to receive and carry the packages when offered to it at Rock Island. They were properly marked and labeled. McClain's Code, ed. 1888, § 2412. It could not lawfully refuse to carry the goods, and no statute of Iowa could be relied on to justify such refusal. Boneman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 500 (31 L. ed. 719). See Hutchinson, Carr. § 47; Collins v. Hills, 3 L. R. A. 110, 77 Iowa, 281. Having received and carried the goods, the law conferred upon the defendant certain rights with relation to them. These were: 1. A lien upon them for their transportation, and also for their storage, if it was compelled to store them. ants appeared to have flagrantly violated the law, without much regard for its regulations. State v. Aulman, 76 Iowa, 624. Abatement of liquor nuisance. Under Iowa Acts, 20 Gen. Assem. chap. 143, § 12, and 21 Gen. Assem. chap. 66, §§ 1, 2, a place where liquor has been illegally sold may be abated. Elwood v. Price, 75 Iowa, 228. Under Iowa Laws 1888, p. 82, providing for the abatement of a liquor nuisance by the seizure and destruction of the liquor and the removal of all articles used in the business on the premises, when the nuisance is established, the court should provide for its abatement. McClure v. Braniff, 75 Iowa, 38. McClain's Code, ed. 1888, § 3364(2177); Winne v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 31 Iowa, 583; Chicago & S. W. R. Co. v. Northwestern Union Packet Co. 38 Iowa, 377. 2. If the goods were unclaimed for six months and the charges unpaid, it could sell them; and, after reimbursing itself for its lien and costs, deposit the money with the county treasurer, through whom it was liable eventu ally to pass into the school fund. McClain's Code, §§ 3365, 3369 (2178, 2182). It might and it became its duty to store the goods after a reasonable time. Angle v. Mississippi & M. R. Co. 18 Iowa, 555. The law contemplated that these liquors, State v. Salts, 77 Iowa, 193; State v. Webber, 76 Iowa, 686. Where he claimed on the trial that the sales were made by his clerk, evidence that the business was conducted under his supervision, and was drunk on the premises, shows knowledge on his part. Elwood v. Price, 75 Iowa, 228. As to abatement of liquor nuisance in other A decree for injunction and the abatement of a saloon nuisance, obtained by a citizen of a county, is a bar to a suit by another citizen of the same county in the absence of anything to show why such first decree remains unenforced. See Dickin Remedy by injunction. Owners of premises which were fitted up with a bar and other appliances for the sale of drinks, and son v. Eichorn (Iowa) 6 L. R. A. 721 and note. on which the evidence showed that a saloon nuisance had been permitted to exist, will be enjoined from maintaining the nuisance, although they reside in another place, where they made no showing | that they acted in good faith in leasing the property. State v. Douglass, 75 Iowa, 432. Where the front room of defendant's building was used as a liquor saloon, but other portions of the building were occupied by his family, and a back room was used for a kitchen and also as a place for storing liquors, the back room was considered an "appendage" to the saloon. State v. Fertig, 70 Iowa, 272. The method of abating nuisances kept in violation of the Liquor Law, defined in Laws 1886, chap. 66, was properly employed in cases which were pending when the Statute was enacted, but not finally determined until afterwards. McLane v. Bonn, 70 Iowa, 752. A statute declaring a building where liquors are unlawfully sold a nuisance and allowing it to be enjoined by a citizen of the county, is not a violation of the right of trial by jury. Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa, 488. Laws 1884, chap. 143, in providing that the nuisance in a building or place where prohibited liquors have been kept or sold may be enjoined, merely provides an additional remedy; and before a defendant can claim that he is about to be deprived of his property without compensation, he must show that such property was owned by him or those under whom he claims, and that it was used for the sale of intoxicating liquors, prior to the enactment of the Statute of 1855. McLane v. Leicht, 69 Iowa, 401. Where it was shown to have been voluntarily The abatement should be decreed, although de- abated before the commencement of the action infendant, who had for years maintained the nui-junction will not lie. Eckert v. David, 75 lowa, 302. sance, discontinued it four days before filing his answer. Halfman v. Spreen, 75 Iowa, 309. The Iowa statute providing that evidence of general reputation shall be admissible to prove the existence of such nuisance, and for the allowance of an attorney's fee, is applicable to an action brought under a former statute, but before the trial of which it took effect. And it is admissible to show the amount of attorneys' fees both in the state courts and in the federal courts to which the action was removed. Farley v. O'Malley, 77 Iowa, 531. The Iowa Act of 1886, providing that pharmacists alone shall have the right to permits to sell liquors for medicinal purposes, though making no mention of the Code, § 1526, abrogates a brewer's right to sell by virtue of a permit under that section. State v. Aulman, 76 Iowa, 624. A Methodist clergyman who settled in a town, under an appointment by the bishop for a year, is a citizen, and may maintain an action to enjoin a liquor nuisance. Fuller v. McDonnell, 75 Iowa, 220, An allegation that the unlawful sale of liquors is conducted with the owner's permission is equivalent to saying that it is done with his knowledge and consent; and a temporary injunction should issue to restrain him from further permitting the use of his building for such a purpose. Gray v. Stienes, 69 Iowa, 124. An adjudication, upon information, that defendant was not guilty of the crime of selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law, is not an adjudication that he is not maintaining a nuisance, and is not a bar to proceedings by injunction to restrain him from continuing it. Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa, 286. A registered pharmacist, permitted to sell liquors for medicinal purposes under Iowa Laws 1886, chap. The lessor of a building used as a place for the 83, is guilty of maintaining a liquor nuisance under unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors becomes an the Code, § 1543, when he sells for other purposes. | aider and abettor in violating the law, and he is a properly marked and labeled, should be carried and stored. McClain's Code, ed. 1888, § 2412; Laws, 22 Gen. Assem. chap. 73, $7. If defendant was bound to receive and carry the goods, it was equally bound to take care of them and for carriage and care it was entitled to compensation. When received and while being carried the goods were lawfully articles of commerce, and no legal seizure could be made of them. See Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 488 (24 L. ed. 548). merce, in the constitutional sense, embraces transportation only. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (32 L. ed. 346), 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232. It is the duty of a common carrier to harmonize its regulations and professions with the law. State v. U. S. Exp. Co. 70 Iowa, 271; Milwaukee Malt Extract Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 73 Iowa, 98. The Statute makes this whiskey subject to condemnation, if, at the time of seizure, it was owned or kept by anyone for sale in violation The articles seized and condemned were of law. articles of interstate commerce. The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 565 (19 L. ed. 1002). The goods do not lose their interstate commerce character because they are held by the carrier awaiting delivery. See Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203 (29 L. ed. 161); License Cases, 46 U. 8. 5 How. 575 (12 L. ed. 256). These articles embarked in interstate commerce were still in transitu, so far as the rights of the consignor were concerned. They had not been delivered to the consignee nor to his agent, but were in the hands of the defendant either as carrier or warehouseman, and in either case were still subject to be recalled by the consignors. O'Neil v. Garrett, 6 Iowa, 480; Greve v. Dunham, 60 Iowa, 108. Mr. J. A. Harvey, with Mr. John Y. Stone, Atty-Gen., for the State: At the time of the seizure, the duty of the Railroad Company as a common carrier had terminated. 2 Keut, Com. 602; Edwards, Bailm. pp. 515517, also pp. 284-286, 295, 296, 506; Angle v. Mississippi & M. R. Co. 18 Iowa, 555. In this class of cases, the regulation of com proper party to proceedings by injunction to restrain the unlawful traffic as a nuisance. lbid.. Disobedience of injunction a contempt of court. The statute which provided a fine of $500 for the disobedience of an injunction against the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors is not unconstitutional. Jordan v. Wapello Co. Circuit Ct. 69 Iowa, 177. Where the selling of intoxicating liquors has been enjoined, proceedings for contempt in disobeying the injunction may be entitled the same as the action in which the injunction was issued. Manderscheid v. Plymouth Co. District Ct. 69 Iowa, 240. Where one has been fined for violating an injunction issued under the Prohibitory Liquor Law, he may, upon default in paying the fine, be imprisoned, under the general provision of Code, § 4509; and under Laws 1884, chap. 143, § 12, such person cannot avail himself of the benefits of Code, § 4611, which permits a poor person, after having been imprisoned thirty days for failure to pay a fine in a criminal case, to be released upon giving his note for the amount of the fine, together with a written schedule of his property. Hanks v. Workman, 69 Iowa, 600: Ex parte Tuicher, 69 Iowa, 393. See Carleton v. Rugg, 5 L. R. A. 193, 149 Mass. 550. § 1546. It was in possession of the Railroad Company but was owned by either the consignor or the consignee. If by the former then it was contraband. State v. U. S. Exp. Co. 70 Iowa, 271. If it was owned by the consignee it was held for unlawful sale, for he was engaged in that business. Beck, J., delivered the opinion of the court: 1. The facts established by the undoubted preponderance of the evidence are these: There was shipped from Rock Island, Ill., by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, consigned to defendant Con Creeden, at Des Moines, six packages of whiskey, in sepa rate shipments. The packages contained about five gallons each. Two were shipped on the 7th, and one each on the 9th, 14th, 15th and 17th days of November. Each package was received at the railroad freight depot at Des Moines in two days after the date of its shipment. The charge on each package was 34 cents. They were kept in the freight house or warehouse of the Company until taken upon the search-warrant issued in this case. The de lish it, was held sufficient to prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations; and an amended petition after two years was good. Myers v. Kirt, 68 Iowa, 124. Defendant is only liable for all the damages to which he contributed, even though it be difficult to separate the damages to which he did not contribute. Huggins v. Kavanagh, 52 Iowa, 368; Richmond v. Shickler, 57 Iowa, 486. The fact that the wife has purchased liquor from the defendant under compulsion, or to keep her husband at home, does not defeat her right to maintain the action. Ward v. Thompson, 48 Iowa, 588. The defendant's knowing the husband to be in the habit of becoming intoxicated, and selling him intoxicating liquors while he was intoxicated, will support a verdict for exemplary damages. Weitz v. Ewen, 50 Iowa, 34. In an action for civil damages for intoxicating plaintiff's husband, evidence of sales made more than two years prior to the action is admissible to rebut evidence that the husband had been a confirmed toper long years before. Gustafson v. Wind, 62 Iowa, 281. An instruction by which it was left to the jury whether plaintiff contributed to the injury by letting her husband have portions of his wages deAction by wife for damages for injury to her means posited with her, when she had reason to believe of support. In an action by a wife for damages, an original petition claiming a lien on the saloon property, which did not state all the facts necessary to estab See also 43 L. R. A. 143. that he would purchase liquors with the money, and that if she did, she could not recover, was held proper. Huff v. Aultman, 69 Iowa, 71. In an action by a wife evidence as to the number, fendant Con Creeden had received like pack-and rights cannot be restricted. We think ages of intoxicating liquor prior to this from there can be no doubt that this is the correct the Railroad Company, which had been, in the purport of this decision. same way, shipped to him from places out of the State. The liquors were seized on the 23d day of November. Two of the packages had been for fifteen days in the railroad freighthouse at Des Moines, one for thirteen days, one for nine days, one for eight days, and one for six days. Con Creeden kept a place in Des Moines for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, and was guilty of frequent violation of the law against their sale. The packages were marked with the word "Whiskey," and prior to the seizure in this case like packages had been received for and delivered to Con Creeden, one at a time, by the Railroad Company. 2. In Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465 [31 L. ed. 700], the United States Supreme Court has held that the laws of this State restricting the transportation of intoxicating liquors from other States into this State are a regulation of commerce, and are therefore in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, which it is held secures the right of transportation of articles of com. merce from one State to another. The features of the Iowa Statute held to conflict with the United States Constitution are those which restrict the right of common carriers to transport intoxcating liquors into this State. The restriction upon the powers and rights of carriers is the point upon which it conflicts with the Constitution of the United States. In so far as the Statute probibits the keepers of saloons, restaurants, warehouses or any other place, from keeping intoxicating liquors for unlawful sales, it does not conflict with the Constitution of the United States. But, as commerce is dependent upon carriers for transportation of all articles of trade, their powers age and sex of her children is not admissible to affect the question of damages. Huggins v. Kavanagh, 52 lowa, 368; Welch v. Jugenheimer, 56 Iowa, 11. But she may show, to sustain a claim for exemplary damages, the number and age of her children, if she also shows that defendant, prior to selling the liquor to her husband, had knowledge that she had such children. Ward v. Thompson, 48 Iowa, 588. To render evidence of recoveries from other parties admissible to reduce damages, it must be shown that such other recoveries were for sales during the same time as that covered by the alleged sales by defendant. Jackson v. Noble, 54 Iowa, 641. Where a joint action is brought by a married woman against the seller and the owner of the premises, said owner is entitled to a trial by jury to decide whether he consented to or had knowledge of the sale. Loan v. Hiney, 53 Iowa, 89. In an action by a wife for injury to her means of support, a judgment obtained by her in an action against another party, for injury thereto accruing, is admissible to show the actual extent of the wrong done by the defendant. Engleken v. Webber, 47 Iowa, 558. Compare Ennis v. Shiley, Id. 552. Proof that the husband bought liquor of the defendant will not shift the burden upon the latter to show that his liquor did not cause the former drunkenness. Macleod v. Geyer, 53 Iowa, 615. Proof that the vendor did not know that such person was in the habit of getting intoxicated constitutes no defense. Dudley v. Sautbine, 49 Iowa, 650. We do not understand that the United States Supreme Court has decided in this case, or in any other, that intoxicating liquors transported from another State may be sold within this State for uses forbidden by its laws. Indeed, the court expressly declares that the question is not in the case. The United States Supreme Court in many decisions has held that the States have the constitutional right to forbid the sale of intoxicating liquors within their borders. It appears that this controlling thought has escaped attention in the discussions upon the subject of the effect of the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate commerce between the States upon the power of a State to forbid the sale of intoxicating liquors within its borders which are imported from another State. Commerce is not the use of arti cles of traffic. When the United States Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to regulate commerce between the States, it was not intended that provisions should be made by Congress to affect the use of the subjects of commerce. It surely was not the intention that laws should be enacted affecting the tastes, habits and wants of the people, so as to increase the demands for articles of traffic; nor could it have been intended that the governments of the States established by the people should be deprived of the power to repress the use of such articles of commerce as the State determines are detrimental to the morals, health, peace and prosperity of the people. The people, by their tastes, habits, wants and laws enacted by them selves, determine what articles of commerce they will use. Commerce in the articles of traffic thus required by the people is regulated by Congress. If the use of certain articles of The fact that a husband, when intoxicated, called his wife a prostitute in the p esence of her feighbors, and threatened to kill her, was held, in the absence of proof that his conduct impaired her health, not to constitute a ground for the recovery of actual damages in her action against the liquor seller, and evidence thereof to be inadmissible as a ground of exemplary damages. Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 455. Evidence that plaintiff's husband had been an habitual drunkard for twenty years before his death was held incompetent to reduce the measure of damages; but evidence of his habitual drunkenness was properly admitted, on plaintiff's behalf, for the purpose of showing that the sale of beer to him was unlawful. Huff v. Aultman, 69 Iowa, 71. In other States. See Cruse v. Aden, 3 L. R. A. 327, 127 Ill. 231; Brockway v. Patterson (Mich.) 1 L. R. A. 708; Jones v. Bates (Neb.) 4 L. R. A. 495. Purchasers may recover purchase money. The Iowa Code, § 1550, allowing purchasers of intoxicating liquor illegally sold to recover the purchase money by action, is valid. Connolly v. Scarr, 72 Iowa, 223. A demand for money paid for liquors unlawfully sold must be made before an action therefor is maintainable. Schober v. Rosenfield, 75 Iowa, 455. An agent making illegal sales of liquor, but not receiving the purchase price therefor, is not liable to an action to recover the amount of such payments, under Iowa Code, § 1550. lbid. ly will not be contended that the storage of goods was a continuation of the transportation. They were stored because the transportation had ceased. commerce, as intoxicating liquors, is forbidden | After that they were held for storage. It sureby the tas es, habits and laws of the people, it is not for the courts, by judicial interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, to force them upon the people against their wishes, and against the laws of their own enactment. The people of the State, in their Sovereign capacity, as rulers of their own domestic affairs, may declare that intoxicating liquors shall not be sold in the State for use as a beverage. The provision of the Constitution of the United States in question cannot nullify such a state law, which is enacted in the exercise of full authority. Under it Congress may regulate the traffic in such things until it comes to the point of their use as a beverage. There the authority to regulate commerce ceases to extend to the interdicted liquors, for they are no longer subjects of lawful commerce. 3. A carrier is a servant of commerce, and is protected under constitutional provisions for the regulation of commerce in the discharge of all the duties of a carrier recognized by the law. Regulations of commerce reach him while he is in the discharge of duties pertaining to commerce. When he ceases to be a carrier he is beyond the protection provided by regulations for commerce. If he ceases to be a carrier and becomes a warehouseman, he cannot be protected as a carrier. 5. It is made plain by a consideration of the facts that the Railroad Company held the liquors under special arrangement with Con Creeden. Six successive shipments of liquor, each containing less than five gallons, were held for from six to fifteen days before they were seized, and it had been the practice of the Railroad Company for some time before these shipments were received to hold shipments of whiskey in the same way. The little freight bills of 34 cents on each shipment were not paid until the package was delivcred. Con Creeden did not present demands for the whiskey, but sent an express wagon to get a jug at a time, as it was wanted for sale in the saloon in violation of law. He was a notorious saloon keeper and violator of the law. The packages were marked "Whiskey." All the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the Railway Company held the liquor for Con Creeden under an agreement that it should aid him to evade the law. It cannot, under these circumstances, base any defense upon the fact that its freight charges were not paid. Had it dealt with Con Creeden with a purpose to obey the law, it would not have permitted its freight bills to remain unpaid for so many days, and would not have permitted its warehouse to be used as a place where liquors kept for unlawful sale could be conveniently concealed and protected. In its attempt thus to violate the law, and to aid a notorious violator of the law to evade its provisions, it loses all claim or lien which it had, either as a carrier or warehouseman, for its freight bills of 34 cents each Recurring to the facts, it will be remembered that the liquor in question had been received at the place of destination from six to fifteen days prior to the seizure, and was kept in the railroad freight house, or warehouse used for stor ing freight transported or for transportation upon the railroad. It is a familiar rule of the law that upon the arrival of freight at the place of destination, and its deposit in the carrier's warehouse, his responsibility as carrier ceases. He becomes, as to the freight and the consign-upon each jug of whiskey. or and consignee, a warehouseman. Francis A violator of the law will not be enabled to v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. 25 Iowa, 60; Mohr v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 40 Iowa, 579; 2 Am. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 881; Ang. Carr. 5th ed. § 304, and cases cited in notes. The defendant did not, therefore, hold the liquor as a carrier, but as a warehouseman. As such he was the agent of Con Creeden, the bailor. 4. But counsel for defendant say that the goods became impressed with the character of interstate commerce, and retained that character after they went into the custody of the warehouseman. In truth commerce, so far as transportation is concerned, ceased to have connection with the liquors when they ceased to be held by the carrier for transportation. justify his offenses, and escape punishment therefor, on the ground of rights of property or other rights which he holds in things used in the commission of the offense. Con Creeden's right of property in the whiskey cannot shield him from the effects of his unlawful acts in keeping the whiskey for unlawful sale. Nor can the Railroad Company, which was engaged with and aided him in the violation of the law, defeat the proceeding and escape the judgment of the law, on the ground that it has a lien for trifling sums upon the liquors which it was keeping in violation of law. The foregoing discussion disposes of all questions in the case. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. entry of defendant upon plaintiff's wharf for the purpose of soliciting passengers as a hackman. Judgment for defendant. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. Francis B. Peckham and Samuel R. Honey for plaintiff. Messrs. William P. Sheffield and William P. Sheffield, Jr., for defendant. Stiness, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff is owner of Commercial Wharf, in Newport, a part of which is leased to the Newport & Wickford Railroad & Steamboat Company as a terminus. To preserve order upon the wharf, stands are let for hackney carriages, and the following rules are prescribed for its use: "Rules for Hackmen and Others. "1. Drivers of hackney carriages shall remain on or near their carriages, except when carrying baggage to or from them. 2. No one shall occupy a hack stand or express stand except the licensee or his employés. 3. No hackney carriage or express wagon shall stand on the space to the eastward of the restaurant building, or on the roadways, except on licensed hack stands, even though ordered in advance by a passenger." East of the restaurant building is a plank walk for passengers, and east of the walk a space is reserved for private carriages. The rest of the wharf is used for sidewalks, roadways, and buildings. The defendant, driver of a hackney carriage in Newport, went to the wharf on the day in question for a lady who was to arrive in the boat, as he had been ordered to do by the passenger, or someone in her behalf. He backed his hack as near as he could to the space reserved for private carriages, when he was ordered to leave the wharf by the superintendent, upon the ground that he had no right to be there, having no license from the owner. The plaintiff claimed that the wheels of the defendant's carriage were backed on to the plank walk, but, upon all the testi mony, we are not satisfied this was so, or, if so, that it was anything more than accidental. At any rate the order to leave the wharf was not put upon this ground, but because he had no right there. Upon receiving the order to leave, the defendant stated, both to the plaintiff and to the superintendent of the wharf, that he had been ordered there for a passenger, and he refused to leave. The plaintiff then called a policeman, who moved the carriage to another place in the roadway, where the defendant remained until the boat arrived, when he took his passenger and drove away. The passenger was an infirm lady, who had been accustomed to ride with the defendant, and one who was obliged to use a stool, which he had with him, to aid her in getting into the carriage. The plaintiff sues in trespass, and the defendant justifies under a right as servant of the passenger. The question is whether the defendant had the right to enter and remain upon the wharf to take the passenger, notwithstanding the rules and the order to leave. We understand the rules to forbid an unlicensed hackney carriage to stand upon the wharf at all; for none are allowed to stand in the road ways, except on the licensed stands, and none are allowed to occupy a stand without a license. But the wharf is leased to a common carrier of passengers, with a provision that the space east of the restaurant shall be reserved for the use of private carriages of passengers arriving at the wharf. The question of right, therefore, is the same as it would be between passengers and a company which owns its terminus. While such ownership carries with it a right of control, in most respects the same as in private property, a railroad station or steamboat wharf is, to some extent, a public place. The public have the right to come and go there for the purpose of travel; for taking and leaving passengers; and for other matters growing out of the busi ness of the company as a common carrier But the company has the right to say that no business of any other character shall be carried on within the limits of its property. It has the right to say that no one shall come there to solicit trade, simply because it may be convenient for travelers, and so to say that none, except those whom it permits, shall solicit in the business of hacking or expressing. When notice of such prohibition has been given, the license which otherwise might be implied is at an end, and it is the duty of persons engaged in any such business to heed the notice and to retire from the premises. Barney v. Oyster Bay & II. Steamboat Co. 67 N. Y. 301; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596. But, while this is so, the company cannot deprive a passenger of the ordinary rights and privileges of a traveler, among which is the privilege of being transported from the terminus in a reasonably convenient and usual way. A company cannot compel a passenger to take one of certain carriages, or none at all; nor impose unreasonable restrictions, which will amount to that. If a passenger orders a carriage to take him from the terminus, such carriage is, pro hac vice, a private carriage, not in the sense that the passenger has a special property in it, so as to be liable for the driver's negligence, but in the sense that it is not "standing for hire." Masterson v. Short, 33 How. Pr. 481. The driver is not engaged in his vocation of soliciting patronage, but is waiting to take one with whom a contract has already been made. No question is made that a passenger may have his own carriage enter the premises of a carrier to take him away; but to say that one who is not so fortunate as to own a carriage shall not be allowed to call the one he wants, because it is a hackney carriage, would be a discrimination intolerable in this country. Yet this is really the plaintiff's claim. Every passenger has the right, upon the premises of the carrier, to reasonable and usual facilities for arrival and departure; and, so far as this includes the right to be taken to and from a station or wharf, it is immaterial whether he goes in a private or a hired carriage. Decisions upon this question have not been numerous, and we know of but one directly in point, although in others there are dicta which indicate what is understood to be the law. Summitt v. State, 8 Lea, 413, was a convic tion of the defendant, a watchman in a depot, for assault in ejecting a hackman therefrom |