Mr. SAYRE. I think I said I spoke subject to correction on that, sir. My memory was that it did require Senate ratification. It now turns out that we are both right. Mr. REED. I am not reckless, I hope, in my statements. Am I wrong in that, too? Mr. SAYRE. I have great admiration for you, Mr. Reed. Mr. REED. Thank you very much. Mr. SAYRE. I think we are quite in agreement on that, Mr. Reed. I think there is no difference. Mr. REED. In view of the fact that Congress has exclusive constitutional authority over tariff making, and in view of the further fact that the tariff exercises a profound influence over our whole economic life, do you not think that the Congress should at least have a veto power over the trade agreements after they have been negotiated and put into effect? Mr. SAYRE. My opinion is definitely not, for this reason: You won't get as good concessions for American exports by the lowering of foreign-trade barriers if you have to inform foreign representatives that everything that is done is subject to veto power by the Congress. They will turn back to this same history which I have been suggesting, and I am afraid the game will be up so far as getting foreign reductions is concerned. Mr. REED. Certainly all these other countries that we have mentioned here Mr. SAYRE. Countries having the parliamentary system; yes. Mr. SAYRE. Ours is not a parliamentary system. Mr. REED. Well, I know, but Mr. SAYRE. Countries having the parliamentary system are countries where the executive has control over the legislative votes, so that the parliament does honor the promises of the executive. Of course, as I need hardly point out to you, Mr. Reed, the conditions we are dealing with here are peculiar. Trade is shifting, very rapidly shifting. In order to make agreements it isn't a case where you can go through the formal, cumbersome machinery of a treaty. You have got to act with expedition and certainty. Mr. REED. Doctor, it seems to me that that is an argument against your position. Economic conditions are changing so rapidly that you have got to act with all this dispatch. I should think that was all the more reason why we should be very careful in regard to entering into binding people, like binding india-rubber, for instance, where we are expending over $600,000,000 to try to develop, temporarily at least, enough to make us self-sufficient, rubber, yet we find it on the free list. Mr. SAYRE. Rubber is on the free list of the Tariff Act. It was first bound in a trade agreement at a time when we were not thinking seriously in terms of synthetic rubber. Gutta balata was bound in the Brazilian trade agreement, made some years ago. Mr. REED. It was bound in the agreement with Great Britain, as I understand it. If I am wrong I want to be corrected, but I think that is correct. Mr. SAYRE. I think it was bound first in the Brazilian trade agreement, which became effective―― Mr. REED. That was controlled by Great Britain, the rubber business in Brazil. Mr. SAYRE. In 1936. Mr. REED. When you came along with your trade agreement with Great Britain you bound india-rubber on the free list, and also with the United Kingdom and Peru. Mr. SAYRE. Yes, sir; india-rubber was bound in the trade-agreements with the United Kingdom and Peru. Mr. REED. I wanted to be sure about that. I don't want to be incorrect in any of my statements here. I notice here in the trade agreement with Argentina, made October 14, 1941, in effect November 15, 1941, a month elapsed. Here is Brazil. The date it was signed was February 2, 1935; in effect January 1, 1936. The interval between date of signing and effective date was 10 months 29 days. Mr. SAYRE. Yes, sir. Mr. REED. All we have heard here, when they were asking to have all these powers vested in the Executive, was that we have to have haste, we couldn't wait for our Congress to pass upon any of these trade agreements. Take Columbia. Date signed, September 13, 1935; in effect May 20, 1936. There was 8 months and 6 days elapsed. That wasn't our fault, was it? That was on the other end of the line. And certainly Congress could and would handle a matter in less than 8 months and 6 days. Mr. SAYRE. Not all treaties have been handled in less than that, sir. Mr. REED. I know not all have. But here was Finland, 5 months and 14 days; Guatemala was 1 month and 21 days; Haiti was 2 months 5 days; Honduras, 2 months 12 days. Nicaraugua was 6 months 19 days. In Sweden they certainly have a legislative body, or did when I was there-2 months and 10 days. I think our Congress handles some very large legislation here relating to almost all questions. There hasn't been such an awfully long delay even on the tax bill that you hear so much about. We manage to come through after a while, after sufficient study of the various proposals. Our legislative body functions, a little slowly, but not as slowly as some foreign nations. Of course, if you people can sit down there and write anything you want to, without any well-defined formula, and then let the other legislative bodies take their time, we don't have anything to do. You may say it would save delay on this end of the line, but I say that when those other countries have the advantage of going over these treaties and these rates the elected representatives of the people of this country should have the same privilege. I don't want to keep you too long. I suppose I am overstaying my time. It is a fact, is it not, that you have deliberately taken away from American producers any right to contest the constitutionality of the act by suspending the appeal provisions of section 516 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930? Was not this action on your part more in keeping with the philosophy of some of the countries we are fighting than with American tradition? Mr. SAYRE. My answer is no, sir. That is the section we were discussing earlier. I will be glad to come to that. Section 516 (b), you remember, was, as I said before, not a right at all. It was a privilege which was given. You remember it was first enacted in 1922, if I remember correctly, in order to give the privilege to not importers or exporters, but to competing producers to contest the validity of, or the legality of, certain import duties. This procedure was used again and again merely for purposes of delay. Importers were unduly held up, sometimes for months and months, sometimes even for years, as I understand, under this unusual procedure; that is, competing producers who did not want goods brought in could hold up transactions, import transactions. Mr. REED. Doctor, would you yield right there? Mr. SAYRE. Certainly. Mr. REED. The excuse for denial, the original excuse given for denying American producers the right to litigate matters arising out of trade treaties, was that it would cause undue delay. This excuse, if it ever had any real validity, no longer obtains, for the reason that under an amendment to the Customs and Administrative Act of 1938 final liquidation of increases no longer is required to be suspended pending the outcome of litigation instituted under the section, so that that doesn't apply now. Mr. SAYRE. It doesn't apply now because the act of which you speak provides that 516 (b) shall not apply to importations under the trade agreements. Mr. REED. I may say further that in the court tests which the American producers have attempted to bring jurisdiction on to hear the case on its merits has been denied on the grounds that their right of appeal under section 516 (b) had been taken away by Congress. Mr. SAYRE. Do you remember the case of Louisiana v. McAdoo (234 U. S. 627), decided in 1914? Mr. REED. That was back in 1914. Mr. SAYRE. Yes, and the Supreme Court in that case said: * * ** we can discover no precedent where even an importer has sought to clog the wheels of government by reviewing the action of the Secretary of the Treasury by a bill such as this. The Supreme Court has not looked with favor on clogging up the wheels of government in this way and, as a matter of fact, as I have tried to explain before, the Supreme Court does not like moot cases where there is no actual "case or controversy" involving a litigant's legal rights. Mr. REED. As a rule, if they discover it is practically just a moot case, they will dismiss it, won't they? Mr. SAYRE. Yes. This is not a case of an importer contesting a right, it is a case of a competing producer, and the courts have held that that is not a right, it is a privilege which has been given him, or was given him under section 516 (b). Mr. REED. Since these trade agreements, do you know how many cases have been brought or attempted to be brought by importers? Mr. SAYRE. I could not say, sir, offhand. Mr. REED. They probably haven't, because they have got the short end of the bargain. Yesterday I know my friend was very much excited at the other end of the table, but Mr. Robertson testified that his action in opposing a reduction in the rate on Argentine turkeys was based on the fact that the Argentine production cost was much lower than our own. Is it not true that all the reciprocal tariff provision does is merely to equalize such differential in production costs on all competitive foreign products? That is the formula? Mr. SAYRE. This is the formula in the so-called flexible tariff provision. Mr. REED. If that is a good rule for Virginia turkeys, it would seem to me to be a pretty good rule for others. I have a lot more here. I just feel that I ought to apologize to you for going on so long. If I were to go on with what I want to ask you, I would be here until night. Mr. SAYRE. I have enjoyed talking with you, sir. Mr. REED. I have enjoyed talking to you, but it is not fair to my colleagues on either side. Mr. WOODRUFF. Go ahead. Mr. REED. I know how they feel. They are getting very itchy and impatient over here, so I think I will call it a day, so far as I am concerned, and just let somebody else take you over, Doctor. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Robertson had not concluded his examination of the witness yesterday. Mr. ROBERTSON. Doctor, I am sure that you share my regret that certain members of this committee who are opposed to this program, and who apparently want to take us back to isolationism and HawleySmootism, and keep this country in the post-war era as an armed camp, should see fit to abandon facts and arguments based on facts to indulge in personalities. They continuously refer to the fact that on one occasion the gentlemen from Virginia appeared before the reciprocity committee to discuss a question in keeping with the fundamental principle of reciprocity agreements, namely, the relative cost of production in this country and Argentina. Now, I say I think it is a little unfortunate, as well as slightly trespassing upon the comity due between gentlemen in the discussion of economic problems, to resort to personalities. The repeated reference to turkeys to me has been utterly absurd and ridiculous. In the first place, turkeys are produced in New York, in Michigan, and in Minnesota. They are not as well known as the turkeys produced in Virginia, but far be it from me to reflect upon their quality. All of those States belong to the International Association of Turkey Producers; all of them were represented at the conference I attended. And contrary to the insinuation of the gentleman from Minnesota, who didn't offer it as a pleasantry but as a nasty insinuation that there was some skulduggery between Secretary Hull and me when the duty on turkeys was not reduced in the Argentina agreement, and contrary to being the Joe Grundy of this committee, worming my way into secret and executive sessions when the destiny of the Nation is being affected by what is being done, I appeared with the national representative speaking for Minnesota, New York, and Michigan, reflecting the viewpoints that those distinguished representatives held then and still hold on this subject. In addition to that there were about 150 spokesmen, when the question of turkeys came up. There were numerous Members of the House there; there were some Senators there, including my distinguished Senator, Senator Byrd, of Virginia. And there were delegations that had come to Washington all the way from Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, South Dakota, Wyoming, Missouri, and Virginia for fear that their national organizations and their congressional representatives would not do the complete job in presenting the facts, and through the process of open covenants openly arrived at Mr. WOODRUFF. Now there's a hot one! Mr. ROBERTSON. They established the fact that for all States, with the possible exception of the great State of Texas, where there are wide-open spaces and plenty of grasshoppers-and the cost of production of turkeys is relatively low-the domestic costs of production of turkeys in this country so far exceeded the delivery costs of the dressed bird from Argentina it would not be in keeping with the fundamental principle under which the State Department was operating to make any reduction in the tariff with respect to the Argentina bird. I hope that settles the turkey issue to the satisfaction of my distinguished colleagues. I know that my friend from New York and my friend from Michigan made the reference in a spirit of levity, and I accept it as such, but I was just afraid that my other good friend, from Minnesota, who has recently got back from Florida-and while he was not tall he was tan and terrific-might not have made his reference in as equally kind and generous a spirit, so for his benefit especially I have gone into more detail than I would ordinarily do with reference to something which, on the face of it and to all present, is simply ludicrous. Now, taking up where we left off yesterday Mr. SAYRE. Yesterday you were asking about the five amendments which the Washington Post reported had been proposed by Congressman Gearhart, and I had answered with respect to the first two of those proposals. Now I should like to reply, if I may, to the third, fourth, and fifth of those proposals. Quoting from the Washington Post, the third proposal for an amendment to the Trade Agreements Act was, Language forbidding reductions in United States tariffs which would “adversely affect" either the American standard of living, farm parity prices, or domestic wage levels. As I need hardly repeat, as I pointed out again and again yesterday, the whole objective of the trade-agreements program is to raise the American standard of living. That is what we are shooting for, to raise the American standard of living, to raise wage levels, to raise the national income, to raise farm prices. How well we have succeeded, due not altogether to the trade-agreements program, to generally improved conditions in the country, but also due in part to the trade-agreements program, I would like to cite you the figures, taking up each one of those three matters mentioned in turn; that is, the American standard of living, farm parity prices, or domestic wage levels. So far as the American standard of living in concerned, I notice that the total income of individuals, which, I take it, comprises and consti |