Patchett, R., 258 Peacock, A., 155 W. S., 33 Peckmore, J., 135 Peet, H., 98 Penn, C., 325 Perkins, W., 288 Munson, M. L., 230 Murray, R., 135 Mycock, J., 110. Perriam, J., 85 Perry, J., the younger, 189 Philipson, J., 242 J., 167 Phillipps, J., 200, 207 P., 418 Phillips, W., 175 R., 114 Philpotts, J., 5 S., 155 Perrett, J., & Garton, C., 200 Roberton, C., 450 Roberts, G., & Roberts, R., Silvester. J., 241 Robins, G. J., 474 Robinson, J., 63 J., 491 Sim, J., Sim, J., & Sim, D., Pickering, E., 219 8 Plant, G., 419 Pocock, T. G., 33 Ponting, W., 266 Potter, T., 24 S., 399 T., 187 Robson, J., 242 Roden, W., 57 Roe, M., 99 Potts, C., Potts, A., & Potts, Rogers, H., 200 J., 78 Powell, M., 282. W., 348 Price, G., 8 J. R., 18 Prior, J. W., 450 M. L., & R. N., 207, 274 Procter, T., 264 Pulbrook, L., '458 Pugh, C. E., 474 Puleston, W., 502 Pulham, J., 258 Pullen, W., 155. Pullin, J., 33 Occleshead, T., & Cummins, Pym, J., 317. Rowan, T., 502 Rowett, W., 419 Dale, Rowles, I., 474 Rudge, L., 46 Rushbrook, J. C., 338 Rust, E., 481 W. E., 474 Nye, G., 239. 0. Oakes, T., 266 W., 200 Rutter, E., 85 E. H., 456 Sage, W. J., 450 J. B., 55 Scriven, R., 198 No. 627-VOL. XIII. Price 1s., with Supplement, 2s. The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: THERE are some rules of practice, both at law and in equity, so contrary to modern reason, that no one can conceive how they ever came to be rules, and that the Courts are continually compelled to make fine distinctions in order to elude the rule as far as possible. Of this character is the rule of Courts of Equity, that, on an interlocutory proceeding, such as a motion for a receiver, or an injunction, or to compel the defendant to pay money into court, the title must be wholly taken from the answer; and that not only can no affidavits be read against the answer, but that they cannot even be read to substantiate facts ignored by the answer, if directly or indirectly they affect the title. We have more than once heard judges, in administering this rule, apparently simple, but complicated in its application, wonder how it ever came to be the rule; and Lord Eldon, who, great judge as he was, delighted in a legal absurdity, if it was but refined enough, and inconsistent enough with substantial justice, put the absurdity of the rule in its most glaring light when he refused to revive an injunction which had been dissolved upon the answer, though the grand jury had found a true bill on an indictment for perjury on that very answer. For, said his Lordship, "the grand jury may have believed, and in most cases must have believed, those very persons upon their oaths for that purpose, whose depositions this Court would not permit to be read for the purpose of discrediting the answer." (Clapham v. White, 8 Ves. 35). So that the rule of practice is, that the defendant's answer is of such conclusive credibility, that nothing can be allowed to be heard but it, even though you have the strongest evidence that it is false. Whether VOL. XIII. A the rule originally took its rise from this, that as in equity you have a right to ransack the defendant's conscience, so as a set-off you shall believe what the defendant says until the cause is at issue, and that, as a consequence, all counter-evidence would be useless, because it could not be believed; or whether the rule took its rise from some imagined difference between the solemnity of swearing an answer and that of swearing an affidavit, it is now difficult, nay impossible, to ascertain. Why the rule should still be retained, when it is execrated by judges, and serves at this day no purpose but to entangle and complicate interlocutory applications, it is as difficult to understand. A defendant's answer is evidence, nothing more. It is the deliberate assertion on oath of a person entitled to credit, unless he be discredited. So is an affidavit. Affidavits are admitted as to matters of fact; why should they not be as to matters of title? Suppose a cestui que trust files a bill for the appointment of new trustees, and for a receiver, and the trustee admits the plaintiff's title, but denies the misconduct : an affidavit may be read against the answer as to the misconduct; but if the trustee denies the identity of the plaintiff, or the execution of the instrument under which he claims, then an affidavit cannot be read against the answer. What possible rational ground can be assigned for this distinction? If it be said, that, by receiving and believing affidavits on the question of title, the Court might be, in fact, wrongfully ejecting the defendant, the answer is, so it might by hearing affidavits as to acts of misconduct. If a man is wrongfully turned out of possession, it cannot matter to him whether it is because the Court wrongfully believes he never had title to be in, or because it wrongfully believes that he has so behaved that he must be turned Court Papers. EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, HILARY TERM, 12 VICT. 1849. *The following abbreviations have been adopted to abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-A. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap. Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Exceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Pin. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. O. Stand Over-Sh. Short. Alexander v. Bushby (F D, Penrice v. Penrice (F D, C) Wynne v. Price Steele v. Parsons (F D, C) Watts v. Cowell Howard v. Howard Brander v. Bull Hulbert v. Hulbert Billing v. Webb (F D, C) Woodhams v. Woodhams (3 Churchman v. Capon (F D, Same v. Stansfeld Barker v. Wylde (3 causes, D, C) F Daintree v. Day Preece v. France Onslow v. Wallis causes, F D, C) Tomlinson v. Trough (F D, Elsam v. Hall (F ́D, C) ton Haydock v.Tomlinson C) Hutton v. Hayley Whitchurch v. Whit Jones v. Francis (F D, C) church Moorley v. Smith Same v. Parrott (F D, C) Before Vice-Chancellor KNIGHT BRUCE. CAUSES, FURTHER DIRECTIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS. Gregson v. East Anglian Rail- | Yetts v. Norfolk Railway Co. Raworth t. Archer Pin. of Smith v. Oliver} (FD, C) way Co. (D) (2 Ds) Re-hearing disposed of Johnson v. Thomas |