relied upon. That was an action to recover damages of the defendant for having harbored and retained the plaintiff's minor son in bis employ. The issues and circumstances were quite different from those certified in this case. The court says: "There could be no such harboring as would render the defendant liable to the father in this action, if the son was in truth emancipated, and, if the son was not emancipareatal authority; no dissatisfied and roving pated, it will still be a question whether there was such harboring as renders the defendant liable. By 'emancipation,' in this connection, we understand such act of the father as sets the son free from his subjection, and gives him the capacity of managing his own affairs as if he was of age."

The following is given as a condensed statement of the facis: "In the spring or summer of 1852, plaintiff's son, a minor of the age of seventeen, went to reside at defendant's house, and was then and afterwards employed by him as a hired hand for over one year, the defendant paying the son full wages for his services. In February, 1853, plaintiff sued defendant to recover for the set vices, in which suit the judgment was for the defendant. The son was of a dissatisfied and roving disposition, careless and improvident in his habits, not under parental control, and, either through willfulness or negligence, had not received the education proper for a person of his age and condition. In December, 1851, a misunderstanding arose between the parent and the child, which resulted in the son's leaving home, and residing and working at various places, before he went into the defendant's service. After said December, 1851, the father did not, apparently, have or exercise the proper and necessary control and authority over the said minor that a parent of a well-regulated family ought and should exercise, and permitted and sanctioned the hiring out of said minor at various places, and at different employments, away from home; but who made the contracts, or received the pay, is not stated nor proven. The father had also stated that he had no control over his son, and had in some instances waived his authority over him. It also appears that on the 11th of September, 1852, the plaintiff, by publication in a newspaper, forewarned all persons from crediting bis said son on his account, avowing, also, therein that he would pay no debts of his contracting, and that he would not fulfill any contracts, or pay debts, entered into by him." The court says: "From these circumstances, to mention none others, we think the court might fairly conclude there was a manumission or emancipation up to the time above stated, and that there was no liability for giving the son shelter, residence and a home. At least, we think it so fairly deducible from the facts that we should not disturb the conclusion."

was attended by the plaintiff, as her physician, from day to day, for a period of twenty-one days, which services were rendered without the procurement, knowledge or consent of the defendant. These circumstances are widely different from those in Everett v. Sherfey. Here there was no disagreement that resulted in the daughter leaving home; no want or waiver of disposition; no statement by the father that he had no control over his daughter; and no publication by the father notifying persons not to credit her on his account. The circumstances disclosed in this case are such as are of frequent occurrence in this country. Parents, either from necessity or from a desire to teach their children to be industrious and self-supporting, emancipate them from service, for a definite or indefinite time, without any intention of thereby releasing their right to exercise care, custody and control over the child. The obligation of parents to support their minor childrea loes not arise alone out of the duty of the child to serve. If so, those who are unable to render service be-cause of infancy, sickness or accident--who most of all others need support-would not be entitled to it.

Blackstone, in his Commentaries (vol. 1, p. 446), says: "The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law, - -an obligation, says Puffendorf, laid on them, not only by Nature herself, but by their own proper act in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents." This obligation to support is not grounded on the duty of the child to serve, but rather upon the inability of the child to care for itself. It is not only a duty to the child, but to the public. The duties extend only to the furnishing of necessaries. What are necessaries must be determined by the facts in each case. The law has fixed the age of majority; and it is until that age is attained that the law presumes the child incapable of taking care of itself, and has conferred upon the parent the right to care, custody, control and services, with the duty to support.

3. There being no direct evidence as to the purposes of the defendant with respect to his daughter, we are to say with what intention he consented to his daughter's going and remain-, ing away from his home as she did. That he intended she should control her own earnings, The circumstances disclosed in this case are at least until such time as he should declare these: The defendant's daughter, at the age of otherwise, is evident; but that it was ever his fourteen, went to reside away from her father's intention that if, by sickness or accident, she bouse, at a place thirty miles distant, where should be rendered unable to support herself, for three years she contracted for, earned and he would not be responsible to those who controlled her own wages, and provided her- might minister to her actual necessities, we do self with clothing, her father consenting there not believe. Such an inference from these facts to, he not furnishing, or agreeing to furnish, would be a discredit to any father. In our her with any money, or means of support. view, there was, at most, but a partial emanThat, while thus absent, she was dangerously cipation,-an emancipation from service for an attacked with typhoid fever, and at her request | indefinite time. The father had a right at any

time to require the daughter to return to his home and service; and she had a right at any time to return to his service, and to claim his care, custody, control and support. There was no such an emancipation as exempted the father from liability for actual necessaries furnished to his daughter. In view of the legal as well as the moral duty of appellant to furnish necessary support to his daughter during minority, and especially when unable, from infancy, disease or accident, to earn her own necessary support, we think he may well be understood as promising payment to any third person for actual necessaries furnished to her. As already stated, what are necessaries must be determined from the facts of each case. What would be necessary support to a child in sickness would not be necessary in health. The services sued for were evidently, necessary for the support and well being of the defendant's daughter. As we have seen, he had not relieved himself from the duty to furnish her such support, and, from his obligation to do so, may be presumed to have promised payment to anyone who did furnish it in his absence.

Our conclusion is that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

Beck, J., dissenting:

2. These facts show that the daughter was emancipated by the father. Emancipation may be shown by circumstances from which may be inferred the consent of the father that the child may control his own time, earnings and actions. Slight circumstances tending to show such consent are sufficient, in the absence of contradictory evidence. Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 267; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 356.

3. Emancipation relieves the child of subjection to the parent, and bestows upon him the capacity of managing his own affairs as if he were of age (Everett v. Sherfey, supra; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 268); and it also relieves the parent of all legal obligation to support the child. Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 268.

4. A parent is bound, neither at common law, nor by any statute of the State, to support his children who are of age. Monroe Co. v. Teller, 51 Iowa, 670; Blachley v. Laba, 63 Iowa, 22.

As I have shown, an emancipated child stands as to his obligation to his parent and the points exempt to or from obligation for his support, just as a child who is of age.

5. It may be that the parent would be under obligation to support a pauper child who is of full age, or that a promise would be implied on the part of the father to render such support. But that point is not in this case, as it is not shown or claimed that the child for whose support the father was sued is a pauper, or not possessed of ample means to pay plaintiff for the services rendered by him.

1. I cannot assent to the doctrines and conclusions announced in the majority opinion in this case. The facts are presented in the certificate of the judge upon which the case is brought here on appeal. We cannot look elsewhere for the facts. They are, briefly stated, these: The daughter was seventeen years old, and, with the father's consent, was at service thirty miles away from his home, and had been for three years, all the time controlling her own wages, and supplying her own wants, and receiving nothing for support or necessaries from her father. The father had no knowledge that services were rendered to the daughter by plaintiff, or that his daughter was sick. It is not shown that the daughter was a pauper, or with- In my opinion, the judgment of the district out means to pay the plaintiff. No presump-court ought to be reversed. tion to that effect will be entertained.

6. Doctrines as to the liability of the father for the support of his minor child, and his liability therefor upon a promise, express or implied, and upon other points of the law, are found in the majority opinion, to which I dissent. As tending to support my views, I cite the following decisions of this court: Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa, 512; Johnson v. Barnes, 69 Iowa, 641. See, to the same effect, Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 236.

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT.

J. W. RUSSELL et al., Appts.,

v.

R. H. TATE et al.

(....Ark.....)

1. A town council has no power to appropriate funds of the town to aid in building a county court-house therein.

NOTE.-Towns and villages may be restrained from making illegal appropriations.

In this country, the right of property holders or taxable inhabitants to resort to equity to restrain municipal corporations and their officers from transcending their lawful powers or violating their legal duties in any mode which will injuriously affect the taxpayers, such as making an unauthorized appropriation of the corporate funds, has been affirmed or recognized in numerous cases in many of the States. 2 Dilion, Mun. Corp. 829.

2. Where an illegal appropriation has been made by a town council and warrants drawn thereon, some of which have been paid, equity has jurisdiction of a suit to cancel the unpaid warrants, to compel repayment of the mon ey paid and to annul the appropriation, and the recalling and cancellation of the unpaid warrants after suit is brought will not oust the jurisdiction; in such case the court may grant affirmative, as well as injunctive, relief.

A citizen and taxpayer of an incorporated city is entitled to an injunction to restrain an illegal appropriation of the money of the city. Withington v. Harvard, 8 Cush. 6; New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Harney v. Indianapolis, C. & D. R. Co. 32 Ind. 244; Scofield v. Eighth School Dist. 27 Conn. 499, 504: Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131; Terrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105.

If an appropriation of money be made for two objects, one lawful and the other not, and it cannot be distinguished and separated, the whole will be

See also 25 L. R. A. 862; 36 L. R. A. 367; 41 L. R. A. 692.

3. Taxpayers may maintain suits against town officers to prevent or remedy misapplica

tion of town funds.

the appropriation to the court-house be quashed,
and for the restitution to the town treasury of
the $675 already paid.

4. Although members of a town council
are not liable for the exercise of their discre-
tion in voting upon measures before them, yet
where they vote an appropriation for their own
benefit, which is paid, the transaction is a conver-lants were all re-elected.
sion of trust funds for which each of them, as
well as the mayor who orders, and the treasurer

On the 27th of March the appellants, in their official capacity as town council, called in and destroyed the $325 warrant.

who makes, the payment, will be liable; and the subsequent re-election of the same parties to office will not affect their liability.

(February 15, 1890.)'

At the town elect on held April 3 the appel

Appellants then filed a motion to dismiss so much of the complaint as related to the $325 warrant, on the ground that the injunctive relief had been extinguished by its destruction, which motion was overruled. They then moved to strike from the complaint all that part which related to the $675, which motion

APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of was also overruled. They then filed an answer

the Circuit Court for Pope County in Chancery in favor of plaintiffs in an action to annul an alleged illegal appropriation of public money, and to compel a return into the public treasury of whatever had been paid under such appropriation. Affirmed.

This action was brought by taxpayers of the Town of Russellville against the mayor, aldermen and treasurer of said town.

in which they alleged, inter alia, that the destruction of the warrant was virtually the rescinding of the resolution of February 3, espe cially to the extent of the $325 warrant, that the act diverting the $675 from the public treasury was within the legislative discretion of the council and that defendants were not liable for their action in regard to that matter; that after the appropriation had been made and the money The aldermen, among others, bad, in consid-paid, the matter had been submitted to the eration that the people would change the county seat of Polk County from Dover to Russellville, executed an approved bond for the use of the county to build a court-house at Russell ville and donate the house and ground to the county. During the course of construction of the court-house appellants, in their capacity as town council of said town, on February 3, 1888, passed a resolution appropriating $1,000 to assist in the completion of the court-house. Two The court overruled the demurrer and after warrants were drawn against this appropria-hearing entered a decree in favor of plaintiffs for tion, one for $675 and the other for $325, the former being immediately paid.

On February 17 appellees filed a bill against appellants in chancery, alleging that they were citizens and taxpayers of said town and praying for a temporary injunction restraining the collection and payment of the $325 warrant, and that finally it be perpetually enjoined, that

held void; otherwise the court will enjoin or relieve against the expenditure which is unlawful. Robberts v. New York, 5 Abb. Pr. 41; Howes v. Racine, 21 Wis. 514.

One or more taxpayers, without showing any other injury than that which they will suffer in common with other property holders of the municipality, may file a bill to restrain the allowance and payment of an illegal claim, or the collection of the tax for unauthorized objects, such as, for example, to pay a fraudulent or collusive judgment. Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170, 180; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Drake v. Phillips, 40 Ill. 388.

But, on the other hand, it has been decided in

New York that resident citizens or taxpayers of a municipal corporation cannot, as such, merely, either on their own behalf or on behalf of themselves and all others having a like interest, maintain a suit to restrain or avoid corporate acts alleged to be illegal. This doctrine, left open in Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N., Y. 356, and Guilford v. Chenango Co. 13 N. Y. 143, was first definitely estab lished in Doolittle v. Broome (o. 18 N. Y. 155, disapproving, on this point, Adriance v. New York, 1 Barb. 19; Brower v. New York, 3 Barb. 254; Christopher v. New York, 13 Barb. 567; Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 13, 244, and De Baun v. New York, 16 Barb. 392.

qualified electors of the town, and the action of the board approved by a large majority, and appellauts all re-elected to office, and that this estopped appellees from bringing suit.

The answer concluded with a demurrer upon the following, among other, grounds: want of proper parties plaintiff. The court had no jurisdiction of the subject in so far as it related to the $675.

the recovery of the $675, en joining defendants from attempting to renew the warrant for $325, and from making any provision for the payment of the money mentioned in the resolution of February 3, 1888. From that decree defendants took this appeal.

Messrs. Wilson & Granger and G. W. Shinn, for appellants:

Remedy against illegal acts of town authorities. Assessments for local improvements by municipal corporations generally made a lien upon the lands declared to be benefited thereby; each separate land owner had some kind of legal remedy, either by action for damages against the officer enforcing the unlawful collection, or by writ of certiorari to review the assessment itself. But such remedy is inadequate when compared with the comprehensive and complete relief furnished by the single decree in equity. Ireland v. Rochester, 51 Barb. 415, 435: Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Kennedy v. Troy, 14 Hun, 308, 312; Clark v. Dunkirk, 12 Hun, 181, 187;

1 Pom. Eq. Jur. 276.

Injunction as a remedy.

An injunction will not be granted, in general, to restrain persons from acting as public officers. The legal remedy is, in general, adequate to test the right to a public office. Campbell v. Taggart, 10 Phila. 443; Jones v. Granville, 77 N. C. 280; Sneed v. Bullock, 77 N. C. 282; Stone v. Wetmore, 42 Ga. 601; Sanders v. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. 419; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. 376.

Injunction will always be granted, if necessary, to protect, aid or enforce any equitable estate, interest or primary right, or to secure and render

The claim to have the $675 refunded to the treasury of the town was a cause of action of a purely legal character, for which there was a full and adequate remedy at law, and therefore a court of chancery had no jurisdiction.

2 Story, Eq. Jur. 156.

A mandatory injunction will not be granted where the thing complained of is accomplished, and there is a remedy at law, although connected with the cause for injunction.

Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works v. Erie R. Co. 20 N. J. Eq. 379; Baxter v. Chicago Board of Trade, 83 III. 146.

Nor will equity, because it has jurisdiction of one cause of action, retain the case to decide one purely legal.

Oakville Co. v. Double-Pointed Tuck Co. 7 Cent. Rep. 720, 105 N. Y. 658; Chapman v. Lee, 11 West. Rep. 650, 45 Ohio St. 356; Pom. Eq. Jur. 178; Lippincott v. Barton, 7 Cent. Rep. 920, 42 N. J. Eq. 272; Dugan v. Cureton, 1 Ark.

42.

So far as the $675 was involved, the right of action was in the town, not in private citizens. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 729, note 1; 3 Dillon, Mun. Corp. $ 730 and note 1, 730a, 730b and note 1, 732; Nixon v. School Dist. No. 92, 32 Kan. 510.

An illegal act which will increase taxation cannot be questioned by a private citizen or taxpayer, unless it is specially injurious to him. Dillon, Mun. Corp. $$ 735 and note 1, 736; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo. 531; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 371, 372; Jones v. Little Rock, 25 Ark. 301.

If appellees had no right to sue, they did not state a cause of action in their favor.

Wi'son v. Galey, 1 West. Rep. 488, 103 Ind. 257; Sinker v. Floyd, 2 West. Rep. 218, 104 Ind. 291; Tipton Co. v. Kimberlin, 6 West. Rep. 885, 108 Ind. 449.

Mr. J. G. Wallace, for appellees: Appellants as the town council, had no power to appropriate and use the revenues and moneys of the town to build a court-house for the county.

Tuck v. Waldron, 31 Ark. 462; Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 337; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110 (27 L. ed. 669), and authorities there cited; Citizens Sav. & Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 655 (22 L. ed. 455); Ark Const. art. 12, § 5; Halbut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark. 246; Jacksonport v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704.

When a court of chancery acquires jurisdiction for one, it does for all, purposes.

Conger v. Cotton, 37 Ark. 287; Bently v. Dillard, 6 Ark. 85.

Jurisdiction always depends on the state of things existing at the time the action is brought. Estes v. Martin, 34 Ark. 410; Sale v. McLean, 29 Ark. 612; Price v. State Bank, 14 Ark, 50. The remedy for the recovery of the $675, standing alone, is purely of equitable jurisdiction.

Ark. Const. art. 16, § 13; Mansf. Dig. §§ 929, 3731; Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. 607; Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U. S. 18 How. 331 (15 L. ed. 401); Bisph. Eq. 49, p. 68; 1 Story, Eq. § 60, 534. It does not matter that the money has been paid. Courts of chancery will decree restitution of it.

2 Story, Eq. § 1252; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 729, 730; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152. Any person owning taxable property in the town may bring his bill in chancery.

Mansf. Dig. § 929; Jacksonport v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Cooley, Torts, 518; Story, Eq. § 1252 (a); Dillon, Mun. Corp. 730, and notes; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601 (25 L. ed. 1070).

Sandels, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

An analysis of the case shows six questions for decision:

1. Has equity jurisdiction as to the matters stated in the bill?

2. Are residents and taxpayers proper parties plaintiff?

3. May affirmative, as well as injunctive, relief be had in such a proceeding?

efficient any purely equitable remedy. So it will lie, the Constitution. If the right to maintain such a against corporations and their directors and officers, to restrain acts which are illegal, ultra vires or in violation of their fiduciary duties. Lord Auckland v. Westminster Local Board of Works, L. R. Ch. 597; Mills v. Northern R. of B. A. Co. L. R. 5 Ch. 621; Pudsey Coal Gas Co. v. Bradford, L. R. 15 Eq. 167; Pickering v. Stephenson, L. R. 14 Eq. 322; Cannon v. Trask, L. R. 20 Eq. 669; Dowling v. Pontypool, C. & N. R. Co. L. R. 18 Eq. 714; Featherstone v. Cooke, L. R. 16 Eq. 298; Mair v. Himalaya Tea Co. L. R. 1 Eq. 411: Carlisle v. Southeastern R. Co. 1 Macn. & G. 689.

On the ground that the remedy in equity is more direct, speedy and effectual than by certiorari, equity will entertain jurisdiction of a bill on behalf of taxpayers to enjoin misapplication of the moneys of the corporation. Colton v. Hanchett, 13 III. 615; Mount Carbon Coal & R. Co. v. Blanchard, 54 Ill. 240; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 583; Harney v. Indianapolis, C. & D. R. Co. 32 Ind. 244. See also Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 831.

bill as this be denied, citizens or property holders would be without adequate remedy to prevent the injury which might result to them from the unauthorized or illegal acts of the municipal government or its officers and agents. Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 395; New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126, and disapproving Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N. Y. 318; and Doolittle v. Broome Co. 18 N. Y. 155. See also Frederick v. Groshon, 30 Md. 436; Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284: Coulson v. Portland, Deady, 481.

Injunction will lie to restrain the imposition cr enforcement of illegal taxes and other public burdens, at the suit of taxpayers. Wagner v. Meety, 69 Mo. 150; Curtenius v. Hoyt, 37 Mich. 583; Cattell v. Lowry, 45 Iowa, 478; Albany & B. Min. Co. v. Auditor Gen. 37 Mich. 391: Sinclair v. Winona Co. 23 Minn. 404; South Platte Land Co. v. Buffalo Co. 7 Neb. 253; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. York Co. 7 Neb. 487; George v. Dean, 47 Tex. 73: Douglass v. Harrisville, 9 W. Va. 162; Marsh v. Clark Co. 42 Wis. 502; Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 48; Hagaman v. Cloud Co. 19 Kan. 394; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496; New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. Dunn, 51 Ala. 128; Wells v. Dayton, 11 Nev. 161; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co. 3 Dill. 200; Brown v. Concord, 58 N. H. 375; Rockingham T. C. Sav. Bank v. Ports

The same doctrine has been expressly sanctioned by the Court of Appea 8 in Maryland, in a case in which it was held that residents and taxpayers of a city might file a bill in equity to restrain the corporation and its officers from taking steps to carry `out a city ordinance creating a debt in violation of, mouth, 52 N. H. 17; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. 377.

4. Was the appropriation of the $1,000 valid | (Canada) 67, cited in note on p. 902, Dillon, or void? Mun. Corp.

The fact that after the suit was brought the city council recalled and canceled the unpaid warrant did not oust the jurisdiction of the court. That was but a part of the purely equitable relief demanded. It was desired to pre- But here, after exercising their discretion in vent its re-issue and cancel the appropriation. voting $1,000 of the money of the town to pay Besides, under our chancery system, had the an obligation which they and a few others had cancellation of the warrant been the only orig-bound themselves to discharge, they or their inal ground of equity jurisdiction, it was not lost. Price v. State Bank, 14 Ark. 50.

NOTE.-Statutes relating to imported liquors, valid. | a statute is not void a a state regulation of inter