"

strictly called Reasoning, but Investigation. But when this major Premiss is granted him, and is combined with the minor, viz. that the animals he has examined have cloven feet, then he draws the Conclusion Logically: viz. that "the feet of all horned animals are cloven." Again, if from several times meeting with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, one would object to his Induction; and yet it would not be, as an argument, illogical; since the Conclusion follows fairly, if you grant his implied Premiss, that the events which happened on those particular Fridays are such as must hapen on all Fridays; but we should object to his laying down this Premiss and therefore should justly say that his Induction was faulty, though his argument

were correct.

doubtful Pre

pressed in Induction.

And here it may be remarked, that the The more ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that miss supin an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss should be always the one of whose truth least doubt can exist, is not observed in Induction for the Premiss which is usually the more doubtful of the two, is, in that, the

* I have selected an instance in which Induction is the only ground we have to rest on; no reason, that I know of, having ever been assigned that could have led us to conjecture this curious fact à priori.

major; it being in few cases quite certain that the individuals, respecting which some point has been ascertained, are to be fairly regarded as a sample of the whole class: the major Premiss, nevertheless, is seldom expressed, for the reason just given, that it is easily understood, as being, mutatis mutandis, the same in every Induction.

What has been said of Induction will equally apply to Example; which differs from it only in having a singular instead of a general Conclusion; e. g. in the instance. above, if the Conclusion had been drawn, not respecting tyrannies in general, but respecting this or that tyranny, that it was not likely to be lasting, each of the cases adduced to prove this would have been called an Example.

CHAP. II.

On the Discovery of Truth.

§ 1.

WHETHER it is by a process of Reasoning that New Truths are brought to light, is a question which seems to be decided in the negative by what has been already said; though many eminent writers seem to have taken for granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a great measure, a dispute concerning the use of words; but it is not, for that reason, either uninteresting or unimportant, since an inaccurate use of language may often, in matters of Science, lead to confusion of thought, and to erroneous conclusions. And, in the present instance, much of the undeserved contempt which has been bestowed on the Logical system may be traced to this source; for when any one has laid down, that "Reasoning is important in the discovery of Truth," and that "Logic is of no service in the discovery of Truth," (each of which propositions is true in a certain sense of the terms employed, but not in the same sense) he is naturally

led to conclude, that there are processes of Reasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does not apply, and, of course, to misconceive altogether the nature of the Science.

In maintaining the negative side of the above question, three things are to be premised: first, that it is not contended that discoveries of any kind of Truth can be made (or at least are usually made) without Reasoning; only, that Reasoning is not the whole of the process, nor the whole of that which is ✓ important therein; secondly, that Reasoning shall be taken in the sense, not of every exercise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in which we have all along used it, and in which it has been defined by all the Logical writers, viz. "from certain granted propositions to infer another proposition as the consequence of them:" thirdly, that by a "New Truth," be understood something neither expressly nor virtually asserted before,— not implied and involved in anything already

known.

To prove, then, this point demonstratively becomes in this manner perfectly easy; for since all Reasoning (in the sense above defined) may be resolved into Syllogisms; and since even the objectors to Logic make it a subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion,

it follows at once that no New Truth (as above defined) can be elicited by any process of Reasoning.

It is on this ground, indeed, that the justlycelebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric objects to the Syllogism altogether, as necessarily involving a petitio principii; an objection which, of course, he would not have been disposed to bring forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill-founded, it lies against all arguments whatever. Had he been aware that a Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any argument whatever, stated regularly and at full length, he would have obtained a more correct view of the object of all Reasoning; which is, merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in those with which we set out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that which he has admitted; to contemplate it in various points of view; to admit in one shape what he has already admitted in another, and to give up and disallow whatever is inconsistent with it.

Nor is it always a very easy task even to bring before the mind the several bearings,the various applications,-of any one proposition. A common Term comprehends several, often numberless individuals; and these often,