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the service of civil process and criminal process against persons charged with crimes committed out of such territory, the government of the United States has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over such territory for all purposes of legislation and jurisprudence, with the single exceptions expressed; and consequently that no persons are amenable to the laws of the commonwealth for crimes and offenses committed within said territory; and that persons residing within the same do not acquire the civil and political privileges, nor do they become subject to the civil duties and obligations of inhabitants of the towns within which such territory is situated."

And accordingly they were of the opinion that persons residing on such lands were not entitled to the benefits of the common schools for their children in the towns in which said lands were situated. (1 Met. 580.)

In Sinks v. Reese (19 Ohio St., 306) the question came before the Supreme Court of Ohio, as to the effect of a proviso in the act of that State, ceding to the United States its jurisdiction over lands within her limits for the purposes of a national asylum for disabled volunteer soldiers, which was, that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent the officers, employes and inmates of the asylum, who were qualified voters of the State from exercising the right of suffrage at all township, county and State elections in the township in which the national asylum should be located. And it was held that, upon the purchase of the territory by the United States, with the consent of the Legislature of the State, the general government became invested with exclusive jurisdiction over it and its appurtenances in all cases whatsoever; and that the inmates of such asylum resident within the territory, being within such exclusive jurisdiction, were not residents of the State so as to entitle them to vote, within the meaning of the Constitution which conferred the elective franchise upon its residents alone.

To the same effect have been the opinions of the Attorney-General, when called for by the head of one of the departments. Thus, in the case of the armory at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, the question arose whether officers of the army, or other persons residing in the limits of the armory, the lands comprising which had been purchased by consent of the State, were liable to taxation by her. The consent had been accompanied by a cession of jurisdiction with a declaration that the State retained concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over the pláce so far as it could be consistently with the acts giving consent to the purchase and ceding jurisdiction and that its courts, magistrates and officers might take such cognizance, execute such

processes and discharge such other legal functions within it as might not be incompatible with the true intent and meaning of these acts. The ques tion having been submitted to the Attorney-General, he replied that the sole object and effect of the reservation was to prevent the place from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the State, and that in all other respects the exterritoriality of the armory at Harper's Ferry was complete, in so far as regards the State; that the persons in the employment of the United States, actually residing in the limits of the armory, did not possess the civil and political rights of citizens of the State, nor were they subject to the tax and other obligations of such citizens. (6 Ops, Attys-Gen., 577. See also the case of New York Post-office site, 10 Id, 35.

These authorities are sufficient to support the proposition which follows naturally from the language of the Constitution, that no other legislative powers than that of congress can be exercised over lands within a State purchased by the United States with her consent for one of the purposes designated, and that such consent under the Constitution operates to exclude all other legislative anthority.

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But with reference to lands owned by the United States, acquired by purchase without the consent of the State, or by cessions from other governments, the case is different. Story, in his commentaries on the Constitution, says, If there has been no cession by the State of the place, although it has been constantly occupied and used under purchase or otherwise by the United States for a fort or arsenal or other constitutional purpose, the State jurisdiction still remains complete and perfect," and in support of this statement he refers to People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225. In that case the land on which Fort Niagara was erected in New York, never having been ceded by the State to the United States, it was adjudged that the courts of the State had jurisdiction of crimes or of offenses against the laws of the State committed within the fort or its precincts, although it had been garrisoned by the troops of the United States and held by them since its surrender to Great Britain, pursuant to the treaties of 1793 and 1794. In deciding the case the court said that the possession of the post by the United States must be considered as a possession for the State, not in derrogation of her rights, observing that it regarded it as a fundamental principle that the rights of sovereignity were not to be taken away by implication. "If the United States," the court added, "had the right to exclusive legislation over the fortress of Niagara, they would have also exclusive jurisdiction, but we are of the opinion that the right of exclusive legislation

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within the territorial limits of any State can be acquired by the United States only in the mode pointed out in the Constitution, by purchase, by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings. The essence of that provision is that the State shall freely cede the particular place to the United States for one of the specific and enumerated objects. This jurisdiction cannot be acquired tortiously by dissessin of the State; much less can it be acquired by mere occupancy, with the implied or tacit consent of the State, when such occupancy is for the purpose of protection."

"Where, therefore, lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a State than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to this qualification: | that if upon them forts, arsenals or other public buildings are erected for the use of the general goverment, such buildings, with their appurtenances as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the general government. Their exemption from State control is essential to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated powers. But, when not used as such instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State over the places acquired will be, as full and complete as over any other places within her limits.

"As already stated the land constituting the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation was not purchased but was owned by the United States by session from France many years before Kansas became a State; and whatever political sovereignty and dominion the United States had over the place comes from the cession of the State since her admission into the Union. It not being a case where exclusive legislative authority is vested by the Constitution of the United States, that cession could be accompanied with such conditions as the State might see fit to annex, not inconsistent with the free and effective use of the fort as a military post."

"In the recent case of Fort Porter Military Reservation, the opinion of the Attorney-General was in conformity with this view of the law. On the 28th of February, 1842, the Legislature of the State of New York authorized the commissioners of its land office to cede to the United States the title to certain land belonging to the State within her limits for military purposes, reserving a free and uninterrupted use and control in the canal com

missioners of all that may be necessary for canal and harbor purposes.' Under this act the title was conveyed to the United States. The act also ceded to them jurisdiction over the land. In 1880, the Superintendent of Public Works of New York, upon whom the duties of canal commissioner were devolved, informed the Secretary of War that the interests of the State required that the land, or a portion of it, should be occupied by her for canal purposes, claiming the right to thus occupy it under the reservation in the act of cession. The opinion of the Attorney-General was therefore requested as to the authority of the Secretary of War to permit the State, under these considerations, to use so much of the land as would not interfere with its use for military purposes. The Attorney-General replied that the United States, under the grant, held the land for military purposes and that the reservation in favor of the State could be deemed valid only so far as it was not repugnant to the grant; that, hence, the right of the State to occupy and use the premises for canal or harbor purposes must be regarded as limited or restricted by the purposes of the grant; that when such use and occupation would defeat or interfere with those purposes, the right of the State did not exist; but when they would not interfere with those purposes, the State was entitled to use so much of the land as might be necessary for her canal and harbor purposes." (16 Ops. Attys.-Gen. 592.)

"We are here met with the objection that the legislature of a State has no power to cede away her jurisdiction and legislative power over any portion of her territory, except as such cession follows under the Constitution from her consent to a purchase by the United States for some one of the purposes mentioned.

But aside from this consideration, it is undoubtedly true that the State, whether represented by her legislature, or through a convention specially called for that purpose, is incompetent to cede her political jurisdiction and legislative authority over any part of her territory to a foreign country without the concurrence of the general government. The jurisdiction of the United States extends over all the territory within the States, and, therefore, their authority must be obtained as well as that of the State within which the territory is situated before any cession of sovereignty or political jurisdiction can be made to a foreign country."

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country; and the two, the State and the general government, may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to carry out the purposes of the Constitution. It is for the protection and interests of the States, their people and property, as well as for the protection and interests of the people gene- | rally of the United States, that forts, arsenals and other buildings for public uses are constructed within the States. As instrumentalities for the execution of the powers of the general government, they are, as already said, exempt from such control of the States as would defeat or impair their use for those purposes; and if, to their more effective use, a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction by the State would be desirable, we do not perceive any objection to its grant by the Legislature of the State.. Such cession is really as much for the benefit of the State as it is for the benefit of the United States. It is necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as the places continue to be used for the public purposes for which the property was acquired or reserved from sale. When they cease to be thus used the jurisdiction reverts to the State. (114 U. S. 542.)

To summarize the conclusions arrived at in these various adjudications we might say in regard to this part and reservation, as well as all others where the conditions are similar:

CONTRACT-DAMAGES.- Where plaintiff, on the promise of defendant, to make papers giving her property to the plaintiff's wife, after defendant's death, if plaintiff would move "from his residence" to defendant's home, and take care of her, moved his buildings outo defendant's property, he cannot recover therefor, on defendant's repudiation of the agreement and refusal to allow plaintiff to remove them; moving the buildings having been either a gratuitous act, or at most a means by which plaintiff enabled himself to do his stipulated part. (Kenerson v. Colgan [Mass.], 41 N. E. Rep. 122.) EQUITY BILL TO CANCEL TAX DEEDS.- -A bill by a landowner to cancel numerous tax deeds, held by different persons under a sale made by the commissioner of school lands, in West Virginia, in one proceeding to forfeit the lands for taxes, may be maintained as a bill to remove cloud from title, and on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, where all the parties claim under a common source of title. (Ulman v. Iaeger [U. S. C. C., W. Va.], 67 Fed. Rep. 980.)

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ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.-A suit in which the United States has no interest, and in which it is under no obligation either to the public or to the party for whose benefit the suit is brought, can be sustained no better in the name of the United States than in the name of the real party in interest; and an estoppel which would operate against the rights of such party will bar recovery, notwith

1. The State courts have no jurisdiction of any kind of crimes committed thereon, and can only serve process for crimes committed outside of it. 2. Only Federal courts have concurrent jurisdic-standing that the United States is the formal com

tion with courts-martial.

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ATTACHMENT-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. -The

statute allowing attachments where a debtor has fraudulently conveyed or assigned his effects so as to hinder and delay his creditors, does not authorize attachments where the debtor has, without fraudulent intent, made a conveyance which is only constructively fraudulent. (Weare Commission Co. v. Druley [Ill.], 41 N. E. Rep. 48.)

CARRIERS OF GOODS-BAILMENT.-The rightful owner of personal property in the possession of a common carrier, or other bailee, may enforce his right thereto, although a stranger to the contract of bailment. (Shellenberg v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. [Neb.], 63 N. W. Rep. 859.)

plainant. (Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 975:)

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The probative force of the official certificate of a notary that he deposited in the post-office notice to an indorser of the non-payment of a bill or note is not overcome by evidence of its non-receipt, standing alone, and unaccompanied by evidence that the notice was not in fact deposited in the post-office. (Roberts v. Wold, [Minn.], 63 N. W. Rep. 739). REMOVAL OF CAUSES.- The mere fact that the defendant is a United States marshal justifying under a writ of attachment issued from the Federal court for this district, does not confer upon him any right of removal of the cause to that court. (Walker v. Coleman [Kan.], 40 Pac. Rep. 640.)

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The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1895.

Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other

business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

THE

THE eighteenth annual meeting of the American Bar Association, recently held at Detroit, was from every point of view one of the most interesting in the history of the Association. The meeting extended over a period of four days, instead of three as heretofore, this having been arranged at the suggestion of the Detroit bar, with a view of enabling it to extend courtesies to the Association which would have been impossible within more limited time. The address of President Carter, as was to have been expected was very much more than the resumé of legislation throughout the United States which is required by the Constitution of the Association. It contained many able and pertinent suggestions, and we hope at a very early day to be able to publish at least that portion of it other than the mere formal part relating to the last year's legislation. President Carter presided with great acceptability. His reply to the exceedingly humorous address of welcome, by John M. Dickinson, on behalf of the Detroit bar and the citizens of Detroit, was inimitable as an impromptu effort and showed Mr. Carter in a light entirely new to those who know him only as a lawyer, as it developed a vein of humor of which heretofore he has not been suspected, and the same remark might well be made with reference to his address at the close of the meeting at the annual dinner of the Association, at which he presided as toastmaster. He was certainly at his best during the entire meeting.

the utmost attention throughout and created an exceedingly favorable impression, not only as to the ability of Judge Taft but as to the correctness of the position and views taken by him on the subject discussed.

Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court, in his address upon the necessity for a higher legal education, took high ground in favor of a thorough and complete education of the bar, urging the necessity for careful and systematic teaching and study and calling attention to the high position which is and should be maintained by the bar in its relations to the public, not only as lawyers but as men influential in guiding and governing public affairs. It was a plea for the education of lawyers not only as lawyers, but as fitting them for public life and to exert the influence which they have been and necessarily must he called upon to exert in connection with public affairs. It is worthy to be ranked with Judge Brewer's notable address before the New York State Bar Association two years ago which attracted widespread and deserved attention.

A paper by Judge William Wirt Howe, of New Orleans, treating upon the relations of the civil law and the common law, brought to the attention of the bar very many of the features common to the Roman jurisprudence and that of England. Judge Howe traced the rise and progress of the English law in its relation to the civil law in force in continental Europe, and cited very many English authorities in favor of the view that very much that is embraced in the common law has been derived from Roman sources. It was an exceedingly polished as well as instructive paper, and must tend to create an interest in the civil law, which was urged by the Committee on Legal Education as a proper topic for study in the law. schools throughout the country.

We publish in this issue the report of the Committee on Law Reporting, presented to the Association through J. Newton Fiero, its chairman, and concurred in by the entire com

The annual address by Judge Taft was a notable effort in its discussion of the legal Raphases of the Chicago riots of last year. The position of Judge Taft upon the bench, his re-mittee, with the exception of Judge Dillon, lation to a portion of this litigation and his ability as a lawyer all conspired to render it a most interesting production. Although of great length, it was received by the association with VOL. 52 No. 10.

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who is abroad, and was, as is stated in the report, unable to take part in its preparation. The movement for this committee began last year through the thorough acquaintance of

Judge Dillon with the subject and his knowledge of what had been accomplished in the State of New York through the Committee on Law Reform of that Association. Upon the completion of the reading of the report, on motion of Judge Baldwin, of Connecticut, the committee was made a permanent committee of the Association, and the constitution and bylaws were, by a unanimous vote, amended for that purpose. This was followed by a motion requesting the chair to reappoint the same committee; as to this, however, President Carter took time by the forelock and reappointed the committee without putting the matter to the

vote of the Association.

The matter of preparing suitable indices to the law reports and a uniform system of titles for digests, was also referred to the same committee, and on motion of Mr. Fiero, on behalf of the committee, Austin Abbott was requested to co-operate with the committee in this matter, and aid in the preparation of a set of titles which may be adopted throughout the country in the indices to the reports and the digests.

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was followed on Wednesday by a sail upon the Detroit river and Lake St. Clair on steamer chartered for that purpose, on which occasion the members of the association were

the guests of the Detroit bar. On Thursday several of the citizens of Detroit placed at the disposal of the bar their steam yachts for the purpose of entertaining the association on a trip upon the river and Lake St. Clair, a member of the local bar accompanying each yacht and acting as host. The hospitality was extended in a most unostentatious manner and reflects very much credit upon the members of the bar and citizens of Detroit.

The annual dinner was a very decided suc-
An exceedingly apt address was made by

cess.

Ex-Governor Alger, in which he said he had in his early days been admitted as a member of the bar, the committee having reported favorably upon his answers to three questions, one of which he answered wrong and two right. He followed this by saying that he undertook to answer the first question and was informed that he was wrong; that in reply to the next two questions he said he didn't know and was promptly informed by the committee that he was right.

Justice Brown, in his address, referred to the measure of success which has attended the or

ganization of circuit courts of appeal of the United States, showing that there is every reason to believe that so soon as the Supreme Court is relieved of the work accumulated before the organization of these courts, it will be fully abreast of its work. In this lies a suggestion of the possibility, and perhaps the probability that the Court of Appeals of New York may also be so fortunate by reason of the organization of the new appellate division of the Supreme Court which is organized upon substantially the basis of the circuit courts of appeal and for somewhat the same purpose.

One of the more important matters brought to the attention of the association is the matter of a uniform system of procedure throughout the English speaking countries in connection with the study of comparative law upon that subject. This matter has attracted the attention of the English bar to a very considerable extent during the past few months and as a result, as stated by him, of communications from leading English barristers, Mr. J. Newton Fiero moved the adoption of the following preamble and resolution :

"Whereas it is desirable that this association

inquire into and collate the facts relative to the movement in progress to further a uniform system of legal procedure, and the study of comparative law on that subject throughout the English speaking world, Resolved, that a committee of five be appointed for that purpose.'

This committee will be appointed by the newly elected President Moorfield Storey, of Boston, and will enable the association, by correspondence and otherwise, to compare the workings of the various systems of procedure under the common law and the code in this

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