der the act of 1887; and after a full consid- | eration it decided in favor of the land company, a decision which, in effect, determined that the company had acted with all necessary promptness, and was entitled to the benefit of the statute. Of course, the privilege granted by the statute would be of little or no avail if it had to be exercised on the very day. Some time must be allowed for acquiring knowledge of the situation and determining the course of action. The plaintiff was as fully charged with knowledge of this act of 1887 as the land company. Upon the records of the county were the deeds from the railroad to the land company and from the latter to its grantees. So she acted with knowledge both of the law and the facts, and is not in a position now to complain of the action of the Land Department. We are not justified in setting aside the decision of the Land Department, and holding that it erred in awarding to the land company the privilege which the statute, without any express limitation of time, gives to it. We see no error in the record, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is affirmed. (196 U. S. 447) v. STATE OF KANSAS. use, or consumption in this state. Fifth.To make or enter into, or execute or carry out, any contract, obligation, or agreement of any kind or description by which they Error to state court-questions of fact-shall bind or have to bind themselves not to construction of state statute-constitu- sell, manufacture, dispose of, or transport tional law-freedom to contract-validity any article or commodity, or article of of Kansas anti-trust law. 1. 3. The verdict of the jury settles all questions of fact on a writ of error from the United States Supreme Court to a state court. The scope and meaning of a state statute as determined by the highest court of the state conclude the Federal Supreme Court in determining, on writ of error to the state court, whether or not such statute violates the Federal Constitution.* trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or by which they shall agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graded figure, or by which they shall in any manner establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves or others in transportation, sale, or manufacture of any such article or commodity, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine, or unite any interest they may have in connection with the manufacture, sale, or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price may in any manner be affected. And any such combinations are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void." Laws of Argued October 20, 21, 1904. Decided Feb- Kansas, 1897, p. 481. [2 Kan. Gen. Stat. The freedom to contract protected by U. S. Const. 14th Amend. is not unduly abridged by so much of the Kansas anti-trust law of March 8, 1897, as is construed by the state courts to forbid inducing four competitive wheat buyers in a single town to enter into an agreement under which, if either should purchase more than one fourth of the wheat coming into the market, he should pay the others 3 cents a bushel for the excess. [No. 13.] ruary 20, 1905. 1N See same case below, 65 Kan. 240, 69 Pac. 199. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: On March 8, 1897, the legislature of Kansas passed an act, the 1st section of which is as follows: 1897, p. 791.] Subsequent sections prescribe penalties, and provide procedure for enforcing the act. On September 27, 1901, the county attorney filed in the district court of Rush county, Kansas, an information charging that the defendant did, on November 20, 1900, "then and there unlawfully enter into an agreement, contract, and combination, in the county of Rush and the state of Kansas, with divers and sundry persons, partnerships, companies, and corporations of grain Bison, in the said county and state aforedealers and grain buyers in the town of said, to wit, Humburg & Ahrens, the La Crosse Lumber & Grain Company, the Bison Milling Company, and George Weicken, who First. To create or carry out restrictions were at the said time and place competitive in trade or commerce or aids to commerce, grain dealers and buyers, to pool and fix in trade or commerce or aids to commerce, or to carry out restrictions in the full and the price the said grain dealers and buyers free pursuit of any business authorized or should pay for grain at the said place, and permitted by the laws of this state. Second. to divide between them the net earnings permitted by the laws of this state. Second. of the said grain dealers and buyers, and to -To increase or reduce the price of mer "Sec. 1. A trust is a combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, or either two or more of them, for either, any, or all of the following purposes: ers." A trial was had, the defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of $500, and to imprisonment in the county jail for three months. On appeal to the supreme court of the state the judgment was affirmed. 65 Kan. 240, 69 Pac. 199. Whereupon this writ of error was sued out. chandise, produce, or commodities, or to prevent competition in the purchase and sale control the cost or rates of insurance. Third, of grain among the said dealers and buy-To prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or commodities, or to prevent competition in aids to commerce. Fourth. To fix any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public shall be, in any manner, controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, Mr. H. Whiteside for plaintiff in error. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin- | ion of the court: It is well settled that in cases of this kind the interpretation placed by the high The verdict of the jury settles all ques- est court of the state upon its statutes is tions of fact. In Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 639, 42 L. ed. 878, 887, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, it is said: "Much was said at the bar about the finding of the jury being against the evidence. We cannot enter upon such an inquiry. The facts must be taken as found by the jury, and this court can only consider whether the statute, as interpreted to the jury, was in violation of the Federal Constitution. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 242, 246, 41 L. ed. 979, 986, 988, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581." We pass, therefore, to a consideration of the questions of law. It is contended that the act of 1897 is in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in that it unduly infringes the freedom of contract; that it is too broad, and not sufficiently definite, and that while some things are denounced which may be within the police power of the state, yet its language reaches to and includes matters clearly beyond the limits of that power, and that there is no such separation or distinction between those within and those beyond as will enable the courts to declare one part valid and another part void. We quote from the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error: conclusive here. We accept the construction given to a state statute by that court. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 408, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. McCann, 174 U. S. 580, 586, 43 L. ed. 1093, 1096, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. Nor is it material that the state court ascertains the meaning and scope of the statute as well as its validity by pursuing a different rule of construction from that we recognize. It may be that the views of the Kansas court in respect to this matter are not in harmony with those expressed by us in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; TradeMark Cases (United States v. Steffens), 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. ed. 550; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 219, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601; and Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 30 L. ed. 766, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 763. We shall not stop to consider that question nor the reconciliation of the supposed conflicting views suggested by the chief justice of the state. The power to determine the meaning of a statute carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations, as well as the method by which they shall be determined. The transaction, as shown by the testi "Section one goes entirely too far, and is an unwarranted attempt upon the part of the legislature to limit the rights of the in-mony, was practically this: There were four dividual in the matter of contracting and dealing with his fellow men. The liberty to contract is as much protected by the constitutional provisions above referred to as is the liberty of person, and any attempt to abridge or limit that right will be held void, unless such abridgment or limitation is nec-ers' Association. essary to preserve the peace and order of the community, or the life, liberty, and morals of individuals, in which cases it is held to be the proper exercise of the police power of the state." It may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the language of the 1st section is broad enough to include acts beyond the police power of the state, and the punishment of which would unduly infringe upon the freedom of contract. At any rate we shall not attempt to enter into any consideration of that question. The supreme court of the state held that the acts charged and proved against the defendant were clearly within the terms of the statute, as well as within the police power of the state; and that the statute could be sustained as a prohibition of those acts irrespective of the question whether its language was broad enough to include acts and conduct which the legislature could not rightfully restrain. dealers in wheat in Bison, a small village in Rush county, situated on the Missouri Pacific Railroad. Three of them owned elevators and one a mill. They were competitors in the purchase of grain. The defendant was secretary of the State Grain Dealers' Association. He was not himself in the grain business, nor interested in that of either of the four dealers. He came to Bison for the purpose of investigating some claims of Bison firms against the Missouri Pacific Railroad. While there he induced these dealers to enter into an arrangement by which, if one bought and shipped more grain than the others, that excess purchaser would pay them a certain per cent. As security for such agreement the parties deposited their checks for $100 each with the defendant. They made to him weekly reports of the amount of grain purchased. If one had purchased more than his share, he paid the defendant three cents a bushel for the excess, and that amount was then divided among the other dealers. Upon these facts, under appropriate instructions, the jury found the defendant guilty. That the transaction was within the letter of the statute, in that it tended to prevent competition in the purchase of mer that he himself has been wrongfully included in the terms of the law, he can have no just ground of complaint. This is fundamental and decisively settled. Kansas City v. Union P. R. Co. 59 Kan. 427, 52 L. R. A. 321, 53 Pac. 468, affirmed under the title Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305, 311, 26 L. ed. 1044, 1049; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 71 Am. St. Rep. 301, 49 N. E. 582." We see no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas, and it is affirmed. 1. v. (197 U. S. 40) MAMIE E. NORMENT et al. of law. A party taking the benefit of a provision in his favor under a will is estopped to assert the invalidity of that instrument.* chandise, is not open to doubt. It is also within the spirit of the statute. It imposed an unreasonable restraint upon competition. It is stated by counsel for plaintiff in error in his brief that not far from Bison were a number of other small towns, at which the principal commercial business was the buying and selling of wheat. But where there were four buyers, as in Bison, apparently competing, farmers nearer to Bison than to other villages, if not farmers more remote, would naturally seek that place in order to benefit by the competition. They would find an apparent competition, and yet each buyer was restrained by this contract from seeking to purchase more than his fourth of the wheat coming to the market, or, if he purchased more, must neces- CHARLES H. UTERMEHLE, Plff. in Err., sarily, in order to make his profit, buy his wheat, pay at least 3 cents a bushel less than what he might otherwise pay, that being the penalty for an excess purchase. It was not Estoppel-by receiving benefits-ignorance an open agreement in respect to price, nor one that enabled sellers to know in advance exactly what they could get for their wheat. Undoubtedly there is a certain freedom of contract which cannot be destroyed by legislative enactment. In pursuance of that freedom parties may seek to further their business interests, and it may not be always easy to draw the line between those contracts which are beyond the reach of the police power and those which are subject to prohibition or restraint. But a secret arrangement, by which, under penalties, an apparently existing competition among all the dealers in a community in one of the necessaries of life is substantially destroyed, without any merging of interests through Argued November 28, 29, 1904. partnership or incorporation, is one to which the police power extends. That is as far as we need to go in sustaining the judgment in this case. That is as far as the supreme District of Columbia to review a judg court of the state went. If other transac- ment which affirmed a decree of the Supreme tions are presented, in which there is an ab- Court of that District, sitting as a court of solute freedom of contract beyond the power probate, admitting a will to probate as a of the legislature to restrain, which come will of real estate which had previously within the letter of any of the clauses of been admitted to probate as a will of perthis statute, the courts will undoubtedly ex-sonalty, with the concurrence and consent clude them from its operation. As said by of all the parties. Affirmed. the supreme court of the state concerning the defendant's criticism of the breadth of this statute (p. 247, Pac. p. 201): 2. Ignorance of the rule of law that a party taking the benefit of a provision in his favor under a will is estopped to assert the invalidity of that instrument, although coupled with ignorance of any evidence on which a contest could be based, will not prevent the application of such rule, in the absence of fraud, imposition, or misrepresentation, where the original situation cannot be restored, and there has been extreme negligence in attempting to discover the facts. [No. 63.] February 20, 1905. Decided N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the IN See same case below, 22 App. D. C. 31. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: The plaintiff in error seeks by this writ to review the judgment of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia (22 App. D. C. 31), affirming the decree of the supreme court of that District, sitting as a court of probate, admitting the will of George W. Utermehle to probate as a will of real estate, by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred upon the court by the act of Con "He cannot be heard to object to the statute merely because it operates oppressively upon others. The hurt must be to himself. The case, under appellant's contention as to this point, is not a case of favoritism in the law. It is not a case of exclusion of classes who ought to have been included, the leaving out of which constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the law, but it is the opposite of that. It is a case of the inclu-gress of June 8, 1898. 30 Stat. at L. 434, sion of those who ought to have been excluded. Hence, unless appellant can show chap. 394. The same will had been admit *Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 49, Cent. Dig. Wills, §§ 1717-1721, 2057. ted to probate in the District in the year | estate, wherever situated, and all the real 1889 as a will of personalty (which was all the jurisdiction at that time possessed by the court), with the concurrence and consent of the plaintiff in error. The facts upon which the case hinges are in substance the following: George W. Utermehle, the testator, died in the city of Washington on the 16th day of April, 1889, leaving a large amount of real and personal property, the real estate amounting, as is said, to about a million dollars, and the personalty to between six hundred thousand and a million of dollars. He left a will, bearing date December 7, 1887, which appeared on its face to have been duly executed for the conveyance of real estate. The testator left him surviving his widow, two daughters-Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Norment-and the plaintiff in error, his grandson, the son of his deceased son, as his sole heirs at law and next of kin. The widow was named executrix of the will, and she propounded the same for probate April 26, 1889. It was duly admitted to probate on that day, on the petition of the widow, as executrix, with the written consent of the daughters and the plaintiff in error. The executrix gave a bond in the sum of $20,000 for the payment of all just debts and claims against the deceased, and for the payment of the legacies bequeathed by the will, and letters were issued to her. She duly administered upon the estate, paid the funeral expenses and other charges, and the legacies mentioned in the will, including that to the plaintiff in error. She filed no inventory, but made a statement of account on the 14th day of May, 1890. The personal property, except such as was otherwise disposed of under the will, and in payment of debts and legacies, she retained for herself, as sole and absolute owner, in accordance with the terms of the will. Of this amount it is said that she thereafter disposed of a large part in charities. By the will of George W. Utermehle, he bequeathed to each of his three nieces, residing in Germany, the sum of $3,000; he devised to his grandson, the plaintiff in error, the property known as the Young Law Building, in Washington; he also bequeathed to him the interest due or to become due on a note for $750, secured on a lot in Washington, and also the principal of the same; he bequeathed to his wife, Sarah Utermehle, all the rest of his personal property, of every kind, to be taken by her in lieu of dower, and to be disposed of by her by deed, will, or otherwise, as she pleased; he devised to her his then present residence and the property adjoining, being square 765 in the city of Washington; he then bequeathed all the rest and residue of his real estate of which he might die seized and possessed, other than that already devised, to his two daughters, Mamie Norment and Rosa Taylor, as tenants in common, share and share alike; he appointed his wife sole executrix of his will, and revoked all other wills theretofore made by him; he suggested that, as he had no debts, and his personal estate was to go to his wife, a very moderate bond should be required of her as executrix. After the death of his grandfather, the plaintiff was present at his late residence and heard this will read. Immediately after the reading of the will he left the house, but Mrs. Taylor, one of his aunts, as he was leaving, asked him to come over the next day, which he did. He testified on this trial that he arrived at the house and went into the dining room, and Mrs. Taylor, Mrs. Norment, and his grandmother were there. Mrs. Taylor did the talking, and started the conversation by stating to the plaintiff in error that the will had virtually cut him off, and that if it had not been for her and the Doctor (her husband) the plaintiff in error would not have been left the property called the Young Law Building; but that they had had his grandfather paint it up and put it in repair, so that when it came into his possession it would not be any expense to him to put it in condition at the time. She further said that his grandmother was left all the personal property, which amounted to almost, if not quite as much, as that which they (his aunts) would receive under the will, and that when his grandmother died she proposed to make him right,-to make him equal with them by equalizing his share; that his grandmother wanted to know what the mortgage on his farm was, as she understood that there was a mortgage; that she wanted to pay it off; that she wanted to start him off without any debts on him. His grandmother was sitting there at the time, but said nothing. He was asked what the mortgage was on his farm. He told them $11,500. The only remarks made were those between Mrs. Taylor (his aunt) and himself, and the only statement he made was what the mortgage on the farm was. He also testified on the trial below that he believed what was then promised him, as to what his grandmother would do when she made her will; that he had no doubt whatever that she would fulfil her promise. His grandmother told him at that interview she would give him a check for the mortgage in a few days, and he then went home. Subsequently, and on the 26th day of April, 1889, he signed the consent to the probate of the will. He did it in re |