cause of its odour; which perception is totally distinct from the sen sation; for it cannot be said to be agreeable or otherwise, and it has an external object, whose existence does not depend upon the act of the mind as the sensation does. Yet we have no name whereby to distinguish the object of this perception, unless that which more properly belongs to the accompanying sensation, viz. the smell of the rose; a defect of language, which is no doubt the source of much ambiguity.'

We very much doubt whether the mind forms a perception of that quality of the Rose which is the cause of the fragrance; and why is it necessary to form such a perception? If it be not necessary, we do not want a term to distinguish the object of perception; and why invent terms that introduce theories and bewilder the mind?

A little farther on, we find this passage:

Thus it appears, that language affords, in general, but a single term whereby to distinguish both the sensation and its accompanying perception; and that this term is chiefly appropriated either to the sensation or perception, according as the attention is most engrossed by the one or the other. Upon this circumstance appears to be founded a distinction of the qualities of body into two kinds, called by Mr. Locke, primary and secondary. The reality of the distinction I would place in this, that the primary qualities are those of which we have a distinct perception, and but a slight sensation; while, of the secondary, our perception is but obscure, and we have a strong sensation, which chiefly arrests our attention. Hence, the names of the primary qualities of body more usually refer to the perception by which they are made known to us; while those of the secondary qualities have more properly a reference to the accompanying seasation.'

We cannot undertake to controvert these positions, since we do not clearly apprehend their meaning. What is the slight sensation of a primary quality?

In the 3rd Chapter, on Perception, an account is given of the various theories that have been formed respecting Perception, from Aristotle to Hume: but we meet with little that is novel in this account, and other authors have on the same subject written more fully. In mentioning Berkeley, Mr. Scott falls into a low expression; Berkeley, (he says) though he denies the existence of a material world, yet as became his Cloth,' &c.-After having stated Reid's account of the phænomena of perception, he proposes to make a slight alteration in it; and he wishes it to be affirmed that, in every perception of an external object of sense, we find; 1st, Some conception or notion of the object perceived; and 2dly, A strong and irresistible belief of its present existence, which is not resolvable into reasoning, or any other kind of evidence.

This statement resolves the belief of external objects and of a material world into an intuitive truth:-but, in perceiving, are we really sensible of the operation of this strong belief? Inquiry may arise on this point.

In treating of Abstraction, (Chap. IV.) the author is led to the controversy between the Nominalists, Realists, and Conceptualists.

If,' says he, 'the ideal theory be relinquished, as I think it must, in consequence of the reasonings of Dr. Reid, the system of the Realists falls to the ground, or at least becomes identified with that of the Conceptualists; for I do not suppose that any philosopher would now be inclined to revive the system of Plato concerning the eternal and independent existence of universal archetypes, or ideas, after the patterns of which all individual things have been formed. The only rational controversy, that now remains, appears to be, Whether is the mind capable of attaching distinct notions, or conceptions, to those general and abstract terms which it so frequently employs? or is it incapable of forming such notions, so that, when it employs general terms, these are to be considered rather as signs than accurate expressions of our thoughts, and if any distinct notion is annexed to them, it must be that of an individual of the species which they are employed to express?'

As the question is important, Mr. Scott proceeds particularly to examine it; and the first section of the discussion treats of the nature and origin of abstract and general terms. We experienced, however, very little satisfaction from this examination; and not being distinctly apprized of the object of the author's reasonings, and certainly not convinced by them, we felt rather surprised at suddenly arriving at this sentence the doctrine, which I have been endeavouring to il

lustrate,' &c.

The origin of generic terms has been successfully assigned by philosophers. Terms appropriated to Individuals are extended to whole classes of like Individuals; and propositions that are true with the generic term are true when the term is restricted to denote an Individual of the genus. Many propositions are true with the generic term, because they have been proved true of a vast number of the Individuals, or because there seems no sufficient reason why that which is true for one Individual should not be true for like Individuals. All bodies fall towards the earth; observation has verified the assertion in a great variety of instances, and daily experience confirms it; we can distinctly assign the causes, when phanomena happen anomalous to this law: but there must be numerous bodies that are never observed to fall, and with which no experiment was ever made; yet the proposition is asserted REV. MARCH, 1807.

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of these, because no reason can be assigned why they should not follow the law. In the above and in similar propositions, however, we cannot be said to annex precise ideas to the generic term: if controversy, indeed, or the necessity of expla nation, forces us into illustration, we must enumerate; in the general proposition we should, instead of the term body, name a stone, or an orange, or a guinea; and in these specifi cations we should have distinct notions of the terms employed or the things specified. With general terms, the case is different; and on this account Condillac and Dugald Stewart have asserted that generic terms are mere signs of convenience, which we acquire the habit of employing with accuracy, but to which no distinct notion can be annexed. This position is controverted by Mr. Scott; who remarks, after having made an extract from Stewart relative to this, subject:

In opposition to this ingenious philosopher, I take upon me to affirm, that though generic terms are very convenient and useful signs, both for communicating our thoughts, and giving them precision, they are by no means indispensably requisite for enabling us to specu late concerning general classes of objects. Thus, I think, though language had contained no such generic term as man, we might have entered into many very useful speculations concerning the whole human race and, in like manner, though we had wanted the words plant and mineral, we should not have been entirely ignorant of the general properties of the vegetable and fossil kingdoms. Nay, I maintain, that we are actually without such generic terms, in many departments where scientific speculation has been most successfully conducted. Thus, I know of no term, in any language, that properly defines and comprehends the objects of astronomical science. The term stars excludes the sun and moon, and perhaps the planets and comets; and hence, in giving a brief explanation of the objects of this science, we are obliged to make use of a circumlocution, viz. the heavenly bodies. But certainly a circumlocution is not a term, but a clumsy substitute for one, which necessity prompts us to employ. I would likewise observe, that the sense in which generic terms are understood, is by no means fixed and precisely limited; so that to one person they may indicate all the individuals of a certain subject of speculation, while to another their meaning may be more circumscribed. Thus, many writers upon Pneumatology employ the term mind, as comprehending not only the intellectual part of man, but also the Divine mind, and every spiritual being; while others limit it to the human mind alone; and are, therefore, without any generic ap: pellation for all the objects of this science. The conclusion I would deduce from these illustrations, is, that generic terms, though extremely useful and convenient, are by no means essential to general speculations, or to the formation of general notions.

The next point which it is of importance to examine, is, When we reason concerning classes or genera, are the objects of our attention merely signs that is, have generic terms any distinct significa

tion, of which a clear conception can be formed or not? And here, too, I must dissent from the doctrine laid down by Mr. Stewart; for I cannot conceive in what manner accurate reasonings can be carried on, or speculation successfully pursued, by means of terms to which we are incapable of annexing a distinct meaning: insomuch, that when casual association does lead us to annex some meaning to them, viz that of an individual of the class which they denote, this has rather a tendency to disturb, than to assist us in our reasoning.'

The meaning that, according to my apprehension, is attached to a generic term, is an inclusive notion of all the individuals which that term is intended to comprehend. Thus, the word tree includes in its meaning all those vegetables to which that name is usually applied; the word man comprehends all the individuals of the human race; and so forth This account of the matter is perfectly agreeable to the origin of these terms, as above detailed, where we find a name successively applied to a variety of individuals, on account of a general resemblance observed among them; and consequently, when the name comes to be again employed, the mind naturally attaches to it the notion, not of one, but of many individuals.

Here, perhaps, it may be objected, that the mind is incapable of forming a notion of such a multiplicity of individuals as must, according to this account of the matter, be conceived to be attached to generic terms. But, in reply to this objection, I would ask, are we capable of distinctly comprehending what is meant by the term forest, for example? And I suppose it will be granted that we are ; in thus far, at least, that we understand by it, a great collection of trees; although it would be absurd to suppose that any definite num ber of trees must be thought of when we use the term. Precisely of the same kind, I conceive to be the notion which we attach to the term tree, viz. an indefinite number of that kind of plants to which the name can be properly applied. Hence, I would describe the notion which the mind attaches to a generic term, to be a general indefinite notion of the various individuals to which the term extends.'

A general indefinite notion of the various Individuals, to which the generic term may be applied', appears to us a very loose mode of expression; and, to retort on the author his own words, we have a very indefinite notion of his meaning.

In section 3rd of this chapter, on the ambiguity of abstract and general terms, the author continues to dissent from Professor Stewart's opinion. This latter writer, a Nominalist, instances Algebra as affording the strongest confirmation of the system of Nominalism: Mr. Scott quotes a passage from the Professor's Philosophy of the Human Mind, and then subjoins the following: but whether this comment was intended to explain Algebra, or to refute Mr. Stewart, we cannot determine.

The algebraic symbols are doubtless of very general application; but I cannot help thinking that their meaning admits of being very precisely

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precisely defined. Thus, I conceive the import of the letters a, b, t, d, &c., which it employs, to be quantity, (i. e. what is susceptible of being numbered, or measured with accuracy, considered in general, or according to some particular limits pointed out by the terms of the problem; + denotes addition; - subtraction; and so on. And if we ever wholly lose sight of these significations during an analyti. cal process, the certainty of the result is nothing dissimilar to what happens in other cases of practical facility, which have usually been explained by a recourse to the principle of habit, and of which the real nature has been so philosophically explained by Mr. Stewart himself."

Professor Scott has not sufficiently noticed the discovery and theory of David Hartley. We speak not of his Vibrations, but of a very curious mental law, the law of Association, which was pointed out and established by that philosopher, in a most masterly manner. When the present author treats of Association, (Chap. V.) he rejects the phrase Association of Ideas, and even proposes to substitute for Association, Combination. We dis like both alterations. Why exclude a convenient term, idea, because there have been absurd ideal systems? Combination refers to a faculty and active power of calling up ideas, and of arranging them. Association ought to stand for that observed law of the mind, according to which, of two ideas before associated, one that is impressed suggests and calls up the other. According to the technical manner of Hartley, if A and B have been associated, A impressed will raise up B. If this faculty or Act be involuntary, Association may properly stand for it; and then Combination may be used to express an active faculty.

Many other subjects usually introduced into metaphysical treatises are discussed by the author in chapters vi, vii, and viii, on Conception or Imagination, on Memory, and on Reason. An Appendix also contains three Chapters on Mathematical Reasoning, on the Induction of Physical Science, and on the Induction of Metaphysics and other Sciences. If we were not tired of objecting, we could make several additional objections against the arguments and reasonings advanced on these points. That Mr. Scott has derived considerable information from the able treatises of Reid and Stewart, we can have little doubt: but he seems not to have obtained an aid that has enabled him to make conquests in the wild and dark regions of metaphysics. Indeed, the science seems to have gone back under his guidance. For several judicious distinctions we are indebted to Mr. Stewart, but these the present author wishes to controvert, and he pro poses some new terms and distinctions of his own, which (in turn) we think ought to be rejected. Metaphysical treatises are principally deficient in plainness and simplicity; and this

defect