him, and afterwards a deed is executed and a fine levied, with the view of putting an end to the settlement and of barring such charge, but without having that effect, and, by the second deed, another charge to the same amount is created in favour of the lady, who takes a less beneficial interest, in other respects, under the second deed than under the first, and such second charge appears, upon the face of the deed, to have been intended to be a substitute for the charge created by the first deed; both charges will, nevertheless, be established: the first, because it was never barred; and the second, because the wife, especially after the lapse of very many years since the execution of the deed, cannot be deprived of the charge which she had stipulated for by the second deed, merely because her husband did not take the proper means to extinguish the first charge. Farr v. Sheriffe and Dykes v. Farr, 15 Law J. 89-V. C. W. person, who has a reversionary interest in stock standing in the names of trustees, bequeaths the same to another person, and appoints one of the trustees her executor, and the legatee made a general assignment of his estate and effects to the other trustee for the benefit of his creditors, of which no notice is given to the executor, who had not assented to the bequest, and the legatee afterwards assigns the stock by way of mortgage, of which notice is given to the executor, the last assignee has the priority; because notice to the executor is necessary where the bequest has not been assented to by him, and constructive notice to the trustees alone, by means of the actual information of the one who is the first assignee, is not sufficient, at least where the other trustee who is also executor, had no actual information of the first assignment in any way. Nor did the pendency of a suit for carrying into effect the trusts of the first assignment constitute notice of the assignment of the stock in question, if there was no specific claim made in that suit to the legacy in question. Holt v. Dewell, 4 Hare, 446; 15 Law J. 14. NOTICE-See" Mortgage." PARTNERSHIP. other of the partners his executor, subsequent payments of interest by the bank, even under its original name or style, are not to be deemed payments by the executor and will not keep alive the debt as against the real or of the deceased partner in his character of executor, personal estate of the deceased partner, so as to prevent the Statute of Limitations from barring the same as against such estate. Way v. Bassett, 15 Law J. 1— Signing a Consent to an Exchange under a Mistake. Where a proprietor of land in a parish about to be inclosed under an act of Parliament, signs a consent to exchange certain pieces of ground belonging to him, designated therein by numbers corresponding to the numbers by which the same are distinguished in a map and terrier used for the purposes of the inclosure and previously inspected by his agent, and the commissioner thereupon allots those pieces of ground in exPayment of Interest by surviving Partners, one of change, and such exchange is approved of by the agent whom is the Executor of the deceased Partner-Statute of of the proprietor, and the allottee of one of them is leting firm, and one of the partners dies, and appoints anLimitations.]-Where money is deposited with a bankinto possession, and begins to exercise acts of ownership, with the consent of the agent; the proprietor has no right to repudiate the consent so signed by him and the exchange made in consequence thereof, and to ask for an injunction to restrain the commissioner from making his award accordingly, upon the ground, that, before the consent was drawn up, he (the proprietor) had instructed his agent not to permit the exchange of that piece of ground except for other land of the like nature; and that he, (the proprietor), on signing such consent, concluded that it did not comprise that piece of ground, when, in reality, it did comprise it, and the same was allotted in exchange for land of a different nature; the restriction imposed on the agent not having been communicated by him to the commissioner. For the proprietor must be the sufferer by the neglect of his agent, and by his own negligence in not inquiring what property was designated by the numbers in the consent before signing it. And, in such case, if the proprietor brings an action of ejectment for the piece of ground in question, he may be restrained, by an injunction, from proceeding with it. Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld, 12 Cl. & Fin. 248. See "Legacy." MORTGAGE. Liability in respect of Shares in a Banking Company after Payment of the Mortgage Debt and Requisition to re-transfer the Shares.]-Where shares in a banking company are transferred by way of mortgage, and afterwards the debt is paid off, and the mortgagor and mortgagee apply to the directors of the company to have the shares re-transferred, the mortgagee becomes a trustee for the mortgagor from that time, and, as such, entitled to an indemnity in equity from his cestui que trust in respect of calls on other payments required to be made during the interval between the requisition to re-transfer the shares and the actual re-transfer thereof. Phene v. Gillon, 15 Law J. 65-V. C. W. In this case it was agreed that the mortgagee should not be liable for any calls or other payments in respect of the shares; but the decision does not appear to have been in any way grounded on that circumstance. Priority of subsequent Mortgagee of Stock over Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors-Notice.]-Where a V.C. W. PERPETUITY. Power to cut down Timber until there should be a Te nant in Tail of full Age, and to invest the Proceeds in Land.]-Where an estate is devised in strict settlement, and the will, after restraining each tenant for life from cutting timber and underwood, except for repairs, declares that it shall be lawful for the executors, at any time, until some person entitled in possession to an estate tail or some greater estate shall attain the age of twenty-one years, to enter and cut timber and underwood, and directs them from time to time, with the consent and approbation of the persons entitled to the rents and profits of the estate, to invest the residue of the proceeds arising from such timber and underwood, after payment of debts and legacies, in the purchase of lands, to be settled to the same uses as the estate devised; the power, whether it be imperative or permissive only, is void, as a whole; because timber stands upon the same footing as the annual rents and profits of an estate in regard to the rule against accumulation beyond a certain period and the rights of a tenant in tail; and if such a trust as that above mentioned were sustained, it would derogate from the rights of each infant tenant in tail, and there might be an accumulation for ages, inasmuch as the event of there being a tenant in tail of the age of twenty-one might not happen for hundreds of years, perhaps never. And not only is the power void as a whole, but it cannot be apportioned so as to be supported so far as it does not transgress the limits allowed by law. Ferrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 344, and 15 Law J. 41, abstracted from the latter report. Although in this case the learned judge held that the power could not be apportioned, yet he said that he had the strongest impression, that, if the mind of the testator be, that successive acts shall be done from year to year, commencing with the year after his death, and if each of these acts be complete in itself, (as felling timber, and converting the proceeds into land upon the uses of a settlement), and if each act is an exact ment, as far as it goes, of the intention of the testator, both as to the thing done and the parties to be benefited by it, there is no ground why the court should not sustain such a power, as long as the exercise of it, determined by events as they stand at the death of the testator, will not be affected by the law against perpetuities, and should not hold the power void only for the excess. But he did not venture to act upon that opinion, as, by so doing, he considered that he should be contravening the language of other cases, particularly that of Ware v. Polhill, 17 Ves. 257. Ib., 15 Law J., 50, 51. See" Remoteness." PORTIONS. Right of the Owner of Land charged with Portions to have them raised before they are payable.]-Where real estate is limited for a term of years, upon trust, out of the rents, or by mortgage or sale, to raise a certain sum varying in amount according to the number of the children, and to be paid at a certain age or on marriage, with interest at 57. per cent. in the meantime for their maintenance, the eldest son is not entitled to have the portions raised and invested, and his estate discharged, before any of the portions are payable; because younger children ought not to be deprived of the security of the land, or be obliged to take the lower rate of interest in the funds. And, for the same reason, the eldest son is not entitled to have the portion of the youngest child raised and invested, when the portions of the elder children are payable, but before the portion of the youngest is payable. Sheppard v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 392. (This Part to be concluded next week). Court Papers. Before the VICE-Chancellor of England. PLEAS, DEMURRERS, Causes, Mainwaring v. Dickenson (E as to answer) Sanders v. Kelsey (D) (part heard) May 25 Terry v. Wacher Garrod v. Moor } C) (E, FD) Smale v. Bickford Insole v. Featherstonhaugh Hodgkinson v. Barrow (FD,C) EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, TRINITY TERM, 1846. The following abbreviations have been adopted to Colbourn v. Coling abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-4. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap. Gowar v. Bennett (FD) Langton v. Langton (2 caus.) Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Ex-Hickson v. Smith (at deft. ceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. O. Stand Over-Sh. Short. Court of Chancery. Strickland v. Strick-7 (Ap) | Mitford v. Reynolds (E) By land Day Ditto v. Boynton to be Ditto v. Strickland fixed. Vandeleur v. Blagrave (Ap) To fix a day Coore v. Lowndes (Ap) To fix a day Minor v. Minor (2 Ap)] To Ditto v. Ditto (Suppl. fix a suit) day Dalton v. Hayter (Ap) To fix a day Att.-General v. Masters and Wardens, &c. of the City of Bristol (Ap) To fix a day Younghusband v. Gisborne (Ap, part heard) Whitworth v. Gangan (Ap) Bush v. Shipman (Ap) Black v. Chaytor (Ap) Johnson v. Ditto (F D) Jord. request) Palmer v. Pattison (F D, C) Haffenden v. Wood (E) Lawrence v. Bowle (Cause by Cradock v. Piper (F D, C) Sh order) Dawson v. Chappell (F D, C) and FURTHER DIRECTIONS Ford v. Wastall Sh Baxter v. Abbott (F D, C) De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir (F D, C) Beale v. Warder (rehearing) Turner v. Simcock (F D, C) Booth v. Lightfoot (F D, C) Waugh v. Waugh Tufnel v. Drever Ludlow v. Guilleband (F D, C) Parris v. Loosmore (2 causes) Hurst v. Kemp Ashton v. Higginbottom (2 c.) Att.-Gen. v. East India Co. De Visme v. Graham (2 caus.) Hollings v. Kirkby (3 causes) Sh Roberts v. Cardell (E) and De Sola v. Mesnard Burnett v. Mackenby De Freis v. Littlewood Worth v. Gresham Davis v. Falk Doe d. Groves v. Glamorgan-Doe d. Richards v. Evans ricks Same v. Same Lincoln-Chapman v. Rawson Nind v. Parry Same v. Rowe and Norman Nicoll v. Orgill O'Neill v. Bundle Doed. Dyke v. Dyke | Reg. v. The Dean and Chapter Thomas v. Jacobs & ors. Somerset-Parnell v. Smith STANDING FOR JUDGMENT. Belcher v. Gummow Rogers v. Brenton Doe d. Earl of Egremont v. Musgrove v. Emerson Hope v. Harman Reg. v. Corporation of Man- Dobson v. Blackmore Doe d. Earl of Egremont v. Doe d. Dayman v. Moore Inkseep v. Harper SPECIAL CASES AND DEMURRERS FOR TRINITY TERM, 1846. Those marked thus * are Special cases-the rest are demurrers. FOR ARGUMENT. *Dale v. Pollard & ors. (stands over till judgment given in Gosling v. Veley & an.) Stephenson v. Newman (stands over till case in Exchequer Chamber is decided) Dolby. Rimington *Pennell & ors. v. Rhodes Springett v. Morrell *Robinson v. Hawksford *Flanders v. Bunbury Sharp v. Watts Chamberlain v. Hammond | of Chester Reg. v. The Bishop of Chester Reg. v. The Justices of Gla- Second Day. Page v. Hatchett Reg. v. Sanders Monday, June 1, by consent. *Reg. v. The Justices of Ely (two cases) |