attempt to explore forbidden fields for evidence of a vague, shadowy, and unsatisfac

the enrolled statutes of the land? In this case, the enrolment, the record of the statute, exists, and we are satisfied that we should not look beyond it, certainly not beyond the record aided by the journals, and looking at both, we must hold the entire act to be a valid law."

evidence in the last resort that the laws | to be seen whether there is anything in our were constitutionally passed, would not Constitution or laws requiring or authorizsome method have been adopted by which ing a departure from the common-law rule. greater care would have been exacted in entering the proceedings of the two houses? Would the task of making them have been intrusted to a single clerk, with a power in the houses to dispense with their reading, even should there be a rule requiring them to be read, a matter, however, about which | the Constitution and laws are silent? In tory character upon which to overthrow that country from which we borrow SO many of our ideas respecting government and laws, and whose common law and early statutes constitute the substratum of all our systems of jurisprudence, the statute roll is the only and exclusive evidence of what the statute law is, so long as it is in existence. Then it is maintained that, if the journal were every way full and perfect, yet it hath no power to satisfy, destroy, or weaken the act, which, being a high record. must be tried only by itself,-teste meipso. So it appears that by the common law the statute roll was the absolute and conclusive proof of a statute. This record could not be contradicted. It implied absolute verity. There was no plea by which the existence of a statute could be put in issue. Under this state of the law our Constitution was adopted."

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This decision was followed in Yolo County v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 265, 84 Am. St. Rep. 41, 64 Pac. 403, though its author, since a judge of the United States circuit court, afterwards seems to have raised some doubt as to its correctness in San Mateo County v. Southern P. R. Co. (C. C.) 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 722.

The question was exhaustively considered in State ex rel. Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. J. L. 29, where, among other things, the court said [in 10 Nev. 182, 21 Am. Rep. 721]: "For whoever engages in any transaction the In Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 89 Am. validity or construction of which depends Dec. 93, will be found a review of the au- upon statutory provisions, whoever holds or thorities up to that time; the court conclud- acquires any sort of property or right, the ing that "the result of authorities in Eng- title or enjoyment of which may be affectland and in the other states clearly is that ed by the operation of any law, is bound to at common law, whenever a general statute take notice, at his peril, what the law is. is misrecited, or its existence denied, the And it is not enough for him to know what question is to be tried and determined by the law is after a court of last resort has the court as a question of law; that is to made an investigation and determined what say, the court is bound to take notice of it, part of the statute roll is to stand and what and inform itself the best way it can; that part to fall, but he must know in advance there is no plea by which its existence can of litigation, and govern his conduct acbe put in issue and tried as a question of cordingly. If there is any record or docufact; that, if the enrolment of the statute ment outside of the statute roll to which a is in existence, the enrolment itself is the court will resort for the purpose of testing record, which is conclusive as to what the the validity of an enrolled law, he must not statute is, and cannot be impeached, de- overlook it. If a court will hear oral testistroyed, or weakened by the journals of mony to impeach the record, he must be Parliament or any other less authentic or able to conjecture in advance what the testiless satisfactory memorials; and that there mony will be, and what weight will be alhas been no departure from the principles lowed to it. Considering the exigency of of common law in this respect in the United this rule, it is easy to perceive of what exStates, except in instances where a depar- treme importance it is that there should ture has been grounded on, or taken in pur- be some high, authentic, and unquestionable suance of, some express constitutional or record to which not only courts and public statutory provision requiring some relax-officers, but private citizens, may resort, and ation of the rule, in order that full effect might be given to such provisions; and in such instances the rule has been relaxed by judges with great caution and hesitation, and the departure has never been extended beyond an inspection of the journals of both branches of the legislature. It remains

by a simple inspection determine for themselves with infallible certainty what are the statutes of the state, and what are their terms. Considerations such as these had led to the firm establishment in England, at a date anterior to American independence, of the maxims that matters of public

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