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from the jury. All which, of course, abundantly shows her fitness to plead the causes of others in like case offending. But the whole report is valuable for its discussions upon the subject of obscene publications, which is now occupying the time of several courts in our own State, and the profession may await with additional interest the more deliberate judgment, and, perhaps, opinion which next winter will be pronounced, and which we shall duly chronicle.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ACTION.

Promise to pay debt of another: stranger to consideration: when agreement does not run with land.-Defendant, for a consideration moving from one Parr, the owner of lands, orally agreed to pay certain mortgages upon the lands held by a savings bank. Subsequently Parr conveyed the lands to plaintiff with a covenant of warranty. Held, that plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration for the promise of defendant, and could not enforce it against him. Under the agreement the bank could enforce the defendant's promise (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burrows v. Bass, 24 id. 178), and Parr also could enforce it upon payment to the bank, and perhaps before. This right could not pass to 'plaintiff by conveyance as annexed to the land. Judgment below affirmed. Miller v. Winchell. Opinion by Andrews, J.

[Decided Sept. 18, 1877.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Street railways in cities: constitutional amendments, 1875: New York Elevated Railway: Laws 1875, chap. 606, § 36.-The constitutional provisions which went into effect January 1, 1875, forbidding the legislature to pass a private or local bill granting to a corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks, or granting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise, and requiring the legislature to pass general laws in these cases, and forbidding it from passing any law authorizing the construction or operation of a street railroad without the consent of property owners, etc. Held, not to be violated by Laws 1875, chapter 606, section 36, making provision for the construction of an elevated street railway in New York city. Order below affirmed. Matter of Gilbert Elevated R. R. Co. Opinion by Church, C. J. 2. Vested right not affected by constitutional amendments.-Where, at the time the constitutional provisions went into effect, a corporation had the right under its charter to lay a railroad track in the streets of a city, such right was not affected by the provisions mentioned, nor were legislative enactments passed in 1875, and accepted by the corporation, changing the method of constructing such track, obnoxious to such provisions. Ib.

3. Statute not declared unconstitutional in doubtful cases. An adverse doubtful construction is not sufficient to condemn an act. It is only in cases of clear and substantial departure from the provisions of the fundamental law, that the courts will declare acts of the legislature invalid. People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 54; People ex rel., etc. v. Briggs, 50 id. 553; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 id. 235; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 345. Ib.

[Decided September 18, 1877.]

MARRIED WOMAN.

Contract for benefit of separate estate: misappropria

tion of loan for benefit of estate.-Defendant, a married woman, owning real estate, borrowed money upon her promissory notes for the avowed purpose of paying interest due upon mortgages upon such real estate. Held, a contract for the benefit of her separate estate, and that the subsequent application by her of the proceeds to another purpose, would not affect the lender's right of action. Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 406. The case of Hough v. Jones, 32 Pa. St. 432, is not authority here. Judgment below affirmed. McVey v. Cantrell. Opinion by Rapallo, J. [Decided Sept. 18, 1877. Reported below, 6 Hun, 528.]

NEW YORK CITY.

Assessment for local improvements: valid and void assessments.-A plot containing thirty-six lots was assessed in 1856 at $10,250. Of this plot petitioner owned seventeen lots. Assessments upon the seventeen lots

for improvements were confirmed in the years 1869, 1870, 1872 and 1874. The assessments were in 1869, 1872 and 1874 less than one-half the proportionate value of the seventeen lots, estimated upon the basis of the assessment of 1856. In 1870 the assessment was greater than one-half such value. The General Term upheld the assesments, except that for 1870, which it held erroneous, and reduced it to $2,710.50. There was nothing in the case to indicate accurately what the assessment for 1870 should be. Held, that the General Term was right in upholding the assessments for 1869, 1872 and 1874 (In re Methodist Episcopal Church, 66 N. Y., distinguished), but wrong in fixing the amount of assessment for 1870. If that assessment was erroneous, and the case did not show the amount to which it should be reduced, it should be set aside. (In re Crane, 16 Alb. L. J. 118.) Judgment below affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Matter of Petition of Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum Society. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided September 18, 1877.]

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.

When rule does not apply: independent agent: New York city: act by servant of board of public instruction. The rule of respondeat superior does not exist when the power does not exist in the employer to select his servants, to discharge them if careless, unskillful or incompetent, or control them while in his employ. (Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; Peck v. Mayor, 8 id. 222; Kelly v. Mayor, 11 id. 432.) Accordingly, where, as in New York city, a board of public instruction, although a branch of a municipal government, has complete control of all its employees and servants, and the municipal government has no control over the appointment, management, and discharge of such employees, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply between the municipal government and such employees, and the city is not responsible for the acts of such employees. (Ferry v. Mayor, 8 Bosw. 504; Treadwell v. Mayor, 1 Daly, 123; Gildersleeve v. Board of Education, 17 Abb. 201; Coulter v. Same, 63 N. Y. 365; 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., § 772; Maximillian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 162.) Judgment below affirmed. Ham v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Sept. 18, 1877.]

SURETYSHIP.

Surety on official bond of tax collector: defalcation made up by extra tax. Where there is a defalcation by a local tax collector, and for the purpose of meeting the deficiency caused by such defalcation the imposition of a new tax is ordered, such action will not relieve

the sureties upon the collector's bond from making good the amount of the defalcation. Judgment below affirmed. Oakley v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided Sept. 18, 1877.]

SURROGATE.

1. Costs in Surrogates' Courts: allowances may be made to all parties appearing.-Under the provisions of the statutes regulating the award of costs and allowances in Surrogates' Courts (2 R. S. 223, § 10, Laws 1870, chap. 359, § 9, Code of Procedure, §§ 308, 309), the surrogate is not limited to an allowance to the party technically successful, but may give it to any and all parties or their counsel deemed to be equitably entitled thereto. Decision of General Term overruled, but order affirmed on another ground. Noyes v. Children's Aid Society. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. Review of decree of surrogate by General Term: discretionary order not appealable to the court.-A decree of a surrogate granting allowances is the subject of appeal to the General Term on the merits (Lain v. Lain, 10 Paige, 191; Wilcox v. Smith, 26 Barb. 316), and may be reviewed by that court and if without justification on the facts and circumstances of the case, reversed entirely or modified and reduced, and an order thereon resting in the discretion of that court cannot be reversed in this court. Order affirmed. Ib. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

WITNESS.

Action against executor: old Code, section 399.-The provision of section 399 of the old Code which prohibits all parties to actions from testifying to personal transactions with a deceased person against his executor, etc., makes no distinction between cases where parties are called as witnesses in their own behalf and in behalf of a co-defendant, in cases where they are jointly and severally liable. Judgment below affirmed. Alexander v. Dutcher. Opinion by Rapallo, J. [Decided Sept. 18, 1877. Reported below, 7 Hun, 439.]

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. Agency: liability of principal: fraud: public policy. -A principal is not bound by a contract made in his name by a sub-agent appointed without authority, even where it is precisely the contract which his agent is employed to make; but public policy requires that the principal be held responsible for the torts of a subagent appointed without authority. If a fraud is committed through the neglect of an agent to employ reasonable precautionary measures to prevent it, or through any improper or wrongful act whilst in the master's business, the principal will be responsible. Where a trust is put in one person, and another whose interest is intrusted to him is damnified by reason of the neglect of such as that person employs in the discharge of that trust, he shall answer for it to the party damnified. Sup. Ct., California, July, 1877. Bank of California v. W. U. Tel. Co. (San Franc. L. Jour.).

Criminal evidence: meaning of motions of a wounded man: expert testimony.-What a witness understood to be meant by certain motions of a wounded man,' made while the latter was speechless and on the verge of unconsciousness, is not competent evidence, where the question assumes that something was meant, and where the understanding of the witness is sought without either calling for his reasons or showing him specially qualified to interpret the motions referred

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facts for himself, should give his opinion on a hypothetical case similar to that before the jury, and not on the actual case as if he were a juror instead of a witness. Sup. Ct., Georgia, August 28, 1877. Griggs v. State.

Exempt property: musical instrument of musician.— Plaintiff was a tinner by trade and also a musician, playing for hire when he had opportunity. In an action for the value of a cornet, seized on attachment against plaintiff by defendant, a deputy sheriff, held, that an instruction that if plaintiff, though a tinner by trade and working principally at that trade, earned money as a musician with his cornet, that was a separate business and trade, and such cornet was one of his tools in trade and would be exempt from attachment, provided the cornet, together with his tinner's tools, did not exceed $100, was correct. Sup. Jud. Ct., Massachusetts, Sept. 19, 1877. Baker v. Willis.

Federal criminal law: obstructing the mails.-The act of Congress which makes it criminal to obstruet or retard the passage of the mail, applies where the mail is carried by rail in a passenger train which is unlawfully stopped by persons who are willing to permit the passage of the mail car detached from the pasenger cars of the train. Words used by such persons may be acts of obstruction when they constitute part of the wrongful business in question. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pennsylvania, August 27, 1877. United States v. Clark.

Indorsement: extension of time to principal debtor: release of indorser.-When a sum of money has been received under a contract, as a consideration in extension of time of payment, without the consent of the indorser, he can make the defense, notwithstanding the contract could not have been enforced under the statute. Sup. Ct., California, July, 1877. Smith v. Pearson (San Franc. L. Jour.).

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Insurance: waiver of condition of policy: condition that waiver must be indorsed on the policy: effect of parol waiver: principal and agent: agent's knowledge: how far principal affected.-A condition contained in an insurance policy, that no officer could waive the performance of a condition except by indorsement on the policy, will not prevent a general officer of the company from waiving a condition by parol, and the question is one of fact for the jury. By the terms of an insurance policy no agent or other person, excepting one of the general officers of the company (and then only by indorsement hereon made and signed by said officer) is authorized to waive, change, alter, or amend any condition or provision of this policy." The secretary having requested the plaintiff's adjuster to delay making out proofs of loss, pending estimates for rebuilding, thereby leading the insured to believe that proofs of loss would not be required within the time specified in the conditions, held, that it was a question of fact for the jury whether there was a waiver or not. The terms of a policy stipulated that "if any incumbrance exists on the insured property at the date of this policy * and the insured shall fail to notify the secretary of this company thereof in writing * * * this company shall not be liable for loss or damage under this policy." An undisclosed mortgage existed at the time of issuing the policy; subsequently, through the same agents, the mortgagee's interest was insured under another policy, and eight months after a renewal certificate of the first policy was issued. Both policies were signed by the president and secretary of

the company, and countersigned by the agents. Held, that the above facts, if not conclusive, were yet sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant had knowledge of the incumbrance. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Jan. 12, 1877. State Ins. Co. v. Todd (Week. Not. Cas.).

Mortgage to secure coupon bond: sheriff's sale: distribution of proceeds: holder of bond informally transferred to him.-Holders of bonds, the whole series of which are secured by a mortgage, share pro rata in the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property, and this, notwithstanding an informality in the manner in which the holders acquired the bonds, if they were really entitled to them. A issued two hundred coupon bonds, each of $500, the payment of each and all of which was secured by a mortgage upon certain property. By the terms of the bonds any holder by indorsement to that effect, could render them not transferable without subsequent indorsement by them. A indorsed all the bonds to himself or assigns, and subsequently by further indorsement made two of the bonds payable to B. The remainder of the bonds he delivered to C without any further indorsement, as collateral security for a pre-existing indebtedness and for future advances. The mortgaged property having been sold at sheriff's sale, under a prior incumbrance, and the fund being insufficient to pay all the bonds, B claimed the payment of his bonds in full out of the proceeds belonging to the mortgage. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that B was not entitled to payment in full, but should share pro rata with C in the distribution of the fund. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 21, 1877. Hodge's Appeal (Week. Not. Cas.).

Negligence: crossing railway track: contributory negligence. In an action to recover for the negligent killing of plaintiff's husband, the evidence tended to show the following facts: The deceased was struck and killed while attempting to cross defendant's railroad in a frequented path leading across the tracks; the day was clear, and the engine might have been seen for at least fifty yards from the point where the casualty occurred. The bell on the engine was not rung, but the bell of another engine standing in the yard near by was being rung at the time, which might have misled the deceased if he had trusted to hearing alone; he could not have been seen after he passed upon the tracks in order to stop the train. Held, that although the defendant's employees were guilty of negligence in not sounding the bell on the engine which caused the injury, yet a verdict for the plaintiff was erroneous, on the ground of the negligence of the deceased in attempting to cross the tracks when he saw or might have seen the approaching engine. One who is about to cross a railroad track must look as well as listen; he must be vigilant and watchful, and the failure to exercise such vigilance is negligence per 8. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co. (Cent. Law Jour.).

Negotiable instrument: accommodation indorser: fraud.-As against the holder of a note as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, it is competent for an accommodation indorser to set up that he indorsed it upon the fraudulent representation of the maker as to his solvency; and further, that he indorsed it in blank at the instance of said maker, who subsequently filled it up for a larger sum than represented. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Feb. 12, 1877. Cummings v. Boyd. Negotiable instrument: conditional note: condition

precedent.--An action was brought on the following note: "Scholarship note. $25.00. No. 148. Columbus City, Iowa, Feb. 10, 1858. For value received I promise to pay in five equal installments, the first of which shall be due the first day of January, 1869, to the treasurer of Oskaloosa College or order, at Oskaloosa, Iowa, tbe sum of twenty-five dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum till paid, payable annually on the first day of January, it being for the purpose of endowing the Bible Department in said college. A. D. HICKOCK." The following indorsement appears on the note: "The giver of this note, if he desires, may use the principal after due, by paying the interest annually. N. E. CAREY, Agent." Held, (1) The indorsement is a part of the original contract, and may be so regarded in construing the instrument. (2) The indorsement permits defendant to use the principal after due- to retain it upon the terms expressed. The plaintiff did not wholly surrender its right to the principal, but that defendant could withhold it, which could be done only by the payment of the interest annually. Where the interest is not paid according to the terms of the note, the principal becomes due. It is no excuse for the non-performance of an obligation that the obligee claimed more of the defendant than he had a right to do. Although the defendant paid the note before suit was commenced, yet by his failure to pay the interest annually the note matured according to its terms, and its indorsement became inoperative. The acceptance of interest was the acceptance of partial payment only. The note having matured, the defendant was entitled to no further extension of time. Sup. Ct., Iowa, June, 1877. Oskaloosa College v. Hickock.

Pledge: rights of pledgee of commercial paper.-The pledge of commercial paper as collateral security for the payment of a debt does not, in the absence of special power for that purpose, authorize the party to whom such paper is so pledged to sell the same upon default of payment thereof at public or private sale. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Joliet I. & S. Co. v. Scioto F. & B. Co.

Statute of limitations: revival of debt.-A promise to pay "all I owe you" is not sufficient to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations, in that it does not fix the amount of the balance due, either directly or by reference to something by which the amount can be definitely ascertained. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Jan. 26, 1877. Miller v. Bashore.

United States Marshal: suit against deputy marshal for breach of official duty.-There is no statute of the United States, that we have been able to find, which authorizes a deputy United States Marshal to be sued for breach of official duty. The liability of the marshal to be sued for a breach of official duty occasioned by himself or deputy, is the same as that of a sheriff by the common law. Sup. Ct., Georgia, Sept. 4, 1877. Elyea v. Williamson.

Usury: new parties: novation: rescission.-Where the original contract was usurious, and there was a novation by a new party being introduced into it one year, and such new party then is released by consent of all the others, and the old contract is renewed by the two original parties without any purgation of the usury, held, that the novation itself having been rescinded by the parties in interest, the renewal of the old usurious contract without purging it of the usury, left it affected still with the taint, and the law still applied the payment, both prior to, and after the rescis

sion, to the principal and legal interest alone. Sup. Ct., Georgia, Aug. 28, 1877. Archer v. Underwood.

Usury: sale of gold.-Where a loan of a certain amount in gold was made, but the borrower executed his note therefor for a considerable larger sum than the equivalent value of the gold in currency, held, that the contract was an usurious one, notwithstanding the claim by the lender, that the amount in excess of the value of the gold was not intended for interest, but was simply the rate at which he held the gold. The intention of the parties must be considered in determining whether or not a contract is usurious, and this can be established more safely from the circumstances attending the transacting, than from its form or the direct testimony of the parties. Sup. Ct., Iowa, March, 1877. Austin v. Walker, Cent. L. J.

Will: construction of: qualification of fee.-Testator first devises to A, his heirs and assigns. Then by a proviso in case of the devisee's death without children or will, then to his next of kin who are lineally descended from testator's father. Held, to be no qualification of his fee; being merely an attempt to regulate the descent when cast, and there being no limitation over in default of children, no design was evinced to create an executory devise or a conditional fee. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, March 30, 1877. Edwards v. Barnard.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT COMMISSION, OHIO.*

CARRIER OF GOODS.

1. Carrier may limit liability.-A common carrier may limit his common-law liability for losses happening to the goods without fault or negligence on his part by a special agreement fairly made by the parties. Gaines v. Union Transp. and Ins. Co.

2. Assent of shipper to contract limiting liability necessary. When a carrier claims exemption from such liability, under a bill of lading not signed by the owner or consignor of the goods, he must aver and prove that such bill was assented to by the shipper. Whether such assent has been given, so as to make the bill of lading binding on the shipper is a fact to be proved, and cannot be implied or presumed contrary to the facts when the acts of the shipper do not operate as an estoppel. Ib.

3. Carrier cannot contract against his own negligence. -Where the action against the carrier is to recover on his common-law liability for losses occurring at the point of delivery after the transit is ended, but before notice of delivery to the consignee, and the defendant claims exemption from such loss by virtue of a condition of the bill of lading to that effect, he must aver and prove, not only that this condition was assented to, but that the loss happened without any fault or neglect on his part, and the failure to establish such assent or show due and proper care to prevent the loss entitles the plaintiff to recover. Ib.

4. Goods shipped over connecting lines: what receiving carrier undertakes.--Where goods are shipped under a contract with a common carrier, to be carried over several independent but connecting lines to their destination, at an agreed through rate, each carrier to receive and carry to the end of his route, and there forward by the next connecting line, and they are lost at the terminus of the route of an intermediate car

* From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports.

rier, while in his possession and before delivery to the next carrier. Held, that such intermediate carrier undertakes not only to carry but to forward, and, as a common carrier, he is liable for loss at the end of his route before the goods are delivered to the next carrier, unless he is exempted from such loss by the terms of his contract. Erie Railway Co. v. Lockwood.

5. Stipulations relieving carrier from liability. — Although the contract of affreightment contains a clause relieving the carrier from loss by fire, he is not thereby exempted from the use of proper care for the safety of the goods while in his possession to be forwarded. It is his duty to keep them while in his hands awaiting reshipment, in a safe and proper place, and the burden of proof is on him to show that he has done so, although the fire originated without his fault, in adjacent property over which he had no control, and although he made all reasonable efforts after it originated to prevent it from extending to the goods destroyed. Ib.

6. Damages: rule as to.-Where the carrier is liable for such loss, the owner is entitled to full compensation for the breach of the contract to carry and forward, and it is not error in the court to refuse to lay down a rule of damages, which may not give him such compensation, nor unless it appears from the record that the failure to so charge was prejudicial to him. Ib.

DOWER.

Antenuptial contract designed to bar dower right.— Where au antenuptial contract, intended to operate as an equitable jointure, and to bar all rights of dower, is entered into by parties of mature age, capable of judging in regard to their interests, without any fraud or imposition, and is reasonable in its terms, and has been in good faith carried into effect by the husband during his life, full effect should be given to it, according to the intention of the parties. In giving construction to a contract, the intention of the parties will govern; and words which, in their strict legal import, are at variance with that intention, will be rejected, or construed so as to comport therewith. Mintier v. Mintier.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Negligence of third person not chargeable on defendant. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages caused to third persons by a train in motion, no recovery can be had unless the agents and servants of the company were guilty of negligence, which occasioned the injury. C., C., C. and Ind. Railway Co. v. Elliott.

2. Railway train: omission to give usual signals.— The omission to ring the bell or sound the whistle at public crossings is not of itself sufficient ground to authorize a recovery, if the party, notwithstanding such omission, might, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the accident. Ib.

3. Contributory negligence.-What is such contributory negligence as will defeat a recovery is usually a question of mixed law and fact, to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances of the case and under proper instructions from the court; but where the undisputed facts show that by the exercise of ordinary care a party might have avoided injury, he cannot recover. lb.

4. Duty of traveler approaching railroad.—It is the duty of a traveler upon the highway, when approaching a railroad crossing, to make use of his senses to ascertain if there is a train in the vicinity; and if,

when in full possession of his faculties, he fails to see or hear any thing, when a prudent man, exercising his eyes and ears, with ordinary care, would have discovered a train in close proximity, and he is thereby injured, he is guilty of such negligence as will prevent a recovery. Ib.

BOOK NOTICES.

STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW.

A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments). By Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, K. C. S. I. Q. C. St. Louis: Soule, Thomas & Wentworth, 1877.

MR.S

[R. STEPHEN has done a vast service not only to the profession and to the law makers, but to the world at large, in preparing his digest of the law of England upon the subjects of evidence and of criminal law. We took occasion, when reviewing the book on evidence, to give some specimens of his style, which has the merit of being clear, concise and certain. He uses the English language of the best writers and speakers to express his meaning, and thus clothes the law in a garment that makes it attractive. The statutes, both in England and America, are written in a senseless jargon, that renders them unreadable, and sometimes incomprehensible, and even the most important and carefully drawn ones are of doubtful meaning until explained by the courts. To show how excellent is the method of expression adopted by Mr. Stephen, and how well his work is done, we will take his definition of murder:

"Murder is unlawful homicide with malice aforethought" (art. 223).

This is certainly a brief description of one of the most terrible crimes. But every term in the sentence, and, indeed, every word needs a definition, and the definitions are given, all of them, as briefly as possible. In the same section malice aforethought is defined, and in the preceding section unlawful homicide. But unlawful homicide is but one kind of homicide, and a definition of homicide is also given as follows: "Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being" (art. 218). And in article 219 the word "killing" is defined.

In fact no word or expression upon whose meaning the nature of the crime depends, is left unexplained. Each of the articles stating a principle, or giving a definition requiring such explanation, are illustrated by examples. Thus:

44

'Article 36. Innocent agent. Whoever commits a crime by an innocent agent, is a principal in the first degree." Illustrations: (1) "A tells B, a child under seven, to bring him money belonging to C. B does so. A is a principal in the first degree. (2) A, knowing a note to be forged, asks B, who does not know it to be forged, to get it changed for him. B does so, and gives A the money. A is a principal in the first degree."

These brief extracts show the character of the work, which ought to be in the hands of every criminal lawyer in the land. The edition before us is a reprint, and is elegantly printed and bound.

HERON ON JURISPRUDENCE. Jurisprudence and its Relation to the Social Sciences. By Denis Caulfield Heron, Q.C., Member of Parliament for the County of Tipperary. San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Company New York: Hurd & Houghton,

1877.

This work treats upon jurisprudence as one of the departments of social science, and consequently discusses what we call the law not alone as it is but as,

according to the author, it ought to be. It is a very entertaining and instructive volume and ought to be read by every one who takes an interest in the matters upon which it touches. We do not suppose that all of those who read will agree with the conclusions arrived at: in fact, as in political economy and all sciences in progress of development, there is here a wide opportunity for reasoners who start from the same point and have the same facts to deal with, to differ. The abstract rules governing right and wrong are perhaps plain and certain, but the practical application of these rules give rise to doubts and disputes and even their theoretical application occasions discussion. There is, however, a tendency in modern times to harmony of thought in respect to these subjects, and though writers do not yet agree they are not so acrimonious in their controversies as they used to be. This volume, after a chapter devoted to the social sciences, as a whole, treats of the relations first of ethics and then of political economy to jurisprudence. Next comes a chapter wherein jurisprudence generally is discussed, the distinction between it and ethics pointed out and its limits defined; the various definitions given and historically considered; the province of government reviewed and its duties explained and a consideration had of the topics of taxation, education and codification. The closing chapter contains an historical review of the subject which is a valuable resume of what has taken place in the direction of law reform up to the present time. Altogether the work constitutes a very valuable contribution to the department of social science upon which it treats.

DAHLGREN ON MARITIME LAW. Maritime or International Law. By John A. Dahlgren, late Rear Admiral United States Navy. Edited by Charles Cowley of the Massachusetts Bar, formerly Judge Advocate on the staff of the author. Boston: B. B. Russell, 1877.

This work was the last effort of the pen of its author, and is composed of notes upon the subject of which it treats, hastily thrown together while he was in command of the South Pacific Squadron, and during a prolonged stay off Callao, Peru. These notes were left in an incomplete state, but they have furnished the basis for a very excellent practical treatise upon those parts of international law that naval officers have to do with. The work of the editor, who has given the treatise its finishing touches, is thoroughly well done, and we know of no volume in which the topics mentioned are more carefully considered. These topics are: Law of Blockade; Contraband of War; Visitation and Search; Duties of Naval Commanders on Foreign Stations. The book, which is in pamphlet form and contains 147 pages, has also a biographical sketch of the author, by his widow, and addenda by the editor. It ought to be read by all who are interested in the subject treated upon.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, Sept. 25, 1877:

Judgment affirmed, with costs Wines v. The Mayor; The People ex rel. Kingsland v. Clark; Morgan v. Smith; Pomeroy v. Tauner; Blanchard v. Blanchard; Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.; Hull v. Donington; Donington v. Hull.— - Order affirmed, with costs-Noyes v. Children's Aid Society of New York City; Standard Sugar Refinery v. Day

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